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Jungere equos."—Virg. Georg.

"Tu qui cæteris cavere didicisti, in Britannia ne ab essedariis decipiaris

"Seu quis, Olympiaeæ miratus præmia palinæ,
Pascit equos . . . . . . .
Corpora præcipuæ matrum legat."—Virg. Georg.
Owing partly to the course of legislation, and partly to the very considerable increase of case law in relation to many of the subjects dealt with in this work, the preparation of the present Edition has been attended with unusual difficulty. The codification of the law relating to the sale of goods by the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, has rendered it necessary to incorporate a number of the sections of that Act in the text, and to make frequent references to many other sections, but, in so doing, the Editor has taken great pains to preserve as much of the original text as is consistent with the provisions of the statute, and this more particularly where the cases cited as authorities are decisions upon contracts relating to the sale of horses as distinguished from the sale of other goods.

The provisions of a variety of other statutes, including the Gaming Act, 1892, and the Betting
PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION.

and Loans (Infants) Act of the same year, have also been incorporated, in so far as they affect the subject-matter of the work.

Independently of legislation, the decisions upon the various subjects dealt with have been sufficiently numerous to involve considerable alterations in and additions to the text, but these, owing to the amount of obsolete or inappropriate matter which has been eliminated, have been effected, so far as regards Parts I. and II., without any corresponding increase of bulk.

With regard to Part III., dealing with the law relating to Racing, Gaming, and Wagers, the alterations are of a more extensive nature, the Gaming Act, 1892, and the numerous decisions upon the construction of several of the other statutes by which the law upon these subjects is regulated, having rendered it necessary to re-write and very considerably enlarge the greater part of this portion of the work.

The Appendix has been very considerably curtailed, and is now confined to the more important and voluminous of the statutes referred to in the text, and these appear in a somewhat mutilated condition, owing to the pruning involved by the
various Statute Law Revision Acts and other repealing statutes which have been passed since the publication of the last Edition.

The plan of referring to the more important decisions in the United States, adopted by the present Editor in the last Edition, has been adhered to. References are given to the Revised Reports as well as to contemporary reports, both in the Table of Cases and in the footnotes. The Table of Statutes has been rendered more complete by indicating the page upon which each section is cited; and the Index has been subjected to a careful revision.

CLEMENT E. LLOYD.

4, King's Bench Walk, Temple:

May, 1896.


PREFACE

TO THE FIRST EDITION.

The object of the present Treatise is to lay before the profession and the public, in as short and convenient a form as possible, the Law of Contracts concerning Horses, whether it be in buying, selling, hiring, or in any other manner dealing with them; to ascertain the liabilities incurred by parties either on "the road," through negligent driving, or in "the field," by riding over the lands of another; also to explain the present state of the law with regard to Racing, Wagers, and Gaming, in connection with the recent alterations effected by the Act of Victoria. The Appendix contains some very late cases, a few important Statutes, and other information which may be found useful for general reference. An attempt has been made, by a judicious division of the subject, and the introduction of marginal notes, to make the text as accessible as possible.

G. H. H. O.

Tem ple: May 15th, 1847.
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INTRODUCTION.

It has been found most convenient to arrange under three heads the various subjects treated of in this work.

1st. Contracts concerning Horses, &c., which, including the Bargain and Sale of Chattels, comprises the law of buying, selling, and exchanging, the doctrine of unsoundness and vice, the law of warranty and false representation; the privileges and liabilities of innkeepers, livery-stable keepers, farriers, trainers, &c., and hiring, borrowing and carrying horses.

2nd. Negligence in the use of Horses, &c., which includes the criminal and civil liabilities incurred through negligent driving, or keeping ferocious and vicious animals, and the liabilities of parties in hunting or trespassing on the lands of another.

3rd. Racing, Wagers, and Gaming, which gives a sketch of their history, rise and progress in this country, and lays down the law on these subjects in connection with the numerous and important alterations made by the "Act to amend the Law concerning Games and Wagers" (a), the "Act for Legalizing Art Unions" (b), and the recent "Act for the Suppression of Betting Houses" (c).

One great peculiarity attending a portion of this work, is the difficult question of warranty in connection with unsoundness. Because at what precise point soundness ends and unsoundness begins has always been a subject of dispute both in and out of the veterinary profession. Therefore, when a horse warranted sound turns out un-

(a) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109.  
(b) 9 & 10 Vict. c. 48.  
(c) 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119.
sound, great difficulties must frequently arise from the nature of the case. For a warranty is in the nature of an Insurance, and when a man warrants a horse sound he insures that of which he can know very little. It is not like the warranty of manufactured goods, where a man calculates, from the skill and materials employed, the exact amount of responsibility he can take upon himself. When a man warrants a horse he does it at his own risk, and of course that risk is very much greater, when he does it upon his own opinion, than when he warrants after the horse has been pronounced sound by men of veterinary skill. So that if an action is brought on an alleged breach of warranty, he is, in the former case, almost entirely in the hands of the veterinary evidence produced by the purchaser; in the latter case he has men of skill to prove the exact state of the horse at the time of sale. For instance, should the purchaser produce veterinary evidence to prove that the horse has a bone spavin, and that it must have existed at the time of sale, the vendor in the latter case would be able to prove by actual examination that no such spavin did then exist, and would therefore have a very strong case to go to a jury.

But it appears that soundness is a subject on which, from the nature of the case, a warranty should very seldom be given: for there seems no reason why a person who buys a horse should not act as he would in any other transaction where there is risk. For instance, a man buying a house does not merely examine it himself, and then, because he likes it, buy it with a warranty; but he takes his surveyor with him, who points out all its defects, and then he buys it or not according to the opinion he may form of its value after these have been taken into consideration.

And in all cases where a risk is run and an insurance effected, there are regular rules laid down by which such transactions are governed. For where a person insures his life, he submits to a regular medical investigation, and no company would act in so unbusinesslike a manner
as merely to take a person's own warranty that he is sound in health and constitution, and so be put to the proof, in case of his death, that he was not so at the time he gave the warranty.

The best rule for a man therefore to follow in selling a horse is this: Where the horse is of no great value, to refuse a warranty altogether, and such a horse is best sold by auction. Where the horse is of great value, if sound, but that appears doubtful, then to let the purchaser be satisfied by a veterinary examination, and so take the responsibility upon himself. Where, however, the seller is confident that the horse is perfectly sound, and that with a warranty he would fetch a much larger price than without one, he should have him examined and certified as sound, &c., by one or two veterinary surgeons of respectability and experience, and then, knowing on what ground he goes, he may take the risk of warranting him sound.

The vexation and difficulty experienced in horse-dealing arises, in a great measure, from the loose manner in which such transactions are conducted, and from the thoughtless manner in which people give warranties; and we generally find that the smaller a man's knowledge may be with regard to horses, the more ready he is to warrant, little knowing the responsibility he is thus fixing upon himself.

A dealer, who from the nature of his business must be constantly buying and selling horses, has an evident advantage over the persons with whom he deals, who probably do not buy or sell horses half a dozen times in a year, and very few of whom can form a reasonable opinion as to a horse's value. But the dealer, to say the least, is a pretty good judge, and, being well acquainted with the routine of his business, may, generally, go on in as satisfactory and reputable a manner as any other tradesman, so long as he keeps honest. The frequent rascality in horse-dealing transactions arises from parties making improper use of that superior knowledge
which experience alone can supply. Because purchasing a horse is a very different affair from buying a manufactured article; for, in the latter case, there are certain trade prices, and a corresponding quality of goods, which every man expects, and of which any ordinary man can judge; and, therefore, as each party has in general a sufficiently competent knowledge, very few disputes arise.

When a horse is free from hereditary disease, is in the possession of his natural and constitutional health, and has as much bodily perfection as is consistent with his natural formation, a veterinary surgeon may safely certify him to be sound. But as there is in most horses some slight alteration in structure, either from disease, accident, or work, a veterinary surgeon in giving his certificate had much better describe the actual state of the horse, and the probable consequences, without mentioning soundness or unsoundness at all, and so let the purchaser buy him or not as he may be advised. Because in such a case a straightforward statement would be made, and a man in the veterinary profession would not be called upon in an off-hand manner to decide questions which are of the greatest nicety, being full of uncertainty, and upon which no conclusive decision can safely be arrived at. For we find the greater the difficulty, the more likely is a decision (if come to at all) to be the result of a slight preponderance of one over each of many conflicting opinions.

We find that a man will sometimes warrant a horse in consequence of a veterinary opinion given in an off-hand manner, either without a sufficient examination of the horse having been made, or sometimes in the face of actual disease; for the giving a warranty seems to be considered quite a trifling matter. Thus, in the case of Hall v. Rogerson, tried at the Newcastle Spring Assizes, 1847, it appeared that a witness, who was a veterinary surgeon, had taken off the horse's shoes, and examined his feet, when he found a slight convexity of sole. The owner then asked him if he would be justified in warranting the horse
as it had been warranted to him; the witness asked him if he was satisfied the horse went sound; he replied, “Perfectly so:” he then said he was justified. On cross-examination, the witness said, “I pointed out a slight disease in the sole, but thought he would have been justified in warranting him; if I had taken the precaution to see him go, things might have been different.” So that a veterinary surgeon finding that a horse has a disease in the sole, and without taking the precaution to see him go, tells the owner he is justified in warranting. Now the use of the word justified shows that neither of the parties fully knew the amount of liability incurred by giving a warranty, and it seems as if they had considered it rather an affair of conscience or honour than of legal responsibility.

That the veterinary profession feel the greatest difficulty in dealing with the question of unsoundness when called upon for a certificate on that point, will appear from part of an article on “Soundness as opposed to Lameness,” by Mr. Percival, M.R.C.S., editor of the Veterinarian; he writes, “Reluctantly as we enter on this difficult and much debated question, we feel it our duty to make some observations on the subject, though these observations will be rather of a general than of a particular nature, and have especial reference to soundness, regarded as the converse of, or opposite, state to lameness. No person buys or sells a horse without feeling some concern as to the soundness of the animal; the purchaser is apprehensive lest his new horse should from any cause turn out unserviceable or unequal to that, for the performance of which he has bought him; the vendor is apprehensive, either lest the animal, in other hands, should not prove that sound and effective servant he conceived or represented him to be, or lest some unrepresented or concealed fault or defect he is aware the animal possesses may now, in his new master’s hands, be brought to light.”

“Soundness, as opposed to actual or decided lameness (or as synonymous with good health), is a state too well understood to need any definition or description; when
we come, however, to draw a line between soundness and lameness in their distinguished form—to mark the point at which one ends and the other begins—we meet a difficulty, and this difficulty increases when we find ourselves called on to include, under our denomination of unsoundness, that which is likely or has a tendency to bring forth lameness. It will be requisite, therefore, for us to say, not simply that every lame horse is unsound, but to add these words, or who has that about him which is likely on work to render him lame. This will, it is true, open the door to difference of opinion and equivocation. There may, as we have seen, spring up two opinions concerning the presence even of lameness. There will in more cases be two opinions concerning that which is accounted to be the precursor of lameness, or may have a tendency at some period proximate or remote to produce it; all which differences are best got rid of by reference to the ablest veterinary advice. There will be less diversity of opinion among professional men than among others, and the more skilful and respectable the professional persons are, the greater will be the probability of a happy unison in their views of the case” (a).

Mr. Godwin, M.R.C.S., Veterinary Surgeon to the Queen, makes the following sensible remarks on the certificates given by veterinary surgeons to the vendors and purchasers of horses. He says, “It is to be regretted that the members of the veterinary profession have not been taught to adopt some rules for rendering the certificates they are required to give upon examining horses as to soundness, at least somewhat similar in the construction and expression of their opinions, so as to render them more intelligible to the persons who have to pay for them. I am quite aware of the impossibility of attempting to reduce professional opinions to one common standard; but I think that our leading practitioners might meet together, and agree upon some general principles for

their guidance, that would make their certificates less liable to the censure and ridicule they both merit and incur. The occurrence is by no means uncommon for a buyer to send a horse to be examined by a veterinary surgeon, and not feeling satisfied with the opinion he obtains, to send him to another; and then comparing the certificates of the two, and finding them diametrically opposite in their statements, he finally trusts himself to the warranty of the dealer, purchases the horse, and at the end of six months has had to congratulate himself upon the possession of a sound animal, and the escape he has had in avoiding two unsound certificates" (a).

THE LAW OF HORSES.

PART I.

CONTRACTS CONCERNING HORSES, &c.

CHAPTER I.

BUYING, SELLING AND EXCHANGING; THE REQUISITES OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS; DELIVERY AND PAYMENT, AND THE LAW AS TO SUNDAY DEALING.

Bargain, Sale and Exchange.

A bargain or mutual agreement or understanding as to terms between the parties, is implied in every contract for a sale or exchange (a).

A sale is a transfer of goods for money, and an exchange is a transfer of goods for other goods by way of barter, and in either case the same rules of law are, generally speaking, prescribed for regulating the transaction (b).

Previously to the Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 71), a contract of sale was termed either an “executed” or “executory” contract according to whether its effect was to transfer the property or right of possession in its subject-matter, or merely to agree to do so (c). But by section 1 of that Act the expressions “sale” and “agreement to sell” are substituted for those terms. The enactment in question is as follows:—

(1) “A contract of sale is a contract whereby the seller transfers or agrees to transfer the property in goods to the buyer for a money consideration, called the price. There may be a contract of sale between one part-owner and another.

(a) See 2 Steph. Com. 120. 430.
(b) 2 Bl. Com. 446; 447; Anon., 3 Salk. 157; Chit. Contr. 12th ed.
(c) See 2 Steph. Com. 112.
(2) "A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.

(3) "Where under a contract of sale the property in the goods is transferred from the seller to the buyer the contract is called a sale; but where the transfer of the property in the goods is to take place at a future time or subject to some condition thereafter to be fulfilled, the contract is called an agreement to sell.

(4) "An agreement to sell becomes a sale when the time elapses or the conditions are fulfilled subject to which the property in the goods is to be transferred."

An executed contract of sale was also called "a bargain and sale," and by s. 62 of Act of 1893 (the Interpretation Clause), "sale" includes a bargain and sale as well as a sale and delivery.

In order to transfer property by gift, there must either be a deed or instrument of gift, or there must be an actual delivery of the thing to the donee. So, where the plaintiff claimed two colts under a verbal gift made to him by his father twelve months before his death, which however remained in his father's possession until his death, it was held, that the property in them did not pass to the son (cc).

If a person buy a horse and a pony together for 100£, the contract is entire, as there is no means of determining the price of each (d).

But if he should purchase them both together, agreeing to pay 30£ for the pony, and 70£ for the horse, the contract would be severable; and if the seller's title to the pony should fail, the buyer would be obliged to keep and pay for the horse (d).

Where a bargain is made by word of mouth, all that passes may sometimes be taken together as forming parcel of the contract, though not always, because matter talked of at the commencement of a bargain may be excluded by the language used at its termination (e).

But if the contract be in the end reduced into writing, nothing which is not found in the writing can be considered as part of the contract (e).

Where one of the parties has the option of completing


(e) Kain v. Old, 2 B. & C. 634. See also Sale of Goods Act, 1893, s. 3.
a contract or agreement at a particular day, the other party has a right of rescission at any time before the ratification by the first (f). Thus, where A. proposed to exchange horses with B. and give him a specific sum as difference, and B. reserved to himself the privilege of determining upon it by a certain day, and before that day arrived, A. gave notice to B. that he would not confirm the proposed contract, it was held that no action would lie to recover the difference agreed to be paid by A. (g).

Where an arrangement is made that the person proposing to purchase shall have the right of trial during a certain time, the other party cannot conclude the negotiation until the time allotted has elapsed. Thus A., having a horse to sell, agreed to let B. have him for 30 guineas, if he liked him, and that he should take him a month upon trial. B. accordingly took him, and kept him about a fortnight, and then told A. he liked the horse but not the price. A. desired him, if he did not like the price, to return the horse, but B. kept him ten days longer, and then returned him. A., however, refused to receive him, and brought an action on the contract for 30 guineas. It was held by the Court of Common Pleas that he could not maintain such action (h). So where a horse was sold by A. to B. upon condition that it should be taken away by the latter and tried by him for eight days, and returned at the end of that period if he did not think it suitable for his purposes; and the horse died on the third day after it was placed in B.'s stable, without default of either party; it was held, by Denman, J., that A. could not maintain an action for the price, as for goods sold and delivered (i).

Where a horse is bought for any price or consideration under the value of 10l., and there is not an actual payment and delivery at the time of sale, and the contract is to be performed within a year, the bargain may be bound by any of the following five methods (j); 1st. An agreement to deliver the horse on a certain day, a day also being agreed upon for payment of the price; and, in default, the buyer may have an action for the horse, or the seller for his

(g) Eskridge v. Glover, 5 Stew. & Port. (Amer.) 264.
(h) Ellis v. Mortimer, 1 N. R. 257.
(i) Elphick v. Barnes, 5 C. P. D. 321; 49 L. J., C. P. 698; 29 W. R. 139; 44 J. P. 661. As to when the property in goods delivered on approval, or on "sale or return," or other similar terms, passes to the buyer, see further the provisions of s. 18, r. 4 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893.
(j) Sheppard's Touch. 225.
money; 2ndly. The payment of the whole price, and then if the seller do not deliver the horse, the buyer may sue him, and recover it; 3rdly. Part payment of the purchase-money, and then the buyer may sue for and recover the horse, or the seller may sue for the residue of the price; 4thly. An earnest (k) may be given, and even the smallest sum is sufficient, and in such case the remedies are reciprocal; 5thly. An actual delivery of the horse, and even if there be none of the purchase-money paid, no earnest given, or no day set for payment, the seller may at any time sue the buyer and recover his money.

Where the price is under 10l., and the seller states what he asks for his horse, and a buyer says he will give it, the bargain is struck, and neither of them are at liberty to be off, provided that immediate possession of the horse or the money be tendered by either side (l).

Anciently, among all the northern nations, shaking of hands was held necessary to bind a bargain, a custom which we still retain in many verbal contracts. A sale thus made was called a hand sale, "venditio per mutuam manuum complexionem" (m). This method of striking a bargain is very much practised in the north of England at the present day, both in horse-dealing and other transactions; and whatever efficacy it may be supposed to have from custom in small dealings, it certainly does not bind the bargain where the horse is worth 10l. or upwards, or where the agreement is not to be performed within a year.

Where the contract for the sale or exchange of a horse is not to be performed within a year, the agreement itself or some memorandum or note of it must be in writing, and be signed by the party to be charged or his agent, within the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds (n).

The words of the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds applicable to a contract of this description are as follows: "And be it enacted, that no action (o) shall be brought upon any agreement that is not to be performed within the space of one year from the making thereof, unless the agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorized."

(k) Earnest, post, p. 12. (n) 29 Car. 2, c. 3.
(m) 2 Bla. Com. 448.
The 17th section of the Statute of Frauds was the foundation of the law governing the transfer of goods and chattels worth 10l. or upwards, and among other things the buying and selling of horses of that value.

That statute was further extended by 9 Geo. 4, c. 14, s. 7, commonly called Lord Tenterden’s Act. But those enactments were repealed by section 60 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 71), and such contracts are now governed by the provisions of section 4 of that Act, sub-sections (1) and (2) of which are substantially a reproduction of section 17 of the Statute of Frauds and section 7 of Lord Tenterden’s Act respectively.

The words of sub-sections (1) and (2) of the 4th section of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, are as follows:

(1) “A contract for the sale of any goods of the value of 10l. or upwards shall not be enforceable by action unless the buyer shall accept part of the goods so sold, and actually receive the same, or give something in earnest to bind the contract, or in part payment, or unless some note or memorandum in writing of the contract, be made and signed by the party to be charged or his agent in that behalf.

(2) “The provisions of this section apply to every such contract, notwithstanding that the goods may be intended to be delivered at some future time, or may not at the time of such contract be actually made, procured, or provided, or fit or ready for delivery, or some act may be requisite for the making or completing thereof, or rendering the same fit for delivery.”

Where an action was brought on a verbal contract, under which the plaintiff agreed to sell to the defendant a certain mare and foal, and at his own expense to keep this and another mare and foal which belonged to the defendant for a certain fixed time, and the defendant agreed to purchase the first-named mare and foal and to fetch them away at the end of the term thus fixed, and to pay the plaintiff the sum of 30l.; it was held, that this contract was one within section 17 of the Statute of Frauds as extended by section 7 of Lord Tenterden’s Act, and which could not therefore be enforced, inasmuch as though it did not very distinctly appear on the face of the contract that the plaintiff’s mare and foal were worth more than 10l., yet that they might and would have been shown by parol evidence to be so, and that there could be no doubt of the fact. It was also held, that this contract was not
less within the statute because something else, which was merely ancillary to its principal subject-matter, and to which the 17th section of the Statute of Frauds did not apply, was included in it, as the contract was an entire one and the price was indivisible (p).

Therefore to make the sale of a horse at 10/ or upwards valid under the 4th section of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, the buyer must either actually accept and receive it, or give something in earnest to bind the bargain, or something in part payment; or the parties to be charged must either themselves or by their agents make and sign some note or memorandum in writing of the bargain.

We shall consider—

1st. The acceptance and receipt.
2nd. The earnest and part payment.
3rd. The note or memorandum in writing.
4th. The signature by the party to be charged.
5th. The signature by an agent.

The Acceptance and Receipt.

To satisfy the statute there must be an acceptance and a receipt of the goods, and the acceptance must be of the goods “so sold,” for the enjoyment of something merely engrafted upon the principal subject-matter of the contract will not satisfy the statute (p). The acceptance must be with the intention of taking possession as owner. And the receipt implies delivery, either actual or constructive (q).

By s. 4, sub-s. (3), of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, “there is an acceptance of goods within the meaning of this section when the buyer does any act in relation to the goods which recognises a pre-existing contract of sale whether there be an acceptance in performance of the contract or not.”

There is always an acceptance and receipt by the purchaser when the vendor has parted with his lien, because, as was laid down by Mr. Justice Holroyd, “upon a sale of specific goods for a specific price, by parting with the possession the seller parts with his lien. The statute contemplates such a parting with the possession, and therefore, so long as the seller preserves his control over the goods, so as to retain his lien, he prevents the vendee

(q) See per Parke, B., Saunders v. Holmes v. Hoskins, 9 Ex. 753.
from accepting and receiving them as his own within the meaning of the statute” (r).

In the case of Saunders v. Topp (s), the learned judges doubted whether in any case there could be an acceptance and receipt before actual delivery. But recent cases show that in the case of specific goods the acceptance may precede the actual delivery, and need not be contemporaneous or subsequent to it (t). For inasmuch as the vendor may lose his lien on the goods without losing the personal possession of them, so may a vendee have accepted and have actually received them within the meaning of the statute without having the personal possession of them; e.g., in a case in which it is agreed between the vendor and the vendee that the possession shall thenceforth be kept, not as vendor, but as bailee for the purchaser, the lien of the vendor is gone, and the goods are no longer in his possession as unpaid vendor (u).

The vendor may at any time disaffirm a sale of goods of the value of 10L. or upwards, if only contracted to be made by parol, before the vendee does anything to bind the bargain; if, however, the buyer has “taken to” the goods, before the contract is disaffirmed, it will, as it would seem, bind the bargain in favour of the buyer as well as the seller (x).

Where however an article is selected by the buyer, very slight evidence of its acceptance, when received, would be sufficient to show an acceptance, coupled with a receipt. As where the defendant verbally agreed to buy some sheep which he had selected from the plaintiff’s flock, and directed them to be sent to his field, which was accordingly done. Two days afterwards he sent his man to remove them from the field to his farm, which was some miles distant, and on their arrival he counted them over and said, “It is all right.” It was held that this was evidence for the jury of his acceptance of the sheep so as to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, notwithstanding he afterwards repudiated the purchase, and sent the sheep back to the plaintiff (y). And Mr. Baron Alderson remarked on the case as follows: “The previous selection of the sheep is

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(s) 1 Exch. 394.
(x) Taylor v. Wakefield, 6 E. & B. 765.
(y) Saunders v. Topp, 4 Ex. 390.
very material, to show the nature of the acceptance when
the sheep were received. The defendant says, 'It is all
right.' If he had never seen the sheep, and there had
been no previous acceptance, his saying 'It is all right''
would have had no effect; but when he had previously
examined and selected the sheep, it was for the jury to
say whether he did not mean, 'These are the sheep which
I selected.' Suppose, in the case of a remarkable animal,
for instance, a horse with peculiar spots, the vendee had
said, 'All right,' there could be no doubt he would mean
'This is the horse I bought.'" (z).

It is a question for the jury whether or not there has
been an acceptance and actual receipt (a).

It has been stated above (b) that there may be an ac-
ceptance and receipt by the vendee before the goods are
actually delivered by the vendor. Thus, after the defen-
dant had verbally agreed to purchase of the plaintiff a
horse, but before there had been any actual delivery
plaintiff requested defendant to lend it to him to take
certain journeys. To this the defendant assented, and the
horse remained with plaintiff for a fortnight, when it was
sent to the defendant, who, however, refused to receive it:
the jury found that the bargain for the purchase of the
horse was complete before the proposal to borrow it was
made, and that the defendant, as owner of the horse, gave
plaintiff permission to keep it. It was thereupon held that
there was evidence of an acceptance and receipt of the
horse to satisfy the Statute of Frauds (c). But the construc-
tive possession by the vendee must be clearly such, as that
by it the vendor would lose his lien on the goods (d).

In all cases of this description there may be such a
change of character in the seller as to make him the agent
of the buyer, so that the buyer may treat the possession
of the seller as his own (e); and the question for the jury
will be, whether the seller held the subject-matter of the
sale as owner, or merely as keeper for the buyer. Thus,
when A. agreed to purchase of B. a carriage then standing
in B.'s shop, A. at the same time desiring that certain
alterations might be made on it, the alterations having

(z) Saunders v. Topp, 4 Ex. 395. See also Simmonds v. Humble, 13
C. B., N. S. 258.
(b) See ante, p. 7.
(e) Marvin v. Wallace, 6 E. & B. 726; 2 Jur., N. S. 689.
(d) Holmes v. Hoskins, 9 Ex. 753.
(e) Castle v. Sowder, 30 L. J., Ex. 310.
been made, the carriage was, at A.'s request, placed in the back shop. A. called at the shop on a Saturday, and requested B. to hire a horse and a man for him, and to send the carriage to his house on the following day, in order that he might take a drive in it. A. had previously intimated his intention to take the carriage out a few times, in order that, as he was going to take it abroad, it might pass the custom-house as a second-hand carriage. The carriage was accordingly sent to and used by A. on the Sunday, A. paying for the hire of the horse and man. A. afterwards refused to take or pay for the carriage. It was held that there was a sufficient acceptance and receipt of the carriage by A. before the Sunday, within the 17th section of the Statute of Frauds (f).

In some cases great difficulty arises in deciding whether there has been such an acceptance and receipt as constitutes a constructive delivery under the statute; and we shall see by the following cases that some very nice distinctions have been drawn: Elmore v. Stone (g) is a leading case on the subject, and, though its authority was doubted by Mr. Justice Bayley in Howe v. Palmer (h), it will be seen that it may be distinguished from that and all the following cases.

In Elmore v. Stone (g) an action was brought for the price of two horses, and a question arose whether there had been a delivery of them under the Statute of Frauds. The plaintiff was a livery-stable keeper and horse dealer. He asked 180 guineas for two horses, which the defendant at first refused to give, but afterwards sent word that "the horses were his, but that as he had neither servant nor stable the plaintiff must keep them at livery for him;" the plaintiff assented, and removed them out of the sale stable into another. The defendant afterwards refused to take them, and set up for his defence the 17th section of the Statute of Frauds. It was there held that if a man bargains for the purchase of goods, and desires the vendor to keep them in his possession for an especial purpose for the vendee, and the vendor accepts the order, it is a sufficient delivery of the goods within the Statute of Frauds, and that it is no objection to a constructive delivery of goods that it is made by words parcel of the parol contract of sale; and Chief Justice

(f) Beaumont v. Brenger, 5 C. B. 301.  
(g) Elmore v. Stone, 1 Taunt. 458; 10 R. R. 578. See also Kibble v.
Mansfield said, "A common case is that of a sale of goods at a wharf or a warehouse, where the usual practice is to deliver the key of a warehouse or a note to the wharfinger, who in consequence makes a new entry of the goods in the name of the vendee, although no transfer of the local situation or actual possession takes place. After the defendant in this case had said that the horses must stand at livery, and the plaintiff had accepted the order, it made no difference whether they stood at livery in the vendor's stable, or whether they had been taken away, and put in some other stable. The plaintiff possessed them from that time, not as owner of the horses, but as any other livery-stable keeper might have them to keep. Under many events it might appear hard if the plaintiff should not continue to have a lien upon the horses which were in his own possession, so long as the price remained unpaid; but it was for him to consider that before he made his agreement. After he had assented to keep the horses at livery, they would, on the decease of the defendant, have become general assets; and so, if he had become bankrupt, they would have gone to his assignees. The plaintiff could not have retained them, though he had not received the price."

But where a purchaser verbally agreed at a public market with the agent of the vendor to purchase twelve bushels of tares (then in the vendor's possession, constituting part of a larger quantity in bulk), to remain in the vendor's possession till called for, and the agent on his return home measured the twelve bushels and set them apart for the purchaser, it was held by the Court of King's Bench that this did not amount to an acceptance by the latter, so as to take the case out of the 17th section of the Statute of Frauds. And Mr. Justice Bayley said, "In Elmore v. Stone (i) the buyer directed expense to be incurred, and the directing of that expense was considered evidence of an acceptance on his part. That case goes as far as any case ought to go, and I think we ought not to go one step beyond it. There is this distinction between that case and this, that there an expense was incurred on account and by the direction of the buyer; here there is none. But I must say, however, that I doubt the authority of that decision. This case is clearly within the statute" (j).

(i) Elmore v. Stone, 1 Taunt. 458; 324. And see Richard v. Moore, 10 R. 578.
(j) Howe v. Palmer, 3 B. & Ald.
THE ACCEPTANCE AND RECEIPT.

However, the case of Elmore v. Stone (k) seems to have been properly decided, because the plaintiff, being a livery-stable keeper as well as a horse dealer, the buyer, by ordering him to keep the horses at livery, directed expense to be incurred; and the plaintiff, by consenting to keep them at livery, relinquished his possession as owner, and held them only as livery-stable keeper.

In the case of Carter v. Touissant (l), which was a sale upon credit, the purchaser had exercised various acts of ownership over the horse, which were held to be no acceptance within the statute. It appeared that the horse was sold by a parol contract for 30l., but no time was fixed for the payment of the price. The horse was fired in the purchaser's presence, and with his approbation, and it was agreed that the horse should be kept by the vendor for twenty days without any charge being made for it. At the expiration of that time the horse was sent to grass by the direction of the purchaser, and by his desire entered as the horse of the vendor. Chief Justice Abbott and Justices Bayley and Holroyd distinguished this case from Elmore v. Stone (k), on the ground that there the plaintiff was both a livery-stable keeper and a horse dealer; but that here he was not; and held that there was no acceptance of the horse by the purchaser within the 17th section of the Statute of Frauds.

The following case was a ready-money transaction, and the agreement was that the horse should be taken away and the money paid on a certain day; on that ground there was held to have been no acceptance within the statute, although the purchaser had exercised various acts of ownership over him. It seems A. entered into a parol agreement to purchase a horse of B. for ready money, and to take him away at a time agreed upon. Shortly before the expiration of that time A. returned and ordered the horse to be taken out of the stable, when he and his servant mounted, galloped and leaped him; and after they had so done, his servant cleaned him, and A. himself gave directions that a roller should be taken off and a fresh one put on, and that a strap should be put upon his neck, which was consequently done: A. then requested that he might remain in B.'s possession a week longer, at the expiration of which time he promised to fetch him away

and pay for him; to this B. assented. The horse died the day before A.'s return, and he refused to pay the price. It was held by the Court of King's Bench that this was a ready-money bargain, and, as the purchaser could have no right to take away the horse till he had paid the price, that there was no acceptance of the horse within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds (m).

The conduct of the buyer after the receipt of the goods will often be the criterion for determining whether he has accepted them (n); as, e.g., where he makes an unreasonable delay in notifying his rejection (nn), or deals with them in an unreasonable manner (o). And there are cases which show that, without any act of ownership, the act of examination of the goods, involving as it does an admission of the existence of the contract, is evidence to go to the jury of an acceptance by the buyer (oo).

Where a person, who has contracted for the purchase of a horse or any other goods, offers to resell them as his own, it is a question for the jury whether or not a delivery to and acceptance by himself has been proved (p). Where, however, the defendant offered goods which he had refused to accept, for resale in the market, stating at the same time that he had not accepted them, and that he would have to make other arrangements before he could sell, it was held that there had been no acceptance (pp).

An agreement for the resale of goods by the vendee is sufficient evidence of a delivery and acceptance, as against him, to leave to the jury (q).

The Earnest and Part Payment.

The civil law called the earnest "Arrha," and this it interprets to be "emptionis-venditionis, contractæ argumentum" (r). It recognized two kinds of earnest,—symbolical and pecuniary; the one being a transfer of some-
thing by way of pledge or assurance, and the other being a payment of part of the purchase-money (s). A similar distinction is made in the Statute of Frauds (t), and in section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, ante, p. 5. Thus the buyer must "give something in earnest to bind the bargain," or "give something in part payment."

A symbolical earnest may be anything used by the parties to bind the bargain. Therefore, a saddle, bridle, horsewhip or currycomb may be used for the purpose.

A pecuniary earnest consists of a current coin or sum of money given in part payment, and its efficacy does not depend upon its value being proportioned to that of the article contracted for.

Where the earnest, whether symbolical or pecuniary, is delivered to the vendor, it should be kept by him, and not be returned to the purchaser. For where the purchaser of a horse or other goods draws the edge of a shilling over the hand of the vendor, and returns the money into his own pocket, which in the north of England is called "striking off a bargain," it is neither an earnest nor a part payment within the statute (u).

Where an earnest was given on a contract of sale, the old rule was, that if the buyer repented of his bargain, he might refuse to fulfil it, upon forfeiting to the seller the whole earnest money deposited. But if the failure to comply with the contract was on the part of the vendor, he was bound to make fourfold restitution to the vendee (x).

But under the statute the earnest binds the bargain, and therefore the property passes in the same way as where there is a part payment. And under such circumstances an action for the price may be supported (y). Thus in an exchange of horses, when it was agreed that the plaintiff should pay the defendant four guineas to boot on the 17th December following, and also that the plaintiff should keep the colt till the September following, and the defendant "to make the agreement more firm and binding, paid to the plaintiff one halfpenny in earnest of the bargain," it was held that the payment of the halfpenny vested the property of the colt in the defendant (z).

(s) Code Civile, 1590; Vinnius, Com. in Inst. l. 3, tit. 324. See also Howe v. Smith, 27 Ch. D. 89, 100, 101; 53 L. J., Ch. 1055; 50 L. T., N. S. 573; 32 W. R. 802.
(t) 29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 17.
(u) Blenkinsop v. Clayton, 7 Taunt. 597; 18 R. R. 602.
(x) Bracton, lib. 2, cap. 27, fol. 62.
Where there was a part payment for some animals, which were deposited with a third party till the full amount was paid, and two of them died, the loss was held to fall on the purchaser (a).

The Note or Memorandum in Writing.

If there has been either an agreement in writing, or a parol agreement which is afterwards reduced into writing, by the parties, that writing alone must be looked to, to ascertain the terms of the contract (b).

No particular form is necessary to constitute a good note or memorandum in writing; and a sold note (c) or a bill of parcels is sometimes sufficient, where it can be proved that it has been recognized by the other party (d). However, there are certain requisites which must be contained within the instrument, to satisfy the statute.

The note or memorandum in writing must state who are the contracting parties (e). But it is not necessary that they should appear actually on the face of the memorandum; if, from the memorandum taken in connection with surrounding circumstances, it clearly appear who they are, this is sufficient (f).

It must also state the terms upon which the contract is made, because the word bargain means the terms upon which the parties contract. As, for instance, in Bristow v. Halford (g), the memorandum of agreement on the sale of a race-horse called Baron Biel, was to the effect that the defendant should purchase the horse for 300l. paid down, 100l. in three months, 100l. on the horse winning the Goodwood Cup, and 1,000l. on his winning the St. Leger Stakes, for which the defendant undertook to enter him.

But though it does not state the terms upon which the contract is made, it will be sufficient to satisfy the statute, if it distinctly refers to and recognizes another document, which does contain them (h). The connection between the

(b) Per Lord Abinger, C. B., Allen v. Pink, 4 M. & W. 144.
(d) See Johnson v. Dodgson, 2 M. & W. 653; Durrell v. Evans, 31 L. J., Ex. 337.
(g) Bristow v. Halford, before Lord Campbell, C. J., West. C. P. Feb. 1, 1853.
(h) Ridgway v. Wharton, 27 L. J., Ch. 46.
documents must appear on the face of them, for it cannot be supplied by parol evidence (i), which can only be used to show, what the writing is which is referred to, and which is not admissible to supply any defects or omissions in the written evidence (k).

An “agreement, letter, or memorandum made for or relating to the sale of any goods, wares, or merchandize,” is exempted from stamp duty (l).

If at an auction the purchaser’s name be signed to a catalogue, it must be connected with or refer to the conditions of sale, to make the contract valid (m). And it is not sufficient where they are merely in the room but not actually attached to the catalogue, or clearly referred to in it; and if during the sale they get separated, the signatures made after the separation are unavailable (n).

Where, at a sale of horses, there was a catalogue which contained the number of the lot, the description of the mare to be sold, and the conditions; and a sales ledger containing the same information with regard to lot and description, together with the name of the purchaser and the price at which the mare was sold, but having no reference to the catalogue which contained the conditions of sale; it was held that the catalogue and conditions of sale were not sufficiently connected with the sales ledger to make a memorandum within the statute.

The Court was also of opinion that a letter, which the purchaser subsequently wrote admitting the purchase, did not constitute a sufficient memorandum, because it neither stated a price nor referred to the sales ledger where the price was stated (o).

The price when agreed upon is a material part of the bargain, and must be stated in the memorandum. Thus, where on the 13th June a verbal contract was made for the sale of a horse, warranted five years old, for 200 guineas, and in order to take the case out of the Statute of Frauds, the plaintiff gave in evidence the following letter, written by the defendant on the 18th of June:


(2) Boydell v. Drummond, 11 East, 142; 10 R. R. 450; Fitzmaurice v. Bayley, 9 H. L. Cas. 78.

(3) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 97, Sch. “Agreement” (3).

The Stamp Act.

Catalogue at a sale.

Price when agreed upon.

(i) Hinde v. Whitehouse, 7 East, 568; 8 R. R. 676.

(w) Kenworthy v. Scholfield, 2 B. & C. 945.

"Mr. Kingscote begs to inform Mr. Elmore, that if the horse can be proved to be five years old, on the 13th of this month, in a perfect satisfactory manner, of course he shall be most happy to take him; and if not most clearly proved, Mr. K. will most decidedly not have him." Lord Chief Justice Abbott was of opinion that this was not a sufficient note or memorandum in writing within the Statute of Frauds, and nonsuited the plaintiff. The Court of King's Bench confirmed the nonsuit, on the ground that the price agreed to be paid constitutes a material part of the bargain; because if it were competent to a party to prove by parol evidence the price intended to be paid, it would let in much of the mischief which it was the object of the statute to prevent (p); but it has been held that a written order for goods, "on moderate terms," is sufficient (q).

If, however, no price is fixed and agreed upon, a note or memorandum which does not state any will be sufficient, and the law will infer that a reasonable price was to be paid (r); on the principle that if I take up wares from a tradesman, without any agreement as to price, the law concludes that I contracted to pay their real value (s).

The omission of the particular mode or time of payment does not necessarily invalidate the agreement (t).

A person who transacts a proposal by letter must be considered as renewing his offer every moment, until the time at which the answer is to be sent, and then the contract is completed by the acceptance of the offer. For if the law were otherwise, no contract could ever be completed by post (u). And if a letter be given in evidence with the direction torn off, the jury will do well to presume primâ facie, that it was addressed to the person who produces it (x).

Where an intending purchaser wrote to the seller saying, "If I hear no more about the horse, I consider the horse is mine at 50l. 15s.," and the seller did not answer the letter, the purchaser would have been bound to his offer, if the seller had chosen to accept it; but the fact of the seller

(q) Ashcroft v. Morrin, 4 M. & G. 450.
(r) Handley v. M'Laine, 10 Bing. 488.
(s) 2 Bla. Com. 30.
(x) Curtis v. Rickards, 1 M. & G. 47, per Tindal, C. J.
not having answered the letter will not bind him, as the purchaser had no right to put upon him the burden of the choice of writing a letter of refusal or being bound by the agreement proposed (y). If letters taken together contain a sufficient contract, namely, one that would express all its terms, they would constitute a memorandum in writing within the statute. And of course therefore the Court may look at all the letters which have passed, for the purpose of seeing whether or not they contain a sufficient contract to take the case out of the statute (z).

A letter signed by the party to be charged after the transaction has taken place, which states (or plainly refers to other documents which state) and admits the terms of the contract, is a good memorandum under the statute, even if such letter contain an attempted repudiation by the writer of his liability under the contract (a).

Where A. sold a particular bay mare to B. through C. who was acting as agent to B., and C. wrote to B. stating that he had bought “the bay mare” for forty guineas, and followed it up by other letters reiterating the terms of sale, and requesting payment; whereupon B. wrote to C. alluding to the mare which C. bought for him, and promising payment; it was held that B.’s letter, though sent to his own agent, was, coupled with C.’s letters, a sufficient memorandum of the sale as against B. (b).

But as mutual assent is necessary to constitute a binding contract, it is held that where it is sought to establish an agreement by means of letters, such letters will not amount to an agreement, unless the answer be ex simplice, without the introduction of any new term (c). Thus, in the following case an action of assumpsit was brought for the price of a mare sold and delivered, to which the defendant pleaded non assumpsit. It appeared that the defendant having seen

(a) Bailey v. Sweeting, 9 C. B., N. S. 843; 30 L. J., C. P. 150; Wilkinson v. Evans, L. R., 1 C. P. 417; Buxton v. Rust, L. R., 7 Ex. 1; 41 L. J., Ex. 1; 25 L. T., N. S. 502, affirmed L. R., 7 Ex. 279; Leather Cloth Co. v. Heironimus, L. R., 10 Q. B. 140; 44 L. J., Q. B. 54; 32 L. T., N. S. 307.
(b) Gibson v. Holland, L. R., 1 C. P. 1; 35 L. J., C. P. 5; 14 W. R. 86.
(c) Cooper v. Hood, 28 L. J., Ch. 212.
and ridden a mare, wrote to the plaintiff, "I will take the mare at twenty guineas, of course warranted; therefore as she lays out, turn her out my mare." The plaintiff agreed to sell her for the twenty guineas. The defendant afterwards wrote again to him, "My son will be at the ‘World's End’ (a public house) on Monday, when he will take the mare and pay you; send anybody with a receipt, and the money shall be paid; only say in the receipt sound, and quiet in harness." The plaintiff wrote in reply, "she is warranted sound, and quiet in double harness; I never put her in single harness." The mare was brought to the "World’s End" on the Monday, and the defendant's son took her away without paying the price, and without any receipt or warranty. The defendant kept her two days and then returned her as being unsound. The learned judge stated to the jury that the question was, whether the defendant had accepted the mare, and directed them to find for the defendant if they thought he had returned her within a reasonable time; and desired them also to say whether the son had authority to take her without the warranty. The jury found that the defendant did not accept the mare, and that the son had not authority to take her away. It was held by the Court of Exchequer, on motion to enter a verdict for the plaintiff, that there was no complete contract in writing between the parties; that therefore the direction of the learned judge was right. Also that the defendant was not bound by the act of the son in bringing home the mare, inasmuch as he had thereby exceeded his authority as agent, and consequently that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover (ce). And where the plaintiff sent his horse to a livery stable for sale, and the defendants bid 75l. for him, but no final agreement was come to, and the plaintiff left the horse at the livery stable to see if the defendants would buy the animal, arranging with the livery-stable keeper that he was to have no commission on the sale unless 75l. or more were paid; and the horse proving slightly unsound, the defendants wrote to the livery-stable keeper offering 70l. for him, and the livery-stable keeper having transmitted their letter to the plaintiff, he (the plaintiff) wrote to the livery-stable keeper as follows: "As the horse is with you he shall go at 70l., clear to me. I will pay no expenses; you must get what you can of Mr. B. (one of the defendants); I cannot allow anything off the 70l." It was

held, that as the plaintiff, by his answer to the defendant's offer, stipulated that they should bear expenses to which he as vendor was \textit{prima facie} liable, he had added a new term to those proposed, and, in the absence of an acceptance of that term, there was no complete contract between the parties ($d$).

On the other hand, however, two letters may be sufficiently identical to constitute a contract, although the letter of proposal may mention a term which is omitted to be mentioned in the letter of acceptance ($e$).

The terms of a written contract for the sale of goods, falling within the operation of the statute, cannot be varied or altered by parol; and where a contract for the bargain and sale of goods was made, stating a time for the delivery of them, it was held by the Court of Exchequer that an agreement to substitute another day for that purpose must, in order to be valid, be in writing ($f$). So, also, where the day appointed for the delivery of goods was subsequently discovered to be a Sunday, and it was then by word of mouth agreed between the parties that the delivery should be made on the "Monday or Tuesday" following: it was held by the Court of Queen's Bench, that the enlargement of time having materially varied the contract, and in fact substituted a new one, an action for nondelivery could not be maintained ($g$). But forbearance on the part of the plaintiff is not a variation of the contract ($h$).

But though the terms of a written contract cannot be contradicted, altered or varied by parol evidence, yet such evidence is admissible to define what the written contract has left undefined ($i$); \textit{e.g.}, where it contains no date ($k$), or where its terms can only be given precision when explained by the sense which mercantile usage has put upon them ($l$), or where the subject-matter of the contract can only be ascertained by the admission of a conversation with reference to it ($m$). So, too, where goods are ordered by

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\text{(d) Louis v. Pedrick, 29 L. T., N. S. 178.} \\
\text{(e) Metzler v. Gounod, 32 L. T., N. S. 656.} \\
\text{\textit{(f) Marshall v. Lynn, 6 M. \& W. 118: and see Noble v. Ward, L. R., 1 Ex. 117; L. R., 2 Ex. 153, Ex. Ch.}} \\
\text{\textit{(g) Stead v. Dawber, 10 A. \& E. 57: and see Hickman v. Haynes, L. R., 10 C. P. 598; 44 L. J., C. P. 358, 32 L. T., N. S. 873; 23 W. R. 871.}} \\
\text{\textit{(h) Ogle v. Vane (Earl), L. R., 3 Q. B. 272, Ex. Ch.; 37 L. J., Q. B. 771.}} \\
\text{\textit{(i) Per Erle, C. J., Lucas v. Bristow, El. Bl. \& El. 913.}} \\
\text{\textit{(k) Davis v. Jones, 25 L. J., C. P. 91.}} \\
\text{\textit{(l) Lucas v. Bristow, El. Bl. \& El. 907; Dale v. Humphrey, El. Bl. \& El. 1004.}} \\
\text{\textit{(m) Macdonald v. Longbottom, 6 Jur., N. S. 724; Chadwick v. Buxton, 12 W. R. 1077. See also Buxton v. Rust, L. R., 7 Ex. 280, 281— Ex. Ch., per Willes, J.}}
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\text{c 2}

Terms cannot be varied by parol.

But may be explained.
letter, which does not mention any time for payment, and
such letter amounts to a valid contract within the statute,
parol evidence is admissible to show that the goods were
supplied on credit (n).

But a matter antecedent to and dehors the writing may
in some cases be received in evidence, as showing the in-
ducement to the contract; such as a representation of some
particular quality or incident of the thing sold. But the
buyer is not at liberty to show such a representation, unless
he can also show that the seller by some fraud prevented him
from discovering a fault which he, the seller, knew to
exist (o).

Parol evidence is also admissible of a condition, on which
the written agreement depends, such evidence being as to
facts distinct from, but collateral to, the written agree-
ment (p).

In order to sustain an action, there must be a good con-
tract in existence at the time of action brought. There-
fore, a memorandum in writing of a contract after action
brought does not satisfy the statute (q).

The Signature by the Party to be Charged.

Section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, requires that
there should be a note or memorandum of the contract in
writing, signed by the party to be charged; and the cases
have decided that, although the signature be in the begin-
nning or middle of the instrument, it is as binding as if at
the foot of it, the question being always open to the jury,
whether the party not having signed it regularly at the
foot, meant to be bound by it as it then stood, or whether
he left it so unsigned, because he refused to complete it (r).

The Christian name of the signature may be set out at
length or denoted by the initial, or left out altogether (s);
but it seems that the surname must be written at length,
and that the mere initials will not suffice (t). A mark by
a person unable to write may suffice if sufficiently iden-
tified (u). An unsigned postscript commencing, “I had
quite omitted to tell you and Martin,” on a separate piece

(n) Lockett v. Nicklin, 2 Ex. 93.
(o) Kain v. Old, 2 B. & C. 634.
(p) Pym v. Campbell, 6 El. & Bl. 370; Lindley v. Lacey, 5 N. R. 51.
(q) Bill v. Bament, 9 M. & W. 36.
(s) Lobb v. Stanley, 5 Q. B. 574, 581.
(t) Sweet v. Lee, 3 M. & G. 452, 460.
of paper, enclosed in the same envelope with, but not referred to by, a letter signed with initials, is not sufficient to satisfy the statute (a).

If a man be in the habit of printing instead of writing his name, he may be said to sign by his printed as well as his written name (y). And an invoice with "Bought of Norris & Co." printed on it, which was filled up in the body with the handwriting of Norris, was held to be, for the purpose of the statute, signed by Norris (z).

The statute requires that the note should be signed by the party to be charged; accordingly it is no objection that it is not also signed by the other party, and consequently that there is no remedy against him (a). But a note in writing, signed by one party, will be insufficient, unless it also specifies the name of the other party (b). A signature by the defendant, however, in the plaintiffs' order-book on the fly-leaf, at the beginning of which were written the plaintiffs' names, will do (c). And where the defendant accepted an offer to buy, by telegram, giving signed instructions to the telegraph clerk, this was held to be a sufficient signature (d). If, on the other hand, the note in writing is signed by the seller only, it will plainly be insufficient to charge the buyer (e).

It is no objection to the signature that it was not made to satisfy the statute, but in obedience to some other statute; so long as it is by the party to be charged, and attests the document which contains the terms of the agreement, it is sufficient (f).

The Signature by an Agent.

The statute requires some note or memorandum in writing, to be signed by the party to be charged, or his

Where a man prints his name.

Names of parties how to be shown.

Signature for another purpose.

What is necessary.

(a) Kronheim v. Johnson, 7 Ch. D. 69; 47 L. J., Ch. 132; 37 L. T., N. S. 752.

(b) Saunders v. Jackson, 2 B. & P. 238; 5 R. R. 580.


(e) Godwin v. Francis, L. R., 5 C. P. 295; 39 L. J., C. P. 121; 22 L. T., N. S. 338.

agent thereunto lawfully authorized, leaving us to the rules of common law as to the mode in which the agent is to receive his authority. Now, in all other cases a subsequent sanction is considered the same thing in effect as assent at the time. Omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur, et mandato aequiparatur; and the subsequent sanction of a contract, signed by an agent, takes it out of the operation of the statute more satisfactorily than an authority given beforehand. Where the authority is given beforehand, the party must trust to his agent; if it be given subsequently to the contract, the party knows that all has been done according to his wishes (g).

An agent must be a third person, and not the other contracting party (h).

An infant or married woman may be an agent, their acts in that capacity not being affected by their disabilities of infancy and coverture respectively (i).

An agent may be constituted either by express appointment or by implication of law arising from the circumstance in which parties are placed (k).

The authority of the agent to sell for his principal may be conferred by word of mouth (l); for it is now clearly settled that the agent need not be authorized in writing (m).

In general an auctioneer may be considered as the agent and witness of both parties; but a difficulty arises in the case where the auctioneer sues as one of the contracting parties. The case of Wright v. Dannah (n), seems to be in point; namely, that the agent contemplated by the legislature, who is to bind a defendant by his signature, must be some third person, and not the other contracting party upon the record (o).

An entry made in the sale book by the auctioneer's clerk who attends the sale, and as each lot is knocked down


(g) Per Best, C. J., Maclean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. 727.

(h) Sherman v. Brandt, L. R., 6 Q. B. 720; 40 L. J., Q. B. 312; Wright v. Dannah, 2 Camp. 203; 11 R. R. 693; Farebrother v. Simmons, 5 B. & Ald. 333.

(i) Paley's Principal and Agent, 2; Trescothick v. Marshall, 7 Bing. 565; Prince v. Brunette, 1 Bing.

N. C. 438.

(k) 2 Steph. Com. 117.

(l) Accabal v. Levy, 10 Bing. 378.

(m) Per Lord Eldon, Coles v. Trescothick, 9 Vesey, 249 a; 7 R. R. 167; Emmerson v. Heeltis, 2 Taunt. 45; 11 R. R. 520.

(n) Wright v. Dannah, 2 Camp. 203; 11 R. R. 693.

(o) Farebrother v. Simmons, 5 B. & Ald. 335; Sherman v. Brandt, L. R., 6 Q. B. 720.
names the purchaser aloud, and on the sign of assent from him makes a note accordingly in the book, is a memorandum in writing by an agent within the statute (p). The book in which the entry is made must, however, be sufficiently connected with the conditions of sale (q).

A memorandum drawn up by the agent of both parties by the authority of the defendants, in their presence, and recognized by them at the time, though unsigned by themselves, yet with their names inscribed on the document by him, will bind them and satisfy the statute (r). But a memorandum written in the buyer's book, drawn up and signed by a person who is the agent of the seller only, although this was done at the request of the buyer, will not bind him (s).

**Delivery and Payment.**

The right of property and the right of possession are distinct from each other; the right of possession may be in one person, the right of property in another (t). For by the law of England, possession is not proof of property (u). It is, at the same time, presumptive proof of ownership, and may be acted on as such (v).

When the contract is executed, the possession and the right are transferred together; where it is executory, the right only vests, and the reciprocal property is not in possession, but in action; for a contract executed (which when it relates to an exchange or sale of goods differs in nothing from an assignment) conveys a chose in possession, a contract executory conveys only a chose in action (x).

It is clear that by the law of England the sale of a specific chattel passes the property in it to the vendee without delivery. Even in this case, however, if the contract show that there is no intention to pass the property until something be done by the seller, either in order to prepare the goods for delivery, or for the purpose of ascertaining

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(q) *Pierce v. Corp*, L. R., 9 Q. B. 310; and see *Repositories and Auctions*, post, pp. 38, 39.
(r) *Durrell v. Evans*, 31 L. J., Ex. 337.
(x) 2 Steph. Com. 112. See also s. 1, sub-s. (3), of the *Sale of Goods Act*, 1893, *ante*, p. 2.
the price, the sale is not perfected, and the property does not pass until that thing is done (y).

Where, in an agreement of sale, a condition as to the price is annexed, and the fulfilment of it is ascertainable, such condition would appear to be good; as where the plaintiff purchased a horse for 55l., and the defendant warranted him sound, and agreed to give back 1l. if the horse did not bring the plaintiff 4l. or 5l. profit (z).

But if such condition is not ascertainable, of course it cannot be enforced, and then it becomes an immaterial part of the agreement. Thus, where a horse was sold to the plaintiff for 100 guineas, "and 10l. more if the horse suited him," Lord Tenterden said, "If the buyer had kept the horse, I do not see how the seller could have maintained any action to recover the 10l. The buyer might have said, 'the horse does not suit me, but I choose to keep him nevertheless'" (a). So, also, where the plaintiff agreed to purchase a horse for 63l., and "if the horse was lucky, he would give the defendant 5l. more, or the buying of another horse," it was held that this part of the agreement was too vague to be legally enforced, and did not amount in point of law to a promise. Thus, Lord Tenterden said, "The remaining part of the consideration, that if the horse proved lucky the plaintiff should give 5l. more, or the buying of another horse, is much too loose and vague to be considered in a Court of law. Who is to say under what circumstances a horse shall be said to have proved 'lucky'? The price at which the horse sold would not determine it. Suppose a year passed before the advanced price was obtained, it might then still be a question, whether the bargain had been lucky or not. But admitted that this could be ascertained, how could the contract to give 5l., or the buying of another horse, be enforced? It is at the option of the contracting party to do either; and what could be made of an action for not buying another horse? The party sued might say he was ready to buy, but too much was asked" (b).

The rule of law is, that where there is an immediate sale, and nothing remains to be done by the vendor as between him and the vendee, the property in the thing

(y) See per Parke, J., Dixon v. 472.
Green, 27 L. J., Ex. 33; Sale of Guthing v. Lynn, 2 B. & Adol.
Goods Act, 1893, s. 18, rr. 1, 2. 234.
(b) Blyth v. Bampton, 3 Bing.
sold vests in the vendee, and then all the consequences resulting from the vesting of the property follow, one of which is, that if it be destroyed, the loss falls upon the vendee (c). Thus, in Noy's Maxims it is said, "If the horse die in my stable between the bargain and the delivery, I may have an action of debt for my money, because, by the bargain, the property was in the buyer" (d). By contract, however, the risk may be in the vendee, even though the vendor may have both the property in and the possession of the goods (e).

A contract for the sale of goods, to be delivered at a future day, is not invalidated by the circumstance that, at the time of the contract, the vendor neither has the goods in his possession, nor has entered into any contract to buy them, nor has any reasonable expectation of becoming possessed of them by the time appointed for delivering them, otherwise than by purchasing them after making the contract (f).

Where there is a sale of an ascertained article, and no provision is made to the contrary, the delivery and payment are to be contemporaneous acts (g).

Unless a different intention appears from the terms of the contract, stipulations as to time of payment are not deemed to be of the essence of a contract of sale. Whether any other stipulation as to time is of the essence of the contract or not depends on the terms of the contract (h).

Where goods are sold, and nothing is said as to the time of the delivery, or the time of payment, and everything the seller has to do with them is complete, the property vests in the buyer, so as to subject him to the risk of any accident which may happen to the goods, and the seller is liable to deliver them, whenever they are demanded, upon payment of the price, but not before (i).

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Goods to be delivered on a future day.

Delivery and payment contemporaneous acts.

Time not the essence of a contract.

Where nothing is said about the time of the delivery.

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(e) Per Bayley, J., Turling v. Baxter, 6 B. & C. 364; see also Farley v. Bates, 33 L. J., Ex. 43; Castle v. Playford, L. R., 7 Ex. 98; Sale of Goods Act, 1893, s. 20.

(d) Noy's Maxims, 298.


(f) Hibblewhite v. McMorine, 5 M. & W. 462; Sale of Goods Act, 1893, s. 5.


(h) Sale of Goods Act, 1893, s. 10; see also Martindale v. Smith, 1 Q. B. 395, per Cur.; Reuter v. Sala, 4 C. P. D. 249, per Cotton, L.J.

(i) Bloxam v. Sanders, 4 B. & C. 941; Sale of Goods Act, 1893, s. 28.
A vendor may have a qualified right to retain the goods unless payment is duly made, and yet the property in these goods may be in the vendee (j). Thus it is said, in Noy's Maxims (k), "If I sell my horse for money, I may keep him until I am paid, but I cannot have an action of debt until he is delivered; yet the property of the horse is, by the bargain, in the bargainee or buyer. But if he do presently tender me my money, and I do refuse it, he may take the horse, or have an action of detainment." And if the buyer in such case take away the horse before the price is paid, the seller may have an action of Trespass, or an action of Debt for the money, at his choice (l).

The seller’s right in respect of the price is not a mere lien which he will forfeit if he parts with the possession, but grows out of his original ownership and dominion, because payment or a tender of the price is a condition precedent on the buyer’s part, for until he makes such payment or tender he has no right to the possession (m).

In the case of an exchange of two horses for one, a delivery of one of the two would not preclude the owner’s lien on the other till the delivering of the one horse for which the two were to be exchanged (n).

And whatever conditional or temporary arrangement be made as to possession, so long as it is consistent with an intention to retain a special right to detain the goods, the seller will not forfeit his lien. Thus, if A. purchase a horse of B., which is not to be delivered until the price be paid, but B. in the meantime allows A. to take the horse for a day or a week to drive, the lien of B. is not determined, but merely suspended during the time for which he allows A. to take the horse (o).

If goods are sold upon credit, and nothing is agreed upon as to the time of delivering them, the buyer is immediately entitled to the possession, and the right of possession and the right of property vest at once in him (p).

But his right of possession is not absolute; it is liable

(k) Noy’s Maxims, 208.
(l) Manby v. Scott, 1 Mod. 137; 1 Dyer, 30 a, pl. 203.
(m) Bloxam v. Sanders, 4 B. & C. 948; Sale of Goods Act, 1893, s. 39.
(n) See Hanson v. Meyer, 6 East, 621; 8 R. R. 672.
(o) See Story on Sales, 236: Reeves v. Capper, 5 Bing. N. C. 136.
(p) Bloxam v. Sanders, 4 B. & C. 948.
to be defeated if he becomes bankrupt before he obtains possession (q).

The sale of a specific chattel on credit, though that credit may be limited to a definite period, transfers the property in the goods to the vendee, giving the vendor a right of action for the price, and a lien upon the goods, if they remain in his possession, till that price be paid, but default of payment does not rescind the contract (r).

The seller of goods has not only a lien on them for the price, whilst they are in his possession, but when the price is unpaid he may, after he has parted with the possession of the goods, and whilst they are in transitu, retake them in the event of the bankruptcy or insolvency of the buyer (s).

Stoppage in transitu, as its name imports, can only take place whilst the goods are on their way to the buyer; and the rule to be collected from the cases is, that they are in transitu so long as they are in the hands of the carrier as such (t), and also so long as they remain in any place of deposit connected with their transmission (u).

A contract of sale is not generally rescinded by the mere exercise by an unpaid seller of his right of lien or retention or stoppage in transitu. But where the seller expressly reserves a right of re-sale in case the buyer should make default, and on the buyer making default, re-sells the goods, the original contract of sale is thereby rescinded, but without prejudice to any claim the seller may have for damages (v).

In a contract for the sale of goods, “the goods to be delivered at the works forthwith, and to be paid for within fourteen days from the date of the contract,” the delivery of the goods is a condition precedent to the right of the seller to claim the payment of the purchase-money. The use of the word “forthwith” shows that the goods ought to have been, and that the parties intended that

Seller’s lien during possession.

His right of stoppage in transitu.

When goods are held to be in transitu.

Effect of stoppage in transitu.

Goods to be delivered before payment.


(s) Liekbarrow v. Mason, 2 T. R. 363; Sale of Goods Act, 1893, ss. 39, 44.


they should be, delivered at some time within the fourteen days (x).

When there are no special indications of the limit of time in a contract, that it should be performed "directly" means that it should be performed not "within a reasonable time" but "speedily," or at least "as soon as practicable" (y); and "as soon as possible" means "without unreasonable delay," regard being had to the ability of the person contracting, and the orders he has already in hand (z).

If there be an express contract between the parties that the goods shall be paid for before delivery, an action may be brought for the money before the goods are delivered. Thus, if A. undertakes to pay 100L. on the 1st of January for a horse purchased by him, and B. agrees to deliver it on the 1st of April following, B. may in the meantime maintain an action against A. for the money, without delivering or offering to deliver the horse (a).

Where two parties enter into a contract which is to be performed at a future day, and before the day of performance arrives one of them gives the other notice that he does not hold himself bound by it, the other is at liberty to treat such renunciation as a breach of the contract, without waiting for the arrival of the day which is fixed for its performance (b).

If the buyer is directed to send the price by post, or if it has been the usual practice between the parties to do so (c), and the letter containing the money properly directed (d) and posted (e) is lost, the debt is extinguished, and the seller must bear the loss (f).

Where the defendant, in answer to a letter demanding payment, sent a post-office order, in which the plaintiff was described by a wrong Christian name, and the plaintiff kept it, but did not cash it, although he was informed at the post office he might receive the money at any time by signing it

(y) Duncan v. Topham, 8 C. B. 225.
(z) Attwood v. Emery, 26 L. J., C. P. 73.
(a) See Pettitt v. Mitchell, 5 Sco. N. R. 740; Thorpe v. Thorpe, 1 Lord Raym. 665; 1 Salk. 171; Dunlop v. Grote, 2 C. & K. 153;
(b) Danube, &c., Co. v. Xenos, 31 L. J., C. P. 284 (Ex. Ch.).
in the name of the payee, it was held by the Court of Exchequer that this was no evidence of payment (g).

Where there is a sale of specific chattels, and a bill is given in payment, though the vendor has then lost his lien in the strict sense of the word, yet, if afterwards an insolvency happens, and the bill is dishonoured, then the vendor has a right somewhat analogous to that which a vendor has over goods in transitu, and if they are still in his hands, he has a right to withhold the delivery of the goods (h).

If a creditor employs an agent to receive money from a debtor, and the agent, instead of so doing, writes off a debt due from himself to the debtor, his debtor is not thereby discharged, unless indeed there is a subsequent ratification by the creditor of the act of his agent (i).

If a creditor is offered cash in payment of his debt, or a cheque upon a banker from an agent of his debtor, and he prefers the latter, this does not discharge the debtor if the cheque be dishonoured; although the agent fails with a balance of his principal in his hands to a larger amount (k). The creditor must, however, present the cheque within a reasonable time (l).

If a creditor prefers a bill of exchange accepted by a stranger to ready money from his debtor, he must abide the hazard of the security he takes (m).

By the order of the creditor, a debt may be paid to a third party, who, if he take payment in any other way than in money, or if he give the debtor further time, without the knowledge of the creditor, he does it at his peril (n).

**Sunday Dealing.**

By a law of King Athelstan, all "merchandizing on the Lord's Day" is prohibited, and it is thus laid down: "Die autem Dominico nemo mercaturam facito; id quod si quis egerit, et ipsa merce, et 30 preterea solidis mulctator" (o).

And by 29 Car. 2, c. 7, s. 1, which is "An Act for the better Observation of the Lord's Day," it is enacted, "that

(g) Gordon v. Strange, 1 Ex. 477.
(h) Per Crompton, J., Griffiths v. Perry, 28 L. J., Q. B. 204. See also Sale of Goods Act, 1893, s. 39, sub-s. (2).
(j) Everett v. Collins, 2 Camp.
(k) Dishonoured bill.
(l) Writing off debt by agent to agent.
(m) Banker's cheque.
(n) Bill of exchange.
(o) Debit paid to a third party.
(p) Law of King Athelstan.
(q) Statute of Charles 2.

515; 11 R. R. 785.
1 Ex. 268; 38 L. J., Ex. 147.
Smith v. Ferrand, 7 B. & C. 19.
2 Iust. cap. 31, p. 220.
no tradesman, artificer, workman, labourer, or other person whatsoever, shall do or exercise any worldly labour, business or work of their ordinary callings upon the Lord’s Day or any part thereof (works of necessity and charity only excepted), and every person being of the age of fourteen years or upwards offending in the premises shall for every such offence forfeit the sum of 5s.; and that no person or persons whatsoever shall publicly cry, show forth or expose to sale any wares, merchandizes, fruit, herbs, goods or chattels whatsoever upon the Lord’s Day or any part thereof, upon pain that every person so offending shall forfeit the same goods so cried or showed forth, or exposed to sale.”

By the 34 & 35 Vict. c. 87 (continued by the Expiring Laws Continuance Act), s. 1, no prosecution or other proceeding shall be instituted for the contravention of this Act, but with the consent in writing of the chief officer of the police of the police district in which the offence is committed, or of two justices of the peace, or of the stipendiary magistrate having jurisdiction in the place where such offence is committed.

A farmer has been held not to be within section 1 of the 29 Car. 2, c. 7, on the ground that he is not “a tradesman, artificer, workman, or ejusdem generis with any of these” (p).

A horsedealer cannot maintain an action upon a contract for the sale and warranty of a horse made by him upon a Sunday. The law on this subject was laid down by the Court of King’s Bench in Fennell v. Ridler (q) on a motion for a new trial, and Mr. Justice Bayley delivered the following judgment: “This was an action upon the warranty of a horse. The plaintiffs were horsedealers, and the horse was bought and the warranty given on a Sunday; and the only question was, whether, under the 29 Car. 2, c. 7, the purchase was illegal, and the plaintiffs precluded from maintaining the action. That the purchase of a horse by a horsedealer is an exercise of the business of his ordinary calling no one can doubt. The act does not apply to all persons, but to such only as have some ordinary calling. In Druvy v. De la Fontaine (r) Lord Mansfield, C. J. (after the Court had taken time to consider), laid it down, that if any man in the exercise of his ordinary calling make a con-

(q) Fennell and another v. Ridler, 5 B. & C. 406.
(r) Druvy v. De la Fontaine, 3 B. & C. 232; but see per Parke, J., Smith v. Sparrow, 4 Bing. 88.
tract on a *Sunday*, that contract would be void (and the case before him was a private contract for the purchase of a horse), but he showed that that case was not within the statute, because no one of the parties was in the exercise of the business of his ordinary calling. His expression, that the contract would be *void*, probably meant only that it would be void so as to prevent a party who was privy to what made it illegal from suing upon it in a Court of law, but not so as to defeat a claim upon it by an innocent party; and so it was considered by this Court in *Bloxsome v. Williams*" (s).

Where neither parties are *horsedealers*, a contract be between them for the sale of a horse is good, though made on Sunday; and this was recognized by Mr. Justice Bayley in the last case, as having been distinctly laid down by Lord Mansfield in *Drury v. De la Fontaine*.

Where a bargain for some cattle was made, and the price agreed on, on a Saturday evening, subject to the defendant’s approval of the beasts upon inspection next morning; and accordingly on Sunday the defendant inspected and approved them, and afterwards kept them for some time and promised to pay for them; it was held, that although the original contract was on Sunday, yet as they continued in the possession of the defendant, who afterwards promised to pay for them, this subsequent promise was sufficient on a *quantum meruit*, or as a ratification of the agreement of the Saturday (t).

But a party cannot sue on a breach of warranty if he take it on a Sunday from a person he knows to be a *horsedealer*. However, where an innocent party brings an action on the breach of a warranty given to him by a *horsedealer* on a Sunday, it is not competent for the defendant to set up his own breach of the law as an answer to the action; and this was so held in the case of *Bloxsome v. Williams* (u), where an action was brought on the warranty of a horse, and an objection was taken that it had been given on a Sunday. It appeared that the defendant was a coach proprietor and *horsedealer*, and that the plaintiff’s son was travelling on a Sunday in the defendant’s coach, and while the horses were changing he made a verbal bargain with the defendant for the horse in question, for the price of thirty-nine guineas; the latter warranted the horse to be

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(s) *Bloxsome v. Williams*, 1 Taunt. 135; S. C., 3 B. & C. 232.  
(t) *Williams v. Paul*, 6 Bing. 653.  
(u) See note (s), ante.
sound, and not more than seven years old. The horse was delivered to the plaintiff on the following Tuesday, and the price was then paid; there was nothing in evidence to show that the plaintiff's son knew at the time when he made the bargain that the defendant exercised the trade of a horse-dealer. The horse was unsound, and seventeen years old. It was objected, on the part of the defendant, that the plaintiff could not recover, on the ground that the bargain having been made on a Sunday was void within the 29 Car. 2, c. 7, s. 2. The learned judge overruled the objection, and the plaintiff obtained a verdict for the price of the horse. The Court of King's Bench discharged a rule for a new trial, and Mr. Justice Bayley said, "In this case there was no note in writing of the bargain, and on the Sunday all rested in parol, and nothing was done to bind the bargain. The contract, therefore, was not valid until the horse was delivered to and accepted by the defendant. The terms on which the sale was afterwards to take place were only specified on the Sunday, and those terms were incorporated in the sale made on the subsequent day."
CHAPTER II.

HORSEDEALERS, REPOSITORIES AND AUCTIONS.

Horsedealer.

A horsedealer, strictly, is a person who by his traffic "distributes" horses \( (a) \). And by 29 Geo. 3, c. 49, s. 5 (repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act, 1861), he was clearly defined to be a person who "seeks his living by buying and selling horses" \( (a) \).

It has not however been decided, whether a person who, for commission, sells by auction or private contract the horses of others, is a horsedealer within the Assessed Tax Acts.

The Judges at Serjeants’ Inn held the proprietor of Aldridge’s Repository to be a horsedealer. When the case came before the Court of Exchequer, Mr. Baron Parke, with whom Mr. Baron Alderson agreed, said, “I am by no means prepared to say that the decision of the Judges, as to the construction of the word ‘horsedealer’ in these statutes, was wrong; if I were forced to give an opinion, it might be in accordance with theirs” \( (b) \).

The duty which was formerly payable by a horsedealer has been repealed by the 37 Vict. c. 16, s. 11, which provides that duties on licences for exercising or carrying on the trade of Horsedealers shall cease to be payable.

By s. 19, sub-s. (5) of the Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 14), it shall not be necessary for a licence to be taken out by any horsedealer who shall have made entry of his premises in accordance with s. 28 of that Act, for any servant employed by him at such premises in the course of his trade, other than a servant employed to drive a carriage with any horse let to hire for any period exceeding twenty-eight days; provided that such horsedealer shall have complied with all the provisions contained in the said section.

\( (a) \) Allen v. Sharp, 2 Exch. 357. \( (b) \) Allen v. Sharp, 2 Ex. 352, 366.
By s. 28, "every person who exercises or carries on the trade of a horsedealer or of a livery stable keeper, or who lets any horse for hire, or who keeps any horse to be used for drawing any public stage or hackney carriage, may, if he shall think fit, deliver to an officer of inland revenue acting in the parish or place in which his premises are situated an entry in writing, signed by such person, containing a description of the premises and of the purpose for which he uses or intends to use them; and every person who shall have delivered any such entry shall cause to be legibly painted upon some conspicuous part of the premises so entered, or upon a board affixed thereto, his christian name and surname, with the addition of such other words as shall denote the particular trade or business, or trades or businesses (if more than one), carried on by him; and such person shall also allow any officer of inland revenue at any reasonable time to inspect the entered premises; and if any person who shall have delivered any such entry as aforesaid shall neglect to comply with the provisions of this section, or any of them, he shall forfeit a penalty of twenty pounds."

Repositories and Auctions.

An auctioneer.

An auctioneer is solely the agent of the seller of the goods, until the sale is effected, and then he becomes also the agent of the buyer for particular purposes (c). For when he signs the printed particulars of sale, he signs them as the agent of the purchaser (d). But as soon as the auction is over, the auctioneer loses his distinctive attributes; and to sales afterwards effected by him, the rules of ordinary sales alone are applicable (e).

The owner may at any time before the contract is complete, revoke the auctioneer's authority, but he does so at his peril; and if the auctioneer has contracted any liability in consequence of the employment and revocation, the auctioneer is entitled to be indemnified by the owner; but if an auctioneer not having authority from the owner to sell property without reserve, undertakes to do so, he is liable on his undertaking (f).

(c) Story on Sales, 61; Williams v. Millington, 1 H. Bla. 81; 2 R. R. 724; Emmerson v. Hoetis, 2 Taunt. 38; 11 R. R. 520.
An auctioneer intrusted with goods for sale by public auction has no implied authority to warrant them (g).

If an auctioneer has notice that property intrusted to him for the purpose of sale does not belong to his principal, and yet continues to sell, he is personally liable for the produce of the sale (h); and in such case the true owner of the property is entitled to recover the real value of the property sold, and not merely what it fetched at the auction, as that sum could not be assumed to be its real value (i).

An action lies against an auctioneer employed to conduct a sale for negligence in his management of it. As where the seller had to make the purchaser compensation, in consequence of the property having been improperly described by the auctioneer who had been employed to prepare particulars, and sell the property (k).

Where an auctioneer, by an unauthorized sale, deprives another of his property permanently or for an indefinite time, he is liable to an action for conversion (i). The case of Cochrane v. Rymill (m) is an instance of wrongful conversion by an auctioneer. In that case the plaintiff by agreement let some cabs on hire to one Peggs, who took them to the defendant, who was an auctioneer, and obtained an advance on them. The defendant by Peggs' instructions, and without any notice of the plaintiff's property in the goods, subsequently sold them by auction, and having recouped himself for his advance, commission, and expenses, handed over the balance to Peggs; and it was held by the Court of Appeal (affirming the judgment of Lord Coleridge, C.J.), that the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages from the defendant for conversion of the goods, and Bramwell, L.J., in the course of his judgment said, "It is, no doubt, a very hard case for the defendant who has acted innocently throughout in the matter; but setting aside the hardship of the case, the law applicable to it is quite clear. Here is Peggs, a man who is not the true owner of these goods, but appearing to act as such, but who has no

Not to warrant.

To sell for true owner.

Liable to an action for negligence.

Or for conversion.


(h) Hardacre v. Stewart, 5 Esp. 103; Davis v. Artingstall, 49 L. J., Ch. 609; 42 L. T., N. S. 507; 29 W. R. 137.

(i) Davis v. Artingstall, ubi supra.

(k) Parker v. Farebrother, 2 W. R. 370; and see Torrance v. Bolton, L. R., 3 Ch. 118; 42 L. J., Ch. 177.


(m) 40 L. T., N. S. 744; 27 W. R. 776.
power whatever to sell, takes them to the defendant and
gets a loan from him on them. The defendant keeps them
and finally sells them in such a way as to pass the property
in them to the buyers, and if that is not a conversion, then
I think there can be no such thing. Supposing a man were
to come into an auction yard holding a horse by the bridle
and to say, 'I want to sell my horse: if you will find a
purchaser I will pay commission.' And the auctioneer says,
'Here is a man who wants to sell a horse; will anyone buy
him?'. If he then and there finds him a purchaser and
the seller himself hand over the horse, there could be no
act, on the part of the auctioneer, which could render him
liable to an action for conversion. But, looking at this
case, there is a clear dealing with the property and exer-
cising dominion over the chattel, and a delivery of it by
the defendant to another person to do what he likes with
it."

But where the plaintiffs were the holders of a bill of sale
including certain horses and harness: and the grantor of
the bill of sale, without the plaintiff's knowledge, took the
horses and harness to the defendant's repository for sale by
auction and they were entered in the catalogue, the defen-
dant knowing nothing of the bill of sale; but before the
auction the grantor of the bill of sale sold the horses and
harness by private contract in the defendant's yard, and the
purchase-money was paid to the defendant, who deducted
his commission and paid the balance to the seller, the horses
and harness being delivered to the purchaser; it was held
that the defendant was not guilty of conversion (i). For
the defendant had received the horses and harness from the
grantor of the bill of sale, and had delivered them back to
the person to whom the grantor of the bill of sale had given
a delivery order; he had not claimed to transfer the title,
and he had not purported to sell; all the dominion he exer-
cised over the chattels was to re-deliver them to the man,
the person from whom he had received them had told him
to re-deliver them (k).

Where a horse is sent to a common repository, for the
sale of horses, an authority to sell is implied, although no
authority was ever given in fact, and the owner will be

(1892) 2 Ch. 172; 60 L. J., Ch. 308; 64 L. T. 411; 39 W. R. 621;
Consolidated Co. v. Curtis, [1892] 1 Q. B. 495; 61 L. J., Q. B. 325; 40
W. R. 426.
bound by a sale to a bonâ fide purchaser, although made without his express consent (l). Where a horse is sold at a repository, the possession is in the auctioneer, and it is he who makes the contract. If the horse should be stolen he may maintain an indictment, and he has such a special property as to maintain an action against the buyer for goods sold and delivered (m), but not in a case where the right of a third person intervenes, and is established (n). But where, as in the north of England, there is a sale by auction of horses and cattle on the owner's premises, it is doubtful whether the auctioneer has such an interest in them as to recover the price (o).

An auctioneer can set up the jus tertii, if he defends the action upon the right and authority of the third person, to a claim for the proceeds of a sale of goods, which he has been employed to sell by auction by a person who had gained possession of them by an illegal distress (p).

An auctioneer may interplead where he has sold goods, and the proceeds of the sale are claimed by a third party (q); and it seems that he is entitled to do so notwithstanding that he claims a lien on the proceeds of the sale for his commission, for in such cases he claims no interest in the corpus of the property (r). But where the claims are not co-extensive, an auctioneer has no right to interplead. In the case of Wright v. Freeman (rr) the defendant, the proprietor of a horse repository, sold there by public auction a horse to the plaintiff, warranted quiet to ride and in harness, but subject to a condition, by which, if considered by the buyer incapable of working from any infirmity or disease, it might be returned on the second day after the sale, and the matter determined by veterinary surgeons according to the terms provided for in such condition. The horse was returned accordingly by the plaintiff, who demanded to have back the money he had paid for the purchase, and this being refused, he brought an

(m) Williams v. Millington, 1 H. Bla. 86; 2 R. R. 724; Robinson v. Rutter, 24 L. J., Q. B. 250.
(o) See per Wilson, J., Williams v. Millington, 1 H. Bla. 86; 2 R. R. 724.
(p) Biddle v. Bond, 6 B. & S. 225; 34 L. J., Q. B. 137.
(q) Best v. Hayes, 32 L. J., Ex. 129.
(r) Ibid., per Martin, B. In this case the Court of Exchequer refused to follow the decision in Chancery in Mitchell v. Hayne (2 Sim. & S. 63), where it was held that an auctioneer, in such a case, could not file a bill of interpleader.
(rr) 48 L. J., C. P. 276; 40 L. T., N. S. 134; ibid. 358—C.A.
action against the defendant for damages for breach of the warranty, and the party who had placed the horse at the repository for sale, claimed of the defendant the proceeds of the sale, stating that the horse had left the repository perfectly sound; it was held that the defendant was not entitled to an interpleader order.

Goods sent to an auctioneer to be sold on premises occupied by him are privileged from distress for rent (s); although he may sell in a place let to him merely for the occasion, or by a person without authority, or the occupation has been acquired by the auctioneer by any act of trespass (t).

An auctioneer, who is employed to sell goods by public auction, has not such an interest as will make the licence to enter the premises irrevocable. Therefore, where the owner of the premises revoked his consent to the auctioneer remaining there, it was held that he had no right to continue there, though he had incurred expenses in allotting the goods, and though he remained only to complete the sale by delivering the goods to the purchasers (u).

After a sale is effected, the auctioneer may in general be considered as the agent and witness of both the parties to a contract; but a difficulty arises in the case where the auctioneer sues as one of the contracting parties (x), because the agent, whose signature is to bind the defendant, must not be the other contracting party upon the record (y). However, an entry made in a sale book by the auctioneer's clerk who attends the sale, and as each lot is knocked down names the purchaser aloud, and on a sign of assent from him makes a note accordingly in the book, is a memorandum in writing by an agent within section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893; for the clerk is not identified with the auctioneer (who sues), and in the business which he performs of entering the names, &c., he is impliedly authorized by the persons attending the sale to be their agent (z).

(u) Tappin v. Florence, 10 C. B. 744.
(x) Wright v. Dannah, 2 Camp. 203; 11 R. R. 693.
(z) Bird v. Boulter, 4 B. & Adol. 443. See also Sims v. Landray, [1894] 2 Ch. 318; 63 L. J., Ch. 635; 70 L. T., N. S. 530; 42 W. R. 621.
But if the purchaser's name be signed to a catalogue, it
must be connected with or refer to the conditions of sale to
make the contract valid (a); and it is not sufficient if they
are even in the same room, so long as they are not actually
attached to the catalogue, or clearly referred to in it; and
if during the sale they get separated, the signatures made
after separation are unavailing (b).

It is a useful and proper general rule that an auctioneer
by parol explanation at the time of sale shall not be
suffered to vary from the terms of the printed particulars.
This rule is attended with no hardship, because it would be
easy to obviate any difficulty in case the article sold be
different from the description; Gunnis v. Echart (c), Powell
v. Edmunds (d), and many other cases collected in Mr.
Phillip's book on evidence, show the principle to be, that a
written instrument signed with the purchaser's name is the
instrument at which we are to look to see what is the con-
tract between the parties (e).

But when the contract is not in writing, a mistake in
the catalogue may be explained by the auctioneer. Thus
where an auctioneer brought an action to recover the price
of an article under the value of 10l., which had been sold
by him, and described in the written catalogue of sale as
being of silver; it was held that evidence was receivable
to show, that before the article was put up for sale, the
auctioneer without making any alteration in the catalogue,
stated publicly from his box, in the hearing of the defen-
dant that the catalogue was incorrect, and that the article
would only be sold as plated, subsequently to which the
defendant bid for it (f).

By the conditions of sale at repositories and public
auctions a specified short time is usually allowed, within
which the purchaser must give notice of any breach of
warranty; and if he neglect to do so, he has no remedy
unless such condition has been rendered inoperative by
fraud or artifice. This subject was fully considered by the
Court of King's Bench in the following case:—A horse
was bought by private contract at a repository, warranted

(a) Hinde v. Whitehouse, 7 East, 568; 8 R. R. 676.
(b) Kenworthy v. Scholfield, 2 B. & C. 945. See also Pierce v. Cort,
L. R. 9 Q. B. 219; 43 L. J., Q. B. 52; 29 L. T., N. S. 919; 22
W. R. 299; Rishton v. Whatmore,
L. R., 8 Ch. D. 467; 47 L. J., Ch.

Purchaser's name signed to a catalogue.

Printed particulars of a sale.

An incorrect catalogue.

A limited warranty.

629; 26 W. R. 827.
(c) Gunnis v. Echart, 1 H. Bl.
289; 2 R. R. 769.
(d) Powell v. Edmunds, 12 East, 6;
11 R. R. 316.
(e) Shelton v. Livius, 2 C. & J. 416.
(f) Eden v. Blake, 13 M. & W.
614.
sound. At the time of sale there was a board fixed on the wall of the repository having certain rules painted upon it, one of which was that a warranty of soundness then given, should remain in full force until noon of the day following, when the sale should become complete and the seller's responsibility terminate, unless a notice and veterinary surgeon's certificate of unsoundness were given in the meantime. The rules were not particularly referred to at the time of this sale and warranty. The horse proved unsound, but no complaint was made till after twelve on the following day. The unsoundness was of a nature not likely to be immediately discovered. Some evidence was given to show that the defendant knew of it, and the horse was shown at the sale under circumstances favourable for concealing it. After verdict for the plaintiff, it was held that there was sufficient proof of the plaintiff having had notice of the rules at the time of sale to render them binding on him; also that the rule in question was such as a seller might reasonably impose, and that the facts did not show such fraud or artifice in him, as would render the condition inoperative; and Mr. John Littledale observed, "The warranty here was as if the vendor had said, 'after twenty-four hours I do not warrant;' such a stipulation is not unreasonable" (g).

If a horse sold at a public auction be warranted sound and six years old, and it be one of the conditions of sale that it shall be deemed sound unless returned in two days, this condition applies only to the warranty of soundness. Therefore, where a horse sold with such warranty was discovered to be twelve years old ten days after sale, and was then offered to the seller, who refused to take him, it was held by the Court of King's Bench that an action might be maintained by the buyer against the seller, and Lord Kenyon said, "The question turns on the meaning of this condition of sale, and I am of opinion that it must be confined solely to the circumstance of unsoundness. There is good sense in making such a condition at public sales, because, notwithstanding all the care that can be taken, many accidents may happen to the horse between the time of sale and the time when the horse may be returned, if no time were limited. But the circumstance of the age of the horse is not open to the same difficulty" (h).

(g) Bywater v. Richardson, 1 A. & E. 608; 3 N. & M. 748; Mendard v. Aldridge, 3 Esp. 271.  
(h) Buchanan v. Parnshaw, 2 T. R. 746.
By the rules of some repositories every horse sold, warranted quiet in harness, is, in cases of dispute, to be tried by an impartial person; and the expense of trial, in case the horse does not answer his warranty, is to fall on the seller. The keeper of the repository has a specific lien on the horse until such expense be paid (i).

Where the auctioneer declares that the conditions of a sale by auction are as usual, there is a sufficient notice of them to purchasers (k), where they are printed and posted up in a conspicuous part of the auction-room. Thus, where an action on the case was brought on the warranty of a horse, it appeared that the horse was sold by auction at the defendant's repository, and warranted sound. The sale took place on the Wednesday. At the time of the sale, the auctioneer announced that the conditions of the sale were as usual. These conditions of sale were proved to be contained in a printed paper pasted up under the auctioneer's box, and by one of them all horses purchased there, in case of any unsoundness being discovered, were required to be returned before the evening of the second day after the sale. The horse in question was not returned till the Saturday. When returned by the plaintiff, he was informed that it was too late, as he ought, pursuant to the conditions of sale, to have returned him on the evening of Friday. It was contended that there was no evidence of notice of the conditions of sale sufficient to bind the plaintiff. But Lord Kenyon (in summing up) said—"In this case it is proved that printed particulars of the sale are pasted up in the public sale room under the auctioneer's box. In the case of carriers, who advertise that they will not be liable for goods lost above the value of 5l., unless entered as such, the posting up of a bill in the coach office to that effect has been held to be sufficient. I therefore think the same mode being adopted here gives the same degree of notice to all persons who come to this sale, and that it is a sufficient notice of the conditions under which the horses are sold." "With respect to the main point, when parties enter into a special agreement, they must adhere to the terms of it. Here there is a condition that the party purchasing must

(i) Hardingham v. Allen, 6 C. B. 797.

(k) By the law of Scotland, a purchaser at a public auction cannot be allowed to plead that he was ignorant of the articles and conditions of sale. See Laing v. Hain, 2 S. M. & P. 395. (Court of Sess. Sco.)
return the horse within two days, which he has not done; I therefore think the plaintiff must be nonsuited” (l).

But when property is sold in lots described in particulars of sale, a vendee is only affected with notice of what concerns the lots which he purchases, and is not to be taken as having read all the particulars of all the lots (m).

Where goods are put up for sale by auction in lots, each lot is \textit{prima facie} deemed to be the subject of a separate contract of sale (n). But the making by the parties of a written contract or memorandum embodying several sales is relevant to prove an intention that the whole transaction shall be one entire contract (o).

“A sale by auction is complete when the auctioneer announces its completion by the fall of the hammer, or in other customary manner. Until such announcement is made any bidder may retract his bid” (oo). The reason for this is that the auctioneer is the agent of the vendor, and the assent of both parties is necessary to make the contract binding, and that is signified on the part of the seller by knocking down the hammer. Every bidding is nothing more than an offer on one side, which is not binding on either side till it is assented to (p).

Where a horse is to be sold “without reserve,” and the vendor buys it, the highest \textit{bona fide} bidder is entitled to recover damages from the auctioneer. In the case of \textit{Warlow v. Harrison} (q), the sale was stated to be “without reserve,” and one of the printed conditions was, “any lot ordered for this sale, and sold by private contract by the owner or advertiser ‘without reserve,’ and bought by the owner, to be liable to the usual commission of 5l. per cent.” There was also the usual condition that the highest bidder should be the buyer. After a \textit{bona fide} bid by a third person, the owner advanced on the bidding, and the lot was knocked down to him. The Court of Queen’s Bench held that the owner could not claim the lot as sold to the

(l) \textit{Mesnard v. Aldridge}, Esp. 271.

(m) \textit{Curtis v. Thomas}, 33 L. T., N. S. 664, V.-C. II.

(n) Sale of Goods Act, 1893, s. 58, sub-s. (1). See also \textit{Emmerson v. Heelis}, 2 Taunt. 38; 11 R. R. 529; \textit{Roots v. Dormer}, 4 B. & Ad. 77.


(oo) Sale of Goods Act, 1893, s. 58, sub-s. (2).


(q) 29 L. J., Q. B. 14; 1 E. & E. 295—Ex. Ch. See also Sale of Goods Act, 1893, s. 58, sub-ss. (3), (4), post, p. 45.
Repositories and Auctions.

The auctioneer, against whom the action was brought, and that they were not called upon to say whether there was any or what remedy on the conditions of sale against the vendor, who violated the condition that the article should be _bonâ fide_ sold "without reserve," but they were clear that the bidder had no remedy against the auctioneer, whose authority to accept the offer of the bidder had been determined by the vendor before the hammer had been knocked down. But in the Exchequer Chamber, to which this case was carried, three Judges held that the purchaser was entitled to recover damages, for they thought that the highest _bonâ fide_ bidder at an auction may sue the auctioneer as upon a contract that the sale shall be "without reserve," and that the contract is broken upon a bid being made by or on behalf of the owner, whether it be during the time when the property is under the hammer, or it be the last bid on which the property is knocked down. They did not doubt that the owner at any time before the contract is legally complete might revoke the auctioneer's authority. As to the conditions, they held that the owner could not be the buyer; and that the auctioneer ought not to have taken his bid, but to have refused it, stating as his reason that the sale was "without reserve." Inclining to differ from the Queen's Bench, they rather thought the bid of the owner was not a revocation of the auctioneer's authority. The other two Judges agreed, but founded their judgment upon the evidence that the auctioneer had not authority to sell except "without reserve," and thought that there ought to be a count added by way of amendment, stating an undertaking by the auctioneer that he had authority to sell "without reserve," and a breach of that undertaking.

But where an auctioneer advertised in the London papers that a sale by auction would take place on a particular day in a country town, and also circulated catalogues specifying the articles to be sold; and a person attended the sale intending to buy certain articles specified in the catalogue, but on the day of sale they were withdrawn by the auctioneer; it was held that there was no implied contract by him to indemnify the intended purchaser against the expense and inconvenience that he had incurred, as the advertising was a mere declaration of intention to sell (r).

A statement that a horse is the property of the vendor, _Effect of advertisement._

(warranty of ownership._

made by himself or agent, is a sufficient warranty of the
ownership, and an assertion by an auctioneer that all the
horses in a sale are the bonâ fide property of the person
whose stud he has advertised as selling, would vitiate the
purchase of a horse belonging to another party, made on the
faith of that representation, such horse having been put
into the sale without notice; because the purchaser would
probably give a much higher price for a horse belonging to
the stud in question, than for one without a character (q).

Where an auctioneer sells a commodity without saying
on whose behalf he sells it, in such case the purchaser is
entitled to look to him personally for the completion of the
contract (r), and the same rule, according to the general
law of principal and agent, applies to purchasers (s).

An auctioneer is not in the position of an ordinary agent,
but may be personally liable for non-delivery of goods, even
though he sells for a disclosed principal, and although a
condition of sale, by which goods are to be cleared out by
the purchaser within a given time, has not been complied
with, at all events where such condition is not a condition
precedent (t).

When a horse is bid up by a puffer, the seller, in the
absence of any notification that the sale is subject to a right
to bid on his behalf, cannot recover the price, as the sale is
void; and in such case it is immaterial whether the sale was
under the usual condition that the highest bidder shall be
the purchaser, or "without reserve," or subject to a
reserved price.

The rule that a sale by auction is vitiated by the secret
employment of a puffer was fully recognized in a series of
decisions previously to the Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (u),
and by s. 58, sub-ss. (3), (4) of that Act is now declared
in the following terms:

(q) Bexwell v. Christie, Coup. 397. See also Hill v. Gray, 1 Stark.
N. P. C. 434; 18 R. R. 802.
(r) Hansot v. Robertdeau, 1 Peake, 163; Franklin v. Lamonde, 4 C. B.
637; 16 L. J., C. P. 221.
(s) As to principal and agent, see the rule in Thompson v. Davenport,
9 B. & C. 86. See also Williamson v. Barton, 7 H. & N. 899; 31 L. J.,
Ex. 170; 10 W. R. 321.
(t) Wollf v. Horne, 2 Q. B. D.
355; 46 L. J., Q. B. 534; 36 L. T.,
N. S. 705; 25 W. R. 728.

(u) See Bexwell v. Christie, Coup.
396; Howard v. Castle, 6 T. R.
634; 3 R. R. 296; Crowder v.
Austin, 3 Bing. 368; 11 Moore,
283; White v. Collier, M. & M.
126; Thornett v. Haines, 15 M. &
W. 367; 16 L. J., Ex. 230; Green
v. Beaverstock, 14 C. B., N. S. 204;
32 L. J., C. P. 181; Mortimer v.
Bell, L. R., 1 Ch. 10; 35 L. J., Ch.
25; Gilliat v. Gilliat, L. R., 9 Eq.
60; 39 L. J., Ch. 142; Parfit v.
Jepson, 46 L. J., C. P. 529; 36
L. T. 251.
(3) "Where a sale by auction is not notified to be subject to a right to bid on behalf of the seller, it shall not be lawful for the seller to bid himself or to employ any person to bid at such sale, or for the auctioneer knowingly to take any bid from the seller or any such person. Any sale contravening this rule may be treated as fraudulent by the buyer."

(4) "A sale by auction may be notified to be subject to a reserved or upset price, and a right to bid may also be reserved expressly by or on behalf of the seller. When a right to bid is expressly reserved, but not otherwise, the seller, or any one person on his behalf, may bid at the auction."

The law is so jealous of the rights of bona fide bidders, that it has been held as doubtful whether a previous private warranty to a person who became an unsuccessful bidder would not avoid the sale to a third party; for it was like puffing, and in a sale by auction all have a right to suppose that they are bidding upon equal terms (x).

An agreement made by two persons not to bid against each other, but that one of them should bid up to a certain sum, and that the lot should subsequently be divided between them, is not illegal, and therefore furnishes no ground for opening the biddings, or annulling the sale (y).

A mock auction with sham bidders, for the purpose of selling goods at prices grossly above their worth, is an offence at common law, and the persons aiding and abetting such a proceeding may be indicted for a conspiracy with intent to defraud (z).

A purchaser at an auction can, before payment, make a complete bargain and sale of the article which he has bought to a third party, so as to maintain an action for goods bargained and sold (a).

Where a party refuses to take goods he has purchased, they should be resold, and he will be liable to the loss, if any, upon the resale (b).

Thus, in Scotland, where some horses were sold by public auction without stipulation as to credit, and the

\[(z)\] Hopkins v. Tanqueray, 23 L. J., C. P. 162.
\[(y)\] In re Carew's Trusts, 26 Beav. 187.
\[(z)\] Reg. v. Lewis, 11 Cox, C. C. 484.

\[(a)\] Scott v. England, 2 D. & L. 520. See also Heffer v. Martyn, 36 L. J., Ch. 372.
\[(b)\] See Maclean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. 729; Story on Sales, 348.
purchaser allowed two days to elapse without tendering the price, it was held that the seller, who had never parted with the possession, was entitled on the third day to resell them without any communication with the original purchaser, and to sue the original purchaser for the difference in the prices, and for the keep of the horses between the periods of sale and resale, and the expenses of the resale (e).

An auctioneer, employed to sell goods for ready money, is the agent of the vendor to receive the price (d); but where the goods are sold on credit, it depends upon the extent of his authority, which, in the absence of any proof of general authority, must depend upon the conditions of sale; and where the only authority given to the auctioneer by these conditions is to receive the deposit money, the vendor reserves to himself or his agent the power to receive the remainder of the purchase-money (e).

And in any case where he has authority to receive the purchase-money, he has no authority to receive it by means of a bill of exchange (f).

Where, by the terms of a sale by auction, a deposit is to be made with the auctioneer, he becomes the stakeholder of both parties, and must retain possession of it (g); and if he accepts a less sum than that which is to be paid by the conditions of sale, he cannot afterwards object that too little is paid (h).

If he parts with the deposit without authority from the vendee, he may be sued for it. Thus, when the auctioneer received the deposit, and signed the agreement that he would complete the sale, and the vendee found the title to the estate sold defective, it was held that he might bring an action for money had and received against the auctioneer for the deposit, though the latter had paid it over to the vendor without any notice from the purchaser not to do so, and before the defect of title was ascertained (i); for in strict

(e) Laing v. Hain, 2 S. M. & P. 396. (Court of Sess., Sco.)
(d) Sykes v. Giles, 5 M. & W. 650; Williams v. Evans, L. R., 1 Q. B. 332; 35 L. J., Q. B. 111.
(f) Sykes v. Giles, 5 M. & W. 652. And see Williams v. Evans, L. R. 1 Q. B. 352; 35 L. J., Q. B. 111.
(h) Hanson v. Roberdeau, 1 Peake, N. P. 163.
(i) Gray v. Gutteridge, 3 C. & P. 40.
law the auctioneer, being a stakeholder, is not entitled to
notice of the contract being rescinded (k).

An auctioneer, being a mere stakeholder, is not liable
for interest on the deposit to the vendor (l).

An auctioneer has a lien upon the goods sold by him,
and a right of lien upon the price when paid, for his
commission and charges (m). With this object he may
bring an action in his own name for the price of the goods
sold by him. Accordingly, where the defendant pleaded
to a declaration for the price of a horse sold and delivered
by the plaintiff, who was an auctioneer, that the plaintiff
sold the horse as auctioneer, agent and trustee for K., and
that defendant had paid K. before action brought, this
plea was held on demurrer to be a bad plea (n).

Where a horse is sold at a repository on certain condi-
tions, one of which, for instance, may be, a power to return
the horse within a certain time, if he does not answer his
warranty; it has been held that the price which the auc-
tioneer has received does not vest in the vendor until the
conditions have been complied with (o).

Where an agent on a sale receives as the price of an
article money obtained by the fraud of his principal, it is
not money received to the use of the principal, but to the
use of the purchaser of the chattel. Thus, a horsedealer
employed an auctioneer to sell a horse for him, and to make
certain representations which amounted to gross fraud.
The horse was sold and paid for, but before the money was
paid over the fraud was discovered and the money returned
to the purchaser. The horsedealer brought an action
against the auctioneer to recover the money so received by
him. But it was held by the Court of Queen's Bench that
he could not recover, as the principle of Murray v. Mann (p)
applied with the greatest force to this case. And it was
said that it would be a discredit to the law of England
if the innocent agent of the plaintiff's fraud were bound
to pay the money over to him. For if he did so after
notice he would be liable to an action at the suit of the
purchaser (q).

(k) Duncan v. Cafe, 2 M. & W. 244.
(l) Harington v. Hogart, 1 B. & Ad. 577.
(m) Coppin v. Craig, 7 Taunt. 243;
17 R. R. 508; Robinson v. Rutter,
24 L. J., Q. B. 250.
(n) Robinson v. Rutter, 24 L. J.,
Q. B. 250.
(p) Murray v. Mann, 2 Exch. 538.
(q) Stevens v. Legh, 2 C. L. R. 251.
Where an auctioneer entrusted with a sale is the *causa causans* of the sale, he is entitled to his commission, even though before the actual sale the vendor withdrew the property from sale by him *(r)*. Thus, by the terms of an agreement between the parties, an auctioneer was to be entitled to a commission, if the estate should be sold by him. The estate was not actually sold by him, but the vendor, after the auctioneer had advertised the sale, and had put up the property for sale by auction, wrote to the plaintiff, and withdrew the property from sale for the present. In the meantime, and before the sale was withdrawn, the vendor and the afterwards purchaser were in negotiation for the purchase of the property. In an action by the auctioneer against the vendor for his commission, it was held by the Court of Common Pleas, that under these circumstances the auctioneer must be held to be the *causa causans* of the sale, and therefore entitled to his commission *(s)*.

CHAPTER III.

FAIRS AND MARKETS OVERT; HORSE STEALING AND THE RECOVERY OF STOLEN HORSES.

Fairs and Markets Overt.

The general rule of law is, that all sales and contracts of anything vendible in fairs or markets overt (that is, open), shall not only be good between the parties, but also be binding on all those that have any right of property therein. And for this purpose, the Mirror informs us, were tolls established in markets, viz. to testify the making of contracts, for every private contract was discountenanced by law; insomuch that our Saxon ancestors prohibited the sale of anything above the value of twenty pence unless in open market, and directed every bargain and sale to be contracted in the presence of credible witnesses (a).

The general rule of the law of England is, that a man who has no authority to sell cannot, by making a sale, transfer the property to another. And the only exception to this rule is the case of sales in market overt (b), when the purchaser's title is good against all the world (c).

This exception, however, only applies to bona fide sales commenced and perfected in market overt; that is, where the goods sold are actually in the market, and where both the sale and delivery of them take place therein (d).

Market overt in the country is only held on the special days provided for particular towns by charter or prescription, but in London every day, except Sunday, is market day (a).

The market place, or spot of ground set apart by custom, or established under powers conferred by a modern Act of parliament (e), for the sale of particular goods, is also in the country the only market overt, but in the city

(a) 2 Bla. Com. 449.
(b) See per Abbott, C. J., Dyer v. Pearson, 3 B. & C. 42.
(c) Candy v. Lindsay, 3 App. Cas. 459; 47 L. J., Q. B. 481; 38 L. T., N. S. 573.
(e) Ganly v. Ledwidge, 10 Ir. R., C. L. 33, Q. B.
of London by the custom of London every shop (except pawnbrokers) in which goods are exposed publicly for sale is market overt, but for such things only as the owner professes to trade in (f). So that Smithfield is not a market overt for clothes, nor Cheapside for horses (ff).

Without the city of London, market overt is an open, public, and legally constituted market (g). Therefore a mere repository for horses is not market overt (h).

By the Markets and Fairs Clauses Act (10 & 11 Vict. c. 14), s. 13, every person, other than a licensed hawker, is prohibited from selling or exposing for sale within the prescribed limits, except in his own dwelling-place or shop, any articles in respect of which tolls are by the special Act authorised to be taken in the market.

The object of the Act was evidently to protect the interests of the market; to restrain anyone from setting up within the limits a rival market; and the substantial meaning of section 13 is, that whenever it appears that the seller sells in a shop which is private and permanent he is to be within the exception, but whenever a man does not sell in his private shop, but sets up a private market of his own, the section imposes a penalty; and whether or not the place of sale is the seller's own private dwelling-place or shop is a question which must be decided upon a consideration of all the elements of the case (i). The section includes horses under the word article, when sold by a licensed auctioneer by auction in the yard belonging to a dwelling-house not his own, and within the prescribed limits (j).

Where an auctioneer sold sheep, cattle and horses at a building called the "Agricultural Hall," of which he was proprietor, and which was capable of holding one hundred head of cattle, and which was, moreover, contiguous to a yard capable of holding 1,400 sheep, it was held, that these premises were not the auctioneer's dwelling-place or shop, notwithstanding that his dwelling-house was only

(f) 2 Bla. Com. 449.
(ff) Moore, 360.
(h) Lee v. Bayes, 18 C. B. 601.
separated from the hall by the yard (k). And, "under that state of facts," said Cockburn, C. J., "it is impossible to say that the sale took place in the dwelling-place of the respondent; for the place is entirely separated from his dwelling-house; and assuming (contrary to my opinion) that a distinction was intended by the use of the phrase 'dwelling-place,' instead of 'dwelling-house,' which occurs in some of the other statutes, and that 'dwelling-place' may apply to somewhat larger and more extensive premises than the term 'dwelling-house' would apply to; yet I do not think that in any sense of the term can those premises be said to be the dwelling-place of the respondent, separated as they are from the place in which he lives. Then, is it his shop? I am of opinion that it is not. It cannot, in any proper sense of the term, be called a shop. I agree that there may be cases in which the term 'shop,' in its popular sense, would not be applicable to the premises in which things were sold or exposed for sale, and yet, by a liberal and rational construction of the Act, the premises might be considered as within the exception of 'shop.' Take, for instance, the place of business of a horsedealer who has stables in which he keeps horses for sale, either as his own or on commission. Although tolls are payable for the sale of horses in the market, it would be, perhaps, too much to say that the horsedealer is not at liberty to sell horses on his own premises, as not being within the exception of 'shop' in the statute. I think we might say that, on fair construction, the horsedealer's premises were 'a shop' within that term as used in section 13. But each case must depend on its particular circumstances. Although, as I have said, the premises of a horsedealer might come within the exception, it is a very different thing when we have to deal with an extensive area like the present, which is, in fact, nearly as extensive as the market-place itself. It is true that the auction itself took place in a building, but the sheep and other things, the subject of the sale, were exposed for sale in this large yard and kept there. To say that this could be a 'shop' within the meaning of this section would be, as it appears to me, quite unreasonable. I own my individual opinion is rather strong against an auctioneer's premises being a 'shop' at all within the meaning of the section, but it is not necessary to determine

that. Assuming that an auctioneer's premises might be a shop for the purpose of selling, so as to come within the exception, it seems to me impossible to say that these extensive premises, being in the open air and capable of holding so many hundred sheep, can in any sense of the term be brought within the description of a shop" (I).

A horse which brings goods to market to be sold is, as well as the goods themselves, exempt from distress, for the sake of public utility (m).

Where a statute prohibited persons from sending animals affected with a contagious disease to market, and inflicted penalties on any person so sending them, the act of sending them, if known to be so infected, was a public offence, but did not amount by implication to a representation that they were sound, and did not of itself raise, as between the vendor of the animals and the purchaser of them, any right on the part of the purchaser to claim damages in respect of an injury he had suffered in consequence of their purchase (n).

**Horse Stealing.**

By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 10, it is enacted, that "whosoever shall steal any horse, mare, gelding, colt or filly, or any bull, cow, ox, heifer or calf, or any ram, ewe, sheep or lamb, shall be guilty of felony:" and by section 11, it is enacted, that "whosoever shall wilfully kill any animal with intent to steal the carcase, skin or any part of the animal so killed, shall be guilty of felony" (o).

In an indictment for horse stealing under 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, s. 25, the phraseology of which section has been followed in this respect by 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 10, it was held, that the animal, whether a horse, mare, gelding, colt or filly, might be described as a "horse," although the statute specified the particular species and gender (p); and the construction thus given to the former statute would probably make it unnecessary to amend in a like case an indictment under the present statute. Now, upon any similar objection being taken, not covered, as in this case, by an

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(m) See Francis v. Wyatt, 3 Burr. 1502, and the authorities there cited.


(o) Repealing but substantially re-enacting 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 28, s. 25.

(p) Rex v. Aldridge, 4 Cox, C. C. 143.
express decision, the indictment might be amended under 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 1.

If a horse in a close is taken with intent to steal him, but the thief is caught before he get out of the close, the offence is complete (q). And where the prisoner went into the stable of an inn, and, pointing to a mare, said to the ostler, “That is my horse, saddle him,” and the ostler did so, and the prisoner tried to mount the mare in the inn yard, but failing to do so directed the ostler to lead the mare out of the yard for him to mount, and the ostler led her out, but before the prisoner had time to mount her a person who knew the mare came up and the prisoner was secured; it was held, that if the prisoner caused the mare to be led out of the stable intending to steal her, that was a sufficient taking to constitute a felony (r).

If the owner of goods gives up the possession of his goods, at the same time intending to part with the entire property in them, it is no larceny, although he may be defrauded in the bargain (s).

A person selling a horse at a fair should take care how he delivers his horse to a stranger without receiving payment for him, because whatever false statements and pretences the stranger may make use of, if the seller part with him on a promise being made that he shall be paid for him at a certain place, and the horse is ridden off without his receiving the money, he cannot get him back again, neither can he indict the stranger for tricking him, but his only remedy is an action for the price, which it might be useless to bring against so worthless a party. Thus, where a man was indicted for obtaining a filly by false pretences, it appeared that the prisoner, pretending to be a gentleman’s servant, that he lived at Brecon, and that he had bought twenty horses at Brecon Fair, got possession of a filly there from a person who had her on sale, saying that if the prosecutor would take a horse he delivered to him to the Cross Keys he would meet him and pay the money. The prisoner never made his appearance, and the horse left was good for nothing. It was held, that as the prosecutor parted with the filly because the prisoner promised to pay him, and not on account of any of the false pretences charged, the prisoner was entitled to an acquittal (t).

(q) 1 Hale, 508.  
(r) Rex v. Pitman, 2 C. & P. 423.  
(s) Per Coleridge, J., Reg. v.  
(t) Rex v. Dale, 7 C. & P. 352;  
(e) R. v. Harvey, 1 Leach, 467. 

When the offence is complete.

Property given up.

Delivery of a horse to a stranger.

Sheppard, 9 C. & P. 123.
Where W. let a horse on hire to C., who fetched the horse every morning from W.'s stable and returned it after the day's work was done, and the prisoner went to C. one day just as the day's work was done and fraudulently obtained the horse by saying, falsely, "I have come for W.'s horse; he has got a job on and wants it as quickly as possible;" and the same evening the prisoner was found three miles off with the horse by a constable, to whom he stated it was his father's horse and that he was sent to sell it. This was held as against W. to be a larceny, though as against C. it would have been an obtaining by false pretences (w).

If, instead of delivering a horse on the completion of a bargain, the owner allows the party to ride him by way of trial, and he rides away in pursuance of an intention to defraud, the property is unchanged, and the felony is complete (w).

If the owner does not consent to the goods being taken, and the person when he bargains for them does not intend to pay for them, but means to get them into his possession, and dispose of them for his own benefit without paying for them, it is a larceny (x).

If a horse be hired for the day by a person intending at the time of hiring to appropriate it, and it is accordingly taken away and sold, a felony is committed, because the owner did not intend to relinquish his property in the horse, but only the temporary possession (y). But where a horse is hired for a particular purpose the selling him after that purpose is accomplished will not constitute a new felonious taking (z).

If goods are delivered to a person on hire, and he takes them away animo furandi, he is guilty of larceny, although no actual conversion of them by sale or otherwise is proved. Thus, where A. hired a horse and gig with the felonious intention of converting them to his own use, and afterwards offered them for sale, but no sale took place; it was held nevertheless that he was guilty of larceny (a).

A taking with the bare intent to use goods, though

\[ (v) \text{ Reg. v. Kendall, 30 L. T. 345; Reg. v. } \]
\[ 12 \text{ Cox, C. C. 598, C. C. R.} \]
\[ (w) \text{ See Dickinson, Q. S. 220.} \]
\[ (x) \text{ Gilbert's Case, 1 Mood. C. C. 186.} \]
\[ (y) \text{ Rex v. Pear, 1 Leach, 521; Rex v. Pateh, Ibid. 238; Rex v.} \]
\[ \text{Pratt, 1 Mood. C. C. 185.} \]
\[ (z) \text{ Rex v. Banks, R. & R. 441.} \]
\[ (a) \text{ Reg. v. Janson, 4 Cox, C. C. 82, overruling Reg. v. Brooks, 8 C. & P. 295.} \]
unlawfully, will be only a trespass if the jury are satisfied that
such was the original intention. Thus, where two persons
took two horses from a stable, rode them to a place at a
distance, and there left them, proceeding on foot, and the
jury found that they took the horses merely to forward
them on their journey, and not to make any further use of
them, this was held not to be a larceny (b). And if a per-
son stealing other property takes a horse, not with the
intent to steal it, but only to get off more conveniently with
the other property which he has stolen, such taking of the
horse is not a felony (c).

Where a man is found in possession of a thing after a
lapse of six or seven months from the time when it was
lost, and there is no other evidence against him but that
possession, he ought not to be called on to account for it.
Thus, where a mare, which had been lost in December,
was not found in the prisoner’s possession till the June or
July following, it was held that his possession was not
sufficiently recent to put him on his defence (d).

By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 40 (e), the malicious killing,
maiming or wounding of any cattle is felony. And the
word “cattle,” which alone is mentioned in the Act, has
been held under former Acts to include horses (f), as well
as oxen, &c., pigs (g), and asses (h).

By section 41 of the same statute, the malicious killing,
maiming or wounding of other animals is made punishable
by imprisonment or fine.

Where a person had poured nitrous acid into a mare’s
ear, and some had run into her eyes and blinded her, and
the injuries produced to the ear were ulcers, not wounds,
though such ulcers would have turned to wounds, a convic-
tion for maiming was held right (i).

The distinction between maiming (k) and wounding (l)
appears to be that the former implies permanent injury,
while the latter does not necessarily so.

It is not necessary under this statute to prove that any
instrument has been used; where the roots of a horse’s
tongue were lacerated, and the tongue was protruding from

(b) Rex v. Phillips, 2 East, P. C. c. 16, s. 98.
(e) Rex v. Crump, 1 C. & P. 658.
(d) Per Maule, J., Rex v. Cooper, 16 Jul. 750.
(e) Repel in but re-enacting 7 & 8Geo. 4, c. 30, s. 16.
(f) Rex v. Futey, 2 W. Bla. 721.
(g) Rex v. Chapple, R. & R. 77;
15 R. R. 736.
(h) Rex v. Whitney, 1 Mood. C. C. 3.
(i) Owen’s Case, 1 Mood. C. C. 205.
(l) K. v. Haywood, Russ. & Ryan,
his mouth, and there was only evidence to show that the injury had been done by the prisoner's hand, it was held that an offence against the Act had been committed (m).

To support an indictment under these sections, it is unnecessary to give evidence of malice against any particular person (n), yet an evil intent in the prisoner must appear. Thus, in a case in which the prisoner, a groom, administered sulphuric acid to his horses, Parke, J., left it to the jury to say, whether he had done it with the intent feloniously to kill them, or under the impression that it would improve their appearance (there being some evidence of a practice of that kind among grooms), and that in the latter case they ought to acquit him (o).

Where, however, the act is cruel and wanton the law will imply malice. Thus, where a man caused the death of a mare from internal injuries not intending by his act to kill, maim, or wound her, and acting recklessly and not caring whether she was injured or not, though without any ill-will or spite, either towards the owner of the animal or the animal herself, and without any motive except the gratification of his own depraved tastes, he was found guilty of maliciously killing the mare contrary to the statute (p).

By 39 & 40 Vict. c. 13 (The Drugging of Animals Act, 1876), the practice of administering poisonous drugs to horses and other animals by disqualified persons and without the knowledge and consent of the owner of such animals is made punishable by fine or imprisonment. The Act does not extend to the owner of the animal, nor anyone acting under his authority, nor does it exempt a person from punishment under any other Act, so that he be not punished more than once for the same offence.

Recovery of Stolen Horses.

Although as a general rule the purchaser of stolen goods in market overt acquires a title to them, this is not the case with regard to stolen horses. For a purchaser gains no property in a horse which has been stolen, unless he buys

it in a fair or market overt, according to the directions of the statutes of Philip and Mary (q), and Elizabeth (r).

By the statutes of Philip and Mary, and Elizabeth, it is enacted, that the horse which is for sale shall be openly exposed in the time of such fair or market, for one whole hour together, between ten in the morning and sunset, in the public place used for such sales, and not in any private yard or stable; and afterwards brought by both the vendor and vendee to the bookkeeper of such fair or market; that toll be paid if any be due, and if not, one penny to the bookkeeper, who shall enter down the price, colour, and marks of the horse, with the names, additions and abode of the vendee and vendor, the latter being properly attested (s).

The sale of a horse under these statutory regulations does not take away the property of the owner, if within six months after the horse is stolen he puts in his claim before some magistrate where the horse shall be found, and within forty days more proves it to be his property by the oath of two witnesses, and tenders to the person in possession such price as he bonâ fide paid for him in market overt (t).

Unless, however, it is proved that the horse was stolen a magistrate has no authority to restore it; and, therefore, where a complaint was made to a magistrate by A. the owner, that his horse had been stolen by B., without actual proof of its having been stolen, it was held that an officer, although armed with a warrant against B., was not justified under the 31 Eliz. c. 12, s. 4, in taking the horse out of the possession of the bonâ fide purchaser from B. (u).

Where horses or other stolen goods are sold out of market overt, the owner's property is not altered, and he may take them wherever he finds them (x).

We have seen that the sale of a stolen horse, even in market overt, is void if certain statutory regulations have not been observed, and in such case the owner does not lose his property, but at any distance of time may seize or bring an action for his horse, wherever he happens to find him (x). But, in a case (y) in which no evidence was

Statutory regulations.

Owner must prove the horse was stolen.

Sale out of market overt.

Recovery when not sold under these regulations.

(q) 2 & 3 Ph. & M. c. 7, post, Appendix. By s. 22, sub-s. (2) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, nothing in that section shall affect the law relating to the sale of horses.

(r) 31 Eliz. c. 12, post, Appendix.

(s) 2 Ph. & M. c. 7, and 31 Eliz. c. 12.

(t) 31 Eliz. c. 12, s. 4; Kel. 48.

(u) Joseph v. Adkins, 2 Stark. N. P. C. 76.

(x) 2 Bla. Com. 449.

given of a compliance with the statutory regulations, a bona
fide purchaser of a horse from a person who had bought it
(as the second purchaser knew) at a fair, without any
evidence that he knew that it was obtained dishonestly,
although it had been purchased on credit, and not paid for,
was held entitled to maintain trover against the original
owner for retaking it.

The onus of showing that the formalities required by the
statute have been observed lies on the buyer. In Moran v.
Pitt (z) the defendant's mare, which he had turned out in
a public park, was found out of the park and was sold at
public auction by the "pinner"; and after an inter-
mediate sale she was sold in market overt by the plaintiff
and subsequently taken possession of by the defendant.
No proof was given that the formalities required by the
statute had been complied with; and the Court of Queen's
Bench, in the absence of such proof, declined to infer that
such formalities had been observed, and held that the
plaintiff could not maintain an action for the mare against
the defendant, the true owner.

It has been held, that where a party has good reason to
believe that his horse has been stolen, he cannot maintain
trover against the person who bought it of the supposed
thief, unless he has done everything in his power to bring
the thief to justice (a). But where the owner of the stolen
property had prosecuted the felon to conviction, and before
that time had given notice of the felony to the defendant,
who had purchased bona fide, but not in market overt,
and the defendant after such notice had sold the property
in market overt, it was held that the owner might
recover from the defendant the value of his property in
trover (b).

Though the decisions themselves in the cases of Gimson
v. Woodfall and Peer v. Humphrey have not been expressly
overruled, yet the general rule upon which they rest can
now only be taken with some modifications. It is a true
principle, that where a criminal and consequently an in-
jurious act towards the public has been committed, which
is also a civil injury to a party, that party shall not be
permitted to seek redress for the civil injury to the pre-
judice of public justice, and to waive the felony (c). But

(a) 42 L. J., Q. B. 47; 28 L. T.,
N. S. 554; 21 W. R. 554.
(b) Peer v. Humphrey, 2 A. & E. 499.
(c) Although this is the rule, it
becomes a different question when
this rule of public policy applies only to proceedings between the plaintiff and the felon himself, or at the most the felon and those with whom he must be sued \( (d) \), and therefore it is not applicable where the action is against a third party, who is innocent of the felony.

Thus, it was held that an action of *trover* was maintainable to recover the value of goods which had been stolen from the plaintiff, and which the defendant had innocently purchased, although no steps had been taken to bring the thief to justice \( (d) \). Thus, too, in a case where A. had *bonâ fide* purchased a stolen horse at a public auction (not being a market overt), and had sent it for sale to a repository for horses kept by B., and there it was found by the owner, who demanded it of B. in the presence of A., and B. refused to give it up without the authority of A.; it was held, in an action of *trover* against A. and B., that in this case it was not necessary in the first instance to prosecute the felon, and that there was sufficient evidence of a joint conversion; inasmuch as, though a servant or agent, who has received goods from his master or principal, may, on the demand made by the true owner of the goods, give a qualified refusal to deliver them up, without being liable to an action of *trover*; yet when a bailee sets up or relies upon the title of his bailor, in answer to such demand, his refusal is evidence of a conversion by him \( (e) \).

If goods be stolen from any common person, and he prosecutes the offender to conviction, he will be entitled, under 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 100 \( (f) \), to an order of restitution from the Court before whom the trial took place, and this notwithstanding any intervening sale in market overt \( (g) \).

Or the goods may be recovered in *trover* from the purchaser of them in market overt, upon a conversion by him subsequent to the conviction of the felon, without any order for restitution having been made. For the effect of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 100 \( (f) \), is to revest the property in stolen goods in the original owner upon conviction of the felon \( (h) \).

we have to consider how it is to be enforced: per Cockburn, C. J., *Weels v. Abrahams*, L. R., 7 Q. B. 557; 41 L. J., Q. B. 306.


\( (e) \) *Lee v. Bayes*, 18 C. B. 559.

\( (f) \) Taken from 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, s. 57.

\( (g) \) 2 Steph. 124.

\( (h) \) *Scattergood v. Sylvester*, 19 L. J., Q. B. 447.

Where the action is against a third party.

Evidence of conversion.

Order for restitution.

Or action of *trover*.
The _bonâ fide_ purchaser of stolen beasts sold in market overt cannot, in answer to a claim for them by the original owner after the conviction of the thief, counterclaim for the cost of their keep while the beasts were in his possession, for they were his own property until, on the conviction, the property revested in the original owner (_i_).

This enactment applies to cases of false pretences as well as felony, and the fact that the prisoner parted with the goods to a _bonâ fide_ pawnee will not disentitle the original owner to the restitution of the goods (_j_). It also applies to property received by a person knowing it to have been stolen or obtained by false pretences. The order of restitution is strictly limited to property identified at the trial as being the subject of the charge; it does not, therefore, extend to property in the possession of innocent third persons, which was not produced and identified at the trial as being the subject of the indictment (_k_).

Where stolen cattle were sold in market overt at about 10 o'clock in the morning, and later on in the day resold likewise in market overt, both purchases being _bonâ fide_, it was held, that, upon the conviction of the thief, the judge had jurisdiction at the trial to order restitution to the rightful owner (_l_).

And by the 30 & 31 Vict. c. 35, s. 9, provision is made upon conviction of the thief, and restitution of the goods, for the payment to an innocent purchaser from the thief, out of any moneys taken from the thief on his apprehension, of the price such purchaser has paid for the stolen goods.

Under 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, the metropolitan police magistrates have power to order that any goods stolen or fraudulently obtained be delivered up to the owner (_m_).

An action of _replevin_ may be maintained for any unlawful taking of goods, as upon a mistaken charge of felony, and is not confined to the case of goods distrained. Thus, where there was a dispute between the defendant L. and the plaintiff as to the ownership of a horse, one H., having obtained possession of it at the plaintiff's request, was charged by L. with stealing it. The defendant C. was a


(l) _Reg. v. Horan_, 6 Ir. R., C. L. 293, C. C. R.

(m) See 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, ss. 27, 40.
policeman of the borough of Liverpool, appointed under 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 76; and the charge having been made to him, he apprehended H. and took possession of the horse. The charge of felony was afterwards dismissed by the police magistrate, but the defendant C. was ordered to give up the horse to the defendant L. The plaintiff brought an action of *replevin* against the defendants C. and L. for taking and detaining his, the plaintiff's, horse, and it was held that, though unusual in such a case, the action was maintainable (*n*).

It was held by Wightman, J., in the case of *R. v. Haigh* (*o*), that a person, who was employed to take a horse to a particular place, and sold it on the way, was rightly indicted under the 2nd section of the Fraudulent Trustees Act of 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. 54), which section, though repealed together with the rest of the Act by 24 & 25 Vict. c. 95, has been re-enacted and extended by 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 76.

CHAPTER IV.

WHAT DISEASES OR BAD HABITS CONSTITUTE UNSOUNDNESS OR VICE.

Unsoundness and Vice.

Present state of the law.

In buying and selling horses, it is of the utmost importance to ascertain what constitutes unsoundness, and what habits are to be considered vices. Until comparatively lately there had been much perplexity on these points; no correct rule as to unsoundness had been laid down, and a difference of opinion existed among the Judges whether or not a temporary disease was, during its existence, a breach of a warranty of soundness. The law on these subjects has been in a great measure settled by the Judges of the Court of Exchequer, where Mr. Baron Parke laid down a rule with regard to unsoundness, by which, so far as the nature of the subject will admit, all future cases will be governed, it being the result of the deliberate consideration of the Court (a). The same learned judge also in another case expressed an opinion as to what constitutes a vice (b), and keeping this in view, a correct estimate may be formed of what will be considered a breach of a warranty of "freedom from vice."

It is a difficult matter without the use of negatives to explain, fully and briefly, the meaning of the word "sound," as applied to horses. Chief Justice Best, in the case of Best v. Osborne (c), held, that "sound" meant perfect. In Kiddell v. Burnard (d), Mr. Baron Parke said, "The word 'sound' means what it expresses, namely, that the animal is sound and free from disease at the time he is warranted." And in the same case Mr. Baron Alderson said, "The word 'sound' means sound; and the only qualification of which it is susceptible arises from the purpose for which the warranty is given."

Definition of soundness.

We may define a horse to be "Sound" when he is free from hereditary disease, is in the possession of his natural and constitutional health, and has as much bodily perfection as is consistent with his natural formation.

The rule as to unsoundness is, that if, at the time of sale, the horse has any disease, which either actually does diminish the natural usefulness of the animal, so as to make him less capable of work of any description; or which, in its ordinary progress, will diminish the natural usefulness of the animal; or if the horse has, either from disease (whether such disease be congenital or arises subsequently to its birth (c)), or from accident, undergone any alteration of structure, that either actually does at the time or in its ordinary effects will diminish the natural usefulness of the horse, such a horse is unsound (f). This very much resembles the definition of unsoundness given in an excellent work, on the Construction of the Horse and the Treatment of his Diseases, by the late Mr. Youatt, published by the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, and which will be used as an authority in the description of those diseases and bad habits to which the horse is subject. But in that work unsoundness is referred to disease only; namely, to that alteration of structure which is connected with or will produce disease, and lessen the usefulness of the animal; and any alteration of structure from accident is not comprehended within the definition there given. This, however, is an important omission, because when the Court of Exchequer laid down the rule as to unsoundness, Mr. Baron Alderson on this point said, "It is, however, right to make to the definition of unsoundness the addition my brother Parke has made, namely, that the disqualification for work may arise either from disease or accident" (g).

The term "natural usefulness" must be borne in mind. One horse may possess great speed, but is soon knocked up; another will work all day, but cannot be got beyond a snail's pace; one with a heavy forehead is liable to stumble, and is continually putting to hazard the neck of his rider; another with an irritable constitution and a washy make, loses his appetite, and begins to scour if a little extra work is exacted from him. The term unsound-
ness cannot be applied to any of these; it would be opening far too widely a door to disputation and endless wrangling. The buyer can discern, or ought to know, whether the form of the horse is that which will render him likely to suit his purpose, and he should try him sufficiently to ascertain his natural strength, endurance and manner of going (h).

The following is a most important case on unsoundness in animals:—An action of assumpsit was brought on the warranty of three bullocks, and under the direction of Mr. Justice Erskine at the trial, a verdict was found for the plaintiff. In refusing a rule for a new trial, Mr. Baron Parke said, "The rule I laid down in Coates v. Stephens (i) is correctly reported, that is the rule I have always adopted and acted on in cases of unsoundness: although, in so doing, I differ from the contrary doctrine laid down by my brother Coleridge in Bolden v. Brogden (j):—

"I think the word 'sound' means what it expresses, namely, that the animal is sound and free from disease at the time he is warranted sound. If, indeed, the disease were not of a nature to impede the natural usefulness of the animal for the purpose for which he is used, as, for instance, if a horse had a slight pimple on his skin, it would not amount to an unsoundness; but even if such a thing as a pimple were on some part of the body where it might have that effect, as, for instance, on a part which would prevent the putting a saddle or bridle on the animal, it would be different."

"An argument has, however, been adduced from the slightness of the disease and the facility of cure; but if we once let in considerations of that kind, where are we to draw the line? A horse may have a cold which may be cured in a day; or a fever, which may be cured in a week or a month; and it would be difficult to say where to stop. Of course, if the disease be slight, the unsoundness is proportionally so, and so also ought to be the damages: and if they were very inconsiderable, the judge might still certify under the statute of Elizabeth (k), to deprive the plaintiff of costs."

"But on the question of law, I think the direction of the judge in this case was perfectly correct, and that this verdict ought not to be disturbed. Were this matter pre-

(i) Coates v. Stephens, 2 M. & Rob. 137; and see "Rule as to Unsound-
ness," ante, p. 63.
(k) 43 Eliz. c. 6, s. 2.
sent to us now for the first time, we might deem it proper to grant a rule, but the matter has been, we think, settled by previous cases: and the opinion which we now express is the result of deliberate consideration."

And Mr. Baron Alderson said, "I am of the same opinion. The word 'sound' means sound, and the only qualification of which it is susceptible arises from the purpose for which the warranty is given. If, for instance, a horse is purchased to be used in a given way, the word 'sound' means that the animal is useful for that purpose; and 'unsound' means that he, at the time, is affected with something which will have the effect of impeding that use. If the disease be one easily cured, that will only go in mitigation of damages. It is, however, right to make to the definition of unsoundness the addition my brother Parke has made, namely, that the disqualification for work may arise either from disease or accident; and the doctrine laid down by him on this subject, both to-day and in the case of Coates v. Stephens (l), is not new law; it is to be found recognized by Lord Ellenborough and other judges in a series of cases" (m).

The rule as to unsoundness applies to cases of disease and accident, which from their nature are only temporary, it not being necessary that the disorder should be permanent or incurable. And this is laid down as law by Lord Ellenborough in Elton v. Brogden (n), and Elton v. Jordan (o); also by Mr. Baron Parke in Coates v. Stephens (p), and by the Court of Exchequer in Kiddell v. Burnard (q), although Mr. Justice Coleridge in Bolden v. Brogden (r) was of a different opinion.

It will be unnecessary to take into consideration acute diseases, such as fevers, inflammation, &c., because all horses are without dispute unsound, during the time they are affected by them.

A vice is a bad habit, and a bad habit to constitute a vice must either be shown in the temper of the horse, so as to make him dangerous, or diminish his natural usefulness; or it must be a habit decidedly injurious to his health (s).


(n) Elton v. Brogden, 4 Camp. 281.


(p) Coates v. Stephens, 2 M. & O.

Rob. 157.


(s) Scobiefield v. Robb, 2 M. & Rob. 210; and see Crib-biting, post.

Temporary diseases.

Acute diseases.

Rule as to vice.
The soundness or unsoundness of a horse is a question peculiarly fit for the consideration of a jury, and the Court will not set aside a verdict, on account of there being a preponderance of evidence the other way (t); and they should consider whether the effect said to proceed from the alleged unsoundness, is such an effect as in the eye of the law renders a horse unsound. It is also a question for them, whether a horse warranted sound was at the time of delivery rendered unfit for immediate use to an ordinary person, on account of some disease (u).

And in case of vice they should consider, whether the effect alleged to proceed from a certain habit, is such an effect as the law holds to be a vice in a horse.

Diseases, Defects or alterations in Structure, and Bad Habits.

We shall now consider, in alphabetical order, as the most convenient method, the various diseases, defects or alterations in structure, and bad habits, to which the horse is liable; and with the assistance of decided cases, and guided by the rules which have been laid down by the courts an attempt will be made to fix in each instance, which of these does, or does not, amount to an unsoundness or a vice. Such conclusions, however, unless founded on decided cases, are merely stated as opinions formed by the application of the rules already mentioned; and from the difficulty there often is in ascertaining where soundness ends and unsoundness begins, people, in doubtful cases, must necessarily be guided in a great measure by circumstances.

Backing and gibbing are closely allied, and are generally the result of bad breaking, at the time when the horse is first put to the collar and refuses to start. When the habit becomes confirmed, the horse swerves, gibs and backs, as soon as he thinks he has had enough work, or has been improperly checked or corrected, or when he begins to feel the pressure of the collar painful. It is impossible permanently to cure a horse of this bad habit when it has become fixed (v); and as it is both dangerous and diminishes a horse’s natural usefulness, it is a breach of a warranty of freedom from vice. In an American case, where these

(t) Lewis v. Peake, 7 Taunt. 153; S. C. 2 Marsh. 43; 17 R. R. 275; per Patteson, J., Baylis v. Lawrence, 11 Ad. & E. 920.
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uces were proved to have appeared in a horse on trial, three or four days after purchase, this was held to be evidence that they existed at the time of purchase (w).

Biting when dangerous is a vice.

The crystalline lens is generally the seat of disease in the eye of a horse; it is so called from its resemblance to a piece of crystal or transparent glass, and on it all the important uses of the eye mainly depend. It is of a thick jelly-like consistence, convex on each side, but there is more convexity on the inner than on the outer side. It is enclosed in a delicate transparent bag or capsule, and is placed between the aqueous and the vitreous humours, and received within a hollow in the latter, with which it exactly corresponds. It has, from its density and its double convexity, the chief concern in conveying the rays of light which pass into the pupil. The lens is very apt to be affected from long or violent inflammation of the conjunctiva, and either its capsule becomes cloudy, and imperfectly transmits the light, or the substance of the lens becomes opaque (x).

The confirmed cataract, or the opaque lens of long standing, will exhibit a pearly appearance, which cannot be mistaken, and will frequently be attended with a change of form, a portion of the lens being forced forward into the pupil. Although the disease may not have proceeded so far as this, yet if there be the slightest cloudiness of the lens either generally, or in the form of a minute spot in the centre, and with or without lines radiating from that spot, the horse is to be condemned; for in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the disease will proceed, and cataract, or complete opacity of the lens and absolute blindness will be the result (x). Cataract is an unsoundness (y).

That inflammation of the eye of the horse, which usually terminates in blindness of one or both eyes, has the peculiar character of remitting or disappearing for a time, once or twice, or thrice, before it fully runs its course. The eye, after an attack of inflammation, regains so nearly its former natural brilliancy, that a man well acquainted with horses will not always recognize the traces of former disease. After a time, however, the inflammation returns, and the result is unavoidable (z).

Blindness is undoubtedly an unsoundness; but to consti-

(w) Finley v. Quirk, 9 Minn. 194. 1850.
(y) Higgs v. Thrale, before Chief Baron Pollock, Guildhall, Feb. 18.
tute a breach of warranty in cases of cloudiness of the eye or opacity of the lens, after the sale, there must either be proof of an attack of inflammation before sale, or veterinary surgeons must be produced who will distinctly state that, from the appearance of the eye, there must have been inflammation before the time of sale. The following case is in point:—

A horse was bought by the plaintiff in April, warranted sound and quiet. He was sent on the 18th of June to be examined by an eminent veterinary surgeon, who detected an "opacity of the crystalline lens" in the near eye, and pronounced it his decided opinion that the defect must have been of long standing, and that in fact it was chronic; to produce which state, it must have required a great many successive attacks of inflammation. It might have been produced in six months, and it was a sort of thing which few dealers would have been likely to find out. Another veterinary surgeon had examined the horse, and did not see the defect, but could not swear that it did not then exist. On this evidence a verdict was found for the plaintiff (a).

Attached to the extremities of most of the tendons, and between the tendons and other parts, are little bags containing a mucous substance to lubricate the tendons so as to prevent friction. From violent exertion these little bags are liable to enlargement, of which wind-galls (b) and thoroughpins (c) are instances. There is one of these bags inside the bending of the hock; this sometimes becomes considerably increased in size, and the enlargement is called a bog-spavin. When the vein, which passes over this bag, is distended with accumulated blood, it is called a blood-spavin, and is therefore the consequence of bog-spavin, with which it is very often confounded (d); they generally produce lameness, and constitute unsoundness.

Bone-spavin is an affection of the bones of the hock joint. When an undue weight and concussion are thrown on the inner splint bone, they cause an inflammation of the cartilaginous substance, which unites it to the shank bone; the consequence of which is, that the cartilage is absorbed and bone deposited, so that the union between the splint-bone and shank becomes bony instead of cartilaginous, and the degree of elastic action between them is destroyed. A

(a) Briggs v. Baker, before Chief Justice Tindal, Nov. 29, 1845.  
(b) Wind-galls, post.  
(c) Thoroughpin, post.  
splint in the form of a tumour appears in the inside of the hind-leg, in front of the union of the head of the splint-bone with the shank, and is called a bone-spavin. It almost invariably produces lameness, and the enlargement rapidly spreads with quick and hard work (e), so as to interfere with the flexion of the hock.

Bone-spavin, whether it produce lameness apparent at the time of sale or not, is an unsoundness; and the following veterinary evidence was given in a case which was tried.

Mr. Nice, a veterinary surgeon, stated for the plaintiff, that eleven days after sale he had seen the horse, which then had a confirmed bone-spavin, and that in his opinion it was not a curable disease. Mr. Sewell, of the Veterinary College, had examined him about a month after sale, and said that at that time he had a confirmed bone-spavin, which could not have occurred subsequent to the time of sale.

For the defendant, Mr. Child, a veterinary surgeon, was called, who said that there was a bony deposit in the interior of the hock, but that it did not interfere with its flexion. It was what is called a bone-spavin, though the term was very indefinite; that the deposit generally, but not invariably, increases (f); and in the incipient stages it requires skill, and is often difficult to determine; that there might be a deposit to a considerable extent without producing lameness; that he had known horses rejected for bone-spavin as unsound, which had not become lame, and had one himself which was rejected three years ago, and had not become so. Another witness, a farrier, said, "I do not think bone-spavin is an unsoundness myself, without lameness; but bone-spavin is in our profession a known unsoundness, whether it produce lameness or not." The plaintiff obtained a verdict (g).

Many old horses, which have been put to hard service, especially before they have gained their full strength, have some of the bones of the back or loins anchylosed, being united together by bony matter, instead of ligament. When this exists to any considerable extent, the horse is not pleasant to ride; he turns with difficulty in his stall; he is unwilling to lie down; or when down, to rise again; and he has a curious straddling action. Such horses are said to be broken-backed, or chinked in the chine (h). Where

(f) Reported decreases. 270, 366.
(g) Watson v. Denton, 7 C. & P. 165.
this impairs the natural usefulness of the horse, it is such an alteration of structure as constitutes unsoundness.

For broken-down, see "Sprain and Thickening of the Back Sinews" (i).

Broken-knees do not constitute unsoundness after the wounds are healed, unless they interfere with the action of the joint; and a horse may fall from mere accident, or through the fault of the rider (k).

Broken-wind is the rupture or running together of some of the air-cells. It is easily distinguished from thick-wind (l); in thick-wind the breathing is rapid and laborious, but the inspiration and expiration are equally so, and occupy precisely the same time. In broken-wind the inspiration is performed by one effort, the expiration by two, occupying double the time, which is plainly to be distinguished by observing the flanks. The reason is that when the lungs are expanded, the air will run in easily enough, and one effort of the respiratory muscles is sufficient for the purpose; but when these cells have run into each other, the cavity is so irregular, and contains so many corners and blind pouches, that it is exceedingly difficult to force it out again, and two efforts can scarcely effect it. This disease is also accompanied by a dry and husky cough of a peculiar sound, and is the consequence of thick-wind (m), and of those alterations of structure consequent on inflammation (n). It is most decidedly an unsoundness (o).

The division of the windpipe just before it enters the lungs, and the numerous vessels into which it immediately afterwards branches out, are called the bronchial tubes, and the inflammation of the membrane that lines them is called bronchitis. It is catarrh (p), extending to the entrance of the lungs, and is characterized by quicker and harder breathing than catarrh usually presents; and by a peculiar wheezing, which is relieved by the coughing up of mucus (q). It is decidedly an unsoundness.

Canker is a separation of the horn from the sensible part of the foot, and the sprouting of fungus matter instead of it, occupying a portion of or even the whole of the sole and frog. It is the occasional consequence of bruise, puncture,

(i) Sprain and Thickening of the Back Sinews, post. 194.
(m) Thickwind, post. (p) See Cough, post.
corn (r), quittor (s), and thrush (t). It is extremely difficult to cure (u), and is an unsoundness.

Capped hocks may be produced by lying on an unevenly-paved stable, with a scanty supply of litter, or by kicking (x), in neither of which cases would they constitute unsoundness, though in the latter they would be an indication of vice; but in the majority of instances they are either the consequence of sprain in the hock, or are accompanied by enlargement of it, when they would be an unsoundness (y).

A horse with a cataract is unsound. See Blindness (z). The muscles of the breast are occasionally the seat of a singular and somewhat mysterious disease. The old farriers called it anticor and chestfounder. The horse has considerable stiffness in moving, evidently not referable to the feet. There is a tenderness about the muscles of the breast, and occasional swelling, and after a while the muscles of the chest waste considerably (a). It is evidently an unsoundness, and was formerly supposed to proceed from rheumatism; but now, according to later opinions (b), chestfounder is pronounced to be the result of navicular disease, which, preventing the forelegs from being exercised to the same extent as before, produces an absorption of the muscles of the chest. Anticor is distinguished from chestfounder, and declared to be an abscess of the breast of the brisket.

But where an action was brought on the warranty of a horse, and the plaintiff obtained a verdict on the ground that the horse was chestfoundered, the Court of Common Pleas refused to grant a new trial on the grounds that there was no known disease to constitute such an unsoundness, or that the defendant was taken by surprise, the plaintiff having before trial refused to inform him of the cause or nature of the unsoundness (c).

For chinked in the chine, see Broken-backed (d).

(r) Corns, post.
(s) Quittor, post.
(t) Thrush, post.
(x) Kicking, post.
(y) Lib. U. K. "The Horse," 361. See, however, App. to Lib. U. K. "The Horse," Ed. 1862, 522, where an opinion is given that it is not an unsoundness, on the ground that it is never occasioned by strains, and is therefore no more than a blemish.
(z) Blindness, ante, p. 67.
(c) Attorbury v. Fairmanner, 8 Moore, 32.
(d) Broken-backed, ante, p. 69.
Clicking.

Cloudiness.

Contraction.

As to clicking, see Overreach (e).

Cloudiness of the eye is an unsoundness, as it is almost quite sure to proceed to complete opacity of the lens, cata-
ract and blindness (f).

In contraction the foot loses its healthy circular form; it increases in length, and narrows in the quarters, par-
ticularly at the heel; the frog is diminished in width; the sole becomes more concave; the heels higher, and lameness, or at least a shortened and feeling action, ensues. It seems there is nothing in the appearance of the feet which would enable a person to decide when contraction is, or is not, destructive to the natural usefulness of the animal; but it is indicated by his manner of going, and his capability for work. Lameness usually accompanies the beginning of contraction; it is the invariable attendant on rapid contrac-
tion, but it does not always exist when the wiring in is slow or of long standing. Contraction may be caused by neglect of paring, by suffering the shoes to remain on too long, by the want of natural moisture on account of the feet being kept too dry, or by the removal of the bars, or by thrushes (g), which, however, are much oftener the consequence than the cause of it. The contraction, however, which is connected with permanent lameness, though increased by the circum-
stances just mentioned, usually derives its origin from a cause which acts violently and suddenly, namely, an inflam-
mation of the little plates covering the coffin bone, and not sufficiently intense to be characterized as acute founder (h). The contracted heel can rarely or never permanently expand, as neither the lengthened and narrowed coffin bone can resume its natural shape, nor can the portion of the frog which has been absorbed be restored (i).

Contraction of the hoof, when produced by inflammation, or accompanied by disease in the foot, or any alteration in its natural structure, though it may not cause lameness at the time of sale, yet, if lameness be afterwards produced by it, is an unsoundness. This was held in the following case, which was tried before Chief Baron Pollock:—It appeared that the plaintiff, who was a horsedealer, bought a mare at Lincoln Fair, warranted sound, for 371. On her way up to town, she gradually became dead lame on her off foreleg. She was brought by easy stages to London, and examined

When held to be unsound-

ness.

(e) Overreach, post.
(f) Blindness, ante, p. 67.
(g) Thrush, post.
(h) Founder, post.
by various veterinary surgeons, who at once asserted that her lameness proceeded from a contraction of the hoof of the off forefoot, which might have existed, and probably did exist, before sale, though the disease had not developed itself in lameness, and that at all events there must have been a strong predisposition to unsoundness. The defendant wrote a letter offering to take her back; however, it was miscarried, and the mare was sold by auction for 25£. An action was brought for the balance, and on this evidence the jury gave a verdict for the plaintiff (j).

In the angle between the bars and the quarters, the horn of the sole has sometimes a red appearance, and is more spongy and soft than at any other part. The horse flinches when this portion of the horn is pressed upon, and there is an occasional or permanent lameness. This disease of the foot is termed corns, bearing this resemblance to the corn of the human being, that it is produced by pressure and is a cause of lameness, but differing from it in that the horn, answering to the skin of the human foot, is thin and weak, instead of being thickened and hardened. When it is neglected, so much inflammation is produced in that part of the sensible sole that suppuration follows, which is succeeded by quittor (k), and the matter either undermines the horny sole or is discharged at the coronet. The cause is, pressure on the sole at that part, by the irritation of which a small quantity of blood is extravasated. The horn is secreted in a less quantity, and is of a more spongy nature, and the extravasated blood becomes inclosed in it. The portion of the foot in which they are situated will not bear the ordinary pressure of the shoe, and any accidental additional pressure from the growing down of the horn or the introduction of dirt or gravel will cause serious lameness. They render it necessary to wear a thick and heavy shoe or a bar shoe to protect the weakened and diseased part (l).

Corns are hardly ever found on the hind feet; in any situation they are very seldom radically cured, and manifestly constitute unsoundness.

A cough from catarrh or common cold is a complaint Cough. of frequent occurrence, generally subdued without much difficulty, but often becoming of serious consequence when

(j) Greenway v. Marshall, Ex.  
(k) Quittor, post.


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neglected. It is accompanied by a little increase of pulse, a slight discharge from the nose and eyes, a rough coat, and a diminished appetite. If the inflammation increases the complaint degenerates into bronchitis (m), catarrhal fever, thick-wind (n), and broken-wind (o).

Although it was laid down differently by Mr. Justice Coleridge in *Bolden v. Brogden* (p), it may now be considered as settled law that a *cough* at the time of sale, whether *permanent* or *temporary*, is a breach of a warranty of *soundness*, and the subsequent recovery of the horse is no defence to an action on the warranty (q), but may be proved in *reduction of damages* (r). The law on the subject of temporary diseases was laid down by Lord Ellenborough many years ago, and with regard to a *cough* his Lordship said, “I have always held and now hold that a warranty of soundness is broken if the animal at the time of sale had any infirmity upon him which rendered him less fit for present service. It is not necessary that the disorder should be permanent or incurable. While a horse has a *cough* I say he is unsound, although that may be either temporary, or the *cough* may prove mortal (s). Any infirmity which renders a horse less fit for present use and convenience is *unsoundness*’’ (t).

In a later case an action was brought on the warranty of a horse, which, immediately on being taken home after sale, was found to have a *cough*. The *cough* became worse, and on the horse being examined by a veterinary surgeon eighteen days afterwards, he was pronounced unsound from *diseased bronchial tube* and chronic inflammation, *cough* being an incident of that disease. However, it appeared that at the time of the trial the *cough* had been cured. Mr. Baron Parke, in summing up, said to the jury, “I have always considered that a man who buys a horse warranted sound, must be taken as buying for immediate use, and has a right to expect one capable of that use, and of being immediately put to any fair work the owner chooses.”

“The rule as to *unsoundness* is, that if at the time of sale the horse has any disease which either actually does diminish the natural usefulness of the animal, so as to make

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(m) Bronchitis, ante, p. 70.
(n) Thick wind, post.
(o) Broken wind, ante, p. 70; Lib. U. K. “The Horse,” 188.
(s) *Elton v. Brogden*, 4 Camp. 281.
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him less capable of work of any description, or which in its ordinary progress will diminish the natural usefulness of the animal; or if the horse has, either from disease or accident, undergone any alteration of structure that either actually does at the time, or in its ordinary effects will, diminish the natural usefulness of the horse, such a horse is unsound."

"If the cough actually existed at the time of the sale as a disease so as actually to diminish the natural usefulness of the horse at that time, and to make him then less capable of immediate work, he was then unsound; or if you think the cough, which in fact did afterwards diminish the usefulness of the horse, existed at all at the time of sale, you will find for the plaintiff. I am not now delivering an opinion formed on the moment on a new subject, but it is the result of a full previous consideration, as I find I differ from the law as laid down by a learned Judge" (u). The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff (v).

Crib-biting, being an unnatural sucking in of the air, must be to a certain degree injurious to digestion, must dispose to colic, and so interfere with the strength and usefulness and health of the horse. Some crib-biters are good goers, but they probably would have possessed more endurance had they not acquired this habit; and it is a fact well established, that as soon as a horse begins to become a crib-biter, he, in more than nine cases out of ten, begins to lose condition. He is not to the experienced eye the horse he was before. The wear of the front teeth, and even the frequent breaking of them, makes a horse old before his time, and sometimes renders it difficult or almost impossible for him to graze (w).

Crib-biting which has not yet produced disease or alteration of structure is not an unsoundness, but is a vice under a warranty that a horse is "sound and free from vice." Thus, where an action was brought on the warranty of a horse which had been sold for ninety guineas, the question was, whether crib-biting, which was the vice in question, was such a species of unsoundness as to sustain the action. The horse had been warranted sound generally. Some eminent veterinary surgeons were called as witnesses, who stated that the habit of crib-biting originated in indigestion;

(u) Mr. Justice Coleridge in Bolden v. Brodgen, 2 M. & Rob. 113.
that a horse by this habit wasted the saliva which was necessary to digest his food, and that the consequence was a gradual emaciation. They said that they did not consider crib-biting to be an unsoundness, but that it might lead to unsoundness; that it was sometimes an indication of incipient disease, and sometimes produced unsoundness where it existed in any great degree. Upon this Mr. Justice Burrough said, "This horse was only proved to be an incipient crib-biter. I am quite clear that it is not included in a general warranty," and the plaintiff was accordingly nonsuited (x).

In a later case a horse was bought warranted "sound and free from vice," and an action was brought against the vendor on the ground of its being a crib-biter and windsucker (y). Veterinary surgeons were examined who said that the habit of crib-biting was injurious to horses; that the air sucked into the stomach of the animal distended it, and impaired its powers of digestion, occasionally to such an extent as greatly to diminish the value of the horse, and render it incapable of work. Some of the witnesses gave it as their opinion that crib-biting was an unsoundness; it was not however shown that in the present instance the habit of crib-biting had brought on any disease, or had, as yet, interfered with the power or usefulness of the horse.

Mr. Baron Parke told the jury, that to constitute unsoundness there must either be some alteration in the structure of the animal, whereby it is rendered less able to perform its work, or else there must be some disease. Here neither of those facts had been shown. If, however, the jury thought that at the time of the warranty the horse had contracted the habit of crib-biting, he thought that was a vice, and that the plaintiff would be entitled to a verdict on that head. The habit complained of might not indeed, like some others (for instance, that of kicking (z), show vice in the temper of the animal, but it was proved to be a habit decidedly injurious to its health, and tending to impair its usefulness, and came, therefore, in his lordship's opinion, within the meaning of the term vice, as used on such occasions as the present (a). And in the case of Paul v. Hardwick, some of the most eminent veterinary surgeons

(y) Windsucker, post.
(z) Kicking, post.
(a) Schoefield v. Robb, 2 M. &
gave evidence that crib-biting was, in their opinion, at all events, a vice within the meaning of a warranty that a horse was free from vice, and the plaintiff had a verdict on that ground (b).

From sudden or over exertion, the ligaments which tie down the tendons in the neighbourhood of joints may be extended, and inflammation, swelling and lameness may ensue, or the sheaths of the tendons in the neighbourhood of joints, from their extent of motion in these situations, may be susceptible of injury. A curb is an affection of this kind. It is an enlargement at the back of the hock, about three or four inches below the point of the hock. Any sudden action of the limb of more than usual violence may produce it, and therefore horses are found to “throw out curbs” after a hardly-contested race, an extraordinary leap, a severe gallop over heavy ground, or a sudden check in the gallop. Young horses are particularly liable to it, and horses that are couched, or whose hocks and legs resemble those of the cow, the hocks being turned inward and the legs forming a considerable angle outwards; for in hocks so formed the annular ligament must be continually on the stretch to confine the tendon (c).

A horse with a curb is manifestly unsound. But as curbs do not necessarily produce lameness, it is considered that horses with curbs may be passed as sound on a special warranty being given, that, should the curb cause lameness within a reasonable time (which time should be fixed), the seller should be responsible.

But if a horse throw out a curb immediately after sale, it is no breach of a warranty of soundness, even if he had curby hocks at the time of sale. Thus, where an action was brought on a breach of warranty of soundness, it appeared that the plaintiff before sale had objected to the horse because he had curby hocks. However, he bought him on a general warranty of soundness being given, and about a fortnight after sale the horse sprung a curb. At the trial veterinary surgeons were called by the plaintiff, who stated that the term curby hocks indicated a peculiar form of the hock, which was considered to render a horse more liable to throw out a curb, but did not of itself occasion lameness.

Lord Abinger, C.B., told the jury, "that a defect in the form of the horse, which had not occasioned lameness at the time of the sale, although it might render the animal more liable to become lame at some future time, was no breach of the warranty." And, on a motion for a new trial, the Court of Exchequer refused a rule, Mr. Baron Alderson saying, "Dickenson v. Follett (d) is expressly in point for the defendant, and the law as laid down by me on that occasion has not been questioned in any subsequent case" (e).

**Cutting.** Like speedy cut, arises from badness of structure, and being neither a disease nor a bad habit, cannot be pronounced a breach of a warranty of soundness and freedom from vice; and although it may be a greater detriment to the horse than some kinds of unsoundness or vice, yet, if the wounds occasioned by it did not actually exist at the time of sale, the purchaser has no legal remedy against the buyer. This is a case to which the legal maxim caveat emptor particularly applies; the purchaser should examine the horse, and if there appear any probability of cutting a special warranty should be taken against it. It is always a great annoyance, and the effects produced by it are sometimes most serious. Many horses go lame for a considerable period after cutting themselves severely; and others have dropped from sudden agony and endangered themselves and their riders. Cutting renders a horse liable to serious injury of the legs, and indicates that he is either weak or has an awkwardness of gait inconsistent with safety (f).

In the only decided case on the subject, it was held that mere badness of shape, though rendering the horse incapable of work, is not unsoundness. It appeared that at the time of sale there existed neither lameness nor wound. And Mr. Justice Alderson said, "The horse could not be considered unsound in law merely from badness of shape. As long as he was uninjured he must be considered sound. Where the injury is produced by the badness of his action, that injury constitutes the unsoundness" (g).

There are two kinds of dropsy, which must both be considered; namely, dropsy of the skin and dropsy of the heart. Dropsical swellings often appear between the forelegs and

(d) Dickenson v. Follett, 1 M. & Rob. 299; and see Cutting, post.  
(e) Brown v. Elkington, 8 M. & W. 132.  
(g) Dickenson v. Follett, 1 M. & Rob. 299.
on the chest; they are effusions of fluid underneath the skin. They accompany various diseases, particularly when
the animal is weakened by them, and sometimes appear
when there is no other disease than the debility, which, in
the spring and fall of the year, accompanies the changing
of the coat (\(h\)).

When the pericardium or the heart itself becomes in-
flamed, the secretion of the pericardium is much increased,
and so much fluid accumulates as to obstruct the beating of
the heart. This is called dropsy of the heart (\(l\)), and each
of these diseases is an unsoundness (\(i\)).

Simple catarrh will occasionally, and severe affection of
the chest will generally, be accompanied by a swelling of
the glands under the jaw, and this does not subside for a
considerable time after the cold or fever has apparently been
cured. If the enlargement is considerable, and especially
if tender, and the gland at the root of the ear partakes of
it, and the membrane of the nose is redder than it should
be, the commencement or lurking of some insidious disease
is to be feared (\(k\)); and a horse under such circumstances
is unsound.

When the hock is enlarged, the structure of this compli-
cated joint is so materially affected, that although the horse
may appear for a considerable time to do ordinary work well,
he will occasionally fail even as to that, and a few days’
hard work will always lame him (\(l\)). A decided case of
enlarged hock is an unsoundness, unless it is a mere blemish,
the result of external injuries.

For eve neck see star-gazer (\(m\)).

Where the coronary ligaments by which the horn of the
coronet is secreted, is either divided by a cut or bruise, or
eaten through by caustic, there will be a division of the
horn as it grows down, either in the form of a permanent
sandcrack (\(n\)), or of one portion of the horn overlapping
the other. This is not only a very serious defect, and a
frequent cause of lameness, but it is exceedingly difficult
to remedy (\(o\)); and must be considered unsoundness.
Sometimes the horn grows down whole, but the ligament is
unable to secrete that which is perfectly healthy, and

(a) Lib. U. K. "The Horse," 363. See also Lib. U. K., Ed. 1862,
171. App. 523; and see Capped Hocks,
343. ante, p. 71.
(b) See Eaves v. Dixon, 2 Taunt.
(k) Lib. U. K. "The Horse,"
363.
301.

Dropsy of the heart.

Enlarged glands.

Enlarged hock.

Ewe neck.

False quarter.

(m) Star-gazer, post.
(n) Sandcrack, post.
(o) Lib. U. K. "The Horse,"
therefore there is a narrow strip of horn of a different and lighter colour.

**Farcy.**

_Farcy,_ which is a disease of the absorbents of the skin, is an _unsoundness_. It is immediately connected with glanders (_p_); they will run into each other, or their symptoms will mingle together; and before either arrives at its fatal termination, its associate will almost invariably appear. An animal inoculated with the matter of _farcy_ will often be afflicted with glanders, while the matter of glanders will frequently produce _farcy_. They are different types or stages of the same disease. There is, however, a very material difference in their symptoms and progress; and this most important of all, that while glanders are generally incurable, _farcy_, in its early stage and mild form, may be successfully treated (_q_).

**Water farcy.**

_Water farcy_, confounded by name with the common _farcy_, is a dropsical (_r_) affection of the skin, either of the chest or of the limbs generally (_q_), and is also an _unsoundness_.

_Inflammation of the foot_, or _acute founder_, is generally caused by suffering a horse to stand in the cold or wet after being hard ridden or driven, and is called "fever in the feet." This fever is not easily subdued; and, if it be subdued, it sometimes leaves after it some fearful consequences. The loss of the hoof is not an unfrequent one (_s_). A horse, therefore, which either has "fever in the feet," or has been at all injured by it, is _unsound_.

For gibbing, see Backing and Gibbing (_t_).

The most formidable of all the diseases to which the horse is subject is _glanders_. It is described by writers fifteen hundred years ago; and it was then, and is now, not only a loathsome, but an incurable, disease. The most early and unquestionable symptom of glanders, is an increased discharge from one or both nostrils; different from the discharge of catarrh, because it is usually lighter and clearer in its colour, and more glutinous or sticky. It is not discharged occasionally and in large quantities like the _mucus_ of catarrh, but it is constantly running from the nostril (_u_). It need hardly be said that a glandered horse has on him the worst sort of _unsoundness_.

(p) Glanders, post. 66.
(r) Dropsy, ante, p. 78.
(t) Backing and Gibbing, ante, p. 121; and see Farcy, ante. In an American case (Woodbury v. Robbins, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 520), it was held
It is a disease not only infectious to beasts (w), but also to man. Therefore, knowingly to bring a glandered horse into a public place is held to be an indictable offence (x).

By the Diseases of Animals Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 57), s. 22 (xxxv.), (xxxvi.), the Board of Agriculture may make such orders as they think fit, subject and according to the provisions of the Act, for extending, for all or any of the purposes of the Act, the definition of disease in the Act, so that the same shall for those purposes, or any of them, comprise any disease of animals in addition to those mentioned in the Act, and in like manner for extending the definition of animals in the Act, so that the same shall for the purposes of the Act, or any of them, comprise any kind of four-footed beast, in addition to the animals mentioned in the Act. Accordingly, by the Glanders or Farcy Order, 1894, horses, &c., are to be deemed "animals," and glanders, including farcy, a "disease." And it shall not be lawful to expose a diseased horse in a sale-yard or other public or private place where horses, &c., are commonly exposed for sale. Provisions are also made against placing a diseased horse in a lair, &c., adjacent to a market or fair, and also with regard to the carriage and pasturing of diseased horses.

Glaucoma is a dimness or obscurity of sight from an opacity of the vitreous humour. It is difficult to ascertain, and is only to be discovered by a very attentive examination of the eye. It prevents a horse from appreciating objects, and is therefore an unsoundness (y).

Swelled legs, although distinct from grease, are apt to degenerate into it. It is an inflammation of the skin of the heel; sometimes of the fore, but oftener of the hind, foot. The skin of the heel of the horse somewhat differs from that of any other part. There is a great deal of motion in the fetlock, and to prevent the skin from excoriation or chapping, it is necessary that it should be kept soft and pliable; therefore in the healthy state of the part the skin of the heel has a peculiar greasy feel. Under inflammation, the secretion of this greasy matter is stopped, the heels become red, dry, and scurfy; and being almost constantly in motion, cracks soon succeed; these sometimes

that the moment symptoms of glanders appear in a horse he is unsound; and that whether or not the symptoms are in fact the seeds of the disease is to be proved by the future history of the horse.

O.

~ Infectious to mankind.~

~ Diseases of Animals Act, 1894.~

(w) See Baird v. Graham, 14 Court of Sess. 615 (Sco.).

~ Glaucoma.~

~ Grease.~

that the moment symptoms of glanders appear in a horse he is unsound; and that whether or not the symptoms are in fact the seeds of the disease is to be proved by the future history of the horse.
extend, and the whole surface of the heel becomes a mass of soreness, ulceration, and fungus (z). When this disease renders a horse unfit for immediate work, it must be considered an unsoundness.

The peculiar knuckling over of the fetlock-joint and tottering of the whole of the fore leg, known by the name of gogginess, and which is so often seen in old and over-worked horses, is seldom an affliction of either the fetlock or pastern joints simply, although these have their full share in the mischief that has been produced. It is sometimes difficult to fix on any particular joint; at other times, it seems to be traced to a joint deep in the foot, where the flexor tendon runs over the navicular bone. It seems usually to be a want of power in the ligaments of the joints, generally produced by frequent and severe sprains, or by ill-judged and cruel exertion, and, in the majority of cases, admits of no remedy, especially as dissection often discovers ulceration within the joints and of the membrane which lines the cartilage, and even of the cartilage itself, which it was impossible to reach or to remove (a). When it exists in such a degree as to diminish the natural usefulness of the horse, it must be considered an unsoundness.

Grogginess.

Grunting.

Gutta serena.

Hereditary disease.

Grunting is an unsoundness; see Roaring (b).

Gutta serena, commonly called glass-eye, is a species of blindness. The pupil is unusually dilated; it is immovable, bright and glassy. It is a palsy of the optic nerve, or its expansion, the retina, and is usually produced by determination of blood to the head. It may be caused by improper treatment of the staggers, where the pressure on the base of the brain has been so great, that the nerve has been injured and its function destroyed (c). It is an unsoundness.

There is scarcely a malady to which the horse is subject which is not hereditary. Contracted feet, curb, spavin, roaring, thick-wind, blindness, notoriously descend from the father and dam to the foal, which from them inherits its constitution and endurance (d). It would no doubt be a matter of great difficulty to maintain an action on a breach of warranty of soundness on the sale of a horse, on the ground of hereditary disease alone, but it is presumed to be

(f) See also Lib. U. K. App. Ed. 1862, p. 507.
(g) Roaring, post.

116. And see Patent Defects, post, Chap V.
221.
just possible that if some general decay of the system or such like, developing itself after sale, could be proved to be hereditary, the purchaser might have his action; and the following case appears somewhat in point:—The plaintiff bought a hundred sheep warranted sound; about two months after sale fifty of them died of the goggles, which was stated by farmers and others conversant with sheep to arise from "breeding in and in from relations;" and that sheep so disordered will thrive and seem to be in sound health until they be about two or three years old; that there were no means of discovering by the appearance or otherwise when sheep are affected; that it is generally fatal, and no cure or prevention known for it, and that it was reputed among farmers an unsoundness. Chief Justice Abbott left it to the jury to say, "whether, at the time of the sale, the sheep had existing in their blood or constitution the disease of which they afterwards died, or whether it had arisen from any subsequent cause." And on this direction a verdict was found for the plaintiff (e).

Kicking, either in the stable or in harness, is a bad and dangerous habit, and therefore a vice. Some horses, particularly mares, from fidgetiness and irritability, get a habit of kicking at the stall; and this taking place generally at night disturbs the other horses, and produces swelled hocks or some more serious injury. It shows vice in the temper of the animal (f), and it is very seldom that a confirmed kicker can be cured (g).

A kidney-dropper will appear quite well at starting, but after travelling a short distance he will come to a dead standstill, and, if not supported, will drop down on the spot. A kidney-dropper is worthless and unsound.

Lameness, whether temporary or permanent, is an unsoundness; because however temporary it may be or however obscure, it lessens the utility of the horse and renders him unsound for the time. How far his soundness may be afterwards affected must depend on the circumstances of the case (h).

The law as laid down in Coates v. Stephens (i) and Kiddle v. Burnard (k), with regard to temporary diseases, is.

(k) Kiddle v. Burnard, 8 M. & W. 670.
is the same as was formerly held by Lord Ellenborough, and will be seen in the following cases:—A horse, sold warranted sound, was proved to have been lame at the time of sale; this the defendant admitted, but undertook to prove that the lameness was of a temporary nature, and that the horse had afterwards recovered, since which he had been perfectly sound: however, Lord Ellenborough said, "I have always held and now hold, that a warranty of soundness is broken if the animal at the time of sale had any infirmity upon him, which rendered him less fit for present service. It is not necessary that the disorder should be permanent or incurable. While a horse has a cough I say he is unsound, although that may either be temporary or may prove mortal. The horse in question having been lame at the time of sale, when he was warranted to be sound, his condition subsequently is no defence to the action." (l). And in another ease, on the trial of an action on the warranty of a horse where the evidence was very contradictory, but a witness of the defendant's admitted that he had bandaged one of the fore legs of the horse, but not the other, because the one was weaker than the other, Lord Ellenborough said, "To constitute unsoundness, it is not essential that the infirmity should be of a permanent nature; it is sufficient if it render the animal for the time unfit for service: as, for instance, a cough, which for the present renders it less useful, and may ultimately prove fatal. Any infirmity which renders a horse less fit for present use and convenience is unsoundness." (m).

In a previous ease it was said to have been held that a warranty that a horse is sound is not false because the horse labours under a temporary injury from an accident at the time the defendant warranted it sound. But the warranty there appears to have been a qualified one, because when bargaining the plaintiff observed, that the mare went rather lame on one leg. The defendant replied, that it had been occasioned by her taking up a nail at the farrier's, and, except as to that lameness, she was perfectly sound (n).

*Laminitis* is an inflammation of the *laminae* of the feet, namely, of the connecting medium between the coffin bone and the interior of the hoof, there being numerous fleshy plates which support the foot. The coronary ring is contracted, the soles become convex, the horse puts his heels

to the ground first and goes short, and lameness ensues. 

Laminitis is such an alteration in structure as is without doubt unsoundness (o).

Some of the lower bars of the palate occasionally swell, and rise to a level with and even beyond the edge of the teeth; they are very sore, and the horse feeds badly on account of the pain he suffers from the pressure of the food on the bars (p). This is called lampas, and being easily cured, and not dangerous, it is only unsoundness while it interferes with the horse's usefulness.

A diseased liver is of course an unsoundness (q).

All diseases of the lungs constitute unsoundness. The various symptoms were discussed in the case of Hyde v. Davis (q).

At the bend of the knee, as well as in the inside of the hock, or a little below it, there is sometimes a scurfy eruption, called mallenders in the fore leg and sallenders in the hind leg. They seldom produce lameness, but if no means are taken to get rid of them, a discharge proceeds from them which it is afterwards difficult to stop (r). They must be considered unsoundness.

The mange is a pimpled or lumpy eruption of the skin, followed by blotches covered with scurf; these change into scabs, and occasionally extend over the whole carcase; it is one of the most contagious diseases to which the horse is exposed (s). A mangy horse is decidedly unsound.

The navicular joint disease is unsoundness, as it produces lameness, which is rarely cured. It proceeds from sudden concussion, or from rapid and overstrained motion. Horses which have irregular and undue exercise are most liable to it, and particularly those whose feet are contracted (t). An action was brought for the breach of an alleged warranty; the unsoundness in question was what is termed "navicular disease," which was stated to be an inflammation in a joint on the inside of the hoof, and to be of such a nature that it might be alleviated by proper treatment, so far as to render a horse fit for gentle work, and to make him appear sound for a short time and on soft ground; but could seldom, if ever, be permanently cured, so as to qualify him for hard

(q) Hyde v. Davis, Liverpool Spring Assizes, March 24th, 1849, cor. Coleridge, J.
(s) Lib. U. K. "The Horse," 379; and see Scab, post.
(t) Bywater v. Richardson, 1 A. & E. 508.
work (u). The "navicular disease" is an unsoundness, and is incurable (x).

A horse on whom the operation of nerving has been performed may be improved, may cease to be lame, may go well for many years; but there is no certainty of his continuing to do so, and he is unsound (y).

This was decided in the following case, soon after neurotomy had been first introduced by veterinary surgeons. An action was brought on the warranty of a horse which had been nerved. Several eminent farriers were called, who stated that the operation of nerving consisted in the division of a nerve leading from the foot up the leg; that it was usually performed in order to relieve the horse from the pain arising from a disease in the foot, the nerve cut being the vehicle of sensation from the foot; that the disease in the foot would not be affected by the operation, and would go on increasing or not, according to its character; that horses previously lame from the pain of such a disease would, when nerved, frequently go free from lameness, and continue so for years; that the operation had been found successful in cavalry regiments, and horses so operated on had been for years employed in active service; but that in their opinion a horse that had been nerved, whether by accident or design, was unsound, and could not be safely trusted for any severe work, and that it was an organic defect (z).

It appeared that the horse in question had not exhibited any lameness. But Chief Justice Best told the jury, "that it was difficult to say that a horse in which there was an organic defect could be considered sound; that sound meant perfect, and a horse deprived of an useful nerve was imperfect, and had not that capacity of service which is stipulated for in a warranty." And the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff (a).

The most frequent disease of the nose is an increased and thickened discharge from it. It may properly be called a nasal gleet. There is a continued and often a profuse discharge of the fluid secreted to lubricate the membrane lining the nose, when every symptom of catarrh and fever has passed away, and an almost incredible quantity of

(u) Bywater v. Richardson, 1 A. & E. 508.
(z) Matthews v. Parker, Gloucester Spring Assizes, April 8th, 1847, 106.
(y) Best v. Osborne, R. & M. 290.
(a) Ibid.
thickened mucus, of different colours; green, if the horse is at grass; or, if he be stabled, white, straw-coloured, brown, or even bloody, and sometimes evidently mingled with matter or pus; and either constantly running, or snorted out in masses many times in the day, often continuing several months, and sometimes eventually destroying the horse (b). Such a disease is without doubt an unsoundness.

It occasionally happens that a horse will seldom or never lie down in the stable. He sometimes continues in apparent good health, and feeds and works well; but generally his legs swell, or he becomes fatigued sooner than other horses (c). It is a bad habit, and when decidedly injurious to his health, and so tending to impair his usefulness, it is a vice.

Opacity of the crystalline lens of the eye is an unsoundness. See blindness (d).

The slide cartilages occupy a considerable portion of the external side and back part of the foot, the expansion of the upper part of which they are designed to preserve. These cartilages are subject to inflammation, and the result of that inflammation is, that the cartilages are absorbed, and bone is substituted in their stead. This ossification of the cartilages frequently accompanies ringbone (e); but it may exist without any affection of the pastern joint. It is oftenest found in horses of heavy draught. It arises not so much from concussion as from a species of sprain; for the pace of such heavy horses is slow. The cause, indeed, is not well understood, but of the effect the instances are very numerous, few heavy draught horses arriving at old age without this change of structure (f). Like ringbone (g), it is an unsoundness (h).

This very disagreeable noise, known by the name of "clicking," "overreach," &c., arises from the toe of the hind foot knocking against the shoe of the fore foot (i). It is not altogether free from danger, as a horse may lame himself by it; or if the fore and hind shoes become locked, he will be suddenly thrown. As to the effects of a neglected tread or overreach, see false-quarter (k) and quitter (l). This

(d) Blindness, ante, p. 67.
(e) Ringbone, post.
(g) Ringbone, post.
(h) See Simpson v. Potts, Appendix.
(k) False-quarter, ante, p. 79.
(l) Quitter, post.
defect, like cutting (m), arises from the bad formation of the horse (n), and is therefore neither an unsoundness nor a vice; but if suspected, a special warranty should be taken against it.

The parotid gland is placed in the hollow which extends from the root of the ear to the angle of the lower jaw. In bad strangles, and sometimes in violent cold, it will swell to a great size and ulcerate; or an obstruction will arise in some part of the duct, and the accumulating fluid will burst the vessel, and a fistulous ulcer will be formed, very difficult to heal. Such a disease is an unsoundness (n).

The point of juncture between the head and the bone nearest the skull is called the atlas, and is the seat of a very serious and troublesome ulcer termed poll-evil, caused by the horse rubbing and sometimes striking his poll against the lower edge of the manger, or hanging back in the stall, and bruising the part with the halter; or from a violent blow on the poll, carelessly or wantonly inflicted, or perhaps by unnecessary tight reining; the consequence is inflammation, and a swelling appears, hot, tender and painful. The swelling increases, and matter is formed, which spreads around and eats into the neighbouring parts (o). This disease is an unsoundness.

The sensible and horny little plates of the foot, which have been elongated and partially separated during the intensity of an attack of inflammation, will not always perfectly unite again, or will have lost much of their elasticity; and the coffin bone, no longer supported by them, is let down and presses upon the sole, which yields to this unnatural weight, and becomes convex or rounded, and thus, coming in contact with the ground, it gets bruised and injured (p). This is called pumiced feet; it is incurable, and is decidedly an unsoundness.

A horse will sometimes partly chew his hay, and suffer it to drop from his mouth. This is called quidding, and proceeds either from irregular teeth or sore throat, but ceases when these are remedied (q). It would be a symptom of unsoundness while the sore throat lasted.

Quitter. Quitter is an unsoundness. It has been described as

(m) Brown v. Elkington, 8 M. & W. 132; Dickinson v. Follett, 1 M. & Rob. 299.
being the result of neglected or bad tread or overreach (r); but it may be the consequence of any wound in any part of the foot. In the natural process of ulceration matter is thrown out from the wound; this precedes the actual healing of the part. The matter which is thrown out in wounds of the foot is usually pent up there, and increases in quantity, and thus urges its way in every direction; it forces the fleshy little plates of the coffin bone from the horny ones of the crust, or the horny sole from the fleshy sole, or even eats deeply into the internal parts of the foot. These pipes or sinuses run in every direction, and constitute the essence of quittor (s).

On the back part of the leg are sometimes excrescences called by farriers rat-tails, from the appearance they give the hair. They generally yield to mild treatment (t); and as they are unlikely, from their situation, to impede the natural usefulness of the horse, it is only in a bad case that they can be considered unsoundness.

Rearing, which is unprovoked by the bruising and laceration of the mouth, is an inveterate and dangerous bad habit (u), and a vice.

In the case of Couch v. Culbreth (x) it was held, by the Supreme Court of South Carolina, that in questions of unsoundness, where the disease is chronic, like rheumatism, it is not necessary to show that the symptoms existed at the time of sale, for subsequent incidents and appearances may show that the disease existed before the sale, although the symptoms had not then been observed.

Ringbone commences in one of the pasterns, and usually about the pastern joint; but it rapidly spreads and involves not only the pastern bones, but the cartilages of the foot. The pastern first becomes connected together by bone, instead of ligament, and thence results what is called an anchoylosed or fixed joint. Its motion is lost, and the disease proceeds to the cartilages of the foot and to the union between the lower pastern and the coffin and navicular bones; the motion of these parts is impeded or lost, and the whole of this part of the foot becomes one mass of spongy bone. When the bony tumour is small and on one side only, there is little or no lameness, yet from the action of the foot, and the stress upon the part, the disease has a

(r) Overreach, ante, p. 87. 275.
great tendency to spread, after there has been the slightest enlargement either of the pasterns or round the coronet (y). The law respecting bone-spavin (z) appears on principle to be exactly applicable to ringbone, the slightest appearance of which must be considered an unsoundness, whether it produce lameness or not.

Roaring is so called from a peculiar sound uttered by a horse with this disease, when briskly trotted or galloped, particularly up hill. In moderate exercise it is scarcely or not at all perceived; but in brisk exercise it may be heard at the distance of several yards. The most general cause of roaring is a tough and viscid substance which is thrown out in the shape of fluid, and adheres to the side of the larynx and upper part of the windpipe, materially obstructing the passage, and sometimes running across it in bands. Some roarers, on dissection, are found to have the shape of the larynx and windpipe materially deformed, crooked, and compressed, and others have presented no appearance of disease. Roaring is no unusual consequence of strangles (a), and it may proceed from tight reining (b). Lord Mansfield and Lord Ellenborough seemed to think that roaring was not necessarily unsoundness; but required proof, in each particular case, that it was symptomatic of disease, or affected the horse so as to render him less serviceable for a permanency, as, otherwise, it might merely be a bad habit. There can be no doubt, however, that every roarer is inconvenience by it when in rapid action, and it would be difficult to say, in any case, that it is merely a bad habit acquired, without some previous inflammation or alteration of structure. In practice roaring is always very properly considered an unsoundness.

The following cases show the opinions expressed in courts of law with regard to roaring. An action was brought on a warranty of a horse, which soon after sale had turned out a roarer. Mr. Field, a veterinary surgeon of experience, stated that roaring is occasioned by the circumstance of the neck of the windpipe being too narrow for accelerated respiration, and that the disorder is frequently produced by sore throat or other topical inflammation, and that the disorder is of such a nature as to inconmode a horse very much when pressed to his speed. And Lord

(a) Strangles, post.  
(z) Bone-spavin, ante, p. 68.
Ellenborough said, "If a horse be affected by any malady which renders him less serviceable for a permanency, I have no doubt that it is an unsoundness. I do not go by the noise, but by the disorder" (c).

And in a previous case, where an action had been brought on the warranty of a horse, which had turned out a roarer, Lord Ellenborough said, "It has been held by very high authority (Sir James Mansfield, C.J.), that roaring is not necessarily unsoundness, and I entirely concur in that opinion. If the horse emits a loud noise, which is offensive to the ear, merely from a bad habit which he has contracted, or from any cause which does not interfere with his general health or muscular powers, he is still to be considered a sound horse. On the other hand, if the roaring proceeds from any disease or organic infirmity, which renders him incapable of performing the usual functions of a horse, then it does constitute unsoundness. The plaintiff has not done enough in showing that this horse was a roarer. To prove a breach of the warranty, he must go on to show that the roaring was symptomatic of disease." The defendant had a verdict (d).

Rolling is a pleasant and safe amusement for a horse at grass, but cannot be indulged in the stable without the chance of his being dangerously entangled with the collar and being cast. Yet, although the horse is cast, and bruised, and half-strangled, he will roll again on the following night, and continue so to do as long as he lives (e). Now this is a bad habit, and a horse may have his health and usefulness impaired by being often cast, or half-strangled and lamed; it must render a horse less valuable, and when inveterate may perhaps be considered a vice.

Some headstrong horses will occasionally endeavour to bolt with the best rider. Others, with their wonted sagacity, endeavour thus to dislodge the timid or unskilful. Some are hard to hold, or bolt only during the excitement of the chase; others will run away, prompted by a vicious propensity, alone. There is no cure here; and being a bad and dangerous habit, it is a vice (f).

When the saddle has been suffered to press long upon the withers, a tumour will sometimes be formed, hot and exceedingly tender. In neglected fistulous withers the ulcer

may be larger and deeper, and more destructive than in poll-evil (g). It may burrow beneath the shoulder-blade, and the matter may appear at the point of the shoulder or the elbow; or the bones of the withers may become carious. On other parts of the back, tumours and very troublesome ulcers may be produced by the same cause. These little tumours resulting from the pressure of the saddle are called warbles; and when they ulcerate, they frequently become sitfasts (h). If the smallest warble is in such a situation as to prevent the putting on of a saddle or harness, it is a breach of a warranty of soundness (i).

On this point Mr. Baron Parke expressed an opinion in Kiddell v. Burnard (k), where he said, "If the disease were not of a nature to impede the natural usefulness of the animal for the purpose for which he is used, as, for instance, if a horse had a slight pimple on his skin, it would not amount to unsoundness; but even if such a thing as a pimple were on some part of the body where it might have that effect, for instance, on a part which would prevent the putting a saddle or bridle on the animal, it would be different."

It is a question for the jury whether the horse in such case is fit for immediate use. Thus, where an action was brought for the price of a horse warranted sound, and the defendant endeavoured to show that he had a tender place on his neck, which, when touched, made him plunge, it being situated where the mane is usually grasped by a person when mounting, and that he was therefore unsafe and unfit for use while it lasted; Mr. Justice Wightman summed up and said to the jury, "I take your opinion whether you are satisfied that the horse when put into the defendant's stable was rendered unfit for immediate use to an ordinary person on account of some disease." The jury held that, when delivered, he was quite fit for present use (l).

Sallenders constitute unsoundness. See Mallenders (m).

Sandcrack, as its name imports, is a crack or division of the hoof downwards, and into which sand and dirt are very apt to insinuate themselves; or it is so called, as some say,

(g) Poll-evil, ante, p. 88.
(i) The same principle is applicable to Bruised Shoulder.
(m) See Mallenders, ante, p. 35.
because it most frequently occurs in sandy districts, the heat of the sand applied to the feet giving them a disposition to crack. It occurs both in the fore and hind feet, and indicates a brittleness of the crust, which is sometimes natural, but oftener the consequence of mismanagement or disease, particularly of false-quarter (n); and where the horn has grown down whole, but leaves a narrow strip of horn of a different and lighter colour, this indicates that there has been a sandcrack, and that a disposition to it may possibly remain (o). Sandcrack is an unsoundness; but as in the case of a curb (p), if a horse, without any indication of having previously had the disease, throw out a sandcrack immediately after sale, it is no breach of a warranty of soundness.

The scab is a disease which constitutes a breach of warranty of soundness, and there is a form of declaration in the Liber Placitandi (q), in a case where, in consequence of the existence of such disease, an action was brought on a warranty given at Leeds in 1649.

By the statute 32 Hen. 8, c. 13, s. 9, intituled "The Bill for the Breed of Horses," no person shall have or put to pasture any horse, gelding, or mare infected with scab or mange, in any common or common fields, on pain of forfeiting 10s., which offence shall be inquirable in the leet, as other common annoyances be, and the forfeiture shall be to the lord of the leet. This statute was, however, repealed by the 19 & 20 Vict. c. 64.

Shivering is a disease known among the London dray horses. The horse constantly shivers, and frequently cannot lie down; he is unable to back, and consequently can only be used in the team and not in the shafts. This would no doubt be a breach of a warranty of soundness.

Shoulder, bruised. See ante, p. 92, n. (i).

Shying is often the result of cowardice, playfulness or want of work. Shying on coming out of the stable is a habit which proceeds from the remembrance of some ill-usage or hurt, which the animal has received in coming out of the stable, and can rarely or never be cured (r). When confirmed, it is a bad and dangerous habit, and therefore a vice.

Shying sometimes, however, results from defective sight. Shying the

(n) False-quarter, ante, p. 79.
(p) Curb, ante, p. 77.
An unusual convexity in the formation of the cornea of the eye will produce short-sightedness, and if, as is often the case, there is thereby induced a habit of shying, such shying is an *unsoundness*, although there is no disease, and although it is the natural result of a congenital malformation of the eye (s).

*Side-bones* is the same disease as ossification of the cartilages (t). A lameness is caused, which is removed by absolute rest for a length of time, but quick work on a hard road soon brings it back again. It is an *unsoundness*, whether it produces lameness or not (u).

Many horses are very clever at *slipping the collar* at night; they gorge themselves with food, and run the risk of being kicked and lamed by other horses (v). As this may be prevented either by carefully and accurately fixing his collar, or by keeping him in a loose box, it cannot in practice be considered a *vice*.

*Spavin* is an *unsoundness*. See *Blood* and Bog-spavin (w), and Bone-spavin (x).

The inside of the leg, immediately under the knee, and extending to the head of the inner splint-bone, is subject to injury from what is termed the *speedy-cut*, which takes place when a horse with high action, and in the fast trot, violently strikes this part either with his hoof, or the edge of his shoe. Sometimes a bony enlargement is the result; at others, great heat and tenderness; and the pain from the blow seems occasionally to be so great, that the horse drops as if he were shot (y). *Speedy-cut*, like cutting (z), is the consequence of defective shape; and therefore, where a horse is sound at the time of sale, lameness from a *speedy-cut* immediately afterwards is *no breach of a warranty of soundness*.

A *splint*, like a bone-spavin (a), is an excrescence or bony deposit on the leg of a horse, and the danger in both cases is the probability of their interfering with his action; the *bone-spavin*, by preventing the proper flexion of the joint, and the *splint*, by pressing on the sinews of the leg. Lameness is thus produced by each; by bone-spavin nearly always,

(t) Ossification of the Cartilages, ante, p. 87.
(u) Simpson v. Potts, Carlisle Spring Assizes, 1847, cor. Rolfe, B.
(w) Blood and Bog-Spavin, ante, p. 68.
(x) Bone-spavin, ante, p. 68.
(y) Lib. U. K. "The Horse,"
(z) Cutting, ante, p. 78.
(a) Bone-Spavin, ante, p. 68.
by a splint sometimes. It entirely depends on the situation of the bony tumour on the inside of the shank-bone, whether a splint is to be considered an unsoundness (b). If it is not in the neighbourhood of any joint, so as to interfere with its action, and if it does not press upon any ligament or tendon, it can be no cause of unsoundness. And although it is often very unsightly, it does not lessen the capabilities and value of the animal (c).

In an action on the warranty of a horse "to be sound, wind and limb at this time," the breach of which was lameness, produced by a splint, it was given in evidence that a splint might or might not be the efficient cause of lameness, according to its position, its size and extent; that the splint in this instance was in a very bad situation, as it pressed upon one of the sinews of the leg and was calculated to produce, when the horse was worked, inflammation of the sinew and consequent lameness.

Lord Chief Justice Tindal said, "It now appears that some splints cause lameness and others do not, and that the consequences of a splint cannot be apparent at the time, like those of the loss of an eye or any other blemish or defect visible to a common observer. We therefore think that by the terms of this written warranty, the parties meant that this was not, at that time, a splint which would be the cause of future lameness, and that the jury have found that it was. We therefore think that the warranty was broken" (d).

The back sinews are enclosed in a sheath of dense cellular substance, to confine them in their situation and to defend them from injury. Between the tendon and the sheath there is a mucous fluid to prevent friction; but when the horse has been overworked, or put to sudden and violent exertion, the tendon presses upon the delicate membrane lining the sheath, inflammation is produced, and a different fluid is thrown out, which coagulates, and adhesions are formed between the tendon and the sheath, and the motion of the limb is more difficult and painful. At other times, from violent or long-continued exertion, some of the fibres

(b) See App. to Lib. U. K. Ed. 1862, 524, where Professor Spooner gives it as his opinion that situation has less to do with the lameness occasioned by splint than the character of the splint. He considers that the test of its being an unsoundness or not is, whether there is tenderness or not on its being pressed.


(d) Margesson v. Wright, 1 M. & Sc. 622. See also Smith v. O'Brien, 11 L. T., N. S. 346; and post, pp. 131, 132.
which tie the tendons down are ruptured. A slight injury of this nature is called a sprain of the back sinews or tendons, and when it is more serious the horse is said to have broken down (e).

A thickening of the back sinews, which indicates a previous and violent sprain, is an unsoundness, because an alteration of structure has taken place, which must impair the natural usefulness of the horse.

When the muscle, whose office it is to raise the neck and elevate the head, is too powerful in its action, the top of the horse’s head is pulled back and the muzzle protruded, the horse cannot possibly carry his head well; he is what is technically called a star-gazer, heavy in hand, boring upon the bit and unsafe.

Inseparable from this is another sad defect, so far as the beauty of the horse is concerned; he is ewe-necked, that is, he has a neck like a ewe, hollowed above, projecting below, and the neck rises low out of the chest, sometimes lower even than the points of the shoulders (f). These being defects in the formation of a horse are neither unsoundness nor vice.

Strangles. Strangles are peculiar to young horses, almost all of which have it once. It is quite different from glanders (g), though they have sometimes been confounded. In its early stage it resembles a common cold and is accompanied with sore throat. It is not dangerous, and is unsoundness only during the time the horse is ill with it (h).

String-halt. String-halt is a singular and very unpleasant action of the hind leg, arising from an irregular communication of nervous energy to some muscle of the thigh, observable when the horse first comes out of the stable, and gradually ceasing on exercise. It is probably so called from its resemblance to the sort of “halt” produced by a “string” tied to the leg of a pig, and held in the hand of the person driving it. It has often been found in those horses that have a more than common degree of strength and endurance, and is almost entirely confined to well-bred horses (i).

There has always, until lately, been a difference of opinion whether string-halt constitutes unsoundness; however, in Thompson v. Patteson it was held to be so, and as

(g) Glanders, ante, p. 80.
the case has not been reported, it will now be given at some length. It was tried before Mr. Justice Cresswell at the Liverpool Summer Assizes, 1846, and was an action of assumpsit on the warranty of a horse, the breach of which was wilremhaunch or string-halt and spavin.

The plaintiff and defendant were both horse-dealers, and it appeared that the plaintiff met the horse in question coming to Chester fair, and at that time there was a kick apparent on one hock. The plaintiff mounted and tried him, but said he had got a string-halt; this the defendant denied, saying there was nothing but the previous kick. The horse was eventually bought for 52l., the defendant warranting him "sound, except a kick on the hock." The horse was string-halted on both legs.

Veterinary surgeons and other witnesses were called on both sides, who all agreed that there was string-halt, but differed in their opinion as to the existence of a spavin.

To prove string-halt unsoundness, Mr. Howarth of Manchester, a veterinary surgeon, described it to be a spasmodic affection of the abductor muscle of the hind leg, a nerve coming through the trunk being affected. He said that a horse affected by it loses its condition and is not able to do so much work.

Mr. Ellis, of Liverpool, a veterinary surgeon, stated that string-halt is a disease of the sciatic nerve, rendering a horse less fit for work and impeding him in backing, and that he had practical experience showing it to be a disease.

Mr. Bretherton, of Liverpool, a veterinary surgeon of twenty-four years' practice, said that string-halt is caused by pressure on the sciatic nerve, that it increases by work, and is unsoundness. He had seen horses become quite useless from it, but that more aggravated cases were seen in the country than any submitted to the veterinary college. He had seen horses in his father's stables quite useless from it, but that at first it is only observable when the horse is turning round.

The defendant called Mr. Gregson, a veterinary surgeon, who had attended the horse, and did not consider string-halt unsoundness. But on being questioned by the Judge he admitted that it frequently gets worse, and that when very bad it impedes the action of the horse, making him less competent for work.

Mr. Taylor, another veterinary surgeon, said that string-halt does not impair a horse's condition. He had examined the horse in question and considered him sound.

O.
Upon this his lordship said, "It is a question for the jury whether string-halt produces those effects which in the eye of the law renders him unsound." And in summing up shortly afterwards his lordship said to the jury, "You have heard the evidence as to string-halt; if you are satisfied that it is a disease calculated to impair the natural usefulness of the horse, you must find for the plaintiff, it being admitted that the horse had it." The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff.

For thickening of the back sinews see Sprain and Thickening of the Back Sinews (k).

Thick-wind consists of short, frequent and laborious breathings, especially when the horse is in exercise; the inspirations and expirations often succeeding each other so rapidly as evidently to express distress, and occasionally almost to threaten suffocation. Some degree of it frequently exists in round-chested and fat horses, and heavy draught-horses are almost invariably thick-winded, and so are almost all horses unused to exercise or violently exercised on a full stomach. The principal cause, however, of thick-wind is previous inflammation, and particularly inflammation of the bronchial passages. Thick-wind is often the forerunner of broken-wind (l), and when it proceeds from inflammation it is an unsoundness (m).

Thinness of sole which does not afford sufficient protection to the inner or sensible sole, makes a horse liable to lameness.

In a case tried at Liverpool before Mr. Justice Cresswell, it appeared that a horse, whose feet were thin-soled, was sold warranted sound. Some time after sale he went lame, and an action was brought on the warranty. Witnesses were called for the defendant, who stated that the mere fact of a horse's feet being formed in this manner would not of itself render him unsound. And Mr. Justice Cresswell in summing up said, "The plaintiff must, in order to recover in this action, make out that the horse was unsound at the time of sale; a defective formation, however, not producing lameness at the time of sale, is not, in my opinion, unsoundness." His lordship then referred to the case of Brown v. Elkington (n), where Lord Abinger, C.B.,

(k) Sprain and Thickening of the Back Sinews, ante, p. 95.
(l) Brokend-wind, ante, p. 70.
(n) Brown v. Elkington, 8 M. & W. 132.
held that curby-hocks (o) not producing lameness at the
time of sale were not a breach of warranty of soundness,
though a curb was afterwards thrown out. And his lord-
ship then said, "This case shows that the mere fact of
the horse in question being thin-soled at the time of sale, is
not sufficient to constitute a breach of the warranty of sound-
ness; and therefore, unless you are of opinion that that
peculiar formation had produced, at the time of sale, actual
lameness, you will find for the defendant," which the jury
accordingly did (p).

In the neighbourhood of the joints are several bags,
containing a mucous fluid, for the purpose of lubricating the
parts, and these sometimes become inflamed and enlarged,
as in wind-galls (q). A similar enlargement is found above
the hock, between the flexor of the foot and the extensor
of the hock, on both sides of which it projects in the
form of a round swelling. It is called a thoroughpin, and
is an indication of considerable work, but, unless it be of
great size, it is rarely attended with lameness (q). It
constitutes unsoundness when it causes lameness, or perhaps
when it is so large as to render it likely that lameness will
soon ensue; however, in such a case it would be very con-
spicuous, and a special warranty against it had better be
taken.

A thrush is the inflammation of the lower surface of the
inner or sensible frog, and the secretion or throwing out of
pus, almost invariably accompanied by a slight degree of
tenderness of the frog itself, or of the heel a little above it,
and if neglected, leading to diminution of the substance
of the frog, and separation of the horn from the parts
beneath, and the production of fungus and canker (r), and
ultimately a diseased state of the foot, destructive of the
present and dangerous to the future usefulness of the
horse (s). A thrush is an unsoundness.
Tripping arises from a heavy forehead, and from the Tripping.
fore legs being too much under the horse, so that, like
cutting (t), it is a consequence of malformation; it also
may indicate tenderness of the foot, grogginess (u), or old
lameness (w). As it arises from such causes it cannot be

(o) Curby-hocks, ante, p. 77.
(r) Canker, ante, p. 70.
(t) Cutting, ante, p. 78.
(u) Grogginess, ante, p. 82.
WHAT DISEASES CONSTITUTE UNSOUNDNESS OR VICE.

called a bad habit, and is, therefore, not a vice, but in some cases it indicates an alteration of structure.

A great many horses, perfectly quiet in other respects, are vicious to clean, and this probably is the consequence of great sensibility in the skin, and of maltreatment at some time or other; and although it may be gradually overcome by kindness (x), yet, when it exists in such a degree as to be dangerous, it is a vice.

The same may be said of being vicious to shoe as where a horse is vicious to clean, except that it is much less common; however, when it is dangerous to shoe such a horse, he must be considered to have a vice (y).

Horses perfectly white or cream-coloured have the iris white and the pupil red. When horses of other colours, and they are usually pied ones, have a white iris and a black pupil, they are said to be wall-eyed. Vulgar opinion has decided that a wall-eyed horse is never subject to blindness, but this seems altogether erroneous, as there appears to be no difference of structure which can produce this exemption (z).

As to warbles see Saddle-galls (a).

Warbles.

Warts are tumours of variable size, arising first from the cuticle, and afterwards connected with the true skin by means of the vessels which supply the growth of the tumours. They are found sometimes on the eyelids, on various parts of the skin, and on the prepuce (b). Unless, however, they exist to such an extent as to impede any of the natural functions, or in such a situation as to prevent a saddle, bridle, or harness being put on a horse, they are not unsoundness (c).

Warls.

For water-farcy see Farcy (d).

Water-farcy.

Weak-foot often arises from disease, but in many instances from the natural construction of the foot. In the slanting of the crust from the coronet to the toe, an angle is formed, amounting probably to not more than forty instead of forty-five degrees; and after the horse has been worked for a year or two, the line, instead of being straight, becomes a little indented or hollow midway between the coronet and the toe. Horses with these feet can never


(a) Saddle-galls, ante, p. 91.
(b) Lib. U. K. "The Horse," 381.
(c) Kiddell v. Burnard, 9 M. & W. 670.
(d) Farcy, ante, p. 80.
stand much work. They will be subject to corns (e), to bruises, to convexity of the sole, to punctures in nailing, to breaking away of the crust, to inflammation of the foot, and to sprain and injury of the pastern, the fetlock, and the flexor tendon (f). When it is the result of disease, it is such an alteration of structure as constitutes unsoundness.

Weaving is a motion of the head, neck and body from side to side, like the shuttle of a weaver passing through the web, and hence the name given to this peculiar and incessant action. It indicates an impatient, irritable temper, and a dislike to the confinement of the stable; a horse which is thus incessantly on the fret will seldom carry flesh, or be safe to ride or drive (g). This being a bad habit is a vice, when it either injures a horse's health, or makes him dangerous.

The wheezer utters a sound not unlike that of an asthmatic person when a little hurried. This is a kind of thick-wind (h), caused by the lodgment of some mucous fluid in the small passages of the lungs, and it frequently accompanies bronchitis. Wheezing can be heard at all times, even when the horse is at rest in the stable, and thus differs from roaring (i), which is confined to the increased breathing during considerable exertion (k). It is an unsoundness (l).

The whistler utters a shriller sound than the wheezer, but only when in exercise, and that of some duration, as a sudden motion will not always produce it. It seems to be referable to some contraction in the windpipe or larynx. The sound is a great nuisance to the rider, and the whistler very speedily becomes distressed (m). This is an unsoundness (n).

Wilremhaunch is the Lancashire name for string-halt (o). There are few horses perfectly free from wind-galls, but they do not interfere with the action of the fetlock or cause lameness, except when they are numerous or large. Like thoroughpin (p), they do not constitute unsoundness unless they cause lameness, or perhaps when they are so large

(c) Corns, ante, p. 73.
(h) Thick-wind, ante, p. 98.
(i) Roaring, ante, p. 90.

(o) String-halt, ante, p. 96.
(p) Thoroughpin, ante, p. 99.
and numerous as to make it likely they will soon cause it \( q\).

In an action which was brought on the warranty of a horse, the breach of which was wind-galls, a verdict was found for the plaintiff \( r\). The wind-galls had probably produced lameness, as there appeared not to have been any dispute about the unsoundness, but only about the form of action.

**Wind-sucking** bears a close analogy to crib-biting \( s\); it arises from the same causes, and the same results follow. The horse stands with his neck bent, his head drawn inward, his lips alternately a little opened and then closed, and a noise is heard as if he were sucking \( t\). It is a vice.

In some few instances the second teeth do not rise immediately under the temporary or middle teeth, but somewhat by their side. The tooth is pushed out of its place to the fore part of the first grinder, and remains for a considerable time under the name of a wolf’s tooth, causing swelling and soreness of the gums, and frequently wounding the cheeks. This is easily remedied by drawing the tooth \( u\), and though an unsoundness while it lasts, no dispute would be likely to arise in practice respecting it.

The yellows, otherwise the jaundice, is the introduction of bile into the general circulation, and which is usually caused by some obstruction in the ducts or tubes which convey the bile from the liver to the intestines. It exhibits itself by a yellowness of the eyes and mouth, and any part of the skin not covered with hair \( x\). It is, while it lasts, an unsoundness.

\( s\) Crib-biting, ante, p. 75.
CHAPTER V.

WARRANTY; SALE AND WARRANTY BY AN AGENT; AND PATENT DEFECTS.

Warranty.

In buying a horse, as well as in making an exchange, the maxim *caveat emptor* is the rule of law, and a party who has got an unsound horse has in neither case any remedy unless there be evidence either of express warranty or of fraud. For in the general sale of a horse the seller only warrants it to be an animal of the description it appears to be, and nothing more; and if the purchaser makes no inquiries as to its soundness or qualities, and it turns out to be unsound or restive or unfit for use, he cannot recover as against the seller, as it must be assumed that he purchased the animal at a cheaper rate (a).

According to the Roman law (b), and in France (c) and Scotland, and partially in America (d), there is always an implied contract that the vendor has the right to dispose of the article which he sells.

In England the common law rule was formerly stated to be that on a sale of specific goods there was no implied warranty of title, and that, in the absence of fraud, the seller was not liable for a defect of title unless there was an express warranty or an equivalent to it by declaration or conduct (e). It was, however, well settled that in an executory agreement, the seller impliedly warranted his title in the goods which he promised to sell (f); and so wide a construction was put upon the circumstances which might be held to be equivalent to an express warranty that Lord Campbell said that the exceptions had well nigh eaten up the rule (g). This dictum was quoted with approval by

(a) Jones v. Bright, 3 M. & P. 175.  
(b) Domat, book 1, tit. 2, s. 2, art. 3.  
(c) Code Civil, chap. 4, s. 1, art. 1603.  
(d) 1 John’s Rep. 274 (Amer.); Story on Sales, 4th Ed. 367. See also Morley v. Attenborough, 3 Exch. 510, per Parke, B.  
(f) Bcnj. on Sales, 4th Ed. p. 622; Morley v. Attenborough, ubi supra.  
(g) Sims v. Marryat, 17 Q. B. 281.
Erle, C.J., in *Eichholz v. Bannister* (h), and since the decision in that case there can be little doubt but that, as Mr. Benjamin, in his work on "Sales," (i) says, the exceptions had become the rule, and the old rule had dwindled into the exception. This, at all events, appears to be the principle upon which the judgment of the Queen's Bench Division (Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. and Lord Esher, M.R.) was founded, in the recent case of *Edwards v. Pearson* (k). In that case a horse which had been stolen was sold by auction, a few days after the theft, at a horse repository, to the defendant, who, almost immediately afterwards, sold it to the plaintiff, who paid him 15l. for it. Soon afterwards the owner traced the animal, and the plaintiff gave it up to the police and then demanded back from the defendant the sum he had paid for it, and, being refused, brought an action in the County Court to recover the price. The judge thought that though the parties had no idea of any warranty of title, but merely a sale of the horse, there was an implied warranty by the defendant that he had a right to sell it, and gave judgment for the defendant accordingly. On appeal to the Divisional Court this judgment was affirmed, the Court being of opinion that the plaintiff intended to buy a horse and not a lawsuit.

But any doubt that may have existed subsequently to the decision in *Eichholz v. Bannister* (l), in relation to the existence of an implied warranty of title on the sale of specific goods, is entirely removed by s. 12 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, which enacts as follows:—

"In a contract of sale, unless the circumstances of the contract are such as to show a different intention, there is—

(1) An implied condition on the part of the seller that in the case of a sale he has a right to sell the goods, and that in the case of an agreement to sell he will have a right to sell the goods at the time when the property is to pass:

(2) An implied warranty that the buyer shall have and enjoy quiet possession of the goods:

(3) An implied warranty that the goods shall be free from any charge or incumbrance in favour of any

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(i) 4th Ed., p. 634.
(k) 6 Times L. R. 220.
third party, not declared or known to the buyer before or at the time when the contract is made."

As sub-s. (1) of this enactment uses the term "implied condition" in contrast with implied warranty in sub-ss. (2), (3), the buyer may, on a breach thereof, repudiate the contract under s. 11 (1), (a), post, p. 108, and recover the price paid on the ground of a failure of consideration (under s. 54), or may treat the breach as a breach of warranty only under s. 11, sub-s. (1), (a) (m).

A dispute respecting the title of different parties to a horse may be decided by an interpleader issue. Thus, a question was tried whether certain race-horses named Ægis, Ninnyhammer, and War Eagle, were the property of the plaintiff when they were seized in execution by the sheriff of Cambridgeshire, at Newmarket, under a ji. fi., consequent on a judgment obtained by the defendant against a gentleman named Carew, and a jury found a verdict for the plaintiff (n).

But an interpleader order will not be granted where the respective claims are not co-extensive. Thus, where the defendant, the proprietor of a horse repository, sold there, by public auction, a horse to the plaintiff, warranted quiet to ride and in harness, but subject to a condition by which, if considered by the buyer incapable of working from any infirmity or disease, it might be returned on the second day after the sale, and the matter determined by veterinary surgeons according to the terms provided for in such condition; and the horse was accordingly returned by the plaintiff, who demanded to have back the money he had paid for the purchase, and this being refused he brought an action against the defendant for breach of warranty; and the person who had placed the horse at the repository for sale claimed of the defendant the proceeds of the sale, stating that the horse had left the repository perfectly sound. It was held that the defendant was not entitled to an interpleader order (o).

Where there is a contract for the sale of goods by description, there is an implied condition that the goods shall correspond with the description (p).


According to Bowen, L.J. (q): “An implied warranty, or, as it is called, a covenant in law, as distinguished from an express contract or express warranty, really is, in all cases, founded upon the presumed intention of the parties and upon reason. The implication which the law draws from what must obviously have been the intention of the parties, the law draws with the object of giving efficacy to the transaction, and preventing such a failure of consideration as cannot have been within the contemplation of either side. . . . I believe if one were to take all the cases . . . it would be found that in all of them the law is raising an implication from the presumed intention of the parties . . . In business transactions, . . . what the law desires to effect by the implication is to give such business efficacy to the transaction as must have been intended, at all events, by both parties, who are business men—not to impose on one side all the perils of the transaction, or to emancipate one side from all the chances of failure, but to make each party promise in law as much, at all events, as it must have been in the contemplation of both parties that he should be responsible for in respect of those perils and chances.”

It is a rule of the common law that, with regard to the sale of ascertained chattels, there is no implied warranty of quality, unless there are some circumstances beyond the mere fact of a sale, from which it may be implied (r). The maxim of the common law, caveat emptor, is the general rule applicable to sales, so far as quality is concerned, and except there be deceit, either by a fraudulent concealment or fraudulent misrepresentation, or the seller has given an express warranty, or unless a warranty be implied from the nature and circumstances of the sale, no action for unsoundness lies by the buyer against the seller upon the sale of a horse or other animal (s). And this rule is recognized and declared by s. 14 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, in the following terms:—

"Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any statute in that behalf, there is no implied warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract of sale, except as follows:—

(q) The Moorcock, 14 P. D. 64; 58 L. J., P. 73; 60 L. T., N. S. 654; 37 W. R. 439.
(s) Hill v. Balls, ubi supra. See also Benj. on Sales, 4th Ed., 637.
WARRANTY.

(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, so as it show that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment, and the goods are of a description which it is in the course of the seller's business to supply (whether he be the manufacturer or not) there is an implied condition that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose, provided that in the case of a contract for the sale of a specified article under its patent or other trade name, there is no implied condition as to its fitness for any particular purpose:

(2) Where goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of that description (whether he be the manufacturer or not), there is an implied condition that the goods shall be of merchantable quality; provided that if the buyer has examined the goods, there shall be no implied condition as regards defects which such examination ought to have revealed:

(3) An implied warranty or condition as to quality or fitness for a particular purpose may be annexed by the usage of trade.

(4) An express warranty or condition does not negative a warranty or condition implied by this Act unless inconsistent therewith."

The reason laid down for requiring a warranty of soundness in buying a horse is, that it is well known they have secret maladies which cannot be discovered by the usual trials and inspections, and that a warranty prevents the purchaser from being damnified by those latent defects against which no prudence can guard; as it differs from the case of a manufactured article, where a merchant, by providing proper materials and workmanship, may prevent defects (t). And the late Mr. Youatt said, "A man should have a more perfect knowledge of horses than falls to the lot of most of men, and a perfect knowledge of the vendor too, who ventures to buy a horse without a warranty" (u). But the same, mutatis mutandis, may very justly be said of a person who ventures to give a warranty on the sale of a horse.

If a buyer, however, means to protect himself from Buyer should

(c) 1 Rol. Abr. 90; Jones v. (u) Lib. U. K. "The Horse," Right, 5 Bing. 544. 368.
hidden defects, he must take a warranty, and he is not protected otherwise, unless he can make out fraud (w).

By s. 62, sub-s. (1) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, "warranty" as regards England and Ireland, means an agreement with reference to goods which are the subject of a contract of sale, but collateral to the main purpose of such contract, the breach of which gives rise to a claim for damages, but not to a right to reject the goods and treat the contract as repudiated.

As regards Scotland a breach of warranty shall be deemed to be a failure to perform a material part of the contract.

It is much better both for the buyer and seller, when the latter states whether he professes to warrant or not; because where nothing has been said on that point, a considerable degree of doubt must frequently rest upon the case, and then it is only by interpreting the expressions used at the time of sale that even an opinion can be formed as to whether a warranty were ever intended. No particular words are necessary to constitute a warranty; if a man says, "This horse is sound," that is a warranty (x); and it is not necessary that the seller should say, "I warrant;" it is sufficient if he says that the article is of a particular quality or is fit for a particular purpose (y). The general rule laid down by Mr. Justice Bayley is, that whatever the vendor represents at the time of sale is a warranty (z). Therefore if a person at the time of sale say, "You may depend upon it the horse is perfectly quiet and free from vice," it is a warranty (a). Words, however, of expectation and estimate only do not amount to a warranty (b).

A condition in a contract of sale as opposed to a warranty is not defined in the Sale of Goods Act, but appears by implication, from ss. 11 and 62 (1), supra, to be an essential term, a breach of which entitles the buyer to reject the goods, and treat the contract as repudiated (c).

Section 11 of the Sale of Goods Act is as follows:

"(1) In England or Ireland—

(a) Where a contract of sale is subject to any condition

(x) Per Best, C.J., Salmon v. Ward, 2 C. & P. 211.
(a) Cave v. Colman, 3 M. & R. 2.
(b) M'Connel v. Murphy, L. R., 5 P. C. 203; 28 L. T., N. S. 713.
(c) See Kerr & Pearson-Gee on the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, p. 68.
to be fulfilled by the seller, the buyer may waive the condition or may elect to treat the breach of such condition as a breach of warranty, and not as a ground for treating the contract as repudiated.

(b) Whether a stipulation in a contract of sale is a condition, the breach of which may give rise to a right to treat the contract as repudiated, or a warranty, the breach of which may give rise to a claim for damages but not to a right to reject the goods and treat the contract as repudiated, depends in each case on the construction of the contract. A stipulation may be a condition, though called a warranty in the contract.

(c) Where a contract of sale is not severable, and the buyer has accepted the goods, or part thereof, or where the contract is for specific goods, the property in which has passed to the buyer, the breach of any condition to be fulfilled by the seller can only be treated as a breach of warranty, and not as a ground for rejecting the goods and treating the contract as repudiated, unless there be a term of the contract, express or implied, to that effect.

(2) In Scotland, failure by the seller to perform any material part of a contract of sale is a breach of contract, which entitles the buyer either within a reasonable time after delivery to reject the goods and treat the contract as repudiated, or to retain the goods and treat the failure to perform such material part as a breach which may give rise to a claim for compensation or damages.

(3) Nothing in this section shall affect the case of any condition or warranty, fulfilment of which is excused by law by reason of impossibility or otherwise.”

By sub-s. (1) (c) of the above enactment, the buyer must, in the absence of any special term to the contrary, treat the breach of a condition only as a breach of warranty where (1) he has accepted part of the goods under an entire contract, or (2), there has been a sale of specific goods.

With regard to part acceptance under an entire contract, the principle is that the buyer, “by not repudiating the contract has affirmed it” (d). “If I bargain for the purchase of ten horses... and the seller delivers only nine, I may say to him, ‘I will not accept them, my bargain was for ten.’ But if, instead of so doing, I take

(d) White v. Beston, 7 H. & N. 42, per Channel, B.
the nine horses and use them, that which at one time was a condition precedent by my conduct has become no condition precedent" (e).

With regard to sales of specific goods, "If a specific thing has been sold with a warranty of its quality, under such circumstances that the property passes with the sale, the vendee having been thus benefited by the partial execution of the contract, and become the proprietor of the thing sold, cannot treat the failure of the warranty as a condition broken (unless there is a special stipulation to that effect in the contract), but must have recourse to an action for damages in respect of the breach of warranty" (f).

Where there is a contract for the sale of specific goods, and the goods without the knowledge of the seller have perished at the time the contract is made, the contract is void (g).

Where there is an agreement to sell specific goods, and subsequently the goods, without any fault on the part of the seller or buyer, perish before the risk passes to the buyer, the agreement is thereby avoided (h).

Thus where A. agreed to sell a specific horse to B. upon condition that it should be taken away by B. and tried by him for eight days, and returned at the expiration of that period if B. did not think it suitable for his purposes, and the horse died on the third day after it was placed in B.'s stable, without fault of either party; it was held by Denman, J., that A. could not maintain an action for the price as for goods sold and delivered (i).

There was at one time a general opinion that a sound price given for a horse was tantamount to a warranty of soundness; but Lord Mansfield considered the doctrine to be so loose and unsatisfactory that he rejected it, and laid down the following rule: "There must either be an express warranty of soundness, or fraud in the seller, to maintain an action" (k).

A general warranty is an unconditional undertaking that a horse or any other article really is what the warrantor professes it to be.

A warranty may be either general or qualified. If a

(c) White v. Recton, 7 H. & N. 42, per Bramwell, B.
(f) Per Curiam, Behn v. Burness, 3 B. & S. at p. 755. See also Street v. Bilay, 2 B. & Ad. 466, 462. As to remedy for breach of warranty, see post, Chap. VIII.
(g) Sale of Goods Act, 1893, s. 6.
(h) Sale of Goods Act, 1893, s. 7.
person at the time of his selling a horse say, "I never warrant, but he is sound so far as I know," it is a qualified warranty, and an action for breach of warranty may be maintained upon it by the purchaser, if it can be proved that the seller knew of the unsoundness (l).

By the conditions of sale at repositories and public auctions, a specified short time is usually allowed, within which the purchaser must give notice of any breach of warranty. If he neglect to do this, he has no remedy, unless such condition has been rendered inoperative by fraud or artifice. And in a case where a warranty was to last till the noon of the following day, when the sale was to become complete, Mr. Justice Littledale said, "The warranty here was as if the vendor had said, 'after twenty-four hours I do not warrant; ' such a stipulation is not unreasonable" (m).

In the case of Chapman v. Gwyther (n) the seller of a horse signed the following warranty:—

"June 5th, 1865. Mr. C. bought of Mr. G. G. a bay horse for ninety pounds. Warranted sound. 90l. G. G.

"Warranted sound for one month.—G. G."

The Court of Queen's Bench held that the latter words limited the duration of the warranty, and meant that the warranty was to continue in force for one month only; and that the complaint of unsoundness must therefore be made by the purchaser within one month of the sale.

Where a horse was sold by public auction at a repository warranted to be a good worker, subject to the condition that "horses warranted good workers, whether sold by private treaty or public auction, not answering such warranty must be returned before five o'clock of the day after the sale, shall then be tried by a person to be appointed by the auctioneer, and the decision of such person shall be final;" and the horse was not returned within the stipulated time: it was held, on demurrer, in an action on the warranty, that the buyer's only remedy was under the condition, and that he could not maintain the action (o).

(m) Bywater v. Richardson, 1 A. & E. 508; 8 C. 3 N. & M. 748; and see Best v. Osborne, 2 C. & P. 74.
(n) L. R., 1 Q. B. 463; 35 L. J., Q. B. 142; 14 L. T., N. S. 477.
The purchaser, however, may return the horse at any time within that specified in the conditions of sale, even though he has notice of the breach of warranty before he removes the horse, and the horse, through an accident having happened to it whilst it was in his possession, but not by his default, becomes depreciated in value (p).

But the mere fact of the contract of sale containing a condition for the return of the horse within a specified short time, in the event of its not answering the warranty given, will not deprive the buyer of his remedy for the breach, if the performance has become impossible without any fault on the part of the seller (q).

Where a horse was sold by auction at a repository warranted quiet to ride, and one of the conditions of the contract was to the effect that if the buyer contended that the horse did not correspond with the warranty it must be returned on the second day after the sale, and that the non-return within the time limited should be a bar to any claim on account of any breach of warranty; and the horse was removed by the buyer, and while being ridden on the next day, ran away, fell, and was so injured that it could not safely be returned on the second day after the sale, but the buyer gave notice to the seller on that day that the animal was not according to the warranty, and was unfit to travel; it was held that under these circumstances the non-return of the horse within the period stipulated by the condition was no bar to an action for breach of warranty; Lord Coleridge, L.C.J., saying that, "the condition as to the return of the horse was subject to the well-known rule that such agreements imply the continued existence of the subject-matter of the agreement. The result of the accident was to disable the animal so completely as to destroy it as a horse for all purposes of draught or riding" (r).

When there is any suspicious place apparent to the parties, which they discuss, or if the seller knows of some defect and does not wish to answer for any unsoundness which may proceed from it, he should give a warranty specially excepting his liability for any unsoundness which may proceed from the defect in question (s); or expressly

(q) Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 826. See also s. 7 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, ante, p. 110.
(s) Jones v. Cowley, 4 B. & C.
state what he warrants: as where a mare was warranted to be "a good hunter, and to have one eye" (t). But where the purchaser requires the vendor to be answerable for some defect, he should take a special warranty against the effects which may be likely to proceed from it.

The buyer should always take care to distinguish between a warranty and a representation (u); however, he is safe if he take a written warranty, and refuse to believe any representation the seller will not commit to paper. A written warranty should comprehend not only soundness, but freedom from vice, and also quietness and age, if necessary.

Also any special terms which may have been agreed upon at the time of sale; for instance, an agreement to take back the horse, in case he does not suit or is unsound, should be made a part of the written warranty or agreement upon which the sale is effected (w).

The following form of receipt and warranty will be found, for general purposes, short and comprehensive:

"Received of P. J. D. fifty pounds for a grey gelding, warranted only six years old, sound, free from vice, and quiet to ride or drive either in single or double harness.

50l."

Where the whole matter passes in parol, all that has passed may sometimes be taken together as forming parcel of the contract, though not always, because matter talked of at the commencement of a bargain may be excluded by the language used at its termination; but if the contract be in the end reduced to writing, nothing which is not found in the writing can be considered as a part of the contract (x).

A warranty may be gathered from letters which have passed between the parties. But where it is sought to import a warranty into a contract for sale contained in letters, which are ambiguous in their terms, it is competent to the party sought to be charged to give evidence of all the surrounding facts and circumstances, for the purpose of showing that a warranty was not contemplated by the parties (y).

445; S. C., 6 D. & R. 533; and Hemming v. Parry, 6 C. & P. 580.
(t) Higgs v. Thrale, before Chief Baron Pollock, Feb. 18, 1850.
(u) See post, p. 134.

A written warranty.
A special agreement.
Form of warranty.
Effect of a written warranty.
Warranty may be gathered from letters.

(w) Payne v. Whale, 7 East, 274.
The parties are bound by the written warranty alone, unless some fraud can be shown; and even if there be a representation it does not avail. If a man brings me a horse, and makes any representation whatever of his quality and soundness, and afterwards we agree in writing for the purchase of the horse, that shortens and corrects the representation; and whatever terms are not contained in the contract do not bind the seller, and must be struck out of the case (z).

Upon a contract for the sale of goods with a particular express warranty, the Court will not extend such warranty by implication, as the maxim, *expressum facit cessare tacitum*, applies to such case (a). Thus, if a man sell a horse, and warrant him to be sound, the vendor knowing at the time that the purchaser wants him for the purpose of carrying a lady, and the horse, though sound, proves to be unfit for that particular purpose, this would be no breach of warranty (a).

When several horses are sold at an entire price, and a warranty is given as to all, the contract of sale is entire, but the warranty is several (b).

A warranty only extends to the state of a particular commodity at the time of sale, unless the warrantor *expressly* fixes some future period to which he undertakes to extend it (c). Thus Blackstone says, "A warranty can only reach to things in being at the time of the warranty, and not to things in future; as that a horse is sound at the time of buying him, not that he *will* be sound two years hence (d). And in a case in the Year Book in the reign of Edward the Fourth, Choke, J., says, "If I sell a horse and warrant him to travel thirty leagues a day, and he fail to do it, I am not liable to an action of deceit, for the warranty is void, because a person only warrants such a thing as *was* at the *time* of warranty, and not a thing which is *to come*" (e).

There is no doubt, however, that a *future event* may be warranted if there be an express undertaking to that effect (f); and it makes no difference whether the war-

(b) See Story on Sales, 191; *Symonds v. Carr*, 1 Camp. 361.
(c) *Eden v. Parkinson*, Doug. 732 a.
(d) 3 Bla. Com. 165.
(e) Year Book, 9 Edw. 4, p. 6.
WARRANTY.

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Warranty be made at the time of sale or before sale, so long as the sale is made upon the faith of the warranty (g). For where a seller informed a buyer that one of two horses he was about to sell him had a cold, but agreed to deliver both at the end of a fortnight sound and free from blemishes, and at the expiration of that time both horses were delivered, but one had a cough and the other a swelled leg, which was apparent at the time of sale, the seller brought an action to recover the price, and a verdict was found for the buyer. The Court of Common Pleas refused to disturb it or grant a new trial, as the warranty did not apply to the time of sale but to a future period (h).

On the sale of goods, if the parties agree to the specific chattels, there is no implied warranty on the part of the seller that the goods shall be fit for the particular purpose (i) for which they are required, but only that they must be merchantable, that is to say, fit for some purpose (k).

If a person sell a commodity for a particular purpose he must be understood to warrant it reasonably fit and proper for such purpose (l). If a man sells a horse generally, he warrants no more than that it is a horse; the buyer puts no question, and perhaps gets the animal cheaper. But if he asks for a horse to carry a lady, or a child, or to drive in a particular carriage, he who knows the qualities of the animal and sells, undertakes on every principle of honesty that it is fit for the purpose indicated; but if it should turn out that the horse was vicious, or had never been in harness, the buyer would be entitled to recover, on proving that the horse was unfit for the purpose for which it was sold, although it might be fit for several other purposes. The selling upon demand for a horse with particular qualities, is an affirmation that he possesses those qualities (m).

And in Chanter v. Hopkins (n), Mr. Baron Parke said, "Suppose a party offered to sell me a horse of such a description as would suit my carriage, he could not fix on me a liability to pay for it, unless it were a horse fit for

\[ \text{Buying for a particular purpose.} \]

A carriage-

\[ \text{horse.} \]

\[ \text{Must be reasonably fit for the purpose.} \]

\[ \text{Bright, 5 Bing. 544.} \]

\[ (g) \text{ Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T. R. 50; 1 R. R. 634.} \]

\[ (h) \text{ Liddard v. Kain, 9 Moore, 356; S. C, 2 Bing. 183.} \]

\[ (i) \text{ Per Parke, B., Sutton v. Temple, 12 M. & W. 55. See also s. 14 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, ante, pp. 106, 107.} \]

\[ (k) \text{ Per Best, C. J., Jones v. Bright, 6 Bing. 544.} \]

\[ (l) \text{ Per Abbott, C. J., Gray v. Cox, 4 B. & C. 115.} \]

\[ (m) \text{ Per Best, C. J., Jones v. Bright, 5 Bing. 544; S. C, 3 M. & P. 162. See also Jones v. Just, L. R., 3 Q. B. 197; 37 L. J., Q. B. 89; 18 L. T., N. S. 208.} \]

\[ (n) \text{ 4 M. & W. 496.} \]
the purpose it was wanted for; but if I describe it as a particular bay horse, in that case the contract is performed by his sending that horse” (o).

Nor is there any exception as to latent undiscoverable defects. In Randall v. Newson (p), the plaintiff ordered and bought of the defendant, a coach-builder, a pole for his carriage. The pole broke in use, and the horses became frightened and were injured. In an action for the damage, the jury found that the pole was not reasonably fit for the carriage, but that the defendant had been guilty of no negligence. On motion by the defendant for judgment, the Court (q) ordered judgment to be entered for the defendant, on the ground that the answers of the jury amounted to a finding of a latent defect in the wood of the pole, which no care or skill could discover, and that the principle of the decision in Readhead v. Midland Rail. Co. (r) extended to the sale of an article for a specific purpose. The plaintiff appealed. And the Court of Appeal held that the limitation as to latent defects, introduced by Readhead v. Midland Rail. Co. (s), does not apply to the sale of a chattel, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the value of the pole, and also for damage to the horses, if the jury on a second trial should be of opinion that the injury to the horses was the natural consequence of the defect in the pole.

Proof that a horse is a good drawer only will not satisfy a warranty that he is “a good drawer and pulls quietly in harness.” And the Court of King’s Bench held that it was quite clear these were convertible terms, because no horse can be said to be a good drawer if he will not pull quietly in harness, and therefore proof that he is merely a good puller will not satisfy the warranty; the word good must mean “good” in all particulars (t). And where a horse was warranted “sound and quiet in all respects,” Lord Abinger, C.B., held it to include the being quiet in harness (u). But where the warranty was as follows, viz., “Received from A. the sum of 60l. for a black horse rising

(p) 2 Q. B. D. 102; 46 L. J., Q. B. 269; 36 L. T., N. S. 164.
(q) Blackburn and Lush, J.J.
(r) L. R., 4 Q. B. 379.
(s) L. R., 4 Q. B. 379. This case decided that the contract made by a carrier of passengers is to take due care to carry the passengers safely, and is not a warranty that the carriage in which he travels shall be in all respects perfect for its purpose.
(t) Coltherd v. Puncheon, 2 D. & M. 10.
(u) Smith v. Parsons, 8 C. & P. 199.
five years, quiet to ride and drive, and warranted sound up
to this date, or subject to the examination of a veterinary
surgeon;" it was held that there was no warranty that the
horse was quiet to ride and drive (x).

But in setting up a breach of such a warranty, it must
be clearly proved that the horse at the time of sale was
unfit for the purpose for which he was bought; and if he
has gone quietly with persons of ordinary skill, there will
be a strong presumption that he answers his warranty. In
the following case it appeared that a horse warranted "a
thoroughbroke horse for a gig," kicked and broke the
gig, &c. the first time he was driven by the purchaser.
This was, however, two months after sale, but in the mean-
time other persons had driven him, and he had always
answered his warranty. It was decided that this was no
breach, because as the horse had previously behaved as he
had been warranted, his bad conduct must be attributed
and have been owing to the purchaser's want of skill in
driving (y). And in the case of Buckingham v. Reeve,
Pollock, C.B., said, "A horse put into a new harness and
an unaccustomed carriage once or twice might kick, and yet
be deserving of a warranty of being quiet in harness" (z).

In all cases of warranty as to the quality of the thing
sold, as, for instance, where a horse is warranted sound or
the like, the warrantor undertakes that it is true at the
time of making it; and the law annexes a tacit contract
that if it be otherwise than warranted, the vendor shall
make compensation to the buyer (a); and the seller will be
liable for any latent defect, according to the old law con-
cerning warranties (b), that is, as Lord Mansfield laid down,
for all faults, known or unknown to the seller (c), inconsis-
tent with the warranty given.

But where a horse is sold with a warranty, any fraud at
the time of sale will avoid the sale, though it is not on
any point included in the warranty (d). A sale, however,
is not avoided by some immaterial representation in the
warranty proving untrue. For Lord Eldon, in delivering
judgment in the case of an appeal to the House of Lords,
held, where a horse was sold under a warranty of sound-

(x) Anthony v. Halstead, 37 L. T.,
N. S. 433.
(y) Geddes v. Pennington, 5 Dow,
164.
(z) Buckingham v. Reeve, N. P. Ex.
Dec. 1, 1857.
(a) Archbold's N. P. 40; Fielder
v. Starkin, 1 H. Bla. 17; 2 R. R.
700.
(b) Parkinson v. Lee, 2 East, 321;
6 R. R. 429.
(c) Stuart v. Wilkins, Doug. 19.
(d) Steward v. Coesvelt, 1 C. & P.
23.
ness, but with a misrepresentation as to the place from which he was brought, "that if the warranty was answered, a misrepresentation as to the place from which the horse was procured would not suffice to set aside the sale" (e).

**Sale and Warranty by an Agent.**

An agent is always incompetent, without special authority for that purpose, to appoint another person to act in his stead, the maxim of the law being, *delegatus non potest delegare* (f).

An agent employed for a particular purpose has no right to exceed his authority. Thus a servant or other person authorized to sell a horse, must receive payment for him in money; he cannot exchange him for another (g).

An agency determines *ipso facto* by the death of the principal, and is also capable of being revoked by him in his lifetime, with as little ceremony as it was created (h).

There is a difference between the principal's rights against a remunerated and against an unremunerated agent. The former, having once engaged, may be compelled to proceed to the task which he has undertaken; the latter cannot, for his promise to do so being induced by no consideration, the rule, *ex nudo pacto non oritur actio*, applies. But if he do commence his task, and afterwards be guilty of misconduct in performing it, he will, though unremunerated, be liable for the damage so occasioned; since by entering upon the business, he has prevented the employment of some better qualified person (i).

Wherever a party undertakes to do any act as the agent of another, if he does not possess any authority from the principal, and the other does not know it, or if he exceeds the authority delegated to him, he will be personally responsible to the person with whom he is dealing, for or on account of the principal (k).

If the agent contracts in such a form as to make himself personally responsible, he cannot afterwards, whether his principal were or were not known at the time of the contract, relieve himself from that responsibility (l). And

*(e) Geddes v. Pennington, 5 Dow, 163.*

*(f) 2 Steph. Com. 120.*

*(g) Thompson v. Davenport, 9 B. & C. 78.*

*(h) 2 Steph. Com. 118.*


*(k) Story's Commentaries, 226; Harver v. Williams, 4 Q. B. 232.*

*(l) Higgins v. Senior, 8 M. & W. 845.*
SALE AND WARRANTY BY AN AGENT.

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where a contract is signed by one who professes to be signing "as agent," but who has no principal existing at the time, and the contract would be wholly inoperative unless binding upon the person who signed it, he is personally liable on it (m).

Where it clearly and expressly appears, that a person really acting as agent fairly contracts as such agent in the name of his principal, and professes to make that principal liable, the agent cannot be sued upon the contract (n).

But he may be sued so as to make him liable in damages, for the loss sustained by the person with whom he has entered into the contract (n).

The rule of law is, that, if an agent is guilty of fraud in transacting his principal's business, the principal is responsible (o); but the agent must be acting within the scope of his authority and in the course of his employment (p).

Nor is there any difference in its effect between a misrepresentation made by an agent, which is collateral to the contract, and one which is embodied in the contract, the fraud of the agent in either case, if committed in the course of his employment, rendering the contract voidable as against the principal, without its being shown that he was privy to it (q).

A master sent his servant with a horse to a fair, at such a distance that the servant was obliged to put the horse up for the night; and the servant put him up in a stable belonging to a tenant of his master. The horse was glandered, and the tenant brought an action against the master for damages sustained by him in consequence of the loss of horses and cattle by infection. It was held by the Court of Session in Scotland, that placing the horse in the tenant's stable was an act done by the servant in the proper execution of his duty, and for which the master was liable, upon proof merely of the servant's knowledge of the disease (r).

Where he cannot be sued on the contract.

But is liable in damages.

Principal answerable for his fraud.

Misrepresentation collateral to contract.

Damage caused by his negligence.


(o) See per Parke, B., Murray v. Mann, 2 Ex. 539; Cornfoot v. Fowke, 6 M. & N. 358; Mackay v. Commercial Bank of New Brunswick, L. R., 5 P. C. 394; 43 L. J., C. P. 31.


(r) Baird v. Graham, 14 Court of Sess. (Sco.) 615.
If a person sells goods, supposing at the time of the contract that he is dealing with a principal, but afterwards discovers that the person with whom he has been dealing is not the principal, but agent for a third person, though he may in the meantime have debited the agent with it, he may afterwards recover the amount from the real principal; subject, however, to this qualification, that the state of the account between the principal and the agent is not altered to the prejudice of the principal (s). So that a vendor, who has given credit to an agent, believing him to be the principal, cannot recover against the undisclosed principal, if the principal has bonâ fide paid the agent at a time when the vendor still gave credit to the agent and knew of no one else as a principal (t). On the other hand, if at the time of the sale the seller knows that the person who is nominally dealing with him is not principal but agent, and also knows who the principal really is, and notwithstanding all that knowledge chooses to make the agent his debtor, then, according to the cases of Addison v. Gandasequi (u) and Paterson v. Gandasequi (x) the seller cannot afterwards, on the failure of the agent, turn round and charge the principal, having once made his election at the time when he had the power of choosing between the one and the other” (y). But the mere knowledge at the time of the contract that there is a principal, if his name be not disclosed, will not prevent the seller from resorting to the principal though he had debited the agent (y). The seller, however, must make his election within a reasonable time. Accordingly, when nine months had elapsed after the discovery of the principal, and no election had been made by the seller, it was held that he could not recover (z).

The insertion of the agent’s name alone in the contract, though the principal is disclosed at the time, and the subsequent demand of payment from the agent, does not necessarily amount to an election to give credit to the agent, and to him alone, but the principal may be sued (a).

The question whether credit was given to the agent or to the principal being for the jury, for whose guidance in

(a) Thompson v. Davenport, 9 B. & C. 86, per Lord Tenterden, C. J.
(u) Addison v. Gandasequi, 4 Taunt. 574; 13 R. R. 689.
(y) Thompson v. Davenport, 9 B. & C. 86.
(a) Calder v. Dobell, L. R., 6 C. P. 486; 40 L. J., C. P. 224 Ex. Ch.
resolving it, evidence of custom and usage will be admissible (b).

Where a person describes himself in a written instrument as the agent of an unnamed principal, it is competent for the party with whom he contracts to show that, although described as agent, he is in fact the principal (c). But there is a distinction between cases where an agent in effecting a contract for the purchase of goods does not disclose the existence of a principal at all, and cases where he discloses that he has a principal but does not give his name; and it has been held that in the latter class of cases the vendor may have recourse to the principal though he has bonâ fide paid the agent for the goods, unless there has been such conduct on the vendor’s part, e.g. delay in applying to the principal, as might justify the principal in concluding that the vendor was not looking to his credit but to that of the agent (d).

Although the rule of law is, that where a contract is made by an agent, the principal may come in and take the benefit of it, that doctrine cannot be applied where the agent contracts as principal (e). Thus, Lord Ellenborough said, “If one partner makes a contract in his individual capacity, and the other partners are willing to take the benefit of it, they must be content to do so, according to the mode in which the contract was made” (f). Thus, in assumpsit on a charter-party executed, not by the plaintiff, but by a third person, who in the contract described himself as “owner” of the ship, it was held, that evidence was not admissible to show that such person contracted merely as the plaintiff’s agent (g).

The rule of law is, that the agent who makes the contract may bring an action on the contract in respect of his privity, and the principal in respect of his interest (h).

If the agent is appointed only for a particular purpose, and is invested with limited powers, or, in other words, is

(b) Curtis v. Williamson, L. R., 10 Q. B. 57, 59; 44 L. J., Q. B. 27; 31 L. T., N. S. 678.
(c) Carr v. Jackson, 7 Ex. 382. See also Paice v. Walker, L. R., 5 Ex. 173; 39 L. J., Ex. 109; 22 L. T., N. S. 547.
(d) Irvine & Co. v. Watson & Sons, 5 Q. B. D. 102; 49 L. J., Q. B. 239; 41 L. T., N. S. 51; per Bowen, J.
(e) Humble v. Hunter, 12 Q. B. 315.
(f) Lucas v. De la Cour, 1 M. & S. 249; 14 R. R. 426.
(g) Humble v. Hunter, 12 Q. B. 310.
(h) Sykes v. Giles, 5 M. & W. 650.

所以，证明作为代理人的证据将被允许 (b)。

如果一个人在一份书面文件中描述自己为一个未命名的代理人的代理人，那么对于与之签订合同的当事人而言，只能根据合同的性质来证明其真实身份（c）。但是，在代理人在没有透露存在一个真正的代理人的案件中，例外考虑是不同的，例如延迟向代理人支付，这将迫使代理人做出决定，而这不是代理人的责任（d）。

法律规定，代理人签订的合同，当事人可以加入并获取其利益，但这种原则不能适用于代理人以自己的名义签订合同的案件（e）。因此，Ellenborough男爵说，“如果一名合伙人以个人名义签订合同，而其他合伙人愿意接受其利益，他们必须接受这种模式”（f）。例如，在一场租用的合同中，代理人未被指定为“所有人”时，应当允许证明该人是否是合同的签订者（g）。

法律规定，代理人可以对与之有利益关系的人提起诉讼，而真正的代理人则可以在与之没有利益关系的人的案件中提起诉讼（h）。

如果代理人仅被指定为特定目的，并被赋予有限的权力，或者，换句话说，是

(b) Curtis v. Williamson, L. R., 10 Q. B. 57, 59; 44 L. J., Q. B. 27; 31 L. T., N. S. 678.
(c) Carr v. Jackson, 7 Ex. 382. See also Paice v. Walker, L. R., 5 Ex. 173; 39 L. J., Ex. 109; 22 L. T., N. S. 547.
(d) Irvine & Co. v. Watson & Sons, 5 Q. B. D. 102; 49 L. J., Q. B. 239; 41 L. T., N. S. 51; per Bowen, J.
(e) Humble v. Hunter, 12 Q. B. 315.
(f) Lucas v. De la Cour, 1 M. & S. 249; 14 R. R. 426.
(g) Humble v. Hunter, 12 Q. B. 310.
(h) Sykes v. Giles, 5 M. & W. 650.
a special agent; then it is the duty of persons dealing with such agent to ascertain the extent of his authority; and the principal will not be bound by any act of the agent not warranted expressly by or by fair and necessary implication from, the terms of the authority delegated to him (i). Therefore the servant of a private owner entrusted to sell a horse on one particular occasion, not at a fair or public mart, is not by law authorized to bind his master by a warranty; and the buyer who takes such a warranty, takes it at the risk of being able to prove that the servant had in fact his master's authority to give it. But the existence of this authority may be inferred; e.g., it was held in an action for the breach of a warranty on the sale of a horse by the servant of a private owner, that a letter from the plaintiff's attorney to the defendant, referring to the alleged warranty and averring a breach of it, and an answer from the defendant merely denying the breach of it, afforded evidence whence the jury were justified in finding that the servant had authority in fact to warrant (k).

In Brady v. Todd (l), Erle, C.J., in delivering the judgment of the Court, said, "When the facts raise the question, it will be time to decide the liability created by such a servant as a foreman alleged to be a general agent, or such a special agent as a person intrusted with the sale of a horse in a fair or other public mart, where stranger meets stranger, and the usual course of business is for the person in possession of the horse, and appearing to be the owner, to have all the powers of an owner in respect of the sale; the authority may, under such circumstances as are last referred to, be implied, though the circumstances of the present case do not create the same inference." Previously to this case it had been held that the servant of a private owner employed to sell a horse at a fair, and receive the price, had an implied authority to warrant the horse to be sound, Lord Ellenborough saying, "If the servant was authorized to sell the horse and to receive the stipulated price, I think he was incidentally authorized to give a warranty of soundness. It is now most usual on the sale of horses to require a warranty; and the agent who is employed to sell, when


(k) Miller v. Laxton, 15 C. B., N. S. 834. It should, however, be noted that in this case the sale took place at a fair.

(l) 30 L. J., C. P. at p. 225.
he warrants the horse, may fairly be presumed to be acting within the scope of his authority. This is the common and usual manner in which the business is done, and the agent must be taken to be vested with powers to transact the business with which he is entrusted in the common and usual manner (m).” In that case no special reference was made to the fact that the horse was sold at a fair, and if the foregoing decision was intended to refer to sales by special agents generally, it must be taken to be overruled by Brady v. Todd. In a comparatively recent case, however, the facts contemplated by Erle, C.J., in Brady v. Todd as raising an implication of authority to warrant on the part of a special agent did arise, and it was held that a servant entrusted by his master with the sale of a horse at a fair might have an implied authority to warrant (n).

But wherever a general authority is given by a principal to an agent, this implies and includes a right to do all subordinate acts incident to and necessary for the execution of that authority; then, if notice is not given to the person with whom the agent deals that the principal has limited his authority, the principal is bound (o). In accordance then with this principle of law, a servant employed by a horsedealer as his general agent to carry on his business, has an implied authority to warrant the horses sold by him for his principal as sound without any special authority for that purpose.

The case of Howard v. Sheward (p) very clearly illustrates the rule that the agent or servant of a horsedealer has an implied authority to bind his principal or master by a warranty. In that case it appeared that the defendant was a horsedealer, and that in March, 1866, the plaintiff, being at a riding-school, asked the proprietor “if he knew of a horse that would be likely to suit him,” and that David Sheward, the brother of the defendant, who happened to be present, and who was a horsedealer, and occasionally acted in the sale of horses for the defendant, said he thought the latter had one. After some conversation the horse in question was brought to the riding-school, and there ridden by the plaintiff and approved of by him; and David Sheward, in answer to questions as to the character and soundness of the animal, said, “I’ll guarantee the horse is

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(m) Alexander v. Gibson, 2 Camp. 555; 11 R. R. 797.
(p) L. R., 2 C. P. 148; 36 L. J., C. P. 42.
sound." Ultimately the horse—which had, at the plaintiff's request, been previously examined by a veterinary surgeon, who gave a certificate that it was sound—was purchased by the plaintiff for 315l., which sum he paid to the defendant. The horse, proving to be unsound, was re-sold by the plaintiff, and this action was brought to recover the difference in price. On the part of the defendant it was contended that the servant of a horsedealer (assuming David Sheward to have been the defendant's servant for this purpose) has no implied authority to warrant on his master's behalf; and evidence was offered to show that it was not the custom with horsedealers to warrant where the horse had been examined by a competent veterinary surgeon and pronounced sound. Erle, C.J., declined to receive the evidence, and said that he should rule that David Sheward had authority to warrant; and the jury, finding that he had done so, and that the horse was unsound, returned a verdict for the plaintiff, damages 127l. 10s., and leave was reserved to the defendant to move to enter a nonsuit or for a new trial. The rule was refused. And Willes, J., in the course of his judgment, said, "David Sheward did not negative the fact that this was an ordinary transaction as between his brother and himself. It must be assumed, therefore, that he negotiated the sale as his brother's servant or agent. It was not an isolated instance, though if it had been I do not conceive that it would have made any difference; but it appeared that David Sheward had before assisted the defendant in the sale of horses. Is it, then, part of the business of a horsedealer to warrant horses which he sells? No doubt it is where a sufficient price is given. Upon the whole I think there was clear evidence of authority to warrant. It arose out of the general character of the transaction, and any person dealing with the agent of a horsedealer has a right to assume it."

It was also decided in Howard v. Sheward (q) that evidence of the alleged usage amongst horsedealers not to warrant where the horse has been examined by a veterinary surgeon, was not admissible to rebut the inference of authority to warrant.

But a horsedealer will not be bound by a warranty given by his servant on an incidental matter, especially where the contract is not an ordinary transaction of sale and purchase.

(q) L. R., 2 C. P. 148.
SALE AND WARRANTY BY AN AGENT.

This statement appears to be justified by the judgment of the Queen's Bench Division in Baldry v. Bates (r). In that case the defendant, the keeper of a riding-school, agreed through his servant to send a horse to the plaintiff on trial. The servant warranted that the horse could be safely put into a stable where other horses of the plaintiff's were. At the trial the jury found that at the time the horse was suffering from the mange, and that the defendant's servant was aware of it. The judge, on further consideration, found, as a fact, that the defendant was a horse-dealer, and, therefore, liable on the warranty given by his servant. On appeal to the Divisional Court it was held (reversing the judgment of Huddleston, B.) that the judge had no power to find any such fact, and that as it had not been found by the jury, the defendant would not be bound by any warranty given by his servant as to the soundness of any horse offered by him for sale; and, further, that as the warranty given had not been given on the soundness of the horse, but on an incidental matter, the servant, even if the defendant had been a horse-dealer, would not have been clothed with authority to give such a warranty.

What an agent says as a warranty or representation at the time of sale respecting the thing sold, is evidence against the principal; but not what he has said at another time, whether to the purchaser, or to a stranger, unless it is a statement accompanying an act done in the course of his agency (s). And Lord Ellenborough said, "If the servant is sent with a horse by his master, and which horse is offered for sale, and gives the direction respecting his sale, I think he thereby becomes the accredited agent of his master, and what he has said at the time of sale, as part of the transaction of selling, respecting the horse, is evidence; but an acknowledgment to that effect, made at another time is not so: it must be confined to the time of actual sale, when he was acting for his master. I think, the master having entrusted the servant to sell, he is entrusted to do all he can to effectuate the sale; and if he does exceed his authority in so doing he binds his master" (t).

If the servant of a horse-dealer, with express directions not to warrant do warrant, the master is bound; because the servant having a general authority to sell, is in a condition to warrant, and the master has not notified to the

Warranty by a servant after sale.

Warranty by a servant forbid to give one.

(r) 1 Times L. R. 558.
(s) Per Erskine, J., Allen v. Denton, 8 C. & P. 760; Petio v. Hague,
(t) Helyer v. Hawke, 5 Esp. 72.
world that the general authority is circumscribed (w). And if a person keeping livery stables, and having a horse to sell, directs his servant not to warrant him, and the servant does nevertheless warrant him, the master is liable on the warranty, because the servant was acting within the general scope of his authority, and the public cannot be supposed to be cognizant of any private conversation between the master and servant (x). And where the owner of a horse sold by a livery-stable keeper with a warranty went to the buyer and requested to have the horse back, stating that he did not authorize the warranty of soundness, and the buyer refused to give it up, saying, "I know nothing of you, I bought the horse of Mr. Osborne;" such a refusal was held to be no waiver of the warranty (y).

But if the owner of a horse were to send a stranger to a fair, with express directions not to warrant the horse, and the latter acted contrary to the orders, the purchaser could only have recourse to the person who actually sold the horse, and the owner would not be liable on the warranty, because the servant was not acting within the scope of his employment (z).

But if the master, under such circumstances, is unwilling to stand to the warranty given by his servant, he is bound to take back the horse and return the money if it has been paid (z). And on this point Lord Abinger, C. B., said, "Put the ordinary case of a servant employed to sell a horse, but expressly forbid to warrant him sound. Is it contended that the buyer, induced by the warranty to give ten times the price which he would have given for an unsound horse, when he discovers the horse to be unsound, is not entitled to rescind the contract? This would be to say, that though the principal is not bound by the false representation of an agent, yet he is entitled to take advantage of that false representation, for the purpose of obtaining a contract beneficial to himself, which he could not have obtained without it" (a).

The general rule, then, in selling a horse by a servant or agent, appears to be the following:—That the master or

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(x) Per Ashurst, J., Penn v. Harrisson, 3 T. R. 760. See also Howard v. Sheward, L. R., 2 C. P. 148.
(y) Best v. Osborne, 2 C. & P. 74.
(z) Per Ashurst, J., Penn v. Harrisson, 3 T. R. 761; and Scotland
(bank v. Watson, 1 Dow, 45; 14 R. R. 11.
(a) Cornfoot v. Fouke, 6 M. & W. 381.
owner is bound by a warranty given by his servant or agent at the time of sale, without his consent, and even against his express directions, if his servant is his general agent to carry on his business. But the master will not be bound by the warranty of the servant, unless the authority to give that warranty can be proved either to have been expressly or impliedly, i.e., by implication of law, granted by the master.

Although a warranty given by a person entrusted to sell primâ facie binds the principal, the warranty of a person entrusted merely to deliver the thing sold is not primâ facie binding on the principal, but an express authority must be shown: and therefore, where a horse had been sold by A. to B., and A.'s servant, on delivering the horse to B., made certain statements, and signed a receipt for the price of the horse, containing a warranty, it was held, in an action on the warranty that A. was not bound by the statement or receipt of the servant, as no express authority to give the warranty was shown (b). And where, on the purchase of a horse, the vendor had given a warranty of soundness generally, and the servant who was sent with the receipt to the agent of the other party inserted at his request, but without a special or general authority from his master, "Warranted sound to the regiment," and the horse was sound when delivered in London, but was in a violent fever, of which he soon afterwards died, when he reached Tewkesbury, where the regiment was quartered; it was held, that the master was not bound by this alteration of the warranty, notwithstanding the money afterwards came to his hands (c).

If an agent is employed to receive a horse, pay for it, and take a warranty, he has no authority to receive it without a warranty (d).

An action in substance for the price of a horse may be brought by the seller against a pretended agent, as in the following case. It was stated in the declaration, that in consideration that the plaintiff would send a pony to the defendant he would sell and deliver it to A.; the defendant undertook that he was authorized by A. to purchase it on his behalf; that the plaintiff sent the pony to the defendant, and was willing to sell it to A., but that the defendant had no authority from A. to purchase it (e).

(b) Woodin v. Burford, 2 Cr. & M. 391; S. C. 4 Tyrw. 264.  
(c) Strode v. Dyson, 1 Smith, 400.  
(e) Price v. Morgan, 2 M. & W. 55.
Patent Defects.

A general warranty does not cover patent defects, being such as are obvious to the buyer. As if a horse warranted perfect be minus an eye or a tail (f), or a house warranted to be in perfect repair, be without roof or windows (g), or, "as if one sells purple to another, and saith to him that this is scarlet, this warrant is to no purpose, for that the other may perceive this, and this gives no cause of action to him. To warrant a thing that may be perceived by sight is not good" (h).

From these examples the proper principle regarding patent defects may clearly be drawn; they must be such defects as a man, unless he is perfectly incompetent to conduct business, cannot help observing. For where a person sees, or has the opportunity of seeing, goods before purchase, caveat emptor is the rule of law; and a man who does not perceive the loss of an eye or tail in a horse, or the absence of the roof or windows from a house, or does not distinguish between purple and scarlet by the light of day, cannot expect the law to give him any assistance, as every man making a bargain is expected to have ordinary perception. Whether a defect is patent or not, or the purchaser has used ordinary care, is a question for the consideration of the jury.

Although the loss of an eye is a breach of a warranty of soundness (i), it has been laid down, that "where one buys a horse upon warranting him to have both his eyes, and he have but one eye, he is remediless; for it is a thing which lies in his own conusance, and such warranty or affirmation is not material nor to be regarded" (k). But this seems to assume that the eye has entirely disappeared, or has been so obviously damaged, that it must lie in the conusance of the buyer; and nothing is said with regard to a loss of sight, where there is little apparent injury to the eyes; for a horse may appear to the majority of people perfect in his eyes, and yet have lost the sight of one or both. Such is the case in gutta serena, vulgarly called "glass-eye" (l), which is a palsy of the optic nerve or retina.

(f) 2 Bla. Com. 165; and per Hank, J., Year Book, 13 Hen. 4, p. 1.
(g) Dyer v. Hargrave, 10 Vesey, 507; 8 R. R. 36.
(h) Bailey v. Merrell, 3 Bulst. 95.

(i) Butterfield v. Borroughs, 1 Salk, 211.
(k) Year Book, 13 Hen. 4, p. 1; Bayley v. Merrell, Cro. Eliz. 389.
(l) Gutta serena, ante, p. 82.
and being difficult of detection can certainly never be considered a patent defect.

This point seems to have been taken in an old case, where it is said, "Lou jeo vend chivall que ad null Oculus la null action gist ; autemment lou il ad un counterfeit faux et Bright Eye." "Where I sell a horse that has no eye, there no action lies; otherwise where he has a counterfeit, false and bright eye" (m). Thus it appears that a distinction is here made between a horse having no eye at all, and having a counterfeit, false or bright one. And probably by bright eye is meant glass-eye or gutta serena; and the words "counterfeit" and "false" may be an attempt of the reporter to explain an expression which he did not understand. Because, putting a false eye into a horse is very far in advance of the sharpest practices of the present day, or of any former period.

Thus, too, in a case in which a convexity in the formation of the cornea of the eye made a horse short-sighted, and thence induced in him a habit of shying, Lord Campbell said that this was not such a defect as the purchaser was bound to take notice of. "There being an express warranty, he was not bound to examine so closely as to ascertain whether the cornea was so formed as to produce short-sight; the most prudent man could not be expected to do that" (n).

But if a person purchase a horse knowing it to be blind, he cannot sue the seller on a general warranty of soundness, although he had warranted the animal to be sound in every respect (o).

Where the buyer observes some defects, and they are discussed by both parties before sale, and a warranty is given; if an action is afterwards brought for a breach of the warranty, it is a question for the jury to say whether the horse is sound in the terms of the warranty, saving those manifest and visible defects which were known to the parties. And then if he is sound with these exceptions, they must consider whether the effect which might be produced by any of those defects was contemplated or not, that is, whether under the circumstances of the case the seller undertook that they should not impede the natural usefulness of the horse. This appears in the following

(m) Southerne v. Howe, 2 Rol. Q. B. 9.
(o) Margetson v. Wright, 5 M. & O.
case:—where an action was brought for a breach of warranty on the sale of a racehorse, the terms of which were, "And the said Mr. Wright (the defendant) doth hereby warrant the said horse to be sound wind and limb at this time," two subjects, namely, crib-biting (p) and a splint (q) on the off-fore leg, were discussed by the parties at the time of the bargain, and after that discussion, the warranty in question was given. The horse soon became lame and afterwards broke down. On the case being tried, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.

Chief Justice Tindal, in making a rule for a new trial absolute, said, "It is laid down in the older books, that where defects are apparent at the time of a bargain, they are not included in a warranty, however general the terms may be, because they can form no subject of deceit or fraud; and formerly the mode of proceeding for a breach of warranty was by an action of deceit grounded on an express fraud, and the averment in the declaration was warrantizando vendidit."

"Although, however, certain exceptions may be grafted on a contract of warranty, yet in this case no fraud or deceit can be attributed to the defendant, as the horse's defect was manifest, the splint not only being apparent, but made the subject of discussion before the bargain was made. If a person purchase a horse, knowing it to be blind, he could not sue the seller on a general warranty of soundness, although he had warranted the animal to be sound in every respect. The splint was known to both the plaintiff and the defendant, and the learned Judge left it to the jury to say whether the horse was fit for ordinary purposes. His direction would have been less subject to misapprehension, if he had left it to them in the terms of the warranty to say whether the horse was, at the time of the bargain, sound wind and limb, saving those manifest and visible defects which were known to the parties; the jury might then have considered whether the effect which might be produced by the splint was contemplated or not" (r).

When the case was again tried the jury found for the plaintiff, as they thought the horse unsound at the time of the contract from the splint, which was in a very bad situation, pressing upon one of the sinews, and which

(p) Crib-biting, ante, p. 75.  
(q) Splint, ante, p. 94.  
(r) Margetson v. Wright, 5 M. & P. 610.
would naturally produce lameness when the horse was put to work (s).

In a more recent case, in which the defendant sold a horse to the plaintiff with a general written warranty of soundness, but at the same time pointed out a splint which it had, and the horse subsequently became lame from the splint, it was held that the lameness was a breach of the warranty. Pollock, C.B., in his judgment, said, "The rule is asked for on the ground that when you point out a splint to the purchaser, you except it out of the warranty; it may be so, if the horse be blind, or have any other patent defect, which is to be seen and is clear; but here it may well be that the defendant warranted that the splint should not grow into a lameness. A person buying a horse is often no judge of horses, and may say, 'I don't want to see the defects or blemishes of the horse, as I really know nothing about them; I want and must have a written warranty. I do not see why this warranty should not be taken thus: 'I show you this splint, and I warrant the horse perfectly sound notwithstanding.' It may have been excepted in the warranty, but there is no exception at all. I think the defendant is liable on his warranty. This entirely agrees with the decision in Margetson v. Wright (s). Some splints cause lameness and others do not. A splint, therefore, is not one of those patent defects, against which a warranty is inoperative." Bramwell, B., in the same case, in giving judgment for the plaintiff based his decision upon the broader ground, that where the warranty is a written one, it cannot be modified by parol evidence to the effect that the defect existed at the time, and was therefore excluded from the warranty (t).

The conclusion then to be drawn from the cases on this subject appears to be:—that the patent defects, which the warranty does not cover, and to which the doctrine of caveat emptor applies, must be so manifest and palpable, as to be necessarily within the knowledge and apprehension of the purchaser, and also such defects as at the time of sale either are, or will inevitably produce, an unsoundness. And as Mr. Baron Bramwell's opinion, that parol evidence is inadmissible to modify the written warranty to the extent of proving the existence of patent defects

(s) Margetson v. Wright, 1 M. & S. 627.

Conclusion to be drawn from the cases.
at the time of the warranty being given \((u)\), appears to be well founded, the written warranty must be taken to contain all the terms of the contract, and evidence as to patent defects will only be receivable in cases where the warranty is not in writing.

Where the buyer suspects some defect and wishes to examine and try the horse for it, but the seller objects and says, "I will warrant him," he is liable for the defect. For where an action on the case was brought when a horse warranted sound had turned out "shoulder-tied," it was contended that an action would not lie, because the defect was visible. But Sir Henry Montague, C.J., said, "This was the ground, that the plaintiff wished to have ridden the horse, but the defendant said 'I will warrant him sound.'" And Noy, J., said, "That is the distinction, where the defect is visible" \((x)\).

Where there is no opportunity of inspecting the commodity, the maxim curcept emptor does not apply; and the intention of both parties must be taken to be, that it shall be saleable in the market under the denomination mentioned between them \((y)\). This has been laid down with regard to horses some centuries ago, for we find in the Year Book it is said by Thirming, J., "If I buy a horse of you in a different place from where the horse is, through the confidence I have in you, and you warrant him sound in all his parts, when he is blind, I shall have a good action of deceit against you" \((z)\). Therefore, at the present day, if A. in London were to buy a carriage horse of B. in Yorkshire, warranted sound, and the horse on its arrival were found to have some patent defect, such as the want of an ear or tail, A. would not be bound to take it, because being maimed, it could not be said to answer the description of the horse he ordered; and by taking a warranty he has done everything in his power to protect himself \((a)\).

In America, a general warranty was held to extend to patent defects, where access to the horse was prevented by the seller by means of a trick, the buyer being un-

\(\text{(w) Smith v. O'Brien, 11 L. T., N. S. 346.}\)
\(\text{(x) Year Book, 13 Hen. 4, p. 1.}\)
\(\text{(y) Dorrington v. Edwards, 2 Rol. 188.}\)
\(\text{(z) See Gardiner v. Gray, 4 Camp. 145; 16 R. R. 764.}\)
\(\text{(a) See Gardiner v. Gray, 4 Camp. 145; 16 R. R. 764. See also Jones v. Just, L. R., 3 Q. B. 197; 37 L. J., Q. B. 82; 18 L. T., N. S. 208.}\)
aware of the defect (b). As to the correctness of this decision there can be no doubt, as it is clear that the maxim *caveat emptor* would be inapplicable to such a case (c).

(b) Kenner v. Harding, 28 Amer. (c) See Margetson v. Wright, 5 Rep. 615. M. & P. 610.
CHAPTER VI.

WARRANTY DISTINGUISHED FROM REPRESENTATION.

It is sometimes not very easy to determine whether an action for breach of warranty should be brought against the vendor of a chattel, or whether the proper remedy be by an action for misrepresentation, the rule of law being that every affirmation at the time of sale of personal chattels is a warranty, provided it appears to have been so intended (a).

In many cases, however, even the positive recommendation of the seller is not, from the nature of the case, to be regarded as a warranty, but merely as an expression of his belief or opinion on a matter of which he can have no certain knowledge, and on which the purchaser is generally capable of forming an opinion (b); the rule being, *commendatio simplex non obligat*.

Therefore a simple affirmation or assertion by the vendor, as to the value or quality of his goods, does not amount to a warranty, unless it be made and received as such, although the purchaser may have bought the goods on the faith of such recommendation (b).

The distinction between a warranty and representation is pointed out in a note to the case of Goram v. Sweeting (c), and was also laid down by Chief Justice Best, in the following case. An action of assumpsit was brought on the warranty of a horse; no direct evidence was given of what took place when the contract was made, but letters passed between the plaintiff and defendant, in which the plaintiff writes, "You well remember that you represented the horse to me as five years old;" to which the defendant answers, "The horse is as I represented it." Chief Justice Best said, "The question is, whether I and the

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(b) Chandelor v. Lopus, Cro. Jac. 4; Rol. Abr. 101.
(c) Goram v. Sweeting, 2 Wms. Saund. 200 c.; and see per Martin, B., Benham v. United Guarantee Co., 7 Ex. 758.
jury can collect that a warranty took place; I quite agree that there is a difference between a warranty and a representation, because a representation must be known to be wrong. The plaintiff in his letter says, "You remember you represented the horse to me as five years old." To which the defendant's answer is, "The horse is as I represented it." Now if the jury find that this occurred at the time of sale, and without any qualification, then I am of opinion that it is a warranty. If it occurred before, or if it was qualified, then it must be taken to be a representation and not a warranty." His Lordship then left the question to the jury, telling them "that if they found that the defendant at the sale gave an undertaking to the effect mentioned in the letters, then such undertaking was a warranty." The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff (e).

A representation to amount to a warranty must be shown not only to have been intended to form part of the contract, but also to have been made pending the contract. And therefore where A. sent his horse to Tattersall's for sale, by auction without warranty, and on the day before the sale found B. in the stable examining the horse's legs, and A. said to him, "You have nothing to look for; I assure you he is perfectly sound in every respect;" whereupon B. replied, "If you say so, I am perfectly satisfied." Upon the faith of this representation (admitted to have been made in good faith) B. became the purchaser. It was held that this was no warranty, as this representation was not intended to form part of the contract of sale, nor was it made pending the contract. For the sale being by auction, the negotiations between the parties had not commenced, inasmuch as the contract began only when the horse was put up for sale, and ended when he was knocked down to the highest bidder (f).

Where the words "In foal to Warlock" were appended to the name of a mare in a printed catalogue of horses to be sold by auction; and other mares in the same catalogue were described as having been "served" by or "stinted to" certain horses; it was held that, looking to the expressions used with respect to other mares and to the nature of the fact represented, the words must

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Where representation amounts to a warranty.

be taken as intended by the parties to amount to a warranty (g).

The proper question for the jury in a case in which the effect of a statement made during the sale is the point at issue, is whether it is or is not intended to form part of the contract. In the case of Foster v. Smith (h), an agent sold a mare to C., and having no express authority from the owner to warrant her, refused to do so, but at the time of the sale told C. that "if the mare was not all right she was not his." C. thereupon paid the price, which was received by the owner. The mare proving unsound, C. returned her to the agent, and sued the owner in the County Court for a return of the money. Jervis, C.J., in delivering the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, said that the proper question to leave to the jury in this case was whether it was part of the contract that the mare should be returned, if she proved unsound; if so, and she were returned, there would be a failure of consideration, and the plaintiff would be entitled to recover back the price.

The judges in the Exchequer Chamber have laid down a rule with regard to warranty and representation which appeared to them to be supported so clearly by the early as well as the most recent decisions, that they thought it unnecessary to bring them forward in review. The judgment was pronounced by Chief Justice Tindal, who said, "The rule, which is to be derived from all the cases, appears to us to be, that where upon the sale of goods the purchaser is satisfied without requiring a warranty (which is a matter for his own consideration), he cannot recover upon a mere representation of the quality by the seller, unless he can show that the representation was bottomed in fraud" (i).

In Jendwine v. Slade (k), where two pictures were sold, described in a catalogue as one by Claude Loraine (l), and the other by Teniers (m), and they turned out to be copies, Lord Kenyon seemed to think that the representation of a fact of which the seller could have no certain knowledge, must be taken as a mere expression of opinion, as these were very old painters, and there was no way of tracing the pictures.

- (g) Gee v. Lucas, 16 L. T., N. S. 357.
- (h) Foster v. Smith, 18 C. B. 156.
- (i) Claude Loraine died in 1682.
- (k) Jendwine v. Slade, 1 Esp. 572; 5 R. R. 754.
- (m) Teniers died in 1694.
And where a man not knowing the age of a horse, but having a written pedigree, which he received with him, said at the time of sale that he sold him according to that pedigree, knowing nothing further than he learnt therefrom, the mark being out of his mouth when he bought him, it was held to be no warranty, and that he was not liable to an action on account of the pedigree turning out false (n).

But a written instrument may consist partly of a warranty and partly of a representation. Thus, where the following receipt was given on the purchase of a horse, "Received of Robert Dickenson 100l. for a bay gelding got by Cheshire Cheese, and warranted sound," and an action was brought on an alleged breach of warranty, on the ground that he was not bred in the manner above described, Chief Justice Dallas held that the warranty was confined to the soundness, and the statement that he was got by Cheshire Cheese was a mere representation (o). Also, where a receipt on the sale of a colt contained the following words after the date, name and sum, "for a grey four years old colt warranted sound in every respect," and the colt turned out to be only three years old, Chief Justice Tindal nonsuited the plaintiff, who had brought an action on that ground, and said, "I am of opinion that the first part of the receipt contains a representation and the latter part a warranty. In the case of a representation, to render liable the party making it, the facts stated must be untrue to his knowledge; but in the case of a warranty he is liable whether they are within his knowledge or not." The Court of Common Pleas discharged a rule nisi for setting aside the nonsuit, and Mr. Justice Alderson said, "A warranty must be complied with whether it is material or not, but it is otherwise as to representation. If the word 'warranted' had been the last word, I should have held that it extended to the whole" (p). However, in a previous case, where the plaintiff brought an action to recover the price of a horse sold under the following warranty, "a black gelding, about five years old, has been constantly driven in the plough—warranted," it was held that the terms of such warranty applied to the soundness of the horse rather than to the nature of his employment (q).

The jury must decide between a warranty and a representation.

So, also, in the case of Anthony v. Halstead (r), the following document, viz.: "Received from A. the sum of 60l. for a black horse, rising five years, quiet to ride and drive, and warranted sound up to this date, or subject to the examination of a veterinary surgeon," was held not to be a warranty that the horse was quiet to ride and drive.

It is a question for the jury whether the description of an article in a catalogue, a receipt, or a bill of parcels, amounts to a warranty, or is merely a matter of description, or intimation of an opinion, and it should be submitted to the jury with all the attendant circumstances. Thus, where a picture has been sold as a Rembrandt, an action was brought on a bill of exchange of which the picture was the consideration, and it appeared doubtful on the evidence whether there had been a warranty or only a representation; Chief Justice Tindal, in summing up, said, "The question is, whether you think that a warranty was in fact given, and that it was broken? For, if you do, you must find your verdict for such sum as you think to be the real value of the picture; but if there was no express warranty, but only a representation, then, as there is no evidence that the plaintiff did not believe that the picture was not a Rembrandt, he will be entitled to recover the full amount of the bill," which the jury found (s). But in a case where pictures were sold with a bill of parcels, containing the words "four pictures, views in Venice, Canaletti," the jury thought this a warranty, and refusing a rule for a new trial, Lord Denman, C.J., said, "It is for the jury to say, under all the circumstances, what was the effect of the words, and whether they implied a warranty of genuineness or conveyed only a description or an expression of opinion. I think that their finding was right; Canaletti (t) is not a very old painter." (u).

So, too, in the case of Percival v. Oldacre (x) the plaintiff saw a horse at Bank's, in Gray's Inn Lane, belonging to the defendant, which was for sale. He afterwards saw the defendant, told him that he had seen the horse, and asked him "What about the horse?" The defendant said that he was a good harness horse, and that he had been bought to

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(r) 37 L. T., N. S. 433.
(s) De Schweenberg v. Buchanan, 5 C. & P. 343.
(t) Canaletti died in 1768, and Claude Loraine and Teniers (the younger), mentioned in Jondwine v. Slade, died, the former in 1682, the latter in 1694.
(x) Percival v. Oldacre, 18 C. B., N. S. 338.
match for Baron Rothschild for 85l., and that he was only selling him because he would not match. The plaintiff on this went to Bank's, and bought the horse eventually for 65l. The horse, on being put in harness, turned out to be a kicker, and kicked the plaintiff's trap to pieces. He was afterwards sent to a stable, and sold for 40l., and the action was brought for the difference. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff for the 25l. claimed. In moving for a new trial it was contended that there was no evidence of warranty, but Erle, C.J., said that Mr. Justice Byles, who tried the cause, was of opinion that there was evidence to go to the jury of a warranty, and that the verdict therefore ought not to be disturbed.

In the case of Behn v. Burness (y) Mr. Justice Williams, in delivering the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber, gave the following lucid exposition of the legal characteristics of representation as distinguished from warranty. He said, "Properly speaking, a representation is a statement or assertion made by one party to the other, before or at the time of the contract, of some matter or circumstance relating to it. Although it is some thing contained in a written instrument, it is not an integral part of the contract, and consequently the contract is not broken, although the representation proves to be untrue nor (with the exception of the case of policies of insurance, or at all events marine policies, which stand upon a peculiar and anomalous footing) is such untruth any cause of action, nor has it any efficacy whatever, unless the representation was made fraudulently, either by reason of its being made with a knowledge of its untruth, or by reason of its being made dishonestly, or with a reckless ignorance whether it was true or untrue (z). If this be so, it is difficult to understand the distinction which is to be found in some of the treatises, and is in some degree sanctioned by judicial authority (a), that a representation, if it differs from the truth to an unreasonable extent, may affect the validity of the contract. Where, indeed, a representation is so gross as to amount to sufficient evidence of fraud, it is obvious that the contract on that ground is voidable. Although representations are not usually contained in the written instrument of contract,

(a) Barker v. Windle, 6 El. & Bl. 675, 680.
yet they sometimes are, but it is plain that their insertion therein cannot alter their nature. A question, however, may arise whether a descriptive statement in a written statement is a mere representation, or whether it is a substantive part of the contract. This is a question of construction, which the Court and not the jury must determine.

"But with respect to statements in a contract descriptive of the subject matter of it, or of some material incident thereof, the true doctrine established by principle as well as by authority appears to be, generally speaking, that if such descriptive statement was intended to be a substantive part of the contract (b), it is to be regarded as a warranty, that is to say, a condition on the failure or nonperformance of which the other may, if he be so minded, repudiate the contract in toto, and so be relieved from performing his part of it (c), provided it has not been partially executed in his favour. If, indeed, he has received the whole or any substantial part of the consideration for the promise on his part, the warranty loses the character of a condition, or, to speak more properly, perhaps ceases to be available as a condition, and becomes a warranty in the narrow sense of the word, namely, a stipulation by way of agreement, for the breach of which a compensation must be sought in damages. Accordingly, if a specific thing has been sold with a warranty of its quality, under such circumstances the property passes by the sale; the vendee having been thus benefited by the partial execution of the contract, and become the proprietor of the thing sold, cannot treat the failure of the warranty as a condition broken, unless there is a special stipulation to that effect in the contract (d), but must have recourse to an action for damages in respect of the breach of warranty.

"But in cases where the thing sold is not specific, and the property has not passed by the sale, the vendee may refuse to receive the thing proffered to him in performance of the contract, on the ground that it does not correspond with the descriptive statement, or, in other words, that the condition expressed in the contract has not been performed. Still, if he receives the thing sold, and has the enjoyment of it he cannot afterwards treat the descriptive statement as a condition, but only as an agreement, for the breach of which he may bring an action to recover damages."

(b) Foster v. Smith, 18 C. B. 156. (d) Bannerman v. White, 10 C. B.,
Q. B. 241.
CHAPTER VII.

FRAUDULENT CONTRACTS.

In many cases, where an attempt is made by one man to overreach another, the law does not interfere; because when it is a mere struggle between mind and mind, caution and wariness, if fairly exercised, may often be held sufficient to obviate the effects of cunning and duplicity (a).

But where several combine for the purpose of aiding and assisting each other in outwitting a single individual, there the parties stand on very different terms, and that which ordinary prudence might otherwise prevent, becomes oftentimes a dangerous and powerful conspiracy, difficult to be detected, and most disastrous in its consequences (a).

Where there is collusion between two or more to cheat in the sale of a horse, an indictment for a conspiracy may be maintained (b), because it is such an offence as affects the Public, and against which no ordinary care or prudence can guard (c).

But no indictment lies for a conspiracy without evidence either direct or indirect (d) of concert between the parties to effectuate a fraud. Thus in the case of Rex v. Pywell (e), where a false warranty had been given, Lord Ellenborough directed an acquittal, because one of two defendants, though acting in the sale, was not shown to have been aware that a fraud was practised (f).

So on an indictment against A., B., C., D., E., F., G., and H., for conspiracy to cheat M. by selling a glanedered horse as a sound horse, the evidence was that A. having previously cheated M. by selling him a kicking horse, the defendants B., C., D., and E., obtained that horse from M. in exchange for a glanedered horse which he subsequently sold. A. accompanied by G., afterwards sold M. another

Where the law does not interfere.

Where several persons combine to cheat.

Conspiracy to cheat indictable.

There must be evidence of concert.

What evidence has been held insufficient.

(a) Reg. v. Bailey, 4 Cox, C.C.397.
(b) Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T. R. 58; 1 R. R. 634; Reg. v. Sheppard, 9 C. & P. 123.
(c) Rex v. Wheatly, 2 Burr. 1127.
(d) Reg. v. Read, 6 Cox, C. C. 134.
(e) Rex v. Pywell, 1 Stark. N. P. C. 402.
(f) See Reg. v. Kenrick, 5 Q. B. 62.
horse, in which transaction the latter was again defrauded. Some evidence was given to show that A. was frequently in company with some of the other defendants, and that he was aware of a previous sale of the gandered horse by them, but there was no other evidence to connect him with its sale to M. It was held by Mr. Justice Cresswell, that in the absence of any evidence clearly leading to the conclusion that A. was a party to that sale, there was no evidence of a conspiracy to go to the jury against him (g). Where on the sale of two horses the prosecutor was told by both the defendants that certain horses had been the property of a lady deceased, and were then the property of her sister, that they had never been the property of a horse-dealer, and were quiet and tractable, all of which was absolutely false, the defendants were found guilty of conspiring to obtain money by false pretences, as they knew that nothing but a full belief of the truth of the above statements would have induced the prosecutor to make the purchase, he having repeatedly informed them that he wanted the horses for his daughter’s use (h).

An indictment lies for conspiracy, where persons have conspired to induce a creditor to forego part of his claim. Thus an indictment was held to be good which alleged that S. sold B. a mare for 39l.; that while the price was unpaid, B. and C. conspired by false and fraudulent representations made to S. that the mare was unsound, and that B. had sold her for 27l., to induce S. to accept 27l., instead of the agreed-on price of 39l., and thereby to defraud S. of 12l. (i).

If one man alone sell an unsound horse for a sound one, it is a mere private imposition, and no indictment can be maintained, because the buyer should be more on his guard (j). But if it be such an offence, as, if practised by two, would be the subject of an indictment for a conspiracy, the vendor is civilly liable in an action for repairation of damages at the suit of the purchaser, because collusion is not necessary to constitute fraud (k).

Chandeler v. Lopus (l) is a well-known case on the subject of fraudulent representation. It was an action on the case against a jeweller for selling a jewel, affirming it

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(g) Reg. v. Read, 6 Cox, C. C. 135.
(j) Rex v. Wheatly, 2 Burr. 1128.
(h) Reg. v. Kenrick, 5 Q. B. 63.
(k) Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T. R. 58; 1 R. R. 634.
to be a Bezoar stone, when really is was not one. All the
Justices and Barons, except Anderson, held "that the bare
affirmation that it was a Bezoar stone, without warranting
it to be so, was no cause of action; and that, although
the seller knew it to be no Bezoar stone, it was not
material, because everyone in selling his wares, will affirm
that they are good, or that the horse which he sells is
sound; yet if he does not warrant them to be so, it is no
cause of action, and the warranty ought to be made at the
same time as the sale."

But the opinion of Anderson is now held to have been a
correct one; for he said, "The deceit in selling it as a
Bezoar, whereas it was not so, is cause of action." And
the following remarks are made upon this case in Smith's
Leading Cases (m):—"If the plaintiff in this case were
to declare upon a warranty of the stone, he would at the
present day perhaps succeed, the rule of law being that
every affirmation at the time of sale of personal chattels
is a warranty, provided it appears to have been so in-
tended (n). If not, he would at all events succeed if he
were to sue in tort, laying a scienter, since the fact of
the defendant's being a jeweller would be almost irresis-
tible evidence that he knew his representation to be false.
When Chandelier v. Lopus was decided, as the action of
assumpsit was by no means so distinguishable from case,
ordinarily so called, as at present,—so the distinction was
not clearly recognized, which is now however clearly estab-
lished, between an action on a warranty express or implied,
which is founded on the defendant's promise that the
thing shall be as warranted, and in order to maintain
which it is unnecessary that he should be at all aware of
the fallacious nature of his undertaking, and the action
upon the case for false representation, in order to maintain
which the defendant must be shown to have been actually
and fraudulently cognizant of the falsehood of his repre-
sentation, or to have made the representation fraudulently,
without belief that it was true; actions of the former
description then being usually framed in tort, under the
name of actions for deceit. However, the main doctrine
laid down in Chandelier v. Lopus has never since been dis-
puted, viz., that the plaintiff must either declare upon a

Remarks on that case.

(m) 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 9th ed. 187.
contract, or, if he declare in tort for a misrepresentation, must aver a scienter. That such an action is maintainable when the scienter can be proved, though there be no warranty, is now (notwithstanding the dictum in Chandelor v. Lopus) well established’’ (o).

Therefore where a person has been cheated or deceived by fraud or artifice in purchasing a horse, his proper remedy against the vendor is an action for fraudulent misrepresentation or deceit (p). Because such action lies where a man does any deceit to the damage of another (q).

The foundation of this action is fraud and deceit in the defendant, and damage to the plaintiff. Fraud without damage or damage without fraud gives no cause of action, but where these two concur an action lies (r).

Fraud generally consists either in the misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. But what does or does not amount to fraud depends very much on the facts of each particular case, on the relative situation of the parties, and on their means of information (s).

To support the action there must always be proof of moral fraud (t): because where there is no warranty, the scienter or fraud is the gist of the action. Thus it was held that an action on the case could not be maintained against the defendant for selling a horse as his own, when in truth it belonged to A. B.; because the plaintiff could not prove that the defendant knew it to be the horse of A. B., for it appeared that the defendant had bought it in Smithfield market, but had neglected to get it legally tolled (u).

Fraud gives a cause of action, if it leads to any sort of damage; but it avoids contracts only where it is the ground of the contract, and where, unless it had been employed, the contract would never have been made (v).

The facts to constitute fraud must be found by the jury; but whether certain facts as proved amount to fraud is a question of law; and therefore legal fraud may exist, when


(p) Rex v. Wheal Try, 2 Burr. 1128.

(q) Com. Dig. tit. Action upon the Case for a Deceit, A. 1.

(r) Per Croke, J., Bailey v. Merrill, 3 Bulst. 95. See Barry v. Crosby, 2 J. & H. 21.

(s) Chit. Contr., 12th ed. 694.


the jury have found that the intention of the defendant was not fraudulent (w).

If a person knowingly utters a falsehood with intent to deprive another party of a benefit and acquire it to himself (x), or with intent to induce another party to do an act which results in his loss, and damage naturally flows to the other party from this belief, an action lies (y).

But an action cannot be supported for telling a bare

naked lie; and that is defined to be, saying a thing which is false, knowing or not knowing it to be so, and without any design to injure, cheat, or deceive another person. Every deceit comprehends a lie; but a deceit is more than a lie, on account of the view with which it is practised, its being coupled with some dealing, and the injury which it is calculated to occasion and does occasion to another person (z).

It is not necessary for the person defrauded to give direct proof that he was influenced by the misrepresentation. And upon this point Lord Denman, C.J., said: "If a fraudulent representation is published, it must be presumed that a party who acts according to such a representation was influenced by it" (a). But this appears to be rather an inference for the Court than a question for the jury, for in the case of Feret v. Hill (b), though the jury found that the plaintiff had obtained a lease by fraud and misrepresentation, yet the Court entered a verdict for the plaintiff on the ground that the fraud was collateral, and that it did not go to the root of the contract.

In considering the question of fraud, the Courts have endeavoured on the one hand to repress dishonesty, and on the other they have required that before relieving a party from a contract on the ground of fraud, it should be made to appear that in entering into such contract he exercised a

Falsehood must be followed by damage.

A naked lie no cause of action.

Presumption that person defrauded was influenced by the misrepresentation.

Due caution must always be observed.


(x) Barley v. Watford, 9 Q. B. 197.

(y) Longmead v. Holliday, 6 Ex. 766; and see Levy v. Langridge, 4 M. & W. 337.

(a) Per Buller, J., Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T. R. 56; 1 R. R. 634; and Mummery v. Paul, 1 C. B. 322.

(b) Watson v. Earl of Charlmont, 12 Q. B. 862.

due degree of caution, because *vigilantibus non dormientibus succurrunt jura* (c).

Therefore, to constitute fraud there must be an assertion of something false within the knowledge of the person asserting it, or the suppression of that which is true, and *which it was his duty to communicate*. So if a person purchases an article which is to be manufactured for him, and the manufacturer delivers it with a patent defect which may render it worthless, if the purchaser has had an opportunity of inspecting it, but has neglected to do so, the manufacturer is not guilty of fraud in not pointing out the defect (d).

In an action of deceit the plaintiff must prove actual fraud. Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made knowingly, or without belief in its truth, or recklessly, without caring whether it be true or false (e).

A false statement, made through carelessness and without reasonable ground for believing it to be true, may be evidence of fraud, but does not amount necessarily to fraud. Such a statement, if made in the honest belief that it is true, is not fraudulent, and does not render the person making it liable to an action of deceit (f).

But to support an action *ex contractu,* for a breach of warranty, it is not necessary to prove that the representation was false to the knowledge of the seller. It is sufficient that it was false in fact. For where a warranty is given, by which the party undertakes that the article sold shall, in point of fact, be such as is described, no question can be raised upon the *sciencer,* upon the fraud or wilful misrepresentation (g).

If a purchaser, choosing to judge for himself, does not avail himself of the knowledge or means of knowledge open to him or to his agent, he cannot be allowed to say he was deceived by the seller’s representations, the rule being *caveat emptor,* and the knowledge of his agent being as binding on him as his own knowledge (h).


(d) Horsfall v. Thomas, 1 H. & C. 90; Smith v. Hughes, L. R., 6 Q. B. 597; 40 L. J., Q. B. 221; 25 L. T., N. S. 329.

(e) Derry v. Peek, 15 App. Cas. 337; 58 L. J., Ch. 864; 61 L. T., N. S. 265; 38 W. R. 33.

(f) Derry v. Peek, 15 App. Cas. 337; 58 L. J., Ch. 864; 61 L. T., N. S. 265; 38 W. R. 33.

(g) Attwood v. Small, 6 C. & F. 444, 445; Broom’s Maxims, 4th ed. 756.

Thus then there are cases of two sorts, in which, though a man is deceived, he can maintain no action. The first class of cases is, where the affirmation is that the thing sold has not a defect which is a visible one; there the imposition and the fraudulent intent are admitted, but there is no tort. The second kind of cases is where the affirmation is (what is called in some of the books) a nude assertion; such as the party deceived may exercise his own judgment upon. For where it is a mere matter of opinion, he ought to make inquiries into the truth of the assertion, and it becomes his own fault from laches if he is deceived (i).

Assertions of this sort are what is called "dealing talk," such as is used more or less by shopkeepers and dealers of every description. For instance, a horse dealer tells his customer that a horse worth 40l. is "worth a hundred guineas," or that a bad, clumsy goer, has "fine action," or is a "clever little horse." And a person who allows himself to be imposed upon by such assertions has no remedy against the vendor. Thus it appeared in the following case that J. S., who had a term for years, affirmed to J. D., that the term was worth 150l. to be sold, upon which J. D. gave 150l. and afterwards could not get more than 100l. for it, and then brought his action. It was alleged that this matter did not prove any fraud, for it was only a naked assertion that the term was worth so much, and it was the plaintiff's folly to give credit to such assertion. But if the defendant had warranted the term to be of such a value to be sold, and upon that the plaintiff had bought it, it would then have been otherwise (j).

The Court will not set aside a deed on the ground of previous or collateral fraud, unless the party is deceived with regard to the execution of the deed itself, for the representation must be as to matters material, and not collateral only, to the contract (k).

If the folly of a contract be extremely gross, the circumstance will tend, if there be other facts in corroboration, to establish a case for relief on the ground of fraud; but more

A visible defect and a nude assertion.

Dealing talk.

Collateral fraud does not avoid a deed.

A foolish bargain.

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(i) 1 Rol. Abr. 101; Yelv. 20; 1 Sid. 146; Cro. Jac. 386; Bailey v. Merrell, 3 Bulst. 95; and per Grose, J., Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T. R. 54.

(j) Harvey v. Young, Yelv. 20; cited per Grose, J., Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T. R. 55; 1 R. R. 634.

folly and weakness, or want of judgment, will not defeat a contract, even in equity (l).

But a vendor is unquestionably liable to an action of deceit, if he fraudulently misrepresents the quality of the thing sold to be other than it is in some particulars, which the buyer had not equal means with himself of knowing (m); and the mere possession of the means of knowledge by the vendee does not necessarily, under all circumstances, oust the vendor's liability for a false and fraudulent representation (n).

Certain misrepresentations about a horse on sale at a repository were made by the defendant to the plaintiff, about four o'clock in the afternoon. On the morning of the next day the defendant accompanied the plaintiff to the auction yard, and pointed out the horse, saying, "That is the horse." On his being put up to auction the plaintiff bought him, and he turned out to be unserviceable. It was held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages from the defendant, as the jury were satisfied that the defendant knew of the falseness of the representations, and that the fact of the sale having been made by an auctioneer made no difference (o).

Where the purchaser and his friend were the only bidders at an auction, the rest of the company being deterred from bidding by the purchaser's stating to them that he had a claim against, and had been ill-used by, the late owner of the article, it was held that such purchaser did not acquire any property against the vendor under such sale (p).

It signifies nothing whether a man represents a thing to be different from what he knows it to be, or whether he makes a representation which he does not know at the time to be true or false, if in point of fact it turns out to be false (q); because there may undoubtedly be a fraudulent representation, if made dishonestly, of that which the party does not know to be untrue, if he does not know it to be true, or at least has not good grounds for believing it to be true (r).

(o) Bardell v. Spinks, 2 C. & K. 646. But see Hopkins v. Tanqueray,
(q) Per Lord Mansfield, C.J., Schneider v. Heath, 3 Camp. 508 ; 14 R. R. 825.
(r) Per Parke, B., Taylor v. Ashton, 11 M. & W. 413; and per Lord Cairns in Reese River Silver Mining.
But to render a person liable to an action for false and fraudulent representations, it is not enough to show that the representations are false. If he acted upon a fair and reasonably well-grounded belief that they were true, he is not responsible for them, however unfounded they may turn out to be (s).

It has been held that even the mere knowledge that the other party is labouring under a delusion which materially affects the contract, when the vendor suffers him to be operated upon by that delusion, makes the contract void (t).

The seller, however, is undoubtedly liable, where he makes such misrepresentation as induces the buyer to forbear making those inquiries, which for his own security and advantage he would otherwise have made (u).

Where a representation is made and a fraud practised through the medium of a third party, and damage has resulted, the vendor is liable to an action; and this was so held by the Court of Common Pleas upon the following facts:—It appeared that the defendant, who was about to sell a public-house, falsely represented to B., who had agreed to purchase it, that the receipts were worth 180l. a month; and B., to the knowledge of the defendant, had communicated the representation to the plaintiff, who in consequence became the purchaser of it, and afterwards found that the receipts had not been worth so much (v).

Where a third party makes a fraudulent representation with regard to an article about to be sold, he is liable to the purchaser. Thus where the plaintiff was about purchasing a horse from a party who warranted him sound, and who, for the corroboratory of his statement, referred him to the defendant, who warranted the horse sound in the wind: Mr. Baron Alderson said, "the merits are, whether or not the defendant made a fraudulent representation. It is proved that he did. He comes here to defend himself from the charge of having made a fraudulent representation on the occasion of the sale." The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff (w).

Co. v. Smith, 4 H. L. 64, 69; 39 L. J., Ch. 849.
(s) Shrewsbury v. Blount, 2 Scott, N. R. 588.
(v) Pilmore v. Hood, 5 Bing; N. C. 97; see also Swift v. Winterbottom, L. R., 8 Q. B. 244, 253; 42 L. J., Q. B. 111; Swift v. Jevons, L. R., 9 Q. B. 301; 43 L. J., Q. B. 56—Ex. Ch.; Richardson v. Sylevester, L. R., 9 Q. B. 34; 43 L. J., Q. B. 1.
(w) Mash v. Densham, 1 M. & Rob. 442.
An action, however, does not lie for a false representation, whereby a party being induced to purchase the subject-matter of the representation even from a third party, has sustained damage, if the representation appear to have been made bonâ fide under a reasonable and well-grounded belief that the same was true, as the rule Caveat emptor applies (x).

A person should be careful how he gives credit to any statement made by a third party as to the character and ability of the person with whom he is about to deal; because under 9 Geo. 4, c. 14, s. 6, "no action lies to charge a person upon or by reason of any representation or assurance made or given relating to the character, conduct, ability, trade, or dealings of any other person, to the intent that such other person may obtain credit, money or goods [there]upon, unless such representation, &c. be made in writing, signed by the party to be charged therewith." The signature of an agent will not satisfy this section (y). And one partner signing in the name of and by the express authority of his firm will make himself only liable (z).

It is now well settled (a) that if goods are sold expressly "with all faults," the seller is not bound to disclose latent defects, and is therefore not liable to an action in respect of them, although he was aware of them at the time of sale, unless there be an express warranty against some particular defect, or unless some artifice or fraud was practised to prevent the vendee from discerning such defects; therefore, in affecting such a sale of a horse, it is best for the seller to say nothing, and let the purchaser inspect the horse, and so judge for himself.

So far as the description goes, there is an express warranty against any particular defect, which is excluded by that description. Accordingly, where an advertisement for the sale of a ship described her as a "copper-fastened vessel," adding that the vessel was to be taken "with all faults, without any allowance for any defects whatsoever;" and it appeared that she was only partially copper-fastened; it was held that the vendor was liable on the ground that she was warranted to be copper-fastened, and that, "with all faults" applies to such faults only as a copper-fastened

(y) Swift v. Jewsbury, L. R., 9 Q. B. 301, Ex. Ch., reversing S. C. sub nom. Swift v. Winterbottom, L. R., 8 Q. B. 244.
(a) Chit. Contr. 12th ed. 503.
FRAUDULENT CONTRACTS.

vessel may have (b). But where a vessel which was described as "teak-built" was sold, "to be taken with all faults," "with any allowance for any defect or error whatsoever," and it turned out that she was not "teak-built," it was held that this was a misdescription of the vessel, which came within the term "error," and that the vendor was not liable as for a breach of warranty (c).

At one time Lord Kenyon held that a seller was bound to disclose to the buyer all latent defects known to him, and that buying "with all faults" without a warranty must be understood to relate only to those faults which the buyer could have discovered, or with which the seller was unacquainted (d).

However, Lord Ellenborough overruled this decision, and said, "I cannot subscribe to the doctrine of that case, although I feel the greatest respect for the judge by whom it was decided. Where an article is sold 'with all faults,' I think it is quite immaterial how many belonged to it within the knowledge of the seller, unless he used some artifice to disguise them, and to prevent their being discovered by the purchaser. The very object of introducing such stipulations is to put the purchaser on his guard, and to throw upon him the burden of examining all faults, both secret and apparent. I may be possessed of a horse I know to have many faults, and I wish to get rid of him for whatever sum he will fetch. I desire my servant to dispose of him, and instead of giving a warranty of soundness, to sell him 'with all faults.' Having thus laboriously freed myself from responsibility, am I to be liable, if it be afterwards discovered that the horse was unsound? Why did not the purchaser examine him in the market, when exposed to sale? By acceding to buy the horse 'with all faults,' he takes upon himself the risk of latent or secret faults, and calculates accordingly the price which he gives. It would be most inconvenient and unjust, if men could not, by using the strongest terms which language affords, obviate disputes concerning the quality of the goods which they sell. In a contract such as this, I think there is no fraud, unless the seller by positive means renders 'it impossible for the purchaser to detect latent faults.'" (e).

(b) Shepherd v. Kain, 5 B. & Ald. 240.
(d) Mollish v. Motteux, Peak. Cas. 115.
(e) Taylor v. Bullen, 5 Ex. 779.
(e) Baglehole v. Walters, 3 Camp. 156.
Therefore, the meaning of a horse being sold "with all his faults" is, that the purchaser shall make use of his eyes and understanding to discover what faults there are; and the seller is not answerable for them if he does not make use of any fraud or practice to conceal them (f).

But it would appear from a case cited by Gibbs, J., in Pickering v. Dowson (g), that where a horse has been sold "with all his faults," and artificial means have been used to conceal some defect, the vendor would be liable to the purchaser for such conduct.

For instance, the practice of plugging, &c., or perhaps the artificially filling up a sandcrack (h) or thrush (i), (such devices being, without doubt, used to deceive the purchaser) would each be a sufficient ground for an action for deceit; because a man may act a lie or fraudulent representation without speaking a word, and the injury under such circumstances would be damage as the result of a fraudulent representation coupled with dealing. Thus when a ship was sold "with all her faults," but means had been taken fraudulently to conceal some defects in her bottom, the vendor was held liable (j).

But where animals are sold "with all faults," it makes no difference whether the sale takes place in a public market or privately, provided that there is no fraudulent representation, or concealment of defect. The mere exposure for sale of animals in a public market is not evidence of fraudulent representation. Thus, in Ward v. Hobbs (k) the defendant sent for sale, to a public market, pigs which he knew to be infected with a contagious disease; they were exposed for sale subject to conditions that the buyer must take them with all faults, no warranty would be given and no compensation would be made in respect of any fault. No verbal representation was made by or on behalf of the defendant as to the condition of the pigs. The plaintiff, having bought the pigs, put them with other pigs, which became infected; some of the pigs bought from the defendant, and also some of those with which they were put, died of the contagious disease. The plaintiff having sued to recover damages for the loss which he had sustained; it was held that, although the defendant might have been

(f) Pickering v. Dowson, 4 Taunt. 784. 508; and Jones v. Bright, 3 M. & P. 175.
(g) 4 Taunt. 785.
(h) Sandcrack, ante, p. 92.
(i) Thrush, ante, p. 99.

guilty of an offence against the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act, 1869, he was not liable to the plaintiff, as his conduct in exposing the pigs for sale in the market did not amount to a representation that they were free from the disease. But if the defendant’s statement had been followed by a declaration that he believed the animals to be free from disease, he would undoubtedly have been liable to an action for deceit (l).

Fraud does not make a contract void, but only voidable, at the election of the party defrauded, who has the option of acquiescing in it, or of avoiding it (m). But until the party defrauded disaffirms the contract it remains good (n).

If a party be induced to purchase an article by fraudulent representations of the seller respecting it, he may treat it as a good contract, or the moment he chooses to declare it void, he may recover the price from the seller (o).

If, when it is avoided, nothing has occurred to alter the position of affairs, the rights and remedies of the parties are the same as if it had been void from the beginning; but if any alteration has taken place, their rights and remedies are subject to the effect of that alteration (p). Thus where the plaintiff was induced by the fraud of the defendants to become a shareholder in a company, it was held, that as he had in the interval between the making of the contract and the discovery of the fraud, received dividends, and otherwise dealt with the property, he could not treat the contract as void, and sue for money had and received; but, though he could not rescind the contract, inasmuch as such rescission would work injustice, yet he might bring an action on the deceit, and recover his real damages (q).

But if after discovering the fraud he continue to deal with the article as his own, he cannot recover back the money from the seller (r). And the right to repudiate the contract is not afterwards revived by the discovery of another incident in the fraud (r).

A sale of goods effected by the fraud of the buyer is not absolutely void, but the seller may elect to treat it as a

Contract made voidable by fraud.

Where fraud is practised upon the buyer.

Except where it works injustice.

Where fraud continues to deal with the article.

Where fraud is practised upon the seller.

(l) Ward v. Hobbs, 4 App. Cas. at p. 21, per Lord Cairns, L.C.
(m) Murray v. Mann, 2 Ex. 541; Urguhart v. Maepkerson, 3 App. Cas. 881; Story on Sales, 126.
(o) Murray v. Mann, 2 Ex. 541.
(q) Clarke v. Dickson, 27 L. J., Q. B. 223.
(r) Campbell v. Fleming, 1 A. & E. 40.
valid transaction (s), or has a right to treat the contract as a nullity, and recover the value of the goods in an action of trover (t).

If he does not treat the sale as void before the buyer has resold the goods to an innocent vendee (s), or pledged them for a bonâ fide advance (u), the property will pass to the vendee.

But the property will not pass to an innocent vendee, unless the relation of vendor and vendee existed between the original owner of the goods, and the person who has fraudulently obtained them; for, if there be not a sale between these parties there is no contract, which the owner can either affirm or disaffirm (x). Thus where A., who had formerly been B.’s agent, and had been known to the plaintiff as such, after his agency ceased, obtained goods from the plaintiff in the name of B., which he handed over to the defendant, an auctioneer, by whom they were sold: it was held, that the plaintiff might maintain trover against the defendant, for there was never any sale to A., or any contract between him and the plaintiff (y).

All contracts of purchase made with the fraudulent intent to cheat the seller, and dispose of the goods at a swindling price, to raise money, are held void (z).

It would appear that where the buyer purchases goods with the preconceived design of not paying for them, such sale does not pass the property therein (d). Thus where some sheep had been bought under such circumstances, Chief Justice Abbott held that if the buyer contracted for, and obtained possession of the sheep in question, with a preconceived design of not paying for them, that would be such a fraud as would vitiate the sale and prevent the property from passing to him (b).

Whether the buyer has obtained possession of the goods with such a preconceived design, is a question for the jury (b).

The resale of the goods at reduced prices immediately

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(s) White v. Garden, 20 L. J., C. P. 166.
(u) Kingsford v. Merry, 11 Ex. 577.
(x) Kingsford v. Merry, 26 L. J., Ex. 83.
(z) Gibson v. Carruthers, 8 M. & W. 346.
(a) See Irving v. Motley, 7 Bing. 551; Load v. Green, 15 M. & W. 221; Ferguson v. Carrington, 9 B. & C. 59.
(b) Earl of Bristol v. Wilsmore, 1 B. & C. 521.
after the buyer has obtained possession of them, is evidence that such prior transaction is fraudulent (e).

A document which purports to be an agreement, and is valid upon the face of it, but which is tendered in evidence to show the transaction with which it is connected to be a fraud, is admissible in evidence, although unstamped (d).

If a buyer, under terms to pay for goods on delivery, obtains possession of them by giving a cheque, which is afterwards dishonoured, he gains no property in the goods, if, at the time of giving the cheque, he had no reasonable ground to expect that it would be paid (e).

The contract of an infant, however fair and conducive to his interests it may be, is not binding on him, unless it be for necessaries. By the common law, however, the contracts of an infant, other than for necessaries, were for the most part only voidable. But now, by the 37 & 38 Vict. c. 62, s. 1, all contracts, whether by specialty or by simple contract, entered into by infants for the repayment of money lent or to be lent, or for goods supplied or to be supplied (other than contracts for necessaries), and all accounts stated with infants, are made absolutely void; provided always, that the above enactment “shall not invalidate any contract into which an infant may, by any existing or future statute, or by the rules of common law or equity, enter, except such as are now by law voidable.” And it was no answer at law to a plea of infancy, that the defendant, at the time of entering into the contract, fraudulently represented himself to be of full age (f).

A husband is not liable for any fraud of the wife, which is directly connected with and dependent upon a contract (g). In a case in which an action had been brought against a husband and wife for a false and fraudulent representation by the wife to the plaintiffs, that she was sole and unmarried at the time of her signing a promissory note as surety to them for a third person, whereby they were induced to advance a sum of money to that person, it was held that an action would not lie. And Pollock, C.B., said, “A feice covert is unquestionably incapable of binding herself by a contract; it is altogether void, and no action

Un stamped agreement admissible to prove fraud.

Payment by a cheque which is dishonoured.

Fraud of an infant.

Of a married woman.

(d) Holmes v. Sezssmith, 7 Ex. 802; Reg. v. Gompertz, 9 Q. B. 824.
(f) Johnson v. Pye, 1 Sid. 258.
(g) Liverpool Adelphi Loan Association v. Fairhurst, 9 Ex. 422; Wright v. Leonard, 30 L. J., C. P. 369.
will lie against her husband or herself for the breach of it. But she is undoubtedly responsible for all torts committed by her on any person, as for any other personal wrongs. But when the fraud is directly connected with the contract with the wife, and is the means of effecting it, and parcel of the same transaction, the wife cannot be responsible, and the husband be sued for it together with the wife” (h). As regards the liability of the wife, however, this case is no longer the law, as a married woman can now render herself responsible on her contracts, and therefore liable on any tort arising out of them (i).

Equity will give relief where there is no reasonable equality between the contracting parties, e.g., in a case in which the vendor, being an aged, illiterate, weak-minded man, though not a person absolutely incapable of managing his own affairs, executed a deed of conveyance of his property for a grossly inadequate consideration (k).

Where a party, when he enters into a contract, is in such a state of drunkenness as not to know what he is doing, and particularly when it appears that this was known to the other party, he cannot be compelled to perform the contract (l).

If, however, a man buys a horse when so drunk as not to know what he is doing, but keeps it after he is sober, he cannot set up his drunkenness as an answer to an action for the price (m).

(h) See note (g), ante.
(i) Eversley on Domestic Relations, p. 297. See also s. 1, sub-s. (2) of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882.
(k) Longmate v. Ledger, 6 Jur., N. S. 481.
(m) Gore v. Gibson, 13 M. & W. 626.
CHAPTER VIII.

BREACH OF WARRANTY.

Where a horse has been sold warranted sound, which it can be clearly proved was unsound at the time of sale, the seller is liable to an action on the warranty, without either the horse being returned or notice given of the unsoundness. And in a case where there was a breach of warranty, Lord Loughborough said, "No length of time elapsed after the sale will alter the nature of a contract originally false. It is not necessary that the horse should be returned to the seller, or that notice should be given" (a).

Where a horse warranted sound turns out unsound, the seller is not bound to take it back again; nor can the buyer, by reason of the unsoundness, resist an action for the price on the ground of breach of warranty, except in case of fraud or express agreement authorising the return, or on a mutual rescission of the contract; but he may give the breach of warranty in evidence in reduction of damages (b).

And it would appear that where a contract is executory only, as where a horse is ordered of a party, and he contracts to supply one fit for a certain purpose, the buyer may rescind the contract after he has received the horse, if he does not answer that purpose, provided he has not kept it longer than was necessary for trial, or exercised the dominion of an owner over it, as by selling it.

This was decided in Street v. Blay (c), and as it is a very important and leading case, it will be given together

(a) Fielder v. Starkie, 1 H. Bl. 17; 2 R. R. 700; and see Poulton v. Lattimore, 9 B. & C. 265.
(b) According to the law of Scotland, it appears that there would be an absolute right to return the horse upon the discovery of the breach of warranty, without any specific stipulation to that effect: Coustoun v. Chapman, L. R., 2 H. L. (S. C.), 256, per Lord Chelmsford. See also s. 11, sub-s. (2) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, ante, p. 109.
(c) Street v. Blay, 2 B. & Ad. 456; and see Dawson v. Collins, 10 C. B. 523; and Ollivant v. Bailey, 5 Q. B. 288. The principles upon which the judgment in Street v. Blay was grounded appear to be fully confirmed by the provisions of s. 11, sub-s. 1 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, ante, p. 108.
with a considerable portion of the judgment delivered by Lord Tenterden. The facts of the case were these: The plaintiff, on the 2nd of February, sold a horse to the defendant for 43l. with a warranty of soundness. The defendant took the horse, and on the same day sold it to one Bailey for 45l. Bailey, on the following day, parted with it in exchange to one Osborne; and Osborne, in two or three days afterwards, sold it to the defendant for 30l. No warranty appeared to have been given on any of the three last sales; the horse was, in fact, unsound at the time of the first sale, and on the 9th of February the defendant sent the horse back to the plaintiff's premises, requiring the plaintiff to receive him again as he was then lame; but the plaintiff refused to accept him. The question for consideration was, whether the defendant, under these circumstances, had a right to return the horse, and thereby exonerate himself from the payment of the whole price?

After taking time to consider, Lord Tenterden, in delivering the judgment of the Court, said, "It is not necessary to decide whether in any case the purchaser of a specific chattel, who, having had an opportunity of exercising his judgment upon it, has bought it with a warranty that it is of any particular quality or description, and actually accepted and received it into his possession, can afterwards, upon discovering that the warranty has not been complied with, of his own will only, without the concurrence of the other contracting party, return the chattel to the vendor and exonerate himself from the payment of the price, on the ground that he has never received that article which he stipulated to purchase."

"There is indeed authority for that position. Lord Eldon, in the case of Curtis v. Hannay (d), is reported to have said, that he took it to be clear law, that if a person purchases a horse which is warranted sound, and it afterwards turns out that the horse was unsound at the time of the warranty, the buyer might, if he pleased, keep the horse and bring an action on the warranty, in which he would have a right to recover the difference between the value of a sound horse and one with such defects as existed at the time of the warranty; or he might return the horse and bring an action to recover the full money paid; but in the latter case the seller had a right to expect that the

(d) Curtis v. Hannay, 3 Esp. 83.
horse should be returned in the same state as he was in when sold, and not by any means diminished in value. And Lord Eldon proceeds to say, that if it were in a worse state than it would have been in, if returned immediately after the discovery, the purchaser would have no defence to an action for the price of the article.” “It is to be implied (says Lord Tenterden) that he would have a defence in case it were returned in the same state, and in a reasonable time after the discovery. This dictum has been adopted in Mr. Starkie’s excellent work on the Law of Evidence (e), and it is there said that a vendee may in such a case rescind the contract altogether by returning the article, and refuse to pay the price or recover it back if paid.”

“It is, however, extremely difficult, indeed impossible, to reconcile this doctrine with those cases in which it has been held that where the property in the specific chattel has passed to the vendee, and the price has been paid, he has no right, upon the breach of the warranty, to return the article and revest the property in the vendor, and recover the price as money paid on a consideration which has failed, but must sue upon the warranty, unless there has been a condition in the contract authorizing the return, or the vendor has received back the chattel and has thereby consented to rescind the contract, or has been guilty of a fraud which destroys the contract altogether. In Weston v. Downes (f), Towers v. Barrett (g), Payne v. Whale (h), Power v. Wells (i), and Emanuel v. Dane (j), the same doctrine was applied to an exchange with a warranty as to a sale, and the vendee held not to be entitled to sue in trover for the chattel delivered by way of barter for another received. If these cases are rightly decided, and we think they are, and they certainly have been always acted upon, it is clear that the purchaser cannot by his own act alone, unless in the excepted cases above mentioned, revest the property in the seller, and recover the price when paid, on the ground of the total failure of consideration; and it seems to follow that he cannot by the same means protect himself from the payment of the price on the same ground.”

“On the other hand the cases have established, that the

(e) Starkie on Evidence, part iv. p. 615. (h) Payne v. Whale, 7 East, 274.
(g) Towers v. Barrett, 1 T. R. 299. (j) Emanuel v. Dane, 3 Camp.

133.
breach of the warranty may be given in evidence in mitigation of damages, on the principle, as it should seem, of avoiding circuity of action (k); and there is no hardship in such a defence being allowed, as the plaintiff ought to be prepared to prove a compliance with his warranty, which is part of the consideration for the specific price agreed by the defendant to be paid."

"It is to be observed, that although the vendee of a specific chattel, delivered with a warranty, may not have a right to return it, the same reason does not apply to cases of executory contracts, where an article, for instance, is ordered from a manufacturer, who contracts that it shall be of a certain quality, or fit for a certain purpose, and the article sent as such is never completely accepted by the party ordering it. In this and similar cases the latter may return it as soon as he discovers the defect, provided he has done nothing more in the meantime than was necessary to give it a fair trial." (l).

"The observations above stated are intended to apply to the purchase of a certain specific chattel, accepted and received by the vendee, and the property in which is completely and entirely vested in him."

"But whatever may be the right of the purchaser to return such a warranted article in an ordinary case, there is no authority to show that he may return it where the purchaser has done more than was consistent with the purpose of trial, where he has exercised the dominion of an owner over it, by selling and parting with the property to another, and where he has derived a pecuniary benefit from it. These circumstances concur in the present case; and even supposing it might have been competent for the defendant to return this horse, after having accepted it and taken it into his possession, if he had never parted with it to another, it appears to us that he cannot do so after the re-sale at a profit."

"These are acts of ownership wholly inconsistent with the purpose of trial, and which are conclusive against the defendant that the particular chattel was his own; and it may be added that the parties cannot be placed in the same situation by the return of it as if the contract had not been made, for the defendant has derived an intermediate benefit in consequence of the bargain, which he

(k) Cormack v. Gillis, cited 7 East, 532.
would still retain. But he is entitled to reduce the damages, as he has a right of action against the plaintiff for the breach of warranty” (m).

In another case, where the question of return was considered, the law laid down by the Court of Queen’s Bench was confirmed by the Court of Exchequer. And Mr. Baron Bayley said, “One party cannot rescind the contract unless the other party agrees to it. The contract of warranty was open, and entitled the plaintiff to recover damages for the breach of it, but did not entitle him to return the horse, and rescind the contract. In Street v. Blay (m), the law on this subject was fully considered by the Court of King’s Bench, and it was there laid down that a purchaser has no right to return the article, unless there has been a condition in the original contract authorizing the return, or the vendor has subsequently consented to rescind the contract, or unless the case turn out to be one of fraud. According to Power v. Welles (n), if the contract is still open, you cannot maintain an action for money had and received; I take the rule to be, that if the contract remains open, so as to give the party a right to recover damages for a breach of warranty, he cannot maintain an action of indebitatus assumpsit on the ground of the failure of consideration.”

And Lord Lyndhurst said, “There was a proposition in this case to rescind the contract, which the defendant was at first willing to accede to, but the agreement to rescind was never completed, therefore the contract remained open. One party alone could not, by his own act, rescind the contract. The case of Street v. Blay (o) seems to have been very much considered. That case shows that you cannot treat a contract as rescinded on the ground of the breach of warranty, except there was an original agreement that the party should be at liberty to rescind in such case, or unless both parties have consented to rescind it. According to that decision, which is the most recent, your remedy was an action for damages” (p).

The remedy for breach of warranty is concisely stated by section 53 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, which, in so far as it deals with such remedy, is in the following terms:—

(1.) “Where there is a breach of warranty by the seller, or where the buyer elects, or is compelled, to treat any

Confirmed by
a later case.

Remedy for
breach of
warranty.

(m) Street v. Blay, 2 B. & Ad. 456.
(n) Power v. Welles, Cwmp. 818.
(o) Street v. Blay, 2 B. & Ad. O.
(p) Gompertz v. Denton, 1 Cr. & M. 207.
breach of a condition on the part of the seller as a breach of warranty, the buyer is not by reason only of such breach of warranty entitled to reject the goods; but he may

(a) set up against the seller the breach of warranty in diminution or extinction of the price; or

(b) maintain an action against the seller for damages for the breach of warranty.

(4.) The fact that the buyer has set up the breach of warranty in diminution or extinction of the price does not prevent him from maintaining an action for the same breach of warranty if he has suffered further damage.

(5.) Nothing in this section shall prejudice or affect the buyer's right of rejection in Scotland as declared by this Act."

The buyer may elect to treat any breach of a condition on the part of the seller as a breach of warranty under section 11, sub-section (1) (a), ante, pp. 108, 109, and be compelled to do so under section 11, sub-section (1) (c), ante, p. 109.

In an unconditional warranty, the only ground on which goods are returnable is that of fraud. And Mr. Baron Parke, referring to the case of Street v. Blay (q), said, "When a horse is warranted sound, and turns out otherwise, the purchaser has no right to return him, unless the warranty was fraudulent; his only remedy is an action on the warranty; this has been lately settled, but the general impression formerly among the profession, and now amongst all others, is, that the purchaser is to return the horse" (r).

But if on the sale of a horse there be an express warranty by the seller that the horse is sound, free from vice, &c., yet if it be accompanied with an undertaking on the part of the seller to take back the horse and repay the purchase-money, and on trial he shall be found to have any of the defects covered by the warranty, the buyer must return him as soon as he discovers any of those defects, unless he has been induced to prolong the trial by any subsequent mis-representation of the seller, because in such case a trial means a reasonable trial (s).

The right to return a horse sold with a warranty which proves incorrect, is not taken away by the fact that the buyer, before removing him, might have found out that the

(q) Street v. Blay, 2 B. & Ad. 456.
(s) Adani v. Richards, 2 H. Bla. 573; 3 R. R. 508.
warranty was untrue, or by the fact that the horse whilst it is in the buyer's possession is injured without his default, by an accident arising from a defect inherent in the horse (t). Thus, in Head v. Tattersall (t), the plaintiff bought a mare, warranted to have been hunted with certain packs of hounds. According to the terms of the sale, the mare, if objected to, was to be returned within a specified time. The plaintiff paid for the mare, but before removing her from the defendant's establishment he was informed by some person that the warranty was incorrect. The mare, whilst she was being taken away by the plaintiff's groom, became restive and received serious injury. The plaintiff returned her within the specified time. The warranty was in fact untrue. The plaintiff brought an action to recover the price of the mare, and it was held that nothing that had happened took away the plaintiff's right to return the mare, and that he was entitled to succeed.

Where a horse is bought on condition that he is to be returned if he does not suit, as the contract for sale is not absolute, the horse may be returned, and an action brought for the price, if paid, as money had and received to the use of the plaintiff (u). But the purchaser must not keep him longer than is necessary for trial, nor exercise the dominion of an owner over him, as by selling him (v). Such an action was brought in the following case, to recover ten guineas which the plaintiff had paid to the defendant for a one-horse chaise and harness, on condition that it was to be returned in case the plaintiff's wife should not approve of it, paying 3s. 6d. per diem for the hire of it. This contract was made by the defendant's servant, but his master did not object to it at the time. The plaintiff's wife not approving of the chaise, it was sent back at the expiration of three days, and left on the defendant's premises, without any consent on his part to receive it; the hire of 3s. 6d. per diem was tendered at the same time, which the defendant refused, as well as to return the money. A verdict was found for the plaintiff. And a rule to show cause why a nonsuit should not be entered, on the ground that this action for money had and received would not lie, was discharged (w).

Where goods are bought on condition that they should

(t) L. R., 7 Ex. 7; 41 L. J., Ex. 4; 25 L. T., N. S. 631.
(u) Towers v. Barrett, 1 T. R. 133.

M 2
be returned, if unsuitable, they would not be returnable on a disapproval which is not \textit{bon\'a\, fide}, or which is merely capricious (\textit{y}). But in a case in which an order for a carriage had been given and accepted on the express condition that the carriage should meet the approval of the defendant on the score of convenience and taste, it was held, that he was entitled (acting \textit{bon\'a\, fide}, and not from mere caprice) to return it (\textit{z}).

Where a horse is bought, warranted fit for a particular purpose, and he proves unfit for that purpose, it has been held, that the purchaser may return him and bring an action for the price, if paid (\textit{a}).

But where, after a warranty of a horse as sound, the vendor, in a subsequent conversation, said, that if the horse were unsound (which he denied) \textit{he would take it again and return the money}, it was held, that this was no abandonment of the original contract, which still remained open; and that though the horse be unsound, the vendee ought to sue upon the warranty, and could not maintain an action for \textit{money had and received}, to recover back the price after a tender of the horse (\textit{b}).

If goods delivered on "sale or return" be not returned within a reasonable time, or the return of them be rendered impossible by the act of the buyer, the contract of sale becomes complete, and an action for \textit{goods sold and delivered} may be maintained by the seller (\textit{c}).

Where a breach of warranty has taken place it is prudent for the buyer, in an ordinary case, to tender the horse back to the seller immediately on discovering such breach (\textit{d}); and so entitle himself to be repaid the expenses he has been put to in keeping him (\textit{e}); and if the seller receive him back there will be a mutual rescission of the original contract (\textit{f}).

But where the seller refuses to take back the horse, he should be sold as soon as possible for the best price that can be procured (\textit{g}). And, perhaps, the best course to be taken in such cases is to deliver the goods to the vendee, with his consent, and make him pay him for them (\textit{h}).

\( \textit{(y)} \) Dallman \textit{v. King}, 5 Scott, 382.
\( \textit{(b)} \) Payne \textit{v. Whale}, 7 East, 274.
\( \textit{(c)} \) Moss \textit{v. Sweet}, 16 Q. B. 493; 20 I. J., Q. B. 167; 16 L. T., O. S. 341. See also s. 18, r. 4 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893.
\( \textit{(f)} \) Weston \textit{v. Dowses}, Dong. 24.
\( \textit{(g)} \) Caswell \textit{v. Coare}, 1 Taunt. 566; 10 R. R. 606.
pursued under such circumstances is to sell him by public auction, for in that way the true market value, which is the proper measure of damages, can best be discovered (h).

If the buyer does not wish to tender the horse, he should at any rate give notice of the breach of warranty, because the not giving notice will be strong presumption against the buyer that the horse, at the time of sale, had not the defect complained of, and will make the proof on his part much more difficult (i). And unless the breach in such case is clearly established, the jury will naturally suppose that the horse corresponded with the warranty (k).

The longer the time before notice, or bringing an action after discovering the breach of warranty, the greater will be the difficulty in making out a good case to a jury (i). But where the breach of warranty can be clearly proved, the length of time before notice does not appear material. For the Court of King’s Bench, in a case where an unsound horse was sold with a warranty of soundness, decided that the buyer might maintain an action on the warranty, although shortly after the sale he had discovered the unsoundness, and, without giving notice of that fact to the seller, had kept and used the horse for nine months as his own, during which period he had given him physic, and used other means to cure him; he had also cut the horse’s tail. The case had been tried at the Hereford Assizes before Mr. Justice Parke, who directed a nonsuit. However, in the ensuing term a rule was obtained to set that nonsuit aside, and for new trial, the cases of Fielder v. Starkie (l) and Caswell v. Coare (m) being referred to. In showing cause, it was contended that Fielder v. Starkie (l) was overruled, or at least qualified, by subsequent cases; but Lord Denman, with the assent of Justices Littlehale, Patteson and Coleridge, said, “We think that Fielder v. Starkie is not overruled. The rule must be absolute” (n).

The seller, on receiving notice of a breach of warranty, should have the horse examined by some skilful person, and so ascertain the exact state of the case. If he find that the warranty is broken, or that there is doubt, he had better either take back the horse, or come to what terms


(i) Fielder v. Starkie, 1 H. Bla. 17; 2 R. R. 700.

(k) Poultam v. Lattimore, 9 B. & C. 265.


(m) Caswell v. Coare, 1 Taunt. 566; 10 R. R. 606.

(n) Patershall v. Tranter, 3 A. & E. 103; S. G., 4 Nev. & M. 649.
he can with the buyer, as horse causes are decided in a
great measure by the strength of veterinary testimony.
But if he find that there is really no breach of warranty,
the evidence of the party who has examined the horse will
place him in a favourable position in case an action should
be brought.

In an action for the breach of warranty of a horse, an
order may be made under Ord. L. r. 2, for the sale of the
horse, as "goods which for some just and sufficient reason
it may be desirable to have sold at once" (o).

(o) Bartholomew v. Freeman, 3 C. P. D. 316; 38 L. T., N. S. 814;
26 W. R. 743.
CHAPTER IX.
PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND DAMAGES.

Pleading and Evidence for the Plaintiff.

Where you proceed for a breach of an executory contract, you must rest on the contract itself; but when the contract has been executed, you proceed on the promise implied by law (a).

"Where, under a contract of sale, the property in the goods has passed to the buyer, and the buyer wrongfully neglects or refuses to pay for the goods according to the terms of the contract, the seller may maintain an action against him for the price of the goods" (b).

"Where, under a contract of sale, the price is payable on a day certain irrespective of delivery, and the buyer wrongfully neglects or refuses to pay such price, the seller may maintain an action for the price, although the property in the goods has not passed, and the goods have not been appropriated to the contract" (c).

Where the buyer wrongfully neglects or refuses to accept and pay for the horse he has bought, the seller may maintain an action against him for damages for non-acceptance (d), even though the horse may afterwards have been re-sold (e); and the statement of claim will set out facts showing the consideration and the promise, the breach, and the damage. Where a certain time or place for delivery has been agreed upon, it is the duty of the vendor to tender the horse, and such tender must be proved (f).

Where by the terms of the contract the defendant was bound to fetch away the horse, the plaintiff should state in the statement of claim that he has not done so, and aver his own readiness and willingness to deliver (g).

(b) Sale of Goods Act, 1893, s. 49, sub-s. (1).
(c) Ibid., sub-s. (2).
(d) Ibid., s. 50, sub-s. (1).
(e) Maclean v. Dunn, 1 M. & P. 761; S. C., 4 Bing. 722; Hore v. Mifner, Peake, N. P. C. 58, n.
(f) Bordenave v. Gregory, 5 East, 111.
Resale of the goods.

Where the purchaser of goods refuses to take them, the vendor by reselling them does not preclude himself from recovering damages for breach of contract. And it was decided by the Court of Common Pleas that "when a party refuses to take goods he has purchased, they should be resold, and that he should be liable for the loss, if any, upon the resale" (h).

An action for the detention of goods may be maintained by any person who has either an absolute or a special property in goods, which are capable of being ascertained, against another, who is in actual possession of such goods either by delivery or finding, and refuses to deliver them (i).

As this action proceeds on the ground of property in the plaintiff at the time of action brought, it cannot be maintained, if the defendant took the goods tortiously, for by the trespass the property of the plaintiff is divested (j). But if I lend a man a horse, and he afterwards refuses to restore it, this injury consists in the detaining, and not in the original taking; and the regular method for me to recover possession is by action for the detention (k). This would be the proper form of action for the specific restitution of a horse, which has been unlawfully detained by a trainer, veterinary surgeon, livery stable-keeper, or other person, into whose hands it had lawfully come in the first instance.

Where the seller wrongfully neglects or refuses to deliver the horse he has sold to the buyer, the buyer may maintain an action against the seller for damages for non-delivery (I); and where a particular time for delivery has been agreed upon, the statement of claim will set out facts showing the consideration and promise, the breach and the damage, and aver a readiness and willingness to accept and receive the horse and pay the price (m). If no particular time has been specified, and the contract be to deliver the horse generally, as where an action of assumpsit for not delivering was brought against a party who had sold the plaintiff a mare, and promised, if she proved unsound, to provide another or return the money (n), there must be a special request to deliver, which

(h) Maclean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. 722.
(i) Selwyn's N. P., 12th ed. 660, 662.
(k) 3 Steph. Com. 524.
(l) Sale of Goods Act, 1893, s. 51, sub-s. (1).
(m) Bordenave v. Gregory, 5 East. 111. See Order XIX. r. 11.
(n) 3 Wentw. 3; and 2 Chit. Pleading, 6th ed. 166.
will come under a general averment of performance of conditions precedent \((o)\). But if a place is mentioned, and no time \((p)\), or the defendant has incapacitated himself from completing the agreement, as by reselling, &c., a request to deliver is unnecessary \((q)\).

"In any action for breach of contract to deliver specific or ascertained goods the Court may, if it thinks fit, on the application of the plaintiff, by its judgment or decree direct that the contract shall be performed specifically, without giving the defendant the option of retaining the goods on payment of damages. The judgment or decree may be unconditional, or upon such terms and conditions as to damages, payment of the price, and otherwise, as to the Court may seem just, and the application by the plaintiff may be made at any time before judgment or decree" \((r)\).

Where the vendor has delivered the horse, and the purchaser neglects or refuses to pay for him; or if a horse or goods be taken in part payment, and the residue is unpaid \((s)\); or if the purchaser has the horse on the terms of sale or return, and keeps him an unreasonable time, the vendor may maintain an action for goods sold and delivered \((t)\).

Where a portion only of a larger bulk of goods to be delivered in pursuance of a written contract by a stated time has been delivered, and the purchaser then rescinds the contract, the vendor may maintain an action for goods sold and delivered, although the time fixed for the payment of the goods has not elapsed \((u)\).

And where A. agreed to give a horse warranted sound in exchange for a horse of B. and a sum of money, and the horses were exchanged; but B. refused to pay the money, pretending that A.'s horse was unsound; it was held that A. might recover for a horse sold and delivered \((x)\).

Where an article, which has been paid for, does not

\((o)\) Bach v. Owen, 5 T. R. 410.
\((q)\) Bowdell v. Parsons, 10 East, 359.
\((r)\) Sale of Goods Act, 1893, s. 52. This enactment reproduces, with modifications owing to the Judicature Acts and Orders, s. 2 of 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97 (the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856), now repealed.


Pleading, Evidence and Damages.

Answer the description of the thing which when bought it purported to be (y); or where a horse is bought warranted sound, &c., and paid for, and on its turning out unsound is returned to the seller, who receives it, there is a mutual rescission of the contract, and the buyer may recover the price paid in an action for money had and received (z). Also, where a horse has been bought warranted sound, to be returned if unsound (a); or if the contract is, that the horse is to be returned if unsuitable (b); or unfit for a particular purpose (c); and circumstances arise in any of these cases which justify the return of the horse, and the horse is tendered, the same form of action lies for repayment of the price. A claim for horse meat and stabling may be added if necessary.

Where money is paid with a knowledge of all the facts, but under a mistake of the law, it cannot in general be recovered back (d). But money paid under a mistake of facts, and which the party retaining it has no claim in conscience to retain, is recoverable as money paid without consideration (e), even though the plaintiff cannot be put in statu quo (f).

Where a horse is bought and the price paid, but the buyer, by the terms of the agreement, has the option of returning the horse within a certain time, allowing a certain sum for the use of it, the residue of the price may be recovered by him after the horse has been returned or tendered in an action for money had and received. Thus, where a pair of horses were bought for 80l. and paid for, with liberty to return them within a month, allowing the seller 10l. out of the 80l., but that if the buyer kept them beyond the month, he should pay the seller 10l. beyond the 80l., it was held that upon the horses being returned within the month, the buyer had a right to recover the 70l. from the seller, in an action for money had and received (g).

If a sheriff wrongfully seize and sell the horse of a third person under an execution, the latter may sue him for

(z) Weston v. Downes, Doug. 24; Power v. Wells, Comp. 818; and Simpson v. Potts, before Rolfe, B., Carlisle Spr. Ass. 1847.
(a) Adam v. Richards, 2 H. Bla. 573; 3 R. R. 508.
(b) Towers v. Barrett, 1 T. R. 133.
(d) Platt v. Browage, 24 L. J., Ex. 63; Barker v. Pott, 4 H. & N. 759; Rogers v. Ingham, L. R., 3 Ch. D. 351.
(c) Bize v. Dickason, 1 T. R. 255.
(f) Standish v. Ross, 3 Ex. 527.
(g) Hurst v. Orbell, S. A. & E. 107.
money had and received; and he will make out a prima facie case by merely proving his, the plaintiff’s, possession of the horse at the time of seizure. Thus, in the case of Oughton v. Seppings (h), a sheriff’s officer had wrongfully seized under a fi. fa. against A. a horse belonging to B. The horse was sold by the sheriff, and the money paid over to the officer. B. brought an action against the officer, for money had and received, to recover the amount. It appeared that the horse had belonged to the husband of B., but that after his death she had provided for his keep; and although no letters of administration were produced, it was held that this was sufficient evidence against a wrongdoer to entitle her to recover in the action.

Money received by B. on A.’s account, subject to certain conditions, cannot, until those conditions have been complied with, be recovered as money had and received to A.’s use (i).

Where a horse or other article has been sold warranted, but is in fact not according to the warranty, the purchaser may of course maintain an action on the warranty; and in such action the statement of claim will set out facts showing the consideration and the warranty, and state a purchase; it will also set out the breach and the damage.

Although infants are liable for torts and injuries of a private nature (k), yet where the substantial ground of action is contract, the plaintiff cannot, by suing in tort, render a person liable who would not have been liable on his promise. Therefore where the plaintiff declared that having agreed to exchange mares with the defendant, the defendant by falsely warranting his mare to be sound, well knowing her to be unsound, falsely and fraudulently deceived the plaintiff, &c., it was held that infancy was a good plea in bar (l).

We have seen in Chapter VII. under what circumstances an action lies, where a horse has been sold without a warranty, and also what constitutes fraudulent representation (m). Where such an action is brought, the statement of claim, in setting out the material facts, should include the statement of the wrongful act, namely, the sale by means of the fraudulent representation (n), and with regard

for price of horse wrongfully sold.

Money received subject to certain conditions.

Action on a breach of warranty.

Liability of an infant.

Action for fraudulent representation.

(k) Oughton v. Seppings, 1 B. & Ad. 241.
(k) Green v. Greenbank, 2 Marsh.

485; 17 R. R. 529; Howlett v. Haswell, 4 Camp. 118.
(l) Ibid.
(m) See ante, pp. 144—146.
(n) Mummery v. Paul, 1 C. B. 325.
to which a *scienter* must be laid; and also the statement of the *damage*.

In an action for breach of contract, a preamble, stating the circumstances under which the contract was made, or to which the consideration has reference, is sometimes necessary. But where the mere statement of the consideration and promise will be sufficiently intelligible without any prefatory allegation, they may be set forth without any preamble.

The action for a misrepresentation in the nature of *deceit* seems to be an exception from the general rule, that in actions for words, or special damage arising therefrom, the very words must be set out, but the statement of claim must correctly state the contract (o).

The consideration may either be *executed* or *executory*. An *executed consideration* consists of something *past*, or *done* before the making of the promise, and must be shown to have arisen at the defendant's request (p).

An *executory consideration* is something *to be done*, and in the statement of it a greater degree of certainty is required (q). But in either case the whole of the consideration, if it be an entire one, should be stated; no part of it ought to be omitted (r). Thus, where an agent sold a horse belonging to A., and another belonging to B., to C. at an entire price, and warranted them sound; and B.'s horse turning out to be unsound, C. brought his action against B., declaring in the usual form as upon a purchase and warranty of one horse only; Lord Ellenborough, C.J., held that the evidence did not support the declaration, because the contract being entire for the sale of two horses, the plaintiff could not divide it, and declare upon it as upon the sale of one horse only (s).

But where, in an action of *assumpsit* on the warranty of a horse, the consideration stated for the warranty was, that the plaintiff would purchase the horse for 63L.; but the consideration as proved was, that the plaintiff would pay that sum, and if the horse was "lucky," would give the

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As to an exchange, see *Mayor of Reading v. Clarke*, 4 B. & Ald. 269.

(s) *Symonds v. Carr*, 1 Camp. 361.
defendant 5l. on the buying of another horse; it was held to be no variance, as the conditional promise omitted in the declaration was too vague to be legally enforced, and did not amount to a promise in point of law (t).

If any one substantive part of a warranty be proved not to be true, there is a breach on which an action may be maintained, and it is sufficient that the plaintiff set out all the substantive and material parts of the contract, the breach of which he complains of, the parts omitted not qualifying in any manner the sense of those parts set out upon which the breaches are assigned. As where the plaintiff declared that in consideration of his re-delivery to the defendant of an unsound horse, the defendant promised to deliver to him another horse in lieu, which should be worth 80l. and be a young horse, and then alleged a breach in both respects, it was held sufficient, though it was proved that the defendant had also promised that the horse was sound and had never been in harness (u).

And where there was a private sale of a mare at a repository, and a warranty of soundness was given, but there was a notice of the rules of sale, by which no warranty was to remain in force after twelve o'clock the following day, the Court of Exchequer held it sufficient to declare on the warranty alone without the condition annexed to it. However, Mr. Baron Parke said, "If the matter relating to the notice had been by way of proviso upon the warranty, it might perhaps have been necessary to state it in the declaration, but upon that point I give no opinion" (x).

Where the consideration is executory, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove the performance of the consideration on his part, that is to say, the purchase, in order to show that he possesses a right of action (y). And as the price has usually been paid when an action is brought on a breach of warranty, the payment, if made, will be included in an averment of performance of conditions precedent (z), but payment is not essential to support the action.

If the false warranty or misrepresentation be misstated,

(t) Guthing v. Lynn, 2 B. & Ad. 232; and see Saxby v. Wilkin, 1 D. & L. 281.
(u) Miles v. Sheward, 8 East, 7; Clarke v. Gray, 6 East, 568.
(x) Smart v. Hyde, 8 M. & W. 728.
(y) See Bul. N. P. 146; and Ring v. Roxbrough, 2 Tyr. 468; S. C., 2 C. & J. 418; and 1 Chit. Pleading, 6th ed. 296.
(z) See Order XIX. r. 14.
warranty or fraudulent representation.

and the variance be material to the merits of the case, it may be that the judge at the trial will refuse to amend on the ground that the defendant has been misled or taken by surprise. Where an action on the case was brought against a third party for a misrepresentation on the sale of a horse, the declaration stated that the defendant warranted the horse to be "sound and a good worker," and it appeared in evidence that he warranted the horse "sound in the wind," an objection was taken that the warranty and misrepresentation alleged in the declaration were not proved; but Mr. Baron Alderson said, "I think the declaration is substantially proved, and therefore I shall direct the record to be amended under the recent statute (e). The variance relied upon by the defendant is not material to the merits. The merits are, whether or no the defendant made a fraudulent misrepresentation. It is proved that he did; and the terms of the misrepresentation are not quite accurately stated in the declaration; it is clear that the defendant cannot have been misled by the statement. If he had, I would not amend. But he comes here to defend himself from the charge of having made a fraudulent misrepresentation on the occasion of the sale, and whether he represented the horse to be wholly sound, or merely sound in the wind, makes no difference to the merits." After this amendment a verdict was found for the plaintiff (a).

A breach must always be stated in the statement of claim, so that the cause of complaint may appear (b). If the contract be in the disjunctive, the breach ought to be assigned that the defendant did not do one act or other; as on a promise to deliver a horse by a particular day or pay a sum of money (c). It is a rule in pleading that the breach may in general be assigned in the negative of the words of the contract; and therefore it is not necessary that the particular description of unsoundness should be stated (d).

In order to recover special damages it is necessary that they be explicitly stated in the statement of claim, so that

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(a) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 23. See now Order XXVIII. r. 12, of R. S. C., 1883.
(b) Breekhead v. Archbishop of York, Hob. 198, 233.
(e) Com. Dig. Plead, C.; Wright v. Johnson, 1 Sid. 440, 417; Aleberry v. Walshy, 1 Stra. 231.
(c) Com. Dig. Plead, C. 46; and see 1 Chit. Pleading, 6th ed. 172.
the defendant may be prepared to dispute the facts. But damages which necessarily, and by implication of law, ensue from the non-performance of the contract, need not be expressly detailed, and are recoverable under the common conclusion of the statement of claim (c).

Where the plaintiff brings an action for the price of his horse as goods bargained and sold, he must be prepared to prove such a contract of a sale (f), made by him to the defendant and completed, as was sufficient in law to vest the property in the defendant. For instance, where the price is 10l. or upwards, the plaintiff must prove that some requisite of the 4th section of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, as to which see ante, p. 5, has been complied with (g). And it will be necessary to show that a specific price was agreed upon (h) as part of the contract.

Where the plaintiff brings an action for not accepting the horse he has sold to the defendant, and a plea traversing the contract or agreement in the statement of claim is pleaded, the plaintiff must prove the contract, that is, the alleged consideration and the promise (i). And if the defendant contest it in his pleading, the plaintiff must show either a tender (k), as the case may be, or that during a reasonable time he was ready and willing to deliver it (l).

The meaning of readiness and willingness is, that the non-completion of the contract was not the fault of the plaintiff, and that he was disposed and able to complete it, if it had not been renounced by the defendant (m).

Where the plaintiff has otherwise than at the buyer's request delayed delivery beyond the proper time, he cannot enforce acceptance, unless the defendant has entered into a new binding contract (n).

Where a horse is bought, and an action is brought for not delivering him, a plea traversing the contract or agreement alleged in the statement of claim will put the plaintiff to prove the contract, namely, the alleged consideration and promise; and if the defendant contest it in his pleading,

(c) See Boorman v. Nash, 9 B. & C. 152; and Chit. Contr., 12th ed. 854; Bulcen and Leake's Pleading, 4th ed. 19; and Damages, post.


(g) Elliott v. Pybus, 10 Bing. 512; Rohde v. Thwaites, 6 B. & C. 398.

(h) Simmons v. Swift, 5 B. & C. 857.

(i) Beal v. White, 12 A. & E. 670.

(k) Proof of Tender, post.


Proof in goods bargained and sold.

Proof in an action for not accepting.

Meaning of readiness and willingness.

Proof in an action for not delivering.
the plaintiff must prove that he was ready and willing to accept and pay for it. But where there is a traverse of readiness, if nothing remain for the plaintiff to do, it lies on the defendant to disprove, rather than on the plaintiff to prove, the readiness and willingness to deliver (o). But it will not be necessary to prove a tender of the money (p). And it is sufficient evidence that the plaintiff was ready and willing, if within a reasonable time the horse is demanded by him (q), or his servant (p).

Where the plaintiff after delivering the horse brings an action for his price, he must be prepared to prove, if denied, 1st, the sale, of which the delivery of the horse to the defendant and an acceptance by him will be sufficient *prima facie* evidence (r); 2nd, the delivery either to the defendant or his agent, or something which has been done equivalent to a delivery (s); and 3rd, the price agreed upon for the horse; but if the price forms no part of the contract, or if the contract is merely to be implied from the delivery to and acceptance by the defendant, the plaintiff must be prepared to show the real and reasonable value of the horse by persons of competent experience.

Where the plaintiff after a breach of warranty sues for repayment of the purchase-money as money had and received, he may be compelled by a proper defence to prove the receipt of the money by the defendant, and his own title to recover it as received for him (t). He must, therefore, prove the consideration and the performance of it on his part, namely, the payment of a particular price (u); also the warranty, the breach of warranty, and either an actual rescission of the contract or a power to rescind, and a consequent tender of the horse.

To support a claim for money found to be due on an account stated, it must appear that, at the time of the accounting, which must have been before action brought, a demand existed between the parties respecting which an

(q) Squire v. Hunt, 3 Price, 68.
(t) Roscoe, N. P. 16th ed. 575.
account was stated, that a balance was then struck and agreed upon, and that the defendant then expressly admitted that a certain sum was then due from him to the plaintiff (x).

Where an action is brought on a breach of warranty, and the warranty is denied, the plaintiff must prove the fact of the sale and warranty having been given. If the breach is traversed the onus lies upon him to prove the unsoundness or vice, or whatever is alleged as the subject-matter of the breach (y). And of course he must in all cases prove damage whether general or special.

Where there is evidence of fraud, it should be alleged in addition to a breach of warranty, where it is doubtful whether a warranty can be proved (z). For if a statement of claim discloses a state of facts, upon which an action may be maintained without fraud, fraud need not be proved, though it be alleged; and the plaintiff may recover upon the facts disclosed, though fraud be alleged and disproved (a). But where the plaintiff relies on fraud alone and does not succeed, he cannot pick out facts which would otherwise have entitled him to relief apart from the fraud (b).

Where no warranty exists in the contract, but the contract is induced by false representation, known by the seller to be false, the action is grounded on the fraud, and should be so framed (c); for the knowledge of the defendant is in such case essential to the cause of action (d).

Where an action is brought for fraudulent representation on the sale of a horse, the plaintiff should be prepared to prove the wrongful act alleged to have been committed by the defendant, namely, the sale by means of the fraudulent representation (e); and it is essential to show that there was a sale and also a misrepresentation (f); and he must give proof of damage whether general or special (g).

(y) Osborn v. Thompson, 9 C. & P. 337; 1 Tayl. Evid. 337.
(z) Bullen & Leake’s Pleadings, 4th ed. 428.
(b) Hudson v. Lombard, L. R., 1 H. L. 324; London Chartered Bank of Australia v. Lempriere, L. R., 4 O.

P. C. 572; Nead v. Murrow, 40 L. T., N. S. 100.
(e) Ormrod v. Huth, 9 C. & P. 337.
(d) Pasley v. Freeman, 2 Sm. L. C. 9th ed. 74.
(c) Per Cresswell, J., Mummery v. Paul, 1 C. B. 327.
(f) Per Erle, J., Ibid.
(g) Per Bramwell, B., Eastwood v. Bain, 28 L. J., Ex. 74.
A sale may in all cases be implied *prima facie* from evidence of a delivery to, and an acceptance by, the purchaser (h). We have seen in Chapter I., what is sufficient evidence of a contract for sale, either where the value is under 10l.; or the agreement is not to be performed within a year; or the value is 10l. or upwards, within the 4th section of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893. Where there is an agreement in writing, it should be put in and proved, and it is not necessary that it should be stamped (i). Where, however, the bargain and sale has been made by word of mouth, the plaintiff (k), or some witness of the transaction must be called.

Where the consideration is set out in the statement of claim as *executory*, it will in point of fact depend upon the same proof as the *contract for sale*. When it is executed, the plaintiff must show that it took place before the contract, and that it arose at the defendant’s request (l). In the case of a sale he must prove *payment of the price*; but where the consideration is another horse, or other goods, a *delivery and acceptance* must be proved. Where, however, the transaction is *substantially a sale*, the plaintiff may prove that the defendant took another horse in part payment (m).

The *payment of the price* is usually proved by producing the receipt, which of course must bear a stamp where the sum is 2l. or upward (n); and if no receipt was given, or it was un stamped or lost, the plaintiff, or some person who witnessed the transaction, must be put into the box (o).

Where a claim consists of several items, the party making the tender has a right of appropriation; but if he omits to make any appropriation, the right to appropriate is transferred to the other party (p).

The plaintiff’s horse, warranted quiet in harness, was sold for 16l. at Aldridge’s repository. It was afterwards returned on the ground that it did not answer its warranty, and, on being tried in a break, was found not to be quiet in harness. By the printed regulations of the repository the purchase-money for any horse, carriage, &c., sold there was not to be paid over to the vendor until four days

(h) Bennett v. Henderson, 2 Stark. 550; and see Smith v. Roll, 9 C. & P. 696.


(k) 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99, s. 2.


(m) Hands v. Burton, 9 East, 349.

(n) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 97, s. 120.


PLEADING AND EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF.

after the sale. And he was also to pay 10s. as the expense of trial, when a horse was found not to answer his warranty.

After the trial of the horse, the plaintiff called at the repository and demanded an account of his expenses, when he received the following:

1847. July 31. Bay gelding bait . . . 0 1 6
    Auction . . . . . 0 5 0
  July 31
  Aug. 4} Bay gelding, three days . 0 10 6
  Aug. 3} To cash price for trial of
          bay gelding in harness . 0 10 0

£1 7 0

The plaintiff, objecting that the charge was exorbitant, laid down 19s. 6d. on the desk in the defendant's office and demanded his horse. The defendant's clerk told him he could not have it unless he complied with the rules and paid the 1l. 7s. The plaintiff then went away, leaving the 19s. 6d. on the desk.

The plaintiff brought an action of debt for money had and received with a count in detinue for the horse. It was held by the Court of Common Pleas, that as the horse was sold subject to certain conditions, the sum received by the defendant on the sale was not money had and received to the use of the plaintiff, until those conditions had been complied with, and the time for returning the horse had elapsed. Also that the evidence did not support a tender, inasmuch as there was no specific appropriation of any part of the 19s. 6d. to the 10s. claimed in respect of the trial of the horse (q).

Where the promise or warranty has been made by word of mouth, the plaintiff or some party who heard it given must be called to prove it. Where the promise or warranty is to be gathered from letters which passed between the parties, or was formally made in writing, and this in the case of a warranty is usually contained in the same instrument as the receipt, they should be put in and read.

The buyer may give evidence of a warranty, although in a note of the sale and receipt for the money, given by the seller after the conclusion of a parol contract, there be contained no notice of any warranty. Thus the defendant

(q) Hardingham v. Allen, 5 C. B. 796.
sold his horse at Aldridge's repository, and said at the time of sale that if he did not work well, and go quietly in harness, the plaintiff was to send him back, and he should have his money returned. The plaintiff bought him and received the following memorandum:

"Bought of G. Pink a horse for the sum of 7l. 2s. 6d.  
G. Pink."

The horse when put into harness was found to be unruly and vicious, and was accordingly returned to the defendant. The price was demanded back, and on its being refused an action was brought to recover it. It was held by the Court of Exchequer, that parol evidence might notwithstanding be given of the warranty (s).

But a warranty contained in a receipt is not always conclusive evidence that a warranty has been given. For where some hours after bargain the defendant sent his coachman to pay the plaintiff the money, and the coachman drew out the following receipt, which was signed by the plaintiff, an illiterate man, "Received 10l. for a colt warranted sound:" it was held to have been properly left to the jury to find whether the warranty of the colt formed any part of the bargain, or was inserted in the receipt without authority, by an after-thought of the defendant's servant (t).

It is not necessary that a written warranty should have an agreement stamp. This was so decided in the following case, where the plaintiff gave in evidence a written instrument signed by the defendant, which had a receipt stamp, and contained a receipt for the price of the horse, with the words subjoined, "warranted sound." It was objected that it could not be read in evidence for the purpose of proving the warranty without an agreement stamp. But on the authority of Mr. Justice Lawrence, in Browne v. Frye (u), Lord Ellenborough held that such a receipt might be received to prove the warranty, as well as the payment of the price of a horse, with a receipt stamp only (x); and a warranty comes within the exception in the schedule of 33 & 34 Vict. c. 97 (the Stamp Act, 1870), as it is an agreement relating to the sale of goods, wares, and merchandizes.

(s) Allen v. Pink, 4 M. & W. 140.  
(t) Fairmaner v. Budd, 7 Bing. 575.  
(u) Browne v. Frye, cited in Skrine  


Where a servant employed to sell and receive the price has given the warranty, it is enough to prove that it was given by him, without calling him or showing that he had any special authority for that purpose (y).

But the warranty of a person merely entrusted to deliver a horse, is not *primâ facie* binding on the principal, but an express authority must be proved (z). So also where an agent makes an alteration in a warranty given by his principal, a special or general authority must be shown (a).

Where a power to rescind is one of the terms of a verbal contract for a horse, some witness to the transaction must be called to prove it (b). Where, however, there is a written contract, and such power appears as one of the terms, it is proved by putting in the document; but if it do not so appear, or if it were given in a subsequent conversation, it is inoperative, and the original contract as proved still remains open (c).

We have seen in the seventh chapter what constitutes a fraudulent representation, so as to support an action for deceit. And it may be laid down as a rule, with regard to the proof of the scintor or fraud, that where a representation is false to the knowledge of the party making it, this is in general conclusive evidence of fraud (d).

Where the breach of warranty (e) is unsoundness, the plaintiff must prove either an actual existence of unsoundness at the time of sale, or that from the appearance of the horse afterwards he must have been unsound when sold. This, however, must be satisfactorily proved, because a mere suspicion that the horse was then unsound is not sufficient (f). Where the breach of warranty is vice, the plaintiff must prove the existence at the time of sale of such a bad habit as in the eye of the law constitutes a vice (g). And where a horse is warranted fit for some particular purpose, he must be proved to have been unfit for it in ordinary hands (h).

It is not necessary that the plaintiff should inform the defendant of the nature of the unsoundness, and he may

(y) Alexander v. Gibson, 3 Camp. 555.
(a) Strode v. Dyson, 1 Smith, 400.
(b) As to unfitness, see Breach of Warranty, ante, Chap. VIII.
(c) Payne v. Whale, 7 East, 274.
(d) Ormrod v. Huth, 14 M. & W. 664—Ex. Ch.
(e) See Breach of Warranty, ante, Chap. VIII.
(f) Eaves v. Dixon, 2 Taunt. 343.
(h) Geddes v. Pennington, 5 Dow, 164.
refuse to do so if applied to before the trial; and the Court of Common Pleas held that if the defendant wishes to ascertain the nature of the unsoundness, he should take out a summons for that purpose (i).

As there are a variety of particular causes of unsoundness (k), the proof of it will vary according to the circumstances of the case.

There are some cases which merely depend upon evidence as to a certain fact; for instance, a horse after sale is discovered to be lame from a curb (l), and a person giving his evidence on the part of the plaintiff, must actually have seen the curb, either before or at the time of sale.

Other cases may be proved either by evidence as to a certain fact, or by veterinary opinion. As where the buyer discovers a spavin (m) after sale, he must either prove its existence before or at the time of sale by some one who had then actually seen it, or he must produce veterinary testimony to show that from its present appearance it must have then existed.

Other cases, again, may be compounded both of fact and veterinary opinion; as where a horse has a splint (n) and is lame, the question is whether the present lameness (o) proceeds from the splint; and if it does, whether the splint actually existed or must have existed before or at the time of sale.

Or a pure question of veterinary opinion may arise, as where there is a dispute whether a horse is spavined (p) or not; or where the natural appearance of a horse's hock is altered, and it is doubtful whether it is merely a capped hock (q), or a material alteration in the structure of the hock joint.

The proof of an alleged vice (r) may depend upon evidence of the fact of its having existed before or at the time of sale; or upon proof of the existence of a certain habit before or at that time, and then upon veterinary opinion as to the effect of it.

The unfitness (s) for the purpose for which the horse was bought must be clearly proved; as, for instance, where a

(i) Atterbury v. Fairmanner, 8 Moore, 33.
(ii) Curb, ante, p. 77.
(ii) Spavin, ante, p. 94.
(iii) Splint, ante, p. 94.
(iv) Lameness, ante, p. 83.

(p) Capped Hoeks, ante, p. 71.
(q) Spavin, ante, p. 94.
(r) Capped Hoeks, ante, p. 71.
(s) Spavin, ante, p. 94.
(t) Unsoundness and Vice, ante, Chap. IV.
horse has been warranted to be a "thorough-broke gig horse," the jury must be satisfied that a person of ordinary skill cannot safely drive him (s).

To prove a rescission, the plaintiff must either prove that the defendant accepted the horse when tendered, or he must show a rescission by mutual agreement.

The plaintiff may prove a tender by showing that he sent the horse back to the defendant, who refused to accept it (t); or that he sent the horse to livery, and informed the defendant that he had done so (u).

Pleading and Evidence for the Defendant.

The ordinary evidence of detention is that the defendant refused to deliver the goods when demanded (x). It is no defence to show that the goods were not in his possession when demanded if he had improperly parted with the possession (y), as where he had sold them, or lost them by carelessness (z).

Where goods have been deposited or pledged with the defendant as part of an illegal or immoral agreement, the maxim "In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis" applies, and the plaintiff cannot recover them (a).

In an action for goods bargained and sold the defendant, provided that he plead them specially, may rely on any of the following facts, viz., that the defendant never bought a horse of the plaintiff at all, or that the sale was invalid under the Statute of Frauds (b), or s. 4 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893: or where he did not see the horse before purchase he may show that it does not correspond with its description (c); or where it has been ordered for a particular purpose, for instance, to run in a carriage, he may show that it was unfit for that purpose (d); or that it was not the horse which he bargained to purchase, though of

(s) Geddes v. Pennington, 5 Dow, 164. See Buckingham v. Reeve, ante, p. 117.
(u) Chesterman v. Lamb, 2 A. & E. 129.
(z) Ibid.
(y) Ibid.
(b) Taylor v. Chester, L. R., 4 Q. B. 309; 38 L. J., Q. B. 225.
(c) Johnson v. Dodson, 2 M. & W. 653; Elliott v. Thomas, 3 ibid. 170; Buttermere v. Hayes, 5 ibid. 456.
the same name (e), or that the contract was made without the proper formalities (f).

In an action for not delivering a horse, the defendant may show that he did not sell a horse to the plaintiff at all, or that the sale was informal under the Statute of Frauds (g). And where he contests it in his pleading, he may show that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to accept and receive it and pay the price (h). And where no particular time has been specified for delivery, he may show that the plaintiff never made any demand (i).

Where there is no ambiguity in the language of a contract, evidence is not admissible to show that, by the usage of the particular trade, persons selling under such contracts are not bound to deliver the goods without payment (k).

Where an action is brought for the price of a horse as goods sold and delivered, the defendant, by proper allegations in his statement of defence, may dispute the sale and delivery in point of fact. Therefore he may show that the sale was on credit which had not expired when the action was brought (l); that no absolute sale took place; that there was no delivery at all (m); or that the delivery was for the purpose of a reasonable trial and that the horse did not suit (n); or he may show that the horse was returned on the ground of a breach of warranty, pursuant to an agreement embodied in the contract. If his defence is payment, of course it must be specially pleaded. So also must want of title (o).

A breach of warranty cannot properly be pleaded by way of defence, even pro tanto, to an action brought by the seller upon a bill of exchange, or other negotiable security given by the buyer for the price, except where there has been a total failure of consideration, and the buyer has repudiated the contract (p). But since the Judicature

(c) Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 33 L. J., Ex. 160.


(g) Johnson v. Dodgson, 2 M. & W. 653; Elliott v. Thomas, 3 ibid. 170; Buttermere v. Hayes, 5 ibid. 456.

(h) Rawson v. Johnson, 1 East, 203; 6 R. R. 262.


(k) Spartali v. Benecke, 10 C. B. 212; and see Humphrey v. Dale, 27 L. J., Q. B. 390.

(l) Broomfield v. Smith, 1 M. & W. 542; Webb v. Fairmanner, 3 M. & W. 473; and see Paul v. Dod, 2 C. B. 800.

(m) See Smith v. Rolt, 9 C. & P. 696.

(n) Street v. Blay, 2 B. & Ad. 466; Moss v. Sweet, 16 Q. B. 493.


(p) See Moggridge v. Jones, 3 Camp. 38; Knox v. Whalley, 1 Esp. 159; Wells v. Hopkins, 5 M. & W. 7; Byles on Bills, 15th ed. 157.
Acts a breach of warranty may be pleaded by way of counterclaim in such an action (q).

However, it is only reasonable and just that when an action is brought by the seller to recover the price or value of a horse or any other goods, that the buyer should be at liberty to show the breach of warranty in reduction of damages (r).

And where a horse is bought warranted sound, and part of the price is paid, and on turning out unsound, he is found to be worth no more than that sum, it is a good defence to an action for the residue. Thus in the following case, it appeared that the plaintiff sold to the defendant a horse, warranted sound, for twelve guineas, of which the defendant had paid three. In fact, the horse was not sound; and the defendant refusing to pay any more, an action was brought to recover the residue of the horse's price. It was proved that the horse, at the time of sale to the defendant, was not worth more than 1l. 11s. 6d., and the defendant afterwards sold it for 1l. 10s. On these facts Lord Kenyon held that the plaintiff could only recover the value; and more having been paid to him by the defendant, he was nonsuited (s).

Where an action is brought to recover back the price paid for a horse, on failure of consideration, as money had and received, the defendant may show that he never received the price, or that he never warranted, or that there was no breach of warranty, or that there was no rescission of the contract, or that there was no power to rescind, or no tender of the horse, or that being sold on trial, it was kept longer than was necessary for such trial (t).

The defendant in an action on a breach of warranty may deny the warranty, or he may show that, at the time of sale, the horse answered his warranty, whether it were soundness, freedom from vice, fitness for a particular purpose, &c. (u).

The defendant may prove that the warranty was added to the form of receipt unknown to him. Thus, in an action brought on the warranty of a horse, the jury gave a verdict

(g) Order XIX. r. 3.
(r) Poulton v. Lattimore, 9 B. & C. 265; Mondel v. Steel, S.M. & W. 593; S. C., 1 D. N. S. 8; Parsons v. Sexton, 4 C. B. 988; 8. C., 16 L. J., C. P. 184. See also s. 53, sub-s. (1).
(s) King v. Boston, cited 7 East, 481.
(t) Street v. Blay, 2 B. & Ad. 456; and see Dawson v. Collis, 10 C. B. 532.
(u) See evidence as to Unsoundness, Vice and Unfitness, ante, p. 182.
for the defendant, being of opinion that the warranty had been surreptitiously introduced into the receipt by the plaintiff before it was signed by the defendant. And Mr. Baron Platt said, that if the jury had been of opinion that the words were added afterwards by the plaintiff, it would have been his duty to have impounded the receipt for ulterior purposes (a).

Where an action is brought on a breach of a warranty of soundness, the subsequent recovery of the horse may be proved in reduction of damages. Evidence may also be given as to the slightness of the disease; because, of course, if the disease be slight, the unsoundness is proportionably so, and so also ought to be the damages; and if they were very inconsiderable, the Judge might certify to deprive the plaintiff of costs (y).

In an action for fraudulent representation on the sale of a horse, the defendant may show that he never made any representation on the sale; or that the representation was honestly made and believed by him at the time, though not true in point of fact; or that the horse at the time of sale corresponded with the representation. A statement merely untrue is not sufficient evidence of fraud; there must be wilful deceit with the object of inducing the plaintiff to act upon it (z).

The defendant may show that he is not bound by the warranty (a), as where it has been given by a person merely entrusted to deliver the horse (b), or by a servant after sale (e). And where the defendant is neither a horsedealer nor stablekeeper he may prove that the warranty was given by an agent who was expressly forbid to warrant (d), and that in consequence he had offered to take back the horse.

The defendant may show that the horse at the time of sale was sound, or free from vice, or that the defect was patent at the time of sale. And this will depend upon the same sort of evidence as we have before described (e). The defendant may also show that the horse was not unfit for

(x) Bliss v. Snow, before Mr. Baron Platt, Ex. N. P. May 12, 1853.
(a) See Warranty, Chap. V.
(b) Wooding v. Burford, 2 Cr. & M. 391; S. C., 4 Tyrw. 264.
(c) Hody v. Hare, 5 Esp. 72.
(d) Penn v. Harrison, 3 T. R. 761; and Scotland (Bank) v. Watson, 1 Dow, 45; 14 R. R. 11.
(e) Evidence as to Unsoundness, ante, p. 182; Patent Defects, Chap. V.
the purpose for which he was bought; for instance, that he has answered his warranty when used by persons of ordinary skill (f).

But where a horse is proved to have had a disease at the time of sale, his subsequent recovery is no defence to an action on a breach of warranty, because where a horse is warranted it is to be presumed he is fit for immediate use (g).

**Damages.**

The damages which necessarily, and by implication of law, ensue from the non-performance of the contract, or the commission of the wrongful act, need not be expressly detailed, and are recoverable under the common conclusion of the statement of claim (h).

But damages which really took place, but do not necessarily arise from the non-performance of the contract, or the commission of the wrongful act, and are not implied by law, must be expressly stated in the statement of claim; so that the defendant may be prepared to dispute the facts.

The damages must be the legal and natural consequences of the breach of contract, or of the injury which has been inflicted (i). Thus the costs of an action brought on a false representation made by a third person of the profits of a business, such third person not having been communicated with before the action was brought, nor having represented himself as agent for the defendants in that action, are not the legal and natural consequences of the breach of contract or of the injury which has been inflicted (k). But it is otherwise, when on the third person being communicated with, before action was brought, he said that the plaintiffs might safely go on with their action, and also professed to have authority as agent for the representations which he made (l).

This rule illustrates the maxim "In jure non remota causa sed proxima spectatur"—it is the proximate only and not the remote consequences of an act that are to be re-

(f) Geddes v. Pennington, 5 Dow, 161.  
(k) Richardson v. Dunn, 30 L. J., C. P. 44. 
garded. But as to the degree of remoteness it is said that no distinct line can be drawn. In each case the Court must say, as a matter of law, whether it is on the one side or the other (m). In Hobbs v. London and South Western Railway Co. (m), the plaintiffs took tickets to travel by a midnight train from W. to H. The train did not go to H., and the plaintiffs were taken to E., which was a station further from the plaintiffs' house than H. was. The plaintiffs walked home in the wet from E., there being no conveyance to be had. It was held that damages might be given for the personal inconvenience and discomfort of having so to walk, but not for illness brought on by the dampness of the night. But where an innkeeper contracted to provide stabling for twelve horses for the plaintiff during a particular fair, and failed to do so, it was held that the plaintiff could recover damages for injury caused to the horses by exposure to the weather while he was engaged in finding other stables for them (o).

The Judge should direct the jury as to any established rules of measuring the damages applicable to the particular case, and the omission to do so is a ground for a new trial (p).

In accordance with the rule that damages should be estimated by the legal and natural consequences of the breach of contract, or such as may be reasonably supposed to have been in the contemplation of the parties at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it, it was laid down in Hadley v. Baxendale (q), that where a contract is made under special circumstances, which are communicated by one of the contracting parties to the other, the damages resulting from a breach of the contract, which the parties would reasonably be supposed to have contemplated, are the amount of injury, which would ordinarily follow from such a breach of contract under the special circumstances. But if the special circumstances are unknown to the party breaking the contract, he, at the most, can only be held to have contemplated the amount of


(n) Ubi supra.

(o) McMahon v. Field, 7 Q. B. D. 591; 60 L. J., Ex. 552—C. A.


injury which would arise generally, and in the great multitude of cases, not affected by any special circumstances, from such a breach of contract. Therefore, in a case where a miller employed a carrier to deliver a broken shaft to an engineer for repair, and the carrier was guilty of an unreasonable delay in delivering it, the result of which was the stoppage of the mill, and a consequent loss of profits, it was held that such a loss of profits should not be taken into consideration by the jury in estimating the damages, as the carrier had not been informed that this would be the result or the probable result of his negligence (q).

In the ordinary case of trover for a horse, the plaintiff recovers the value of the horse, and not what the horse might have earned besides (r). Special damages may be recovered in trover if laid. Therefore, where in trover for a horse it was laid as special damage, that the plaintiff was obliged to hire other horses, it seems that the amount of damages should be the value of the plaintiff’s horse when taken, and the sum he paid for hire, deducting what would have been the expense of keeping his own horse for the time (s).

Where the property in goods has passed under the contract, but the price has not been paid, and the vendor has wrongfully converted and disposed of the goods so as to preclude himself from delivering them, and recovering the price, the vendee can only recover the difference between the value of the goods and the contract price, and cannot recover the full value by suing for the conversion of the goods instead of for the breach of contract (t).

Whenever a party is liable for a breach of a contract, either express or implied, the plaintiff is, in general, entitled to nominal damages; although the action be framed in tort for such breach of contract, and no actual damage be proved (u). But in the case of actions framed in tort for breach of contract, the damages must be such as are capable of being appreciated or estimated, whereas in such

(s) Davis v. Oswell, 7 C. & P. 804; see further, France v. Gaudet, L. R., 6 Q. B. 199; 40 L. J., Q. B. 121.
as are not founded on contract the jury may consider the
injury to the feelings and many other matters which have
no place in actions of contract (x).

In an action for the recovery of a fixed pecuniary de-
mand, which the defendant has not shown grounds for
reducing, by proving a partial failure of consideration, it is
obviously in general the duty of the jury to give the plaintiff
neither more nor less than the sum specified (y).

However, by 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 28, it is enacted,
"that upon all debts or sums certain, payable at a certain
time or otherwise, the jury on the trial of any issue, or
on any inquisition of damages, may, if they shall think fit,
allow interest to the creditor, at a rate not exceeding the
current rates of interest, from the time when such debts or
sums certain were payable if such debts or sums be payable
by virtue of some written instrument at a certain time; or
if payable otherwise, then from the time when demand of
payment shall have been made in writing, so as such
demand shall give notice to the debtor, that interest will be
claimed from the date of such demand until the term of
payment: provided that interest be payable on all cases in
which it is now payable by law."

This provision does not extend to actions on contracts
which are brought for the recovery of unliquidated damages
resulting from the breach of such contracts, and ascertained
only by a jury, for instance, actions for not delivering
goods, &c. (z). Nor, as it appears, to any case in which
the claim is not for a sum certain as contradistinguished
from one the amount of which is merely capable of being
ascertained (a). Its effect is to leave it discretionary in
the jury to allow interest even in the cases specified; in
other cases it is to be taken as limiting their discretion,
unless there be proof of a written instrument, whereby
the sum certain is made payable at a certain time (b), or
of a written demand of the money containing a notice that
interest from thenceforth will be claimed (c); and in all
those cases, in which it was payable by law at the time the
Act was passed, to make it compulsory on the jury to give
interest.

(x) Per Pollock, C.B., Hamlin v.
Great Northern Rail. Co., 1 H. & N. 410.
(z) Ibid. 661.
(a) Hill v. South Staffordshire Rail. Co., L. R., 18 Eq. 154; 43
L. J., Ch. 566.
(b) Taylor v. Holt, 3 H. & C. 452.
(c) Harper v. Williams, 4 Q. B. 219; Monett v. Lord Loundesborough,
Nothing in the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, is to affect the right of the buyer or the seller to recover interest or special damages in any case where by law interest or special damages may be recoverable, or to recover money paid where the consideration for the payment of it has failed.

But in all actions which sound in damages, the jury seem to have a discretionary power of giving what damages they think proper; for though in contracts the very sum specified and agreed upon is usually given, yet, if there be any circumstances of hardship or extreme folly, though not sufficient to invalidate the contract, the jury may consider them, and proportion and mitigate the damages accordingly. Thus, where an action was brought on a promise of 1,000l. if the plaintiff should find the defendant's owl; the Court held, though the promise was proved, that the jury might mitigate the damages (d).

Where an action was brought in special assumpsit on an agreement to pay for a horse a barley-corn a nail, doubling it for every nail in the horse's shoes; and there were thirty-two nails, and this being doubled, every nail in a geometrical progression, came to five hundred quarters of barley; on the cause being tried before Mr. Justice Hyde, at Hereford, the jury, under his direction, gave the real value of the horse, 8l. as damages; and this contract seems to have been held valid; for it appears by the report that there was afterwards a motion to the Court in arrest of judgment, for a small fault in the declaration, which was overruled, and the plaintiff had judgment (e).

An action will lie for the performance of a contract undertaken for a valuable consideration, though its performance turns out to be impossible (unless it has been rendered impossible by the act of the other party), for it is the result of the "heedlessness of the contracting party, if he runs the risk of undertaking to perform an impossibility, when he might have provided against it by his contract" (f). But where the law casts a duty on a man which, without fault on his part, he is unable to perform, the law will excuse him for non-performance (g).

The damages in an action for the price of a horse, as goods (h). In goods

(d) Bac. Abr. Damages (D), 602.
(e) James v. Morgan, 1 Lev. 111; S. C., 1 Keb. 569; and Chit. Contr. 12th ed. 22.
bargained and sold, will be the whole sum, and not merely damages for not accepting and paying for it.

In an action for not accepting a horse "the measure of damages is the estimated loss directly and naturally resulting, in the ordinary course of events, from the buyer's breach of contract" (h).

Where there is an available market for the horse in question, the measure of damages is prima facie to be ascertained by the difference between the contract price and the market or current price at the time when he ought to have been accepted, or, if no time was fixed for acceptance, then at the time of the refusal to accept (i).

In an action for not delivering a horse according to a contract, the measure of damages is the estimated loss directly and naturally resulting in the ordinary course of events, from the seller's breach of contract (k). Where there is an available market for the horse in question, the measure of damages is prima facie to be ascertained by the difference between the contract price of the horse at the time he ought to have been delivered, or if no time was fixed, then at the time of the refusal to deliver (l). And this rule applies even though the seller in the interim have resold the horse, provided that the buyer did not assent to rescind the contract (m).

If the buyer, at the request of the seller, forbear to enforce the contract at the time the goods ought to be delivered, but afterwards do so, the measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the market price when the buyer so enforces the contract, e.g., by buying the goods in the market (n). Where there has been a written contract, the vendee cannot enhance the damages by oral proof that the contract price was higher than the market price by reason of the shortness of the time fixed by the contract for delivery (o).

Where there is no difference between the contract price

(h) Sale of Goods Act, 1893, s. 50, sub-s. (2).
(i) Ibid., sub-s. (3). See also Phillips v. Evans, 5 M. & W. 475; Boorman v. Nash, 9 B. & C. 145; Josling v. Irvine, 6 H. & N. 512.
(k) Sale of Goods Act, 1893, s. 52, sub-s. (2).
(l) Ibid., sub-s. (3). See also Boorman v. Nash, 9 B. & C. 145; Leigh v. Paterson, 8 Taunt. 540; Barrow v. Arnaud, 8 Q. B. 609; per Tindal, C.J.; Valpy v. Oakeley, 16 Q. B. 941.
(m) Leigh v. Paterson, 8 Taunt. 540; S. C., 2 Moore, 588.
(n) Ogle v. Earl Vane, L. R., 2 Q. B. 275; Ex. Ch., L. R., 3 Q. B. 272. See Tyers v. Rosedale, &c. Iron Co., L. R., 8 Ex. 365; Ex. Ch., L. R., 10 Ex. 195; 42 L. J., Ex. 185; 29 L. T., N. S. 761.
(o) Brady v. Oastler, 3 H. & C. 112; 33 L. J., Ex. 300.
and the market price, the damages are only nominal (p).

And where goods were paid for by bill, and after a breach of contract by the vendor in not delivering the goods the bill was dishonoured, the purchaser was held entitled to recover only nominal damages (q).

In an action for the price as goods sold and delivered, the damages will be the price or value of the horse.

Where an action for money had and received is brought for the repayment of the price, and there is a claim for horsemeat and stabling, the measure of damages is the price paid for the horse; and also the expense of keep from the day of sale; as the contract must be taken to have been rescinded from the day it was entered into (r). And as to the recovery of interest on the price paid, see 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 28, by which statute a demand in writing and notice of such claim is necessary (s).

The damages in the case of a breach of warranty must be treated in the same way as an action on a contract (t).

The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the estimated loss directly and naturally resulting, in the ordinary course of events, from the breach of warranty (u). In the case of breach of warranty of quality such loss is primâ facie the difference between the value of the goods at the time of delivery to the buyer and the value they would have had if they had answered to the warranty (x).

Where the horse has been returned, and no special loss has accrued, the damages consist of the price paid (y).

Where the horse has not been returned the measure of damages will be the difference between its value with the defect warranted against and the value it would have borne without the defect. It was formerly laid down that the measure of damages would be the difference between the contract price and that for which it would sell with its defect (z). But the rule in England is now settled as stated above, and the doctrine is the same in America (a).

Damages in goods sold and delivered.

In money had and received.

On breach of warranty.

General rule.

Where the horse has been returned.

Where the horse has not been returned.

(p) Valpy v. Oakeley, 16 Q. B. 941.

(q) Griffiths v. Perry, 28 L. J., Q. B. 204.

(r) Caswell v. Coare, 1 Taunt. 566; King v. Price, 2 Chit. 416.

(s) See Interest, ante, p. 190.


(u) Sale of Goods Act, 1893, s. 53, sub-s. (2).

(v) Ibid., sub-s. (3). See also 


(y) Caswell v. Coare, 1 Taunt. 566; 11 R. R. 668; Heilbut v. Hickson, L. R., 7 C. P. 438; 41 L. J., C. P. 228.

(c) Caswell v. Coare, 1 Taunt. 566; 11 R. R. 668.

(a) See per Buller, J., 1 T. R. 136; per Lord Eldon, C.J., Curtis.
Where the horse has been resold by the purchaser before the breach of warranty has been discovered, the price obtained at the second sale may be left to the jury as a mode of estimating what the real value of the horse, if perfect, would have been; but the difference between the price and the purchase-money cannot be given as specific damage on account of the loss of profit which might have been made on it (b).

But after a breach of warranty, the buyer is entitled to recover a reasonable sum of money for the expense of keep, where before re-sale he has tendered the horse to the seller; and the buyer is entitled to keep the horse for such reasonable time as is required to sell him to the best advantage (c). What length of time and sum of money is reasonable for the keep is a question for the jury (d).

The whole subject of keep was fully considered in the case of Chesterman v. Lamb (d), where an action of assumpsit was brought on the warranty of a horse, and also for the expense of his keep. It appeared at the trial that the defendant sold and delivered the horse to the plaintiff on the 28th of June. Early in July the horse was found to be lame; and on the 10th, upon examination by a veterinary surgeon, the complaint was found to be spavin (e). On the 11th of July the plaintiff gave the defendant notice that the horse was unsound, and that he should return him and demand back the purchase-money; and on the 21st the plaintiff sent the horse to livery, and informed the defendant that he had done so. On the 27th the action was commenced; and on the 16th of September, the plaintiff (having informed the defendant of his intention to do so) sold the horse by auction for twenty-three guineas. The action was brought to recover the difference between that sum and 40l., the price given by the plaintiff, and likewise 9l. 17s. for the horse's keep at livery till the second sale.

For the defendant it was insisted that the horse was not unsound, and consequently that nothing was due on account either of the price or the keep.

Mr. Justice Taunton, in leaving the case to the jury,


(b) Clare v. Maynard, 6 A. & E. 519; Cox v. Walker, ibid. 523, n.; Mayne on Damages, 4th ed. 192.

(c) McKenzie v. Hancock, R. & M. 436.

(d) Chesterman v. Lamb, 2 A. & E. 129.

(e) Spavin, ante, p. 94.
said, "That in his opinion there had been a sufficient tender of the horse back to the defendant; that if the horse was unsound, it was the defendant's duty to provide for the charges of standing at livery; and therefore the plaintiff, in that case, would be entitled to the 9l. 17s. claimed for keep." The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff for the whole sum demanded. A rule was obtained to show cause why there should not be a new trial, or why the verdict should not be reduced in respect of the keep; the rule, however, was discharged.

And Lord Denman, C.J., said, "I can conceive no case where a purchaser returns a horse, in which the seller may not be liable for some keep. The law upon the subject is thus laid down in Mr. Selwyn's Law of Nisi Prius (f). As soon as the unsoundness is discovered, the buyer should immediately tender the horse to the seller; and, if he refuses to take him back, sell the horse as soon as possible for the best price that can be procured; for the purchaser is entitled to recover for the keep of the horse for such time only as would be required to resell the horse to the best advantage."

"Whether the time of keeping be reasonable or not, is a question for the jury. But here the defendant altogether denied his liability. It is true that counsel would have been under a disadvantage in resting the case on two different grounds; but that consideration cannot vary the course which must be pursued in trying a cause. If the defendant's counsel meant to rely upon the unreasonable-ness of the time, he should have shown grounds for insisting on that point, and taken the opinion of the jury upon it" (g).

In the following case, where an action of assumpsit was brought on the warranty of a horse, it appeared that the plaintiff had tendered back the horse to the defendant, and on his refusal to receive it, had kept it nearly eight weeks at livery at Reading, till Reading Fair, when it was sold. The plaintiff sought to recover the difference between the price which he had given for the horse and the sum for which he was sold, and also the expense of his standing at livery.

Mr. Justice Coleridge, in summing up, said to the jury, "With respect to the keep of the horse, I am of opinion

(f) Selwyn's N. P. 12th ed. vol. 1, p. 656, tit. Deceit, l. 2.  
(g) Chesterman v. Lamb, 2 A. & E. 129.
that if a person has bought a horse with a warranty, which has been broken, and he tenders the horse to the seller, and the seller refuse to receive it back, the buyer is entitled to keep it a reasonable time till he can sell it, and for that time he may, against the seller, recover the expense of keeping it; but he must not keep it as long as he chooses. All that he is allowed to do is to keep it for a reasonable time till he can fairly sell it, and for that time he ought to be allowed for keeping it. If it was a good thing for the sale of the horse to keep it till Reading Fair, you will find your verdict for the amount claimed; but if you think the horse ought to have been sold within a week or a fortnight, or some other short time, you will deduct so much of the claim as goes beyond the time.” The jury gave the plaintiff a verdict for the whole amount (h).

In the case of Cox v. Walker (i), where an action was brought for a breach of the warranty of a horse sold as sound, the special damage alleged in the declaration was the plaintiff’s expense incurred by reason of the warranty, and his loss of gains and profits in reselling the horse; and the only plea was a denial of the unsoundness. It appeared that the plaintiff had bought the horse of the defendant for 100l., and had been offered 140l. for him, but the horse, proving unsound, the plaintiff had been obliged to give up the bargain, and sell him for 49l. is. Lord Denman, C.J., directed the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the difference between the price at which he was finally sold, and the actual value of the horse if he had been sound at the time of such sale; and he left to the consideration of the jury, as a measure of the value, the price offered for the horse whilst in the plaintiff’s hands. The jury found for the plaintiff 90l. 13s. damages. A rule nisi was obtained for a new trial on the ground of misdirection, or for a reduction of damages. Cause was shown in Easter Term, 1836, before Lord Denman, C.J., and Littledale, Patteson, and Coleridge, J J. The Court took time to consider, and the case stood over for several terms, but was at length settled.

And in another case, where the horse had been tendered to the defendant and refused, Chief Justice Tindall in charging the jury said, “You will give as damages the

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(h) Ellis v. Chinnock, 7 C. & P. 169.
difference between the price paid and the real value of the horse, and the damages for the expense which the plaintiff was put to by the defendant selling him that which was of no use to him, for a certain time, at least to the time when he offered the horse to the defendant" (k).

The increase in value consequent on the care and expense bestowed on a horse after purchase, and evidenced by an advance of price on a resale, might probably be recovered if the cause of such increase were properly laid as special damage. Because, although the Court of Queen's Bench thought it unnecessary to give their opinion in Clare v. Maynard (l), as that point did not there properly arise, yet Lord Denman, C.J., appeared to hold that if it had arisen, he should have directed the jury as he did in the case of Cox v. Walker, and then the measure of damages would be the difference between the price ultimately obtained for him, and his actual value if he had been sound at the time of such last resale (m).

And where a horse had been bought in the country, and brought up to London, and after it was discovered to be unsound was tendered to the seller, and then sold by auction, Lord Denman, C.J., told the jury that the measure of damages was the difference between the value of the horse, if sound (of which the price was only strong evidence), and the sum it brought as unsound (n).

That the buyer could not recover the expenses of obtaining a certificate of unsoundness from the veterinary college or of counsel's opinion, as they were no part of the necessary expenses, but were merely for the plaintiff's own comfort, and to convince him that he could bring an action in safety (n).

But that he was entitled to be paid the expenses of bringing the horse up to London, and of its keep (n).

A person who has bought a horse warranted sound, and has had it returned to him after resale at a profit, cannot in an action on the warranty recover damages for the "loss of a good bargain" (o); and on this ground the Court of Queen's Bench gave their decision in Clare v. Maynard (p), because the declaration there merely alleged that the plaintiff

(m) Cox v. Walker, cited ibid.
(n) Clare v. Maynard, 7 C. & P. 741.
(p) Clare v. Maynard, 6 A. & E. 524.
bought the horse at so much, and resold him at so much, without alleging the cause of the advance, or averring that he had laid out any money on the horse in the meantime. And it was held, in that case, that although the contract of sale at a profit had been actually completed before the unsoundness was discovered, yet the plaintiff could not recover as special damage the advance in value, which, as stated in the declaration, was the mere loss of a good bargain (q).

If the buyer of a horse with a warranty, relying thereon, resells him with a warranty, and being sued thereon by his vendee, offers the defence to the vendor, who gives no directions as to the action, the plaintiff defending that action is entitled to recover the costs of it from his vendor as part of the damage occasioned by his breach of warranty (r). He may also recover not only a sum fairly and reasonably paid to the second vendee as compensation (s), but also a sum in respect of damages, which he has agreed to make good, although no amount has been fixed, nor any sum actually paid, the mere liability to pay such costs being sufficient to sustain the claim for special damage (t). But he cannot recover any such costs if, by a reasonable examination, he could have discovered the breach of warranty before sale (u).

Where there is a misrepresentation of the character or condition of goods, the vendor is responsible for all injury which is the direct and natural result of the purchaser’s acting on the faith of his representation. Therefore, where a cattle dealer fraudulently represented a cow to be free from infectious disease when he knew that it was not so, and the purchaser placed it with five others which caught the disease and died, the latter was held entitled to recover as damages, in an action for fraudulent misrepresentation, the value of all the cows (x). And the same rule would be applied where there was no fraud, but the beast was warranted free from disease, and both parties contemplated its being placed with other stock (y).

(q) Clare v. Maynard, 6 A. & E. 524.
(r) Lewis v. Peake, 7 Taunt. 153; 2 Marsh. 43; 17 R. R. 475; and see Ralph v. Crouch, L. R., 3 Ex. 44; 37 L. J., Ex. 8.
(s) Dingle v. Hare, 7 C. B., N. S. 145.
(t) Randall v. Roper, 27 L. J., Q. B. 266.
(u) Wrightup v. Chamberlain, 7 Scott, 598.
(x) Mullets v. Mason, L. R., 1 C. P. 569; 35 L. J., C. P. 299; Mayne on Damages, 4th ed. 197; Sherwood v. Longdon, 21 Iowa, 518.
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It is illegal to bring a glandered horse into a public market or fair (z), but there is nothing illegal in a simple sale; therefore a person who sold a glandered horse without a warranty and without misrepresentation was held not responsible for disease communicated to other horses of the purchaser’s in the stable to which he removed it (a). But a breach of statutory duty may not constitute the foundation for a private right of action. A statement that the purchaser of a horse must take it “with all faults” and that the vendor will give no warranty with it, and will refuse all future claim for compensation (where the vendor does nothing to conceal the defect), relieves the vendor from all liability in respect of any defect in the horse itself (b). If such a statement were followed by a declaration of the vendor (who knew the reverse) that he knew the animal to be free from objection, there might be ground for an action of deceit (c). Thus where a statute prohibited persons from sending animals infected with a contagious disease to market, and inflicted penalties on any person so sending them, the act of sending them, if known to be so infected, was a public offence, but did not amount by implication to a representation that they were sound, and did not itself raise as between the vendor of the animals and the purchaser of them any right of the purchaser to claim damages in respect of an injury he had suffered in consequence of their purchase (d). But it seems that if the defendant had sent tainted animals into the public market-place, and the plaintiff’s animals, in that public place, by contact or neighbourhood had been infected, and the plaintiff suffered loss, that he might have recovered damages for that loss (e).

(a) Sill v. Balls, 2 H. & N. 299; 27 L. J., Ex. 45. And see per Willes, J., L. R., 1 C. P. 563.
(c) Ibid., per Lord Cairns, C.
(d) Ward v. Hobbs, ante, note (b).
(e) Ibid., per Lord Cairns.
CHAPTER X.

INNKEEPERS, VETERINARY SURGEONS, FARRIERS, HORSE-BREAKERS, TRAINERS, ETC.

Innkeeper.

His business. When a horse is taken to an inn, the innkeeper has a particular responsibility imposed upon him, in return for which he has certain peculiar privileges.

An innkeeper is a person who makes it his business to entertain travellers and passengers, and to provide lodging and necessaries for them and their horses and attendants, and it is no way material whether he have any sign before his door (a).

The true definition of an inn is, a house where the traveller is furnished with everything which he has occasion for whilst on his way" (b).

The word hostler is derived ab hostle; and the word hospitator, which is used in the old writs for an innholder, is derived ab hospicio; and hospes est quasi hospitium petens (c).

A guest is properly a lodger or stranger at an inn; and the word "guest" is derived from the Saxon gest, which had the same meaning as the French gist or gite, that is, "a stage of rest in a journey," "a lodging" (d). And Lord Holt says, "It is the lodging of the man at the inn that makes him guest" (e).

An innkeeper or hotel-keeper undertakes to receive and entertain all travellers until his house is filled; and an innkeeper by opening a common inn undertakes also to receive and keep the horses of those who come to his inn (f).

It is said that an innkeeper may be compelled by the constable of the town to receive and entertain a traveller as his guest (g).

(a) Palm. 374; 2 Rol. Rep. 345.
(c) Calye's case, 8 Coke, 32.
(f) Jones v. Osborn, 2 Chit. 484.
(g) 5 Edw. 4, 2 b. Dalt. cap. 7; 1 Show. 268.
If an innkeeper who has room in his house refuse to receive a traveller, after a tender or an attempted tender of a reasonable sum for his accommodation, he may be indicted for it, and the indictment must state that the person refused was a traveller (h).

And it is no defence for the innkeeper that the guest was travelling on a Sunday, and at an hour of the night after the innkeeper's family had gone to bed; or that the guest refused to tell his name and abode, as the innkeeper had no right to insist upon knowing these particulars (i).

But although an innkeeper cannot refuse a person who is sick, he is not bound to receive a person who comes to the inn drunk, or behaves in an indecent or improper manner (k).

An action lies to recover compensation for any injury in consequence of such refusal; but, as it appears, not for the mere refusal to receive the traveller or his horse (l).

An innkeeper, though licensed to let post-horses, is not liable to an action for refusing to supply a chaise and horses to enable his guest to pursue his journey, although they be disengaged and a reasonable sum be tendered for them (m).

But although a traveller is entitled to reasonable accommodation in an inn, he is not entitled to select a particular apartment, or to insist on occupying a bedroom for the purpose of sitting up all night, so long as the innkeeper is willing and offers to furnish him with a proper room for that purpose (n); nor is he entitled to compel an innkeeper to furnish rooms in which to exhibit the wares of his guest, for an innkeeper is not bound by law to find show-rooms for his guests, but only convenient lodging-rooms and lodging (o).

An innkeeper was formerly prima facie liable to any amount for loss not occasioned by the act of God or the King's enemies (p). But by the 26 & 27 Vict. c. 41, s. 1, he is no longer liable to make good any loss to goods or property brought to his inn, not being a horse or

(h) Fell v. Knight, 8 M. & W. 276; Rex v. Ivens, 7 C. & P. 219; Rex v. Luellin, 12 Mod. 445.

(i) Rex v. Ivens, 7 C. & P. 213.


May be indicted for refusing.

What held to be no defence.

Sickness, drunkenness, &c.

Action for compensation.

Not liable for refusing to supply post-horses.

Traveller not entitled to select particular apartments.

Liability of innkeeper limited by 26 & 27 Vict. c. 41.

18; Collin's case, Godb. 346; Palm. 374; 2 Rol. Rep. 345; Newton v. Trigg, 1 Show. 270.

(m) Dicas v. Hides, 1 Stark. 247.

(n) Fell v. Knight, 8 M. & W. 260.


other live animal, or any gear appertaining thereto, or any carriage, to a greater amount than the sum of 30l., except where the loss shall have been occasioned "through the wilful act, default or neglect of the innkeeper, or any servant in his employ," or "where such goods or property shall have been deposited expressly for safe custody" with him: provided always, that in the case of such a deposit, the innkeeper may require, as a condition of liability, "that such goods or property shall be deposited in a box or other receptacle fastened and sealed by the person depositing the same." By section 3, the innkeeper must exhibit in a conspicuous part of the hall or entrance to his inn at least one copy of the first section of this Act, in order to be entitled to its benefit.

It has been held that "wilful" in section 1 of the 26 & 27 Vict. c. 41, must be read with "act" only, and not also with "fault or neglect" (q). A mere verbal error in a copy of section 1 of the Act, exhibited for the purpose of limiting an innkeeper's liability, will not vitiate the notice so as to make it ineffectual, provided the notice states correctly the provisions of the Act; but the omission of a material portion of the statute will render the notice ineffectual to protect the innkeeper (r). A notice was exhibited in an hotel, containing a copy of the first section of the Act, correct in every particular, only that in the exception the word "act" was accidentally omitted. The Court held that this was a material omission, and that the notice was insufficient to protect the innkeeper (s).

The salaried manager of an hotel belonging to a company is not an innkeeper, so as to be by law responsible for the goods and property of the guests, although the usual licence has been granted to him personally (t).

An innkeeper is not absolved from responsibility for his guest's goods by reason of the luggage being placed in a particular room at the request of the guest (u); nor before the Innkeepers' Liability Act (x) was passed was he compellable to receive every description of goods with a guest, but only such as a person ordinarily travels with (y). But

(q) Squire v. Wheeler, 16 L. T., N. S. 93, per Byles, J.
(s) Ibid.
(t) Dixon v. Birch, L. R., 8 Ex. 417.
(x) 26 & 27 Vict. c. 41.
(y) Broadwood v. Granara, 10 Ex.
by the 2nd section of the 26 & 27 Vict. c. 41, it is enacted that, "if an innkeeper shall refuse to receive for safe custody, as before mentioned, any goods or property of his guest, or if any such guest shall, through any default of such innkeeper, be unable to deposit such goods or property as aforesaid, such innkeeper shall not be entitled to the benefit of this Act in respect of such goods or property." However, it is to be presumed that this section does not apply to such goods as an innkeeper was entitled to refuse before this Act came into operation, as, if made applicable to all goods, an innkeeper who refused to convert his inn into a warehouse for the goods of his guest would be disentitled to the benefit of the Act in respect of them.

It is no defence to an action by a guest for the loss of his goods for the innkeeper to allege that he was sick or of non sane memory at the time (z); or that there was no positive negligence on his part (a); but the negligence of the guest is a good defence, if it is gross negligence (b), or even if it occasioned the loss "in such a way as that it would not have happened if the guest had used the ordinary care that a prudent man may be reasonably expected to take under the circumstances" (c).

If the guest's horse is stolen the innkeeper is answerable in an action upon the custom of the realm (d), even if the owner has gone away for several days, and it is lost or stolen in his absence, or if it has been brought by a servant (e). And inasmuch as 26 & 27 Vict. c. 41, s. 1, specially exempts horses from the operation of that Act, the innkeeper's liability as respects amount is not restricted with regard to them.

But if a person takes another's horse, and rides him to an inn where he is lost or stolen, the owner has no action against the host, but has his remedy against the taker (f).

The liability of an innkeeper for loss continues only so

(a) Morgan v. Rawley, 30 L. J., Ex. 131.
(e) 1 Salk. 338; 1 Rol. Abr. 3; Moor, 877; Cro. Jac. 224; Yelv. 162; Bac. Abr. tit. Inns and Innkeepers.
(f) 1 Rol. Abr. 3.
long as he derives benefit from his visitor or his property, for if the innkeeper could not gain a profit, he is not liable to suffer loss without a special undertaking (g), for so long only is a visitor a guest. Upon this principle a person leaving a horse at an inn becomes a guest, while a person leaving dead goods at an inn does not become a guest, for the horse must be fed, by which the innkeeper has gain (h). And therefore the innkeeper is liable for the loss of the horse, although its owner is not staying at the inn. Thus, too, when a person came to an inn, and desired to leave some goods there till the next week, which was refused, and then stayed to drink something during which time his goods were stolen, the innkeeper was held to be liable (i). But if a man who has been a guest, gives up his room, and quits the inn for a few days, intending to return, and asks for permission to leave his goods at the inn, and the innkeeper takes charge of them, the innkeeper is clothed only with the ordinary duties and responsibilities of a bailee (k).

An innkeeper is only bound by the custom of the realm to answer for those things that are infra hospitium, and not for anything out of his inn. For where a horse is lost or stolen when out at grass by the guest’s desire, the host is not chargeable, unless it was the consequence of his wilful negligence (l): for instance, an action lies against an innkeeper who voluntarily leaves open the gates of his close, whereby the horse strays out and so is lost or stolen (m).

But he is answerable if he has put the horse out to grass without the owner requiring him to do so (m). And where an innkeeper took in a horse and gig on a fair-day, and the hostler, without the guest’s permission, placed the gig outside the inn-yard, in the part of the street in which the carriages at the inn were usually placed on fair-days, and the gig was stolen thence, the Court of King’s Bench held the innkeeper responsible. And Mr. Justice Taunton said, “It does not appear that the gig was put in this place at all at the request or instance of the plaintiff; the place is therefore an inn; for the defendant by his conduct treats it as such. If he would wish to protect himself,

(g) Gelley v. Clerk, Cro. Jac. 188.  
(h) York v. Grindatone, 1 Salk. 388.  
(k) Smith v. Dearlove, 6 C. B. 132.  
(m) Bac. Abr. tit. Inns and Innkeepers: Calve’s case, 8 Coke, 32 b; Moor, 1229; Pop. 127; Mosley v. Bosset, 1 Rol. Abr. 3; 4 Leon. 96; 2 Brownl. 255; Richmond v. Smith, S. B. & C. 11.
he should have told the plaintiff that he had no room in his yard, and that he would put the gig in the street, but could not be answerable for it; not having done so, he is bound by his common law liability.” (n)

It is said in Calye’s case (o), that an innkeeper’s liability is confined to “bona et catalla,” and that he is not answerable if the guest himself is beaten, as that is not a damage to “bona et catalla.” But it seems that this statement must be simply taken to mean that the innkeeper is not bound to insure his guest; for in a recent case it was held that it is the duty of an innkeeper to take reasonable care of the persons of his guests, so that they are not injured by reason of a want of such care on his part whilst they are in the inn as his guests (p). Where the guest’s horse has been beaten, the innkeeper was held liable; and it appeared that it had been injured by having been taken out of the inn and immoderately ridden and whipped, though it did not appear by whom (q).

Where a guest’s horse is injured, there is always a presumption of negligence against the innkeeper. It is questionable, indeed, if in any case this presumption can be rebutted without proof of actual negligence on the part of the guest. The case of Dawson v. Chamney (r) has been relied upon to show that this presumption may be rebutted by giving proof of such skilful management on the part of the innkeeper, as to convince the jury that the damage could not have been occasioned by the negligence imputed. But this view of the law was held to be untenable by Pollock, C.B., in the case of Morgan v. Rav ey (s), who, in delivering the judgment of the Court of Exchequer, said, “We think the cases show there is default in the innkeeper wherever there is a loss not arising from the plaintiff’s negligence, the act of God, or the Queen’s enemies” (t).

Presumption of negligence against the innkeeper.

Where a guest’s person or horse is injured.
And it must be borne in mind that, though there be a private arrangement between the innkeeper and the keeper of the inn stables or hostler, and the result of that arrangement be that as between him and the innkeeper, the innkeeper has lost all control over the stables, yet as between the innkeeper and his guest no such private arrangement can be recognized, and the innkeeper's liability towards him for injury done to the horse remains unimpaired (ui).

For the security and protection of travellers, inns are allowed certain privileges, such as that the horse and goods of the guest cannot be distrained, &c. (x).

If an innkeeper takes his guests to rooms that he has provided for him, on account of not having sufficient room in his inn, these rooms are privileged from distress (y).

So also if a guest's horse is put into a stable provided for a particular occasion, it cannot be distrained. Formerly, however, a different view was taken in a similar case. For where the tenant of a stable had sub-let it to an innkeeper during races, and the horses of a guest were put into it and

Bench, that in such case there was a presumption of negligence on the part of the innkeeper or his servants; but that this presumption might be rebutted by giving proof of such skilful management on his or their part as to convince the jury that the damage could not have been occasioned by the negligence imputed. But a material difference will be found in the report of the facts of this case in 7 Jur. 1057, for it is there stated, that "there was no evidence of the manner in which the horse received the injury for which the action was brought." It appears that the only report of this case which was seen by the Court, when giving judgment in the case of Morgan v. Ravey, was that of the Jurist, and that Pollock, C.B., founded the only possible reconcilement of Dawson v. Chamney with the law upon this point, which is the very point of discrepancy between the Jurist and the other reports. He said, "The only case which points the other way is that of Dawson v. Chamney, and according to the report of that case in 7 Jur. 1057, there was no evidence of the manner in which the horse received the injury for which the action was brought; and this may be the explanation of that case, for though the damage happening to the horse from what occurred in the stable might be evidence of default or neglect, still it was not shown how the damage arose, and it was not even shown that it arose from what occurred in the stable. It might have arisen from something which had occurred long prior to the horse being put into the custody of the innkeeper. That would distinguish this case, and reconcile all the cases with the general current of authority." It matters not indeed, so far as the law is concerned, which report of the case of Dawson v. Chamney is authentic, for if that contained in the L. J. and Q. B. Reports is the correct one, it has been overruled by Morgan v. Ravey; and if that of the Jurist is to be taken, it does not establish the point that in case of loss to the guest, the presumption of negligence on the part of the innkeeper can be rebutted, otherwise than by proof of actual negligence on the part of the guest.

(x) 1 Rol. Abr. 668; Co. Litt. 47.
afterwards distrained by the landlord, the distress was held good, and Lord Mansfield, C.J., thought that the owner of the horses had his remedy against the innkeeper under the implied warranty for safe custody (z).

An innkeeper has a general lien on all goods and chattels belonging to his guest (a).

He has no lien on goods sent to his guest for a particular purpose, and known by him to be the property of another person (b), but his lien extends to goods brought to the inn by a guest, though they belong to a third party, provided they be such as persons ordinarily travel with (c), as these he is compelled to receive. And in Threfall v. Borwick (d), it was held that his lien extends to all the goods which he has actually received with a guest whether the property of the guest or not, and is not limited to such things as he was bound to receive with the guest.

An innkeeper retaining the goods of his guest by virtue of such lien is not bound to use greater care as to their custody than he uses as to his own goods of a similar description (e).

As an innkeeper by law is bound to receive the horse of a traveller in case his stable is not full, he has therefore a lien for its keep upon a horse left with him, and received by him in his character as innkeeper (f), whether it be kept in the stable or put out to grass. For the pasture of such persons, set up by law for entertainment, has the same privilege as the stables, and an action of trover cannot be maintained against him for detaining the horse of his guest, unless the money due for its keep has been paid or tendered (g).

An innkeeper cannot detain a guest, or take off his clothes, in order to secure payment of his bill (h).

But he may detain his horse, or may bring an action for lodging, &c., without any special contract (i).

(b) Broadwood v. Granara, 10 Ex. 417.
(c) Sneed v. Watkins, 26 L. J., C. P. 57.
(d) L. R., 10 Q. B. 210; 44 L. J., Q. B. 87; 32 L. T., N. S. 32—Ex. Ch. See also Gordon v. Sliber, 25 Q. B. D. 491; 59 L. J., Q. B. 507; 63 L. T., N. S. 283; 39 W. R. 111, where it was held to extend to the separate property of the wife of the party to whom credit was given.
(g) Smith v. Dearlove, 6 C. B. 135; S. C. 12 Jur. 167.
It has been said that the horse of a guest can be detained only for his own meals, and not for the meals and expenses of the guest (k). But this doctrine was doubtful (l). And in a comparatively recent case (m), the Court of Appeal held, that a chattel although deposited with the innkeeper and placed by him apart from the personal goods of the guest, may be detained by him on account of money owing to him for the lodging, food, and entertainment of the guest.

An innkeeper's right of lien depends upon the fact of the goods coming into his possession in his character of innkeeper, as belonging to a guest (n). So in a case in which a trainer of racehorses went with them to an inn, stayed there for a length of time, and put the horses into training; nothing being said of any special contract between him and the innkeeper, it was held by the Exchequer Chamber that he came there on the ordinary terms of an inn, and that the innkeeper had a lien on the horses for their keep, although they were frequently taken off the premises for days together to attend races (o).

But if a man send his horses and carriage to livery at an inn, and they are so received, the fact of his becoming a guest at a subsequent period does not give the innkeeper any lien (n).

Where several horses are brought to an inn by the same person, each by the custom of London may be sold for his own keep only, and not for the keep of the others; so that if the innkeeper permits the guest to take away all but one, he cannot sell this to pay the expenses of keeping the whole, but must deliver it up on tender of the amount for its own keep (p).

Where a person wrongfully seizes a horse, and takes it to an inn to be kept, the owner cannot have it until he has satisfied the innkeeper for its meat; for the innkeeper is not bound to inquire who is the owner of the property brought to his inn (q). If the innkeeper in such case was to have no lien, Doderidge, J., said, "It were a pretty trick for one who wants keeping for his horse" (r).

(k) Bac. Abridg. Inns and Innkeepers.
(l) See Story on Bailments, 503, 504.
(o) Allen v. Smith, 9 Jur., N. S. 230, 1284; and see Mulliner v. Florence, ubi supra.
(p) Moss v. Townend, 1 Bulst. 207. But see the Innkeepers Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 38), s. 1, post.
(q) Darrell v. Crawley, 18 L. J., Q. B. 155.
(r) Robinson v. Walter, Pop. 127.
But if he knew at the time the horse was left, that the person who brought it was a wrongdoer, and not the owner of it, he has made himself a party to the wrongful act, and has no lien upon the horse for its keep; and the question as to the scienter must be left to the jury (s).

The horse must be placed at the inn by a guest to entitle the innkeeper to detain it for its keep; for where a person was stopped with a horse under suspicious circumstances, and it was left at an inn by the police, it was held that the innkeeper had no lien, and that an auctioneer, by the direction of the innkeeper, selling the horse for its keep, was liable to the owner of the horse in an action of trover (t).

If the innkeeper previously agree to give the guest credit for his entertainment, he cannot detain his horse or goods; or if where there has been no such agreement, he suffer his guest’s horse to depart without payment, or by any other means give credit to the owner, he cannot afterwards detain it for the debt upon its coming again into his possession (u).

If a third party promise the innkeeper to satisfy him for the meat of the horse, in consideration that he will deliver it to the guest, it is a good promise; for there is a good consideration, inasmuch as the innkeeper loses the detainer, which is a damage, and the guest regains the horse, which is the advantage (x).

But where the owner of a horse has fraudulently got possession of it to defeat the lien, the innkeeper may retake it without force, for the lien is not put an end to by his having thus parted with the possession of it (y). But it is held that the innkeeper must make fresh pursuit after it, and retake it, otherwise the custody is lost; for he cannot take it at any other time, as it is in the nature of a distress. But where there is a lien by agreement, it is in the nature of a pledge, and the innkeeper may retake the horse, not only on fresh pursuit, but also wherever he finds it (z).

It has been held that an innkeeper who detains a horse for his keep has a lien upon him for the necessary food supplied when thus in his possession, even if it be given against the express direction of the owner. Thus where the owner of a horse standing at an inn came and directed that

But not if he knew it at the time it was left.

A horse left by the police.

Giving a guest credit.

A third party when answerable.

Horse removed to defeat the lien.

Keep during detention.

(s) Johnson v. Hill, 3 Stark. N. P. C. 172.
(t) Binns v. Pigot, 9 C. & P. 208.
(u) Jones v. Thurloe, 8 Mod. 172.
(v) Jones v. Pearle, 1 Str. 557.
(w) Hutton, 101.
the innkeeper should not give him any more food, as he
would not be responsible for it, and the question was,
whether the owner was chargeable for the food given after
this direction, Chief Justice Holt was at first inclined to
consider this a discharge, and that the horse, though he
might be retained by the innkeeper, was but in the nature of a
distress, and that being in the custody of the innkeeper
in his inn, it was a pound covert, and the horse consequently
ought to be maintained at his peril. However, he afterwards changed his opinion, and directed that this was no
discharge; for then any innkeeper might be deceived, and
his security would be lessened (a). But his first opinion
appears to be consistent with the law (b).

Where an innkeeper detains a horse for its meat he cannot
use it, because he detains it as in the custody of the law,
and the detention is in the nature of a distress, which can-
not be used by the distrainor (c).

An innkeeper could not formerly sell the horse he de-
tained for his meat and so pay himself, because, as the
Court said in Jones v. Thurloe, “he is not to be his own
carver” (d). And even if the horse “eat out the price of its
head,” that is, consume as much as it is worth, he could
not sell it, except he lived in London or Exeter, where by
the custom of those places, if the horse is the property of
the guest, he may take it as his own upon the reasonable
appraisement of four of his neighbours (e).

But now, by the Innkeepers Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict.
c. 38), s. 1, “the landlord, proprietor, keeper, or manager
of any hotel, inn, or licensed public-house shall, in addition
to his ordinary lien, have the right absolutely to sell and
dispose by public auction of any goods, chattels, carriages,
horses, wares, or merchandise which may have been de-
posited with him, or left in the house he keeps, or in the
coach-house, stable, stable-yard, or other premises appur-
tenant or belonging thereunto, where the person depositing
or leaving such goods, chattels, carriages, horses, wares, or

(a) Gelber v. Berkeley, Skin. 648;
and see Scarfe v. Morgan, 4 M. & W. 270.

(b) Co. Litt. 47 b; British Empire
Shipping Co. v. Sones, 28 L. J., Q. B.
220; S. C. 30 L. J., Q. B. 229—
Ex. Ch. See also Scarfe v. Morgan,
4 M. & W. 279, 284.

(c) Westbrook v. Griffith, Moor.
876; Robinson v. Walter, 3 Bulstr.

270; Bac. Abr. tit. Inns and Inn-
keepers.

(d) Jones v. Thurloe, 8 Mod. 172;
S. C., Jones v. Pearle, Str. 556.

(e) Bailey v. Oyster, 1 Vent.
71; Westbrook v. Griffith, Moor.
876; Moss v. Townsend, 1 Bulstr.
207; Robinson v. Walter, 3 Bulstr.
270; Bac. Abr. tit. Inns and Inn-
keepers.
merchandise shall be or become indebted to the said innkeeper either for any board or lodging or for the keep and expenses of any horse or other animals left with or standing at livery in the stables or fields occupied by such innkeeper.

"Provided that no such sale shall be made until after the said goods, chattels, carriages, horses, wares, or merchandise shall have been for the space of six weeks in such charge or custody or in or upon such premises without such debt having been paid or satisfied, and that such innkeeper, after having, out of the proceeds of such sale, paid himself the amount of any such debt, together with the costs and expenses of such sale, shall on demand pay to the person depositing or leaving any such goods, chattels, carriages, horses, wares, or merchandise the surplus (if any) remaining after such sale.

"Provided further, that the debt for the payment of which a sale is made shall not be any other or greater debt than the debt for which the goods or other articles could have been retained by the innkeeper under his lien.

"Provided also, that at least one month before any such sale the landlord, proprietor, keeper, or manager shall cause to be inserted in one London newspaper and one country newspaper circulating in the district where such goods, chattels, carriages, horses, wares, or merchandise, or some of them, shall have been deposited or left, an advertisement containing notice of such intended sale, and giving shortly a description of the goods and chattels intended to be sold, together with the name of the owner or person who deposited or left the same, where known."

The lien of an innkeeper over a chattel belonging to a guest is waived, if in order to reimburse himself he sells it, unless under the foregoing enactment, and this rule holds good even although the retention of the chattel is attended with expense (f). But an innkeeper who accepts security from his guest for the payment of his bill does not waive his lien upon the goods of the guest unless there is something in the nature of the security, or in the circumstances under which it was taken, which is inconsistent with the existence or continuance of the lien and, therefore, destructive of it (g).


(g) Angus v. McLachlan, 23 Ch. 330; 52 L. J., Ch. 587; 48 L. T., N. S. 863; 31 W. R. 641.
Under statute 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 59, s. 4, requiring the distrainor of any horse (which word "horse" may by section 21 be construed as "horses") to feed it while in the pound, and empowering him, after seven days, to sell any such horse for the expenses, a party distraining several horses may, by a proper exercise of discretion, sell one or more, for the expense of all. And it would seem that he may repeat such sale from time to time as need requires \((k)\). This statute has been repealed. But its provisions have been substantially re-enacted by 12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, except as to the power of sale. And this was restored by 17 & 18 Vict. c. 60, s. 1.

**Veterinary Surgeon and Farrier.**

Previously to the Veterinary Surgeons Act, 1881, there was no law which applied to veterinary surgeons in particular; and where there was no contract he had to go on a *quantum meruit*. And an usage to charge for attendance, where there was not much medicine required, was held too uncertain \((hh)\).

The Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons was founded in the year 1791, and received a charter of incorporation in the year 1845. By its charter, veterinary surgery is constituted a profession, and the registered members of its body are alone to be recognized as the members of the veterinary profession. Its diploma is granted only to persons who have qualified themselves by a certain educational course tested by examination. In the earlier editions of this work it was suggested that it would be a security to the public against unqualified practitioners, if the legislature were to impose a penalty on persons practising as veterinary surgeons, without possessing a diploma from this or some other duly constituted body. This suggestion is carried out by the Veterinary Surgeons Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 62), which by sections 11, 12, imposes a penalty not exceeding 50\(\)., or imprisonment with or without hard labour, for any term not exceeding twelve months, on any person obtaining registration by false representation, or on the registrar for wilful falsification of the register of veterinary surgeons. The Act, by sections 13, 14, further provides for the registration of colonial or foreign practitioners possessing some recognised diploma; by section 16 imposes a penalty of 20\(\).

on any person falsely representing himself to be a member of the Royal College; and by section 17 imposes a like penalty on any person not possessing the prescribed qualifications who, after December 31st, 1883, "takes or uses . . . any name, title, addition or description stating that he is . . . a practitioner of veterinary surgery, or of any branch thereof, and further incapacitates any such person from recovering any fee for performing any veterinary operation (i).

Where a man takes upon himself a public employment he is bound to serve the public as far as his employment goes, or an action lies against him for refusing. Thus if a farrier refuse to shoe a horse (j), an innkeeper to receive a guest, a carriage to carry, when he may do it, an action lies (k).

But the horse must be brought to be shod at a reasonable time for such purpose; because if brought at an irregular hour, the farrier may say, "I will not do it" (j).

A farrier is liable for laming a horse in shoeing it, and the action is founded on the implied contract, that every workman undertaking any work will perform it properly (l), because it is the duty of every artificer to exercise his art rightly and truly as he ought (m).

And an action may be maintained for a breach of duty, arising out of a contract with a third person. Thus Coke, C.J., puts this case, "If the master sends his servant to pay money for him upon the penalty of a bond, and on his way a smith in shoeing doth prick his horse, and so by reason of this the money is not paid; this being the servant's horse, he shall have an action upon the case for prickings of his horse; and the master also shall have his action upon the case for the special wrong which he hath commending medicines which he kept and advising people in some cases to consult a veterinary surgeon, and described himself in the book as a pharmaceutical and veterinary chemist, it was held that he was not unlawfully using a description implying that he was a veterinary surgeon (Veterinary College v. Green, 57 J. P. 505).

(i) Where a shoeing-smith not possessed of the qualifications specified by section 17 had for the last twenty-five years described his place of business as a "veterinary forge," it was held that these words constituted a description that he was specially qualified to practise a branch of veterinary surgery within the meaning of the section, and that he was, therefore, liable under the section (Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons v. Robinson, [1892] 1 Q. B. 557; 61 L. J., Q. B. 146). But where a chemist published a book dealing with diseases of horses, re-

Farrier cannot refuse to shoe a horse.

When brought at a reasonable time.

Answerable for his own want of skill.

Where a third person is affected.

(j) 14 Hen. 6, 18.

(k) See note (hh), ante.

(l) 2 Chit. Pleading, 6th ed. 262.

(m) Rex v. Kilderby, 1 Saund. 312, n. 2.
When answerable for his servant.

**Action against a farrier for pricking a horse.**

**Collins v. Rodway.**

sustained by the non-payment of his money occasioned by this" (n).

And where a horse has been injured in shoeing from the negligence of a farrier’s servant, the master is liable (o). But not if the wrong be wilful, as if the servant maliciously drives a nail into the horse’s foot in order to lame him (p).

An action lies against a farrier for pricking a horse when shoeing him (q), and where one smith lends a horse to another, and the second pricks him in shoeing, the action lies against the first, or the second, in the option of the owner (r).

The rule of law as to the extent of a farrier’s liability in shoeing a horse, is fully and clearly laid down by Chief Baron Pollock in the case of Collins v. Rodway (s); and as that case does not appear in any of the reports, it will here be given at considerable length. The following is compressed from an exact copy of the shorthand notes which were taken at the trial, and afterwards published in the *Veterinarian*. It was an action brought against the defendant, a farrier, for unskilfulness in the shoeing of two horses sent by the plaintiff to be shod at the defendant’s forge, which he carried on for the purpose of shoeing horses with a shoe for which he had a patent.

The one, a grey mare pony, was sent on the 16th of July, in the evening after working hours, and was shod at the particular request of the plaintiff’s father. On the 17th she was driven with two men in a gig to Barnet, and it was admitted that for three miles she had gone sound. On the 20th the shoes were taken off by the apprentice of Beck, another farrier. On the 21st the defendant received notice of her lameness, and on the 26th, after her feet had been cut about and poulticed, she was reshoed by Beck and afterwards worked. It appeared that subsequently she had been turned out for nine weeks.

The other, a black entire pony, was sent to be shod on the 18th July. On the 21st the shoes were taken off by Beck, and blood was said to have followed the withdrawal of two of the nails. It was admitted that this pony’s feet

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(n) Everard v. Hopkins, 2 Bulstr. 332; and see Longmead v. Holliday, 6 Exch. 764.
(o) 1 Bla. Com. 431; Randleson v. Murray, 8 A. & E. 109.
(p) Jones v. Hart, 2 Salk. 440.
(q) Nut. Brev. 94 d.; 17 Edw. 4, 43; 11 Edw. 4, 6; 56 Edw. 3, 19; 3 Hen. 6, 6; 14 Hen. 6, 83; Orig. 106 a; 48 Edw. 3, 6, pl. 11.
(r) 12 Edw. 4, 13.
(s) Collins v. Rodway, before Pollock, C.B., Guildhall, Dec. 15, 1845; 14 Veterinarian, 102.
were very thin and bad, and his action very high. What was done to this pony did not appear; but he had been under the care of Mr. Field the veterinary surgeon, and was afterwards sold for a small sum at Aldridge's repository some time in October.

At the trial no veterinary surgeons were called to give any information as to the nature of the injury or of the parts injured. And the allegation that the patent shoe was one likely to produce lameness by its application, was withdrawn by the plaintiff's counsel.

The defendant's case rested on two grounds: First, That even supposing the ponies to have been lamed in shoeing, he was not liable because he had brought to the performance of that duty competent skill and reasonable care, and that the plaintiff knowingly brought them to have the patent shoe applied. Secondly, That one pony was lame before it was shod, and the other had not been lamed by the shoeing, but the lameness had arisen from other causes.

In summing up Chief Baron Pollock said to the jury: "The only rule of law that I feel it necessary to lay down upon the subject in this case is, that if this operation has been performed unskilfully and improperly, no doubt the defendant is liable to the plaintiff for any mischief that may have resulted from such unskilfulness; but he is liable only to the extent to which mischief has been produced. The rule I take to be this, that a person employed for any purpose must bring to the subject-matter a reasonable skill and fitness, and he must exercise that reasonable skill and fitness with due and proper care. If he be deficient in the requisite skillfulness, and in consequence of that the operation is performed in a bad and bungling manner, or if, having the requisite skillfulness, he fails to bring it to act, he is liable for any mischief which results from that."

"I need hardly tell you, that an operation of this sort cannot be considered in the light of an insurance. If you apply to a surgeon or a medical man to cure you of any disorder, he is liable if there is any want of skill or proper care; and I observed that one of you asked whether pricking a horse was a frequent accident. I think the answer to that immediate question was, that it was not, at all events, very unfrequent; still it may happen without any great degree of unskilfulness attaching to it. The operation most resembles that of shaving. If a man undertakes to shave another, he would not be responsible for every abrasion of the skin that the barber might make; it
requires a degree of skilfulness and care, and it might be hardly possible to operate upon a certain person without something of that sort taking place: and although an accident may happen, such as in this case, it may be that the foot of the horse was in such a state that it would be difficult to perform the operation of shoeing.”

“Wherever that is the case, you would naturally expect some information given that there were those defects and difficulties, so that the farrier might be made acquainted with the risk he was exposing himself to. You will therefore have to judge whether you think there was any want of skill in the operation of shoeing these horses. I own it appears to me that I think it is impossible to doubt as to the fact that there was an actual pricking.”

“With respect to the man’s skill, he may have done it on this occasion badly, they coming to him at night to insist upon the job being done at an irregular hour; that was partly suggested at one time. I must say it appears to me as a question of law, that it is no excuse. If you go to any place, and call in a surgeon or a farrier, or any person to perform an operation, if the time is inconvenient, and if the light be not sufficient, and if the occasion be not suitable, he is bound to say ‘I will not do it.’ If he does it, he is answerable, unless indeed he distinctly and explicitly says, ‘I do it at your urgent request, but I will not be responsible for the consequences.’ Nothing of that sort appears to have come from him. On the contrary, though there may have been a remonstrance that the man came too late, yet it was done. It appears to me in point of law that if a person, called upon at an unseasonable time, undertakes to do it without declaring he will not be responsible, he does it with the same responsibility as if he did it at any proper time.”

The jury found a verdict for the defendant, and the Court of Exchequer afterwards refused a rule for a new trial, which was applied for on the ground that the verdict was against the evidence.

Under the Police of Towns Act every person who, in any street, to the obstruction, annoyance or danger of the residents, shoes, bleed or farries any horse or animal (except in cases of accident), or cleans, dresses, exercises, trains, or breaks, or turns loose any horse or animal, is liable to a penalty not exceeding 40s. (t).

(t) 10 & 11 Vict. c. 89, s. 28. See also 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, s. 54 (1).
A horse standing at a farrier's to be shod is exempt from distress on the ground of public utility (w).

As a party has a right to go to a farrier's shop by the tacit permission of the law (x), an action of trover does not lie against a farrier for refusing to deliver a horse which he has shod, unless the money due for the shoeing has been paid or tendered (y).

Because the artificer to whom goods are delivered for the purpose of being worked into form,—the farrier by whose skill an animal is cured of a disease,—the horsebreaker by whose skill a horse is rendered manageable, and the man who covers a mare with a stallion, have liens on the chattels in respect of their charges. And all such specific liens, being consistent with the principles of natural equity, are favoured by the law, which is construed liberally in such cases (z).

But the horse can only be kept for work done at that particular time, for the lien does not extend to any previous account; and when this point was decided by the Court of Queen's Bench, Lord Ellenborough said, “Growing liens are always to be looked at with jealousy, as they are encroachments on the common law. If they are encouraged in practice, the farrier will be claiming a lien upon a horse sent to him to be shod. It is not for the convenience of the public that these liens should be extended further than they are already established by law” (a).

In the case of Scarfe v. Morgan (b) a difficulty arose out of the circumstance that a living chattel might become expensive to the detainer, and would raise the question as to who was liable to feed it intermediately. But this difficulty was answered by referring to the analogous case of a distress kept in a pound covert, where he who distrains is compellable to take reasonable care of the chattel distrained, whether living or inanimate; and to the case of a lien upon corn, which requires some labour and expense in the proper custody of it (c).

(w) Francis v. Wyatt, 3 Burr. 1502, and the authorities there cited.
(x) Lane v. Cotton, 1 Salk. 18.
(y) Bac. Abr. Trover (B.) 516.
(a) Rushforth v. Hadfield, 7 East, 229; 8 R. R. 520.
(b) Scarfe v. Morgan, 4 M. & W. 280.
(c) See ante, p. 209; 12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, and 17 & 18 Vict. c. 60, s. 1; also ante, p. 212; British Empire Shipping Co. v. Somes, 28 L. J., Q. B. 220—Ex. Ch.
Horsebreaker, Trainer, &c.

A horsebreaker is liable for any damage which through his negligence may happen to the horse he is breaking. Thus an action on the case was brought, and damages recovered against the defendant, to whose charge a mare had been committed, "to be taught to pace" (d).

The horsebreaker, by whose skill the horse is rendered manageable, has a lien upon him in respect of his charges; and such lien being consistent with the principles of natural equity, is favoured by the law, which in such case is construed liberally (e).

It was for a long time doubtful whether in any case a trainer had a lien for the keep and exercise of a racehorse sent to him to be trained; unless perhaps it was delivered to be trained for the purpose of running a specified race (f). In Bevan v. Waters (g) he was held to have a lien; and the question also arose in Jacobs v. Latour (h), but the case was decided on another point. The doubt seemed to be whether in the contract for training there was a stipulation for the re-delivery of the horse trained for the purpose of racing. And in a later case Mr. Baron Alderson said, "It may be very doubtful whether a trainer would not be considered to be in the situation of a livery-stable keeper, if by the contract he is to allow the owner to run the horse" (i). Mr. Baron Parke, shortly afterwards in another case, said, "As to the case of the training groom it is not necessary to say anything, as it has not been formerly decided; for in Jacobs v. Latour (h) the point was left undetermined. It is true there is a nisi prius decision of Best, C.J., in Bevan v. Waters (f), that the trainer would have a lien, on the ground of his having expended labour and skill in bringing the animal into condition to run at races; but it does not appear to have been present to the mind of the Judge, nor was the usage of training to that effect explained to him, that when horses are delivered for that purpose the owner has always a right during the continuance of the process to take the animal away for the purpose of running races for

(d) Lib. Plac. 25.
(e) Scarfe v. Morgan, 4 M. & W. 276.
(f) See Jackson v. Cummins, 5 M. & W. 350.
(g) Bevan v. Waters, 3 C. & P. 520. See also Sanderson v. Bell, 2 C. & M. 304.
(h) Jacobs v. Latour, 2 M. & P. 205.
(i) Scarfe v. Morgan, 4 M. & W. 276.
(j) Bevan v. Waters, 3 C. & P. 520.
plates elsewhere. The right of lien, therefore, must be
subservient to this general right which overrules it; so that
I doubt if that doctrine would apply where the animal
delivered was a racehorse, as that case differs much from
the ordinary case of training. I do not say that the case of
Bevan v. Waters (k) was wrongly decided; I only doubt if
it extends to the case of a racehorse, unless perhaps he was
delivered to the groom to be trained for the purpose of
running a specified race, when of course these observations
would not apply” (l).

It has, however, been decided in a later case, that the
labour and skill employed on a racehorse by a trainer are
a good foundation for a lien (m). But if by usage or
contract the owner may send the horse to run at any
race he chooses, and may select the jockey, the trainer
has no continuing right of possession and consequently
no lien (m).

The owner of a stallion is entitled to a specific lien on
the mare, in respect of his charge for covering her. Thus
in the following case S. sent a mare to M., a farmer, to
be covered by a stallion belonging to him, and the mare
was taken to M.'s stables and covered accordingly upon
a Sunday. However, the charge for covering not being
paid, M. detained the mare, and on a demand of her
being afterwards made, M. refused to deliver her, claiming
a lien not only for the charge on that occasion, but for a
general balance due to him on another account. It was
held that M. was entitled to a specific lien on the mare
for the charge of covering her, and that the claim made
by M. to retain the mare for the general balance was not
a waiver of his lien for the charge on the particular occa-
sion, and did not dispense with the necessity of a tender
of that sum (n).

It was also decided that such a contract was not void
within 29 Car. 2, c. 7, s. 1, on the ground of its having
been made and executed on a Sunday, but that even if it
were void the contract having been executed the lien
attached. And Mr. Baron Parke said, “We are of
opinion that this is not a case within the statute 29 Car.
2, c. 7, which only had in its contemplation the case of

(k) Bevan v. Waters, 3 C. & P. 520.
(m) Forth v. Simpson, 13 Q. B. 680; 18 L. J., Q. B. 266; see also
(n) Searf v. Morgan, 4 M. & W. 270.
persons exercising trades, &c. on that day, and not one like the present, where the defendant, in the ordinary calling of a farmer, happens to be in possession of a stallion occasionally covering mares; that does not appear to me to be exercising any trade, or to be the case of a person practising his ordinary calling” (o).

(o) Scarfe v. Morgan, 4 M. & W. 270.
CHAPTER XI.

LIVERY-STABLE KEEPERS, AGISTERS, AND THE HIRING AND BORROWING HORSES.

Livery-stable Keeper.

A livery-stable keeper, who is not an innkeeper, has no privilege himself, and none can be claimed under him; he must therefore rest on his own agreement (a). But he is not liable to the inconveniences to which innkeepers are subject, such as taking out licenses, &c.; and he is not bound to have soldiers quartered upon him (b).

But if a horse in his keeping be lost or stolen, he is liable where the horse is lost. Horse at livery distrainable for rent (c).

A person should satisfy himself of the credit and solvency of the livery-stable keeper, to whom he proposes to entrust his horse; because horses and carriages standing at livery are distrainable for rent (c).

But the case of a horse sent to a livery-stable merely to be cleaned and fed, is very different from one, where he is sent to remain during the owner's pleasure, the feeding and grooming being only incidental to the principal object (d).

In the case of Parsons v. Gingell (e), the following distinction was taken by Chief Justice Wilde: "If the goods are sent to the premises for the purpose of being dealt with in the way of the party's trade, and are to remain upon the premises until that purpose is answered, and no longer, the case falls within one class; but if they are sent for the purpose of remaining there merely at the

(a) Yelv. 66; Chapman v. Allen, Cro. Car. 271; Yorke v. Greenough, 2 Ld. Raym. 687; S. C. 1 Salk. 388; Gelly v. Clerk, Cro. Jac. 188.
(b) Parkhurst v. Foster, 1 Salk. 387; Barnard v. How, 1 C. & P. 366.
(d) See per Wilde, C. J., Parsons v. Gingell, 4 C. B. 558.
(e) Parsons v. Gingell, 4 C. B.
will of the owner, there being no work to be done upon them, it falls within a totally different consideration.

A livery-stable keeper cannot detain a horse for his keep as an innkeeper may, because he is not bound to take it, much less can he detain, or be bound to take a carriage without horses (f).

But he may have a lien by special agreement, as where a mare was placed with a livery-stable keeper, who advanced money to her owner, and it was agreed that she should remain as a security for the repayment of the sum advanced, and for the expenses of her keep, the livery-stable keeper was held to have a lien on her for the amount due (g).

And if he have such lien by agreement, and the owner of the horse fraudulently take it out of his possession to defeat the lien, the livery-stable keeper may retake it without force, for the lien is not put an end to by his having parted with the possession under such circumstances (h).

A livery-stable keeper has no lien on a horse for money expended by him on the horse at the request of the owner. Thus in a case in which a livery-stable keeper had employed a veterinary surgeon at the request of the owner to blister a horse standing at livery with him for splints, and had actually paid the bill, it was held that he had no right to detain the horse for the amount of this bill, inasmuch as the veterinary surgeon had no lien for his bill, nor the livery-stable keeper for his keep; and inasmuch as there is no rule of law, which gives a livery-stable keeper a lien for money expended upon a horse standing at livery at the request of the owner (i).

Where a livery-stable keeper brings an action for a horse's keep, money received by him as the price of the horse, but afterwards returned on the rescission of a contract of sale, cannot be set off against him by the defendant. Thus, the plaintiff, a livery-stable keeper, sold for the defendant a horse and received the price. The purchaser afterwards rescinded the contract on the ground of fraud, and was repaid the purchase-money. In an action by the plaintiff


(g) Donatty v. Crowder, 11 Moore, 479.


(i) Orchard v. Rackstraw, 9 C. B. 698.
for the keep of the horse, it was held that the defendant could not set off the price as money received for his use, it having ceased to be so when the contract was defeated by the purchaser, although the defendant was ignorant of the fraud (k).

A livery-stable keeper who undertakes for reward to receive a horse or carriage and lodge it in a stable or coach-house, is bound to take reasonable care (l). The obligation to take reasonable care of the thing entrusted to a bailee of this class, involves in it an obligation to take reasonable care that any building in which it is deposited is in a proper state, so that the thing deposited may be reasonably safe in it; but no warranty or obligation is to be implied by law on his part that the building is absolutely safe. The fact that the building has been erected by the livery-stable keeper on his own ground makes no difference to his liability (m).

In Searle v. Laverick (n), the plaintiff brought his horses and two carriages to the defendant, a livery-stable keeper; the carriages were placed under a shed on his premises, a charge being made by him in respect of each. The shed had just been erected, the upper part still being in the hands of workmen. The defendant had employed a builder to erect the shed for him as an independent contractor, not as his servant, and he was a competent and proper person to employ. The shed was blown down by a high wind, the defendant being ignorant of any defect in it, and the carriages were injured, upon which the plaintiff brought an action against him. At the trial, the above facts having been admitted, the judge rejected evidence to prove that the fall of the shed was owing to its being unskilfully built through the negligence of the contractor and his men; and he nonsuited the plaintiff, ruling that the defendant's liability was that of an ordinary bailee for hire, and that he was only bound to take ordinary care in the keeping of the carriages, and that if he had exercised in the employment of the builder such care as an ordinary careful man would use, he was not liable for damage caused by the carelessness of the builder, of which the defendant had no notice. And this nonsuit and ruling were held right.

(k) Murray v. Mann, 2 Ex. 538.  
(m) Ibid.  
(n) Ibid.
An action against a livery-stable keeper for not taking due and proper care of a horse of the plaintiff's, whereby damage resulted, is founded on contract, and not in tort, and thus differs from an action against a farrier, who shoes a horse negligently, and so commits a breach of a common law duty. Therefore, where less than 20l. is recovered against a livery-stable keeper, the plaintiff is deprived of costs by the County Courts Act, 1888, s. 116, unless the judge certifies that there was sufficient reason for bringing the action in the High Court (o).

**Agister.**

An agister has such a possession that he may maintain trespass against a person who has taken away any horse or cattle left with him to be agisted (p). He may also maintain an action of trover for horses or other cattle during their agistment (q). If a horse so left be sold by him, it is no larceny (r); and if it be stolen, and the thief prosecuted, the property may be laid as his (s).

A person who takes in horses to agist does not, like an innkeeper, insure their safety. He is obliged to use reasonable care, but is not answerable for the wantonness or mischief of others. For if a horse has been taken from his premises, or has been lost by accident, against which he could not guard, he is not responsible (t).

A person who takes horses to agist is answerable, either if a particular negligence be proved, through which the horse was lost, or if, in ignorance of the special circumstances of the case, there be gross general negligence, to which the loss may reasonably be ascribed (v).

For instance, if cattle be agisted, and the agister leaves the gates of his field open, he uses less than ordinary diligence; and if the cattle stray out and are stolen, he must make good the loss (v).

Where an action was brought for the breach of a contract

(o) Legge v. Tucker, 1 H. & N. 500; 26 L. J., Ex., 71, decided under 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61, s. 11.  
(q) Clarke v. Roe, 4 Tr. C. L. Rep. 7.  
(r) Rex v. Smith, 1 Mood. C. C. 473.  
(s) Woodward's case, 2 East's P. C. 653.  
(t) Broadwater v. Blot, Holt, 547.  
(u) Ibid.  
of agistment of a mare to be agisted in a field which was separated by a wire fence from another field in the occupation of a cricket club; and it was alleged that, owing to the negligence of the agister's servant in leaving open a gate between the two fields, the mare had escaped from the field in which she was placed into the cricket field, whereupon certain members of the club endeavoured in a careful and proper manner to drive her back through the gate; but the mare refused to go through the gate, and having run against the wire fence fell over it, and was injured by one of the iron standards. It was held that the injury to the mare was the natural consequence of the gate having been left open, and that the agister was liable.  

So, too, if the fences were in an improper state when the horse was taken in to agist, or if the party taking it in, did not apply that care and diligence to its custody, even though it be taken in gratuitously (x), which the owner had a right to expect (x); as where, from not properly fencing a pond, the horse stuck in the mud and died, the agister is answerable for such negligence (y). But where a horse fell through some rotten boards into a cesspool and was injured, it was doubted by Willes, J., whether the defendant was liable (z).

In the case of Gaunt v. Smith (a), tried before Pollock, C.B., which was an action brought against an agister for negligence in the care of the plaintiff's pony, which was kicked and damaged during its agistment by a horse, whose shoes had not been taken off, there being no evidence that the defendant knew the horse to be vicious, the plaintiff was nonsuited. But it must not be supposed from this ruling that the doctrine of scienter has any application to an alleged breach of contract of agistment, except, perhaps, in so far as the knowledge of the agister of the ferocious character of the animal causing the injury may be evidence of negligence; for the contract of agistment is a contract to take reasonable care, and he is, therefore, not exempt

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(z) Rooth v. Wilson, 1 B. & Ald. 59; 18 R. R. 431.
(y) Poyey v. Purnell, before Chief Justice Jervis, C. P., N. P., Dec. 6, 1853. And see Groucott v. Williams, 32 L. J., Q. B. 237, in which it was held that injury done to a horse when grazing in a field, by falling down a shaft, which was improperly fenced by the defendants, who were in occupation of the minerals under the field, was actionable.
from liability merely on the ground that he did not know that the animal causing the injury was ferocious. This statement would appear to be fully justified by the decision of the Queen's Bench Division in the case of Smith v. Cook (b), the facts of which were as follows:—An agister of cattle placed a horse in a field with a number of heifers, knowing that a bull, kept on adjoining land, had several times been found in the adjoining field, and there was no sufficient fence to keep it out. He did not, however, know that the bull was of a mischievous disposition. The horse was gored by the bull and killed; and in an action by the owner of the horse against the agister for breach of contract to take reasonable care, the jury found for the plaintiff. It was held that the fact that the agister had no knowledge of the mischievous disposition of the particular bull was no ground for disturbing the verdict, as such knowledge was not essential to his liability under his contract as an agister to take reasonable care of the horse.

It is only just, that if A. send his horse to B. to be kept for him at grass for a certain time, B. should be answerable to him, if the horse when returned appear in worse condition than horses usually are under such circumstances, unless B. show that the horse has been in a good pasture, and therefore that the falling off must have arisen from some fault in his constitution. But were B. to agree to take in A.'s horse as one of ten to graze on a certain field, in that case B. would not be answerable, if A.'s horse fell off in condition in consequence of the field being eaten bare.

It will be seen by a comparatively modern case that on a demise of land or the vesture of land (as the eatage of a field) for a specific term at a certain rent, there is no implied obligation on the part of the lessor that it shall be fit for the purpose for which it is taken. Therefore, where A. had agreed in writing to take the eatage of twenty-four acres of land from B. for seven months, at a rent of 40%, and then stocked the land with beasts, several of which died a few days afterwards, from the effect of a poisonous substance, which had accidentally been spread over the field without B.'s knowledge among some manure; the Court of Exchequer held that A. was not entitled on that account to throw up the land, but continued liable for the whole rent. Mr. Baron Parke saying, in the course of the argu-

(b) 1 Q. B. D. 79; 45 L. J., Q. B. 122; 33 L. T., N. S. 722.
ment, "It comes simply to the question, whether there is an implied undertaking that the grass shall be fit for the eatage of cattle; if there is, cadit quastio; if not, the plaintiff has performed his engagement, and the defendant has had all he bargained for, namely, a demise of the eatage for six months, and must pay for all" (c).

If a man take in horses, kine or other cattle to depasture, on a contract at so much a head per week, he cannot detain them for the value of the agistment, unless there is a special agreement to that effect (d). And the law on this subject was laid down and explained in the case of Jackson v. Cummins (e), in which Mr. Baron Parke said, "I think that by the common law no lien exists in the case of agistment. The general rule as laid down by Best, C.J., in Bevan v. Waters (f), and by this Court in Scarfe v. Morgan (g), is, that by the general law, in the absence of any special agreement, whenever a party has expended labour and skill in the improvement of a chattel bailed to him, he has a lien upon it. Now, the case of agistment does not fall within that principle, inasmuch as the agister does not confer any additional value on the article either by the exertion of any skill of his own, or indirectly by means of any instrument in his possession, as was the case with the stallion in Scarfe v. Morgan (g); he simply takes in the animal to feed it. In addition to which we have the express authority of Chapman v. Allen (h), that an agister has no lien; and although possibly that case may have been decided on the special ground that there had been an agreement between the parties, or a conversion of the animal had taken place, still it is also quite possible that it might have proceeded on the more general principle that no lien can exist in the case of agistment; and it was so understood in this Court in Judson v. Ethridge (i). The analogy also of the case of the livery-stable keeper who has no lien by law, furnishes an additional reason why none can exist here; for this is a case of an agistment of milch cows, and from the very nature of the subject-matter, the owner is to have possession of them during the time of

Agister has no lien.

(c) Sutton v. Temple, 12 M. & W. 60.
(e) Jackson v. Cummins, 5 M. & W. 342.
(f) Bevan v. Waters, 3 C. & P. 520; M. & M. 236.
(g) Scarfe v. Morgan, 4 M. & W. 283; 1 Horn & Hurl. 292.
(i) Judson v. Ethridge, 1 Cr. & M. 743.
milking; which establishes that it was not intended that
the agister was to have the entire possession of the thing
bailed; and there is nothing to show that the owner might
not for that purpose have taken the animals out of the field
wherein they were grazing if he had thought proper so to
do. This claim of lien is therefore inconsistent with the
necessary enjoyment of the property by the owner."

But where there is a special agreement, there may of
course be a lien (j). Thus the plaintiff having a cow at
grass in defendant's field, and being indebted for the
agistment, agreed with him that the cow should be security;
that he would not remove her till the defendant was paid,
and that, if he did, the defendant might take her where she
might be, and keep her till he was paid. The plaintiff
removed the cow without having paid the debt, and the
defendant seized her on the high road. In an action of
trespass for the taking, it was held that the agreement might
be set up as a defence under a plea that the cow was not
the plaintiff's (j).

In Re Woodward, Ex parte Huggins (k), H. placed certain
stock upon the lands of W. upon an agreement whereby the
stock remained the property of H., who, at the end of a
certain period, was to sell the stock; and, after deducting
the original price and a percentage for profit, to hand over
the balance to W. During the continuance of the agree-
ment W. became bankrupt, and the trustee claimed the
stock in question as being within the reputed ownership of
the bankrupt. It was held that the custom of agistment
was notorious, and that being the case, that no reputation
of ownership could arise in the case of stock on the lands of
a farmer.

Horses and cattle put into a close to be agisted are liable
at common law to be taken in distress by the landlord, the
general rule being that all things on the land are distrain-
able for rent in arrear (l).

Horses or cattle driven to a distant market, and put into
land to rest for one night, cannot be distrained for rent by
the owner of the land, such protection being absolutely
necessary for the public interests (m).

Thus it was held in the Irish Court of Queen's Bench,

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*(j) Richards v. Symons, 8 Q. B. 90.*

*(k) 54 L. T., N. S. 683.*


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that certain cattle belonging to a drover on their way to a market for the purpose of being sold there, and put to graze for one night, immediately before the morning on which the market was to take place, were privileged from distress by the landlord, for rent due to him out of the place in which they fed (n).

The settled distinction seems to be, that where a stranger's cattle escape into another's land by breaking the fences, where there is no defect in them, or if the tenant of the land where the distress is taken is not bound to repair the fences, though there is a defect in them, the cattle may be distrained for rent whether they are levant et couchant or not. If, however, the cattle escape through the defect of fences which the tenant of the land is bound to repair, they cannot be distrained by the landlord for rent, though they have been levant et couchant, unless the owner of the cattle, after notice that they were on the land, neglects or refuses to drive them away (o).

But live stock agisted on a holding to which the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 61), applies, enjoy a limited privilege from distress by virtue of section 45 of that Act, which enacts as follows:—

"Where live stock belonging to another person has been taken in by the tenant of a holding to which this Act applies to be fed at a fair price agreed to be paid for such feeding by the owner of such stock to the tenant, such stock shall not be distrained by the landlord for rent where there is other sufficient distress to be found, and if so distrained by reason of other sufficient distress not being found, there shall not be recovered by such distress a sum exceeding the amount of the price so agreed to be paid for the feeding, or if any part of such price has been paid exceeding the amount remaining unpaid, and it shall be lawful for the owner of such stock, at any time before it is sold, to redeem such stock by paying to the distrainer a sum equal to such price as aforesaid, and any payment so made to the distrainer shall be in full discharge as against the tenant of any sum of the like amount which would be otherwise due from the owner of the stock to the tenant in respect of the price of feeding: Provided always, that so long as any portion of such live stock shall remain on the said holding

(n) Nugent v. Kirwan, 1 Jeff & Symes, 97 (Q. B. Ir.).
(o) Poole v. Longueville, 2 Wms.
the right to distrain such portion shall continue to the full extent of the price originally agreed to be paid for the feeding of the whole of such live stock, or if part of such price has been bonâ fide paid to the tenant under the agreement, then to the full extent of the price then remaining unpaid."

Live stock agisted for a fair equivalent is within this section, as taken in to be fed at a "fair price," and may, therefore, be exempt from distress, even although such equivalent be not money. Therefore, where cows were agisted on the terms "milk for meat," i.e., that the agister should take their milk in exchange for their pasturage, it was held that the agistment was within the Act (p). But otherwise, where cattle were distrained on a holding pursuant to an agreement by which the tenant, in consideration of 2l., allowed the owner "the exclusive right to feed the grass on the land for four weeks," as there the tenant did not agree to "take in" or to "feed" the cattle, and the sum he was to receive was not the "price" of the feed of the cattle, but a payment in the nature of rent for use and occupation (q).

By section 46 it is enacted that "where any dispute arises—

(a) in respect of any distress having been levied contrary to the provisions of this Act; or

(b) as to the ownership of any live stock distrained, or as to the price to be paid for the feeding of such stock; or

(c) as to any other matter or thing relating to a distress on a holding to which this act applies: such dispute may be heard and determined by the County Court or by a Court of Summary Jurisdiction, and any such County Court or Court of Summary Jurisdiction may make an order for restoration of any live stock or things unlawfully distrained, or may declare the price agreed to be paid in the case where the price of the feeding is required to be ascertained, or may make any other order which justice requires: any such dispute as mentioned in this section shall be deemed to be a matter in which a Court of Summary Jurisdiction has authority by law to make an order on complaint in pursuance of the Summary Jurisdiction Acts; but any person aggrieved by any decision of such Court of Summary Jurisdiction under this section may, on

(q) Masters v. Green, 20 Q. B. D. 568.
giving such security to the other party as the Court may think just, appeal to a Court of General or Quarter Sessions.

Hiring Horses.

Letting for hire is a bailment of a thing to be used by the hiver, for a compensation in money (r).

If a horse or carriage be let out for hire for the purpose of performing a particular journey, the party letting warrants that the horse or carriage, as it may be, is fit and proper and competent for such journey (s).

The fact that the defendant has taken all reasonable and proper care to provide a fit and proper carriage is not sufficient; it is his duty to supply a carriage as fit for the purpose for which it was hired as care and skill can render it, and this was so held in the recent case of Hyman v. Nye (t), in which the point was very fully discussed. In that case the plaintiff hired from the defendant, a jobmaster, for a specified journey a carriage, a pair of horses, and a driver. During the journey a bolt in the underpart of the carriage broke, the splinter bar became displaced, the horses started off, the carriage was upset, and the plaintiff injured. In an action against the defendant for negligence, the jury were directed that, if in their opinion the defendant took all reasonable care to provide a fit and proper carriage, their verdict ought to be for him. The jury found a verdict for the defendant, and in particular that the carriage was reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was hired, and that the defect in the bolt could not have been discovered by the defendant by ordinary care and attention. A rule having been obtained, calling upon the defendant to show cause why there should not be a new trial on the ground of misdirection, and that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, Lindley, J., in the course of his judgment said, "A careful study of [the] authorities leads me to the conclusion that the learned judge at the trial put the duty of the defendant too low. A person who lets out carriages is not, in my opinion, responsible for all defects, discoverable or not; he is not an insurer against all defects; nor is he bound to take more care than coach proprietors, or railway companies who provide carriages for the public.

Letting for hire.
Warranty of fitness for journey.

Hyman v. Nye.

(r) Jones on Bailments, 118.  
(s) Per Pollock, C.B., Chew v. Jones, 10 L. T. 231.  
to travel in; but, in my opinion, he is bound to take as much care as they; and although not an insurer against all defects, he is an insurer against all defects which care and skill can guard against. His duty appears to me to be to supply a carriage as fit for the purpose for which it is hired as care and skill can render it; and if whilst the carriage is being properly used for such purpose it breaks down, it becomes incumbent on the person who has let it out to show that the breakdown was in the proper sense of the word an accident, and not preventible by any care or skill. If he can prove this, as the defendant did in Christie v. Griggs (v), and as the railway company did in Readhead v. Midland Rail. Co. (w), he will not be liable; but no proof short of this will exonerate him. Nor does it appear to me to be at all unreasonable to exact such vigilance from a person who makes it his business to let out carriages for hire. As between him and the hirer the risk of defects in the carriage, so far as skill and care can avoid them, ought to be thrown on the owner of the carriage. The hirer trusts him to supply a fit and proper carriage; the lender has it in his power not only to see that it is in a proper state, and to keep it so, and thus to protect himself from risk, but also to charge his customers enough to cover his expenses.

"Such being, in my opinion, the law applicable to the case, it follows that the direction given to the jury did not go far enough, and that it was not sufficient, in order to exonerate the defendant from liability, for him to prove that he did not know of any defect in the bolt, had no reason to suppose it was weak, and could not see that it was by an ordinary inspection of the carriage. It further follows that, in my opinion, the evidence was not such as to warrant the finding that the carriage was in a fit and proper state when it left the defendant's yard." And Mathew, J., coming to the same conclusion, a new trial was ordered accordingly.

A person who, on hiring a carriage, looks at it merely to test its capacity to hold a certain number of persons, does not by so doing, select it so as thereby to relieve the party letting it to hire from liability with respect to its safety (w). The question whether the owner would be relieved from

(v) 2 Camp. 80; 11 R. R. 666.  (v) Jones v. Page, 15 L. T., N. S.
liability if the hirer had selected the carriage after examining it with a view to ascertain its fitness, does not appear to have been decided, but it is clear that he would be so relieved if the hirer had selected it, notwithstanding the existence of patent defects.

Even if a particular horse has been selected out of the owner's stables, it makes no difference, as it must be supposed that all are fit for their work (x).

But if a horse is hired for one purpose, and is used for another, and the horse when thus used is injured, the hirer is liable for the damage thus occasioned. Accordingly where a horse was hired as a lady's riding horse, the hirer was held to be liable for damage occasioned when trying him in harness (y).

In contracts reciprocally beneficial to both parties, such as hiring, &c., such care is exacted, as every prudent man commonly takes of his own goods; and by consequence the hirer is answerable for ordinary neglect (z). If therefore a man so treat and manage his hired horse as any prudent man would act towards his own horse, he is not answerable for any damage the horse may receive (a).

If a hired horse is injured owing to the negligence of the hirer's servant, the hirer will be liable to make good the damage to the owner. Thus where the coachman of the hirer of a horse and carriage instead of taking them, as was his duty, to the stable, drove for his own purposes in another direction, and while he was thus engaged the horse and carriage were injured, owing to his negligent driving; it was held that there had been a breach of the hirer's contract as bailee, for which he was liable (b).

Where the plaintiff declared that, at the defendant's request, he delivered a mare to the defendant to be prudently ridden, and the defendant injured her, it was held that he might plead his infancy in bar, as the action was founded on a contract (c).

But where it is clear, from the statement of claim, the whole of which must be looked at in order to see whether the action is substantially founded in tort or in contract, that the plaintiff claims damages for a tort; and that in

Where a particular horse is selected.

But a horse should not be used for a purpose other than that for which it was hired.

What care is required.

Liability of hirer for negligence of servant.

Infancy good defence to an action on contract.

Secus where action founded in tort.

(z) Jones on Bailments, 25.

(a) Cooper v. Burton, 3 Camp., 5 n.; 13 R. R. 736.
(b) Coupe Co. v. Maddick, [1891] 2 Q. B. 413; 60 L. J., Q. B. 676.
(c) Jennings v. Rundall, 8 D. & R. 335.
In addition to breaking the contract, the defendant by driving the horse at an excessive speed, and unduly flogging and otherwise illtreating and negligently and carelessly using him, has committed a separate and independent wrong apart from the contract, he will be liable for that wrong in the action, and the plea of infancy will afford no defence (d).

A hirer is answerable at all events, if he keep the thing hired, after the stipulated time, or use it differently from his agreement (e).

If a man hire a horse to go from A. to B., he ought to go by the usual road, and should not unnecessarily deviate from the usual and customary way. And if he make a material deviation, and any damage ensues, he would appear to be liable for it at all events (f).

Where there has been no material deviation, and the horse has not been kept after any stipulated time, there must be positive proof of negligence, to fix the hirer. For instance, if an action is brought against him for using a hired horse so negligently that it broke its knees, it will not be sufficient for the plaintiff merely to show that the horse was a good horse, and not in the habit of falling (g).

If the horse falls lame on the journey, the hirer may abandon him at any place where he turns out unfit, and give notice of that fact to the party letting him out, whose duty it is to send for him (h).

Where the strength of a horse which has been hired or borrowed is exhausted, and it has refused its feed, the hirer or borrower has no right to pursue his journey with it. This was so held in Bray v. Mayne (i), where a person had a horse on trial for some days on condition that he should pay 10l. for its hire if he did not like it. The horse at that time had a slight cold, but on the last day of trial, after the horse had been driven twenty miles, it was discovered that there was a swelling under its throat and it refused its feed. The defendant, however, drove it on to London, which was about twelve miles further, notwithstanding that it was much distressed during part of the journey; and when brought to the plaintiff’s

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(e) Jones on Bailments, 121.
(f) See Davis v. Barrett, 6 Bing. 716.
(g) Cooper v. Burton, 3 Camp.
(h) Per Pollock, C.B., Chew v. Jones, 10 L. T., Ex. 231.
(i) Bray v. Mayne, 1 Gow, 1; 21 R. R. 786.
stables, it was in much worse condition than when delivered.

A veterinary surgeon in his evidence said that he considered it a want of proper care and attention to compel a horse to pursue his journey after it had been driven twenty miles, and had then refused its feed; and Chief Justice Dallas directed the jury accordingly (k).

His Lordship also held that the defendant was not entitled to return the horse on payment of 10l., because as the horse, on being returned, was in a worse state than when originally delivered, the condition on which it was delivered had not been fulfilled (k).

If a hired horse is taken sick on the journey agreed upon, without the fault of the hirer, its cure is at the expense of the owner (l).

But if the hirer prescribes medicines for it, he is answerable for any improper treatment, but not if he call in a farrier. Thus, where a horse had been hired of the plaintiff by the defendant, who, on the horse having been taken ill, prescribed improper medicines for it, and the horse died, Lord Ellenborough said, "Had the defendant called in a farrier, he would not have been answerable for the medicines the latter might have administered; but when he prescribes himself, he assumes a new degree of responsibility; and prescribing so improperly, I think he did not exercise that degree of care which might be expected from a prudent man towards his horse, and was in consequence guilty of a breach of the implied undertaking he entered into when he hired the horse from the plaintiff (m).

Pothier says, that where a horse is let to one on hire, to be kept by him for a certain period, the hirer is to pay for his shoeing during that time. But that it is otherwise, if a person lets his coach and horses to another for a journey, to be driven by his own servants (n).

A bailee of goods for hire, by selling them determines the bailment, and the bailor may maintain trover against the purchaser, though the purchase was bona fide (o). Thus, where a person hired a horse and sold it to a third party, it was held by Mr. Justice Bosanquet that the owner might recover its value from the purchaser, although he

Where the horse refuses its feed.

Where the horse is returned in worse condition.

Expenses of curing sick horse.

Who must pay for shoeing.

Bailment determined by selling the goods.

(k) Ibid.

(l) Pothier, Louage, p. 129; Story on Bailments, 258.

(m) Dean v. Keate, 3 Camp. 4; 13

(n) See Pothier, Louage, pp. 107, 129; Story on Bailments, 258.

(o) Cooper v. Willomatt, 1 C. B. 672.
had acted bona fide, and had given the hirer the full value for it, as the hirer could give him no better title than he got himself (p).

If through the hirer’s negligence, as by leaving the door of his stable open at night, the horse be stolen, he must answer for it; but not if he be robbed of it by highwaymen, unless by his imprudence he gave occasion to the robbery, as by travelling at unusual hours, or by taking an unusual road. The hirer is liable in the same way for the negligence of his servant when acting under his directions either express or implied (q).

If a person gets a horse out of the possession of the owner under the pretence of hiring it, and then go and offer it for sale, there will be no felony at common law until the sale is actually effected. In the following case the prisoner was indicted for stealing a horse and gig which he had hired of a livery-stable keeper in Stratford Mews, near Manchester Square, London. It appeared that he drove it off for some distance, and offered it for sale at a small price to an innkeeper, who, under pretence of getting him the money, procured a constable and gave him into custody (r).

On the trial Pear’s case (s), Charlewood’s case (t) and Semple’s case (u) were referred to, and the following passage from the latter quoted:—“But, on the other hand, if the hiring was only a pretence made use of to get the chaise out of the possession of the owner, without any intention to restore it, or pay for it, in that case the law supposes the possession still to reside with the owner, though the property itself has gone out of his hands, and then the subsequent conversion will be the felony.”

And Chief Justice Tindal said, “This case comes near to many of those which have decided that the appropriation of property, under circumstances in some degree similar to the present, amounts to larceny. However, there has been no actual conversion of the property, but only an offer to sell; therefore the prisoner must be acquitted (x).

If the owner parts with the possession of a horse for a

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(p) Shelly v. Ford, 5 C. & P. 313. See also Marner v. Banks, 17 L. T., N. S. 147; 16 W. R. 62; and see Stolen Horses, ante, Chap. III.
(q) Jones on Bailments, 88.
(s) Pear’s case, 1 Leach, 212.
(t) Charlewood’s case, 1 Leach, 409.
(u) Semple’s case, 1 Leach, 420.
Hiring Horses.

special purpose, and the bailee, when that purpose is executed, neglects to return it, and afterwards disposes of it; if he had not a felonious intention when he originally took it, his subsequent withholding and disposing of it will not, at common law, constitute a new felonious taking, or make him guilty of felony (y).

But these questions will not now arise in cases of the kind just referred to, as by 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 3, the fraudulent appropriation of property by bailees is declared to be larceny, and may be the subject of an indictment for larceny.

Of course a person is liable to pay for horses used by himself and hired on his behalf by his servant. Thus, if a coachman go in his master’s livery, and hire horses which his master uses, the master will be bound to pay for the hire of the horses, though he has agreed with the coachman that he will pay him a large salary to provide horses, unless the person letting the horses had some notice that the coachman hired them on his own account, and not for his master (z); for wherever one of two innocent persons must suffer by the acts of a third, he who has enabled such third person to occasion the loss, must sustain it (a).

In general the owner of a horse is liable for any accident which may befall it when fairly used by the hirer (b). Thus, where a carriage is let for hire, and it breaks down on the journey, the person who lets it is liable, and not the hirer (c); unless it breaks down through some act of the hirer, which is not within the contract (d). And we shall see in a variety of cases, what are the circumstances under which owners have been held liable for damage, inflicted through the negligent use of carriages or horses they have let for hire.

If a man hire a carriage and any number of horses, and the owner send with him his postilion or coachman, the hirer is discharged from all attention to the horses, and remains obliged only to take ordinary care of the glasses and inside of the carriage while he sits in it, and he is not answerable for any damage done by the negligence of the owner’s servants (e).

(z) Rimell v. Sampayo, 1 C. & P. 254.
(a) Per Ashurst, J., Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T. R. 70; 1 R. R. 425.
(b) Sec Arbon v. Fussell, 3 F. & F. 152; and Holmes v. Onion, 2 C. B., N. S. 790.
(c) Sutton v. Temple, 12 M. & W. 60.
(e) Jones on Bailments, 88;
Where horses are hired to draw a private carriage to a certain place, and they are driven by the owner's servants, the owner is liable for any damage done through the servants' negligence. For where a person hired horses to take his own carriage to Epsom, and he was driven by the owner's postboys, Lord Ellenborough held that a person who hires horses under such circumstances has not the entire management and power over them, but that they continue under the control and power of the servants who are entrusted with the driving; and that the owner of them would be answerable for any accident occasioned by the postboys' misconduct on the road; and his lordship mentioned a case of the kind, in which damages were recovered against the owner of a chaise for an injury done by it when Mr. Burton, a Welsh judge, was in it, and who was called as a witness (f).

And where horses were hired to draw a private carriage to Windsor, the owner of the horses was held liable for damage done, because they were under the care and direction of his servant (g).

And in the case of Sir Henry Hoghton (h), horses were hired by him to draw his carriage, travelling post, and he was held not to be answerable for damage which had been done.

But where horses have been hired to be driven about by the owner's servant wherever the hirer pleases, and for which he gives him some gratuity, there seems at one time to have been a difference of opinion among the judges as to the party liable for injury done.

In Laugher v. Pointer (i), where the able judgments on both sides, as is observed by Mr. Justice Story in his book on Agency, "exhausted the whole learning of the subject," the judges of the Court of King's Bench were equally divided, Chief Justice Abbott and Mr. Justice Littledale holding that the hirer of the horses was not liable for an injury done, and Mr. Justice Bayley and Mr. Justice Holroyd being of the contrary opinion.

In the case of Quarman v. Burnett (k), the owners of

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Samuel v. Wright, 5 Esp. 263; Smith v. Lawrence, 2 M. & R. 1.

(f) Dean v. Branthwaite, 5 Esp. 35; and quoted by Mr. Justice Littledale in Laugher v. Pointer, 5 B. & C. 558.

(g) Samuel v. Wright, 5 Esp. 263.

(h) Sir H. Hoghton's case, cited 5

B. & C. 556.

(i) Laugher v. Pointer, 5 B. & C. 558.

the carriage had always been driven by the same driver, he being the only regular coachman in the employ of the owner of the horses, who paid him regular weekly wages. The owners of the carriage paid him 2s. a drive, and provided him with livery, which he left at their house at the end of each drive. Mr. Baron Parke said, "It appears to us that there are no special circumstances which distinguish the present case, and that we must decide the difference between the judges in Laugher v. Pointer (l). There is no satisfactory evidence of any selection by which this man was made the defendant's servant; the question is therefore the same as in that case. If the driver be the servant of a jobmaster, we do not think he ceases to be so by reason of the owner of the carriage preferring to be driven by that particular servant, where there is a choice amongst more, any more than a hack postboy ceases to be the servant of an innkeeper, where a traveller has a particular preference to one over the rest, on account of his sobriety and carefulness. If, indeed, the defendants had insisted upon the horses being driven not by one of the regular servants, but by a stranger to the jobmaster, appointed by themselves, it would have made all the difference." 

"The fact of the coachman wearing the defendant's livery with their consent, and so being the means of inducing third persons to believe that he was their servant, was mentioned in the course of argument as a ground of liability, but cannot affect our decision. If the defendants had told the plaintiff that he might sell goods to their livery servant, and had induced him to contract with the coachman, on the footing of his really being such servant, they would have been liable on such contract; but this representation can only conclude the defendants with respect to those who have altered their condition on the faith of its being true. In the present case it is matter of evidence only of the man being their servant, which the fact at once answers. We have fully considered the judgments on both sides in Laugher v. Pointer (m), and think that the weight of authority and legal principle is in favour of the view taken by Lord Tenterden (n) and Mr. Justice Littledale."

A person jobbing a carriage by the year under a written agreement, by which the owner binds himself "to keep

(l) Laugher v. Pointer, 5 B. & C. 547. "

(m) Ibid.

(n) Then Chief Justice Abbott.
the same in perfect repair without any further charges whatever,” is not liable for repairs made necessary by accident. And in a case where the owner had so bound himself, Lord Denman said, “Looking at the terms of the agreement, it seems to me that the only case in which the defendant could be subjected to the expense of repairs is the case of damage happening through the wilful default of the defendant. With regard to the evidence of the usage of the trade, the language of the agreement between the parties being clear and unequivocal, evidence as to the general usage of the trade cannot be of any avail” (o).

The hirer of a horse or carriage is liable for damage occasioned by the negligence of himself or his servant; and where two persons hire a carriage, they are both answerable for any damage occasioned by the negligent driving of one of them; but if it be hired by one only, the other, who is a mere passenger, is not liable (p).

It is undoubtedly true that there may be special circumstances which may render the hirer of job horses and servants responsible for the neglect of a servant, though not liable by virtue of the general relation of master and servant. Thus, he may become so by his own conduct, as by taking the actual management of the horses, or ordering the servant to drive in a particular manner which occasions the damage complained of (q).

When a master and servant are together in a carriage, and an injury ensues, the master, from his mere presence, is a co-trespasser, if the act of the servant amount to a trespass (r). And on this principle where a carriage and horses are hired, and the postboys are servants of the owner; if the hirer be sitting outside, and have a view of their proceedings, and do not interfere to prevent their misconduct, and an injury ensues, he is a co-trespasser with them, because as he did not endeavour to stop their improper proceedings he has adopted their conduct as his own.

The Court of Common Pleas entered fully into the subject, and laid down the law upon it in the case of McLaughlin v. Pryor (s), in which a trespass had been com-

Where the hirer is liable for damage.

Hirer liable through his own conduct.

Hirer liable where he might have controlled his servant.


{o} Reading v. Menham, 1 M. & Rob. 234.
{p} Davy v. Chamberlayne, 4 Esp. 229.
{q} Per Parke, B., Quarman v. Burnett, 6 M. & W. 499.
{r} Chandler v. Broughton, 1 Cr. & M. 229.
mitted by a carriage and horses hired by the defendant driving against the plaintiff's gig. It appeared that the defendant and seven others were driving in a carriage and four, with two postillions, to Epsom races on the 3rd of June, 1840. The defendant with another party sat upon the box. The carriage was not in the line of the vehicles which were going through the turnpike at Sutton, and as it approached the toll-bar the postillions endeavoured to get into that line, in order that they might pass through the gate. The plaintiff and a friend of his, Mr. Mason, were driving in a small gig at that particular place where the postillions attempted to fall into the line. The man on the wheel horses said to the other postillion, "Break in, you are all right there," and upon doing this the trace of the leaders of the carriage caught the wheel of the plaintiff's gig; the gig was upset, and the plaintiff was injured and rendered lame for life. Immediately before the accident the defendant called out to his postillions to let the plaintiff's gig pass first, but the order then came too late. As soon as the accident had occurred the carriage was stopped and the owner's name demanded; whereupon the defendant, in order to prevent his party being detained, offered money to the parties, and eventually gave his card.

On the part of the defendant it was objected, that, even assuming that the fault lay with the drivers of the carriage, the defendant was not responsible, neither the horses nor the carriage being his; or, at all events, that he was not liable in trespass. Chief Justice Tindal left it to the jury to say whether the accident was the result of want of skill or caution on the part of the drivers of the carriage, or on the part of the owner of the gig—reserving it for the Court of Common Pleas to say whether, upon the facts proved, the defendant was liable in this form of action; the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.

The Court of Common Pleas discharged the defendant's rule nisi for a nonsuit, and Chief Justice Tindal said, "Undoubtedly the cases in which the hirer of a glass-coach or a post-chaise has been held not to be responsible for the act of the driver, depend upon grounds wholly different from those on which the liability of the defendant on this occasion is to be sustained. It has always been held that the hirer of the carriage, having no power of selection, no fore-knowledge of the character of the driver, is not responsible for any negligence or want of skill or experience on his part; for that it is the duty of the party who lets, to exercise..."
care and caution in the selection of those to whom he entrusts the government and direction of his horses and his carriage. But here the question is, whether the evidence did not show that this defendant so conducted himself as to be liable as a co-trespasser with the postillions whose conduct has given rise to this inquiry."

"The general rule is, that all who are present, and who from the circumstances may be presumed to be assenting to the wrongful act, are trespassers. In trespass all are principals. I think there was abundant evidence to justify the jury in coming to the conclusion they did. In the first place the defendant was present, sitting on the box of the carriage; and when he saw that the carriage was out of the line, he must have known that the postboys intended to get into it again whenever they found an opportunity, so as to be enabled to pass through the toll-gate."

"Had the defendant at that time expostulated, I hesitate not to say that he would not have been a trespasser, whatever might have ensued; for no servant can against his master's will make him a trespasser by any wrongful act of his. Had he expressed any, the slightest disapproval of the course the postboys were evidently pursuing, he would have escaped all liability; or if the defendant and his friends had all been inside the carriage, so that they could not be supposed to be well aware of what was going on, the plaintiff must have sought his remedy elsewhere."

"But being, or some of them being, on the outside, and seeing the improper manner in which the postboys were endeavouring to get on, and, though not actually encouraging them in their unlawful course, yet abstaining from all interposition to restrain them, this, though not very strong, certainly was some evidence whence the jury might properly infer that the defendant assented to that course. But the evidence does not stop there; for the defendant, some time after the accident, in a conversation with one of the witnesses, said that he intended to have stopped when the carriage had established itself in the line, and allowed the gig to regain its place. Now that remark showed pretty strongly that the defendant was exercising control over the motions of the postboys, and was an assenting party to their act. I therefore think the defendant, the dominus pro tempore, being present and seeing what was going on, and not interfering to prevent the mischief, must be taken to have been an assenting party; and that this case falls within the principle laid
down in Gregory v. Piper (t) and Chandler v. Broughton (u), in which latter case it was held that where master and servant are together in a vehicle, and an accident occurs, from which an immediate injury ensues, the master is liable in trespass and not in case, although the servant was driving, and not only no evidence was given on the part of the plaintiff of any interference on the master's part, but the evidence on the part of the defendant distinctly negatives any interference; so that the mere presence of the master with the servant will constitute him a trespasser, if the act of the servant amount to a trespass. Upon the whole, therefore, in this case, I think the jury may have come justly to the conclusion that the defendant was a co-trespasser with the postboys.” And in this decision Coltman, Erskine and Cresswell, Justices, concurred (x).

It is always a question for the jury whether the driver is acting as servant for the hirer or owner; and Lord Abinger, in leaving that point to the jury, observed, “that no satisfactory line could be drawn, at which, as a matter of law, the general owner of a carriage, or rather the general employer of a driver, ceased to be responsible, and the temporary hirer to become so; each case of this class must depend upon its own circumstances” (y).

A hirer may of course, by agreement, make himself answerable for accidents. Thus in the following case it appeared that a man who let out horses to hire told a person who applied to him for one, that he had no horse at home but a black one which shied, and that if he took it on hire he must be answerable for all accidents. The horse was engaged for six weeks at a certain price, and it appeared that whilst it was in the hirer’s possession it came down upon the road in consequence of shying, and suffered a material injury in having its fetlock severely cut by a glass bottle. The owner of the horse brought an action against the hirer on his agreement, and the latter was held answerable for the damage done (z).

(x) M’Laughlin v. Pryor, 1 C. & Marsh. 354; S. C., 4 Scott, N. R.
(y) Brady v. Giles, 1 M. & Rob. 496.
Borrowing Horses.

Lending for use is a bailment of a thing for a certain time when used by the borrower without paying for it (a).

The duties of the borrower and lender are thus well laid down by Mr. Justice Coleridge in Blackmore v. Bristol and Exeter Railway Company (b):—"The duties of the lender and borrower are in some degree correlative. The lender must be taken to lend for the purpose of a beneficial use by the borrower; the borrower therefore is not responsible for reasonable wear and tear; but he is for negligence, for misuse, for gross want of skill in the use, above all, for anything which may be defined as legal fraud. So, on the other hand, as the lender lends for beneficial use, he must be responsible for defects in the chattel, with reference to the use for which he knows the loan is accepted, of which he is aware, and owing to which directly the borrower is injured."

"Would it not be monstrous to hold, that if the owner of a horse, knowing it to be vicious and unmanageable, should lend it to one ignorant of its bad qualities, and conceal them from him, and the rider, using ordinary care and skill, is thrown from it and injured, he should not be responsible."

"By the necessarily implied purpose of the loan a duty is contracted towards the borrower not to conceal from him those defects, known to the lender, which may make the loan perilous or unprofitable to him."

In contracts from which a benefit accrues only to him who has the goods in his custody, as in that of lending for use, an extraordinary degree of care is demanded, and the borrower is therefore responsible for slight negligence (c).

But if the lender was not deceived, but perfectly knew the quality as well as age of the borrower, he must be supposed to have demanded no higher care than that of which such a person was capable; as if a person lend a fine horse to a raw youth, he cannot exact the same degree of management and circumspection as he would expect from a riding-master or an officer of dragoons (d).

(a) Jones on Bailments, 118.
(c) Jones on Bailments, 65. See Exod. xxii. 14, 15.
(d) Jones on Bailments, 65; Dumoulin's Tract—De eo quod interest, 185; Story on Bailments, 161.
BORROWING HORSES.

Where a person rides a horse gratuitously at the owner's request, for the purpose of showing him for sale, he is bound in so doing to use such skill as he actually possesses, or such as may be implied from his profession or situation, and he is equally liable with a borrower for injury done to the horse while ridden by him. In a case tried before Mr. Baron Rolfe, it appeared that the plaintiff had entrusted a horse to the defendant, requesting him to ride it to Peckham, for the purpose of showing it for sale to a Mr. Margetson. The defendant accordingly rode the horse to Peckham, and, for the purpose of showing it, took it into the East Surrey Race Ground, where Mr. Margetson was engaged with others playing at cricket; and there in consequence of the slippery nature of the ground, the horse slipped and fell several times, and in falling broke one of his knees. It was proved that the defendant was a person conversant with and skilled in horses.

The learned Judge in summing up left it to the jury to say whether the nature of the ground was such as to render it a matter of culpable negligence in the defendant to ride the horse there; and told them, that under the circumstances the defendant being shown to be a person skilled in the management of horses, was bound to take as much care of the horse as if he had borrowed it; and that if they thought the defendant had been negligent in going upon the ground where the injury was done, or had ridden the horse carelessly there, they ought to find for the plaintiff, which they did.

The Court of Exchequer refused a rule for a new trial applied for on the ground of misdirection. Lord Abinger, C.B., saying, “We must take the summing-up altogether; and all it amounts to is, that the defendant was bound to use such skill and management as he really possessed. Whether he did so or not, was, as it appears to me, the proper question for the jury.”

And Mr. Baron Parke said, “The defendant was shown to be a person conversant with horses, and was therefore bound to use such care and skill as a person conversant with horses might reasonably be expected to use; if he did not, he was guilty of negligence.”

And Mr. Baron Rolfe said, “The distinction I intended to make between this case and that of a borrower is, that a gratuitous bailee is only bound to exercise such skill as he possesses, whereas a hirer or borrower may reasonably be taken to represent to the party who lets or from whom
he borrows, that he is a person of competent skill. If a person more skilled knows that to be dangerous which another, not so skilled as he, does not, surely that makes a difference in the liability. I said I could see no difference between negligence and gross negligence—that it was the same thing with the addition of a vituperative epithet" (e).

"Whether there is a distinction, and what that distinction is, if there be one, between negligence and gross negligence, is a matter of little importance; but one thing is settled, that the negligence of a gratuitous bailee, to be actionable, differs from the negligence which would be actionable in a bailee who is not gratuitous, and the distinction appears to be that a gratuitous bailee is not liable for simple negligence, for which a borrower would be liable, but only for such negligence as he is guilty of in spite of the better skill or knowledge, which he either actually had, or undertook to have (f).

And the principle upon which he is liable is thus well laid down in Coggs v. Bernard (g): "If a man will enter upon a thing, and take the trust upon himself, and miscarries in the performance of the trust, an action will lie against him for that; though no one could have compelled him to do the thing."

In cases of mere gratuitous loan, the use is to be deemed strictly a personal favour and confined to the borrower, unless a more extensive use can be implied from other circumstances; such, for instance as lending the horse on trial. In general it may be said, in the absence of all controlling circumstances, that the use intended by the parties is the natural and ordinary use for which the thing is adapted (h).

A borrowed horse cannot be used by a servant. Thus, where an action of trespass was brought for inmoderately riding the plaintiff's horse, it appeared that the defendant had borrowed the animal, and that he and his servant had ridden it by turns. It was held that the licence was

\( \text{(e) Wilson v. Brett, 11 M. & W. 113. See also per Willes, J., in Grill v. General Iron Screw Colliery Co., L. R., 1 C. P. 612.} \)


\( \text{(g) Coggs v. Bernard, 1 Smith's L. C. 9th ed. 201 et seq.; Giblin v. McMullen, L. R., 2 P. C. 317.} \)

\( \text{(h) Story on Bailments, 161; and Lord Camoys v. Seurr, 9 C. & P. 386.} \)
annexed to the person of the defendant, and could not be communicated to another. (i).

If a horse or cart, or such other thing as may be used and delivered again, be used according to the purpose for which they are lent and they perish, he who owns them must bear the loss, if they perish not through default of him who borrowed them, or he made a promise at the time of delivering to redeliver them safe again (k).

But if they be used in any other manner than according to the lending, in whatever manner they may perish, if it be not by default of the owner, the borrower is chargeable both in law and conscience (l). Thus, if the borrower, instead of coming to London, for which purpose the horse was lent, go towards Bath, or having borrowed him for a week, keep him for a month, he becomes responsible for any accident that may befall the horse in his journey to Bath, or after the expiration of the week (m).

In regard to time, if no particular time is fixed a reasonable time must be intended, keeping in view the objects of the bailment. If a horse is lent for a journey, it is presumed to be a loan for the ordinary time consumed in such a journey, making proper allowance for the ordinary delays and the ordinary objects of such a journey (n).

But where the borrower of a horse promised to re-deliver it on request, and the horse died without his default before request, he was held not liable (o).

A party who borrows a horse is bound to feed it during the time of the loan (p); and if it is returned out of condition, the borrower would probably be called upon to prove that he fed it properly, and that the falling off in condition did not arise from any neglect on his part (q).

Where the horse is exhausted and refuses his feed, he must not be ridden or driven any further (r).

If a man through his own imprudence has his borrowed horse killed, by robbers for instance, or by a ruinous house or stable, in manifest danger of falling, coming on to his head, the owner is entitled to the price of the horse, but

(i) Brinlow v. Morrice, 1 Mod. R. 210; 3 Salk. 271.
(k) Noy's Maxims, 91.
(l) Ibid.
(m) Jones on Bailments, 68;
Coggs v. Bernard, Ld. Raym. 915;
2 Ld. Raym. 909; 3 Bract. c. 2, s. 1; 1 Smith's L. C. 9th ed. 201.
(n) Story on Bailments, 161.
(q) Bray v. Mayne, 1 Gow, 1; 21 R. R. 786.
(r) Ibid. And see Hiring Horses, ante, p. 234.
LIVERY-STABLE KEEPERS, AGISTERS, ETC.

not if the house or stable were in good condition, and fell by the violence of a sudden hurricane (s).

Where a borrowed horse dies from disease, the borrower is not answerable. Thus, in Williams v. Hide et Uxor. (t) the plaintiff declared that in consideration that he had lent to the defendant's wife, dum solu, a horse to be returned upon request, she promised to return it upon request, but had not done so. The defendants pleaded that, before the request, the horse per diversos morbos in corpore suo crescentes moritur; and so they could not re-deliver it. Upon demurrer the defendants had judgment; for, where the agreement is possible when made, but afterwards becomes impossible by the act of God, the party is for ever discharged.

A person borrowing a horse or carriage is answerable for any damage occasioned by negligent management, whether done by himself or another person in driving (u).

But the borrower of a horse is not liable to the owner for an injury due to the negligence of a stranger. Thus, where the owner of a horse sent it to an auctioneer, with liberty to use it until sold, and whilst it was being driven by the bailee's servant along a highway, it was frightened by a steam tramcar, which was travelling at an improper speed, and in consequence fell, plunged, and injured itself, the accident being wholly due to the negligence of the tramway company; it was held that the auctioneer could not maintain an action to recover the diminution in the value of the horse, as he was under no liability to the owner for the injury it had sustained (x).

The rule is, that when there has been a misuser of the thing lent, as by its destruction or otherwise, there is an end of the bailment, and an action of trover is maintainable for the conversion (y).

(s) Jones on Bailments, 68.
(u) Wheatley v. Patrick, 2 M. & W. 650. And see Hiring Horses, ante, p. 240.
(y) See per Pollock, C.B., Bryant v. Wardell, 2 Ex. 482.
CHAPTER XII.

CARRYING HORSES.

A common carrier is a person who undertakes for hire to transport from place to place, either by land or water, the goods of such persons as think fit to employ him (a). A person who carries persons only is not a common carrier (b).

Railway companies are common carriers (c). But their duties and obligations differ in some respects from those which attach to common carriers by virtue of the statutes under which they are constituted, and of other Acts, more especially the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854 (d).

A common carrier is bound to convey to and from the places within which he professes to ply (although one of those places may be without the realm (e)), the goods of any person who offers to pay his hire, unless his carriage be already full, or the risk sought to be imposed upon him be extraordinary, or unless the goods be of a sort which he cannot convey, or which he is not in the habit of conveying (f). He is not, in the absence of a special contract, bound to carry within any given period of time, but only within a time which is reasonable, regarding all the circumstances of the case; and he is not responsible for delay arising from causes beyond his control (g). He is bound to deliver the goods safely, and in the same condition as when they were received; or in default thereof to make compensation to the owner for any loss or damage which

(a) Coggs v. Bernard, 1 Smith’s L. C. 9th ed. 201; Trent and Mersey Navigation v. Wood, 3 Esp. 127; S. C., 4 Doug. 287.
(b) See Coggs v. Bernard, 1 Smith’s L. C., 9th ed. 201, and cases there cited.
(d) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 31; see post, p. 255.
happens while the goods are in his custody, except such loss or damage as arises from the act of God, as storms, tempests, and the like; or from the Queen's enemies (h). Act of God means not merely an accidental circumstance, but something overwhelming (i), and which "could not have been prevented by any amount of foresight and pains and care reasonably to be expected from" the carrier (k).

The liability of railway companies as common carriers of animals is subject to a further exception in cases where the injury is the consequence of an inherent vice of the animal carried, which results in its destruction, without any negligence on their part. The leading case on this subject is Blower v. Great Western Rail. Co. (l), which was an action brought in the county court, for the non-delivery of a bullock which was delivered to them at Dingestow station to be carried by them to Northampton. In the course of the journey the animal escaped from the truck in which it was placed, and was killed. In a case stated by the county court Judge, it was found that the escape was wholly attributable to the efforts and exertions of the animal itself, and not to any negligence on the part of the company, and that the truck was in every respect proper and reasonably sufficient for the conveyance of cattle; the Court held that, upon this state of facts, the Judge ought to have directed a verdict for the defendants, and Willes, J., in the course of his judgment, said, "The bullock was received by the company under the terms of a notice which is assailed by the plaintiff. It is unnecessary to consider whether or not the notice was a reasonable one. The question for our decision is, whether the defendants, upon the facts and findings of the county court Judge, are liable as common carriers for the loss of this animal. Whether a railway company are common carriers of animals is a question upon which there has been much conflict of opinion, and, although there may be difficulties in determining that question, such as induced Lord Wensleydale, in Carr v.

(h) Crouch v. Great Western Rail. Co., 11 Ex. 742.

(i) Oakley v. Portsmouth, &c. Steam Packet Co., 11 Exch. 623; 21 L. J., Ex. 101—per Martin, B.


Lancashire and Yorkshire Rail. Co. (m), to make the observations which have elicited remarks from some learned Judges apparently to the contrary, it may turn out after all to be a mere controversy of words. The question as to their liability may turn on the distinction between accidents which happen by reason of some vice inherent in the animals themselves, or disposition producing unruliness or phrenzy, and accidents which are not the result of inherent vice or unruliness of the animals themselves. It comes to much the same thing whether we say that one who carries live animals is not liable in the one event, but is liable in the other, or that he is not a common carrier of them at all, because there are some accidents, other than those falling within the exception of the act of God and the Queen's enemies, for which he is not responsible. By the expression 'vice,' I do not, of course, mean moral vice in the thing itself, or its owner, but only that sort of vice which, by its internal development, tends to the destruction or the injury of the animal or thing to be carried, and which is likely to lead to such a result. If such a cause of destruction exists, and produces that result in the course of the journey, the liability of the carrier is necessarily excluded from the contract between the parties."

Kendall v. London and South Western Rail. Co. (n) was an action to recover damages for injuries sustained by the plaintiff's horse whilst it was being carried by the defendants on their railway. The cause was tried before Martin, B., at Guildhall, at the sittings after Hilary Term, 1872. It appeared that the horse was taken, saddled and bridled, to the defendants' station at Waterloo, and was there delivered to the defendants to be carried to Ewell. It was attempted to be shown that the defendants' servants were guilty of negligence in not fastening up the stirrups; but as the plaintiff was himself present when the horse was put into the box, and had, after first objecting, acquiesced in the stirrups being allowed to hang down; and, as evidence was also given that the course adopted was usual and proper, that contention was abandoned.

No accident happened to the train, nor anything likely to alarm the horse, which was proved to be a quiet animal and accustomed to travel by rail; but, at the end of the journey, the horse was found to have sustained considerable

(m) 7 Ex. 712, 713; 21 L. J., Ex. 261. (n) L. R., 7 Ex. 373; 41 L. J., Ex. 184; 26 L. T., N. S. 735.
injuries: and it was in respect of these injuries that the action was brought.

A verdict was entered for the plaintiff for 31l. 10s., leave being reserved to the defendants to move to enter the verdict for them, the Court to have power to draw inferences of fact. A rule having been obtained accordingly, the Court held, drawing inferences of fact (Martin and Bramwell, B.B., Pigott, B., dissenting), that the defendants were not liable, since it was to be inferred that the injuries resulted from the proper vice of the horse. Bramwell, B., saying, "There is no doubt that the horse was the immediate cause of its own injuries. That is to say, no person got into the box and injured it. It slipped or fell, or kicked, or plunged, or in some way hurt itself. If it did so from no cause other than its inherent propensities, 'its proper vice,' that is to say, from fright, or temper, or struggling to keep its legs, the defendants are not liable. But if it so hurt itself from the defendants' negligence, or any misfortune happening to the train, though not through any negligence of the defendants, as, for instance, from the horse-box leaving the line owing to some obstruction maliciously put upon it, then the defendants would, as insurers, be liable. . . . . Now it might be a question on whom, in such a case as the present, the burthen of proof lay: on the carrier or his employer? But in the actual case each party has given evidence. The defendants' witnesses have sworn that the train proceeded on the journey without disturbance or interruption, and that there was nothing to excite the horse to do what he did to his own damage, no cause of mischief except his own inherent disposition. If this is so the defendants are not liable. On the other hand, the plaintiff's witnesses have shown that the horse was quiet, used to travelling, and therefore, they say there must have been something extraordinary to excite the animal. This is a question of fact properly for a jury, but referred to us. If I am to decide it, I find for the defendants. The evidence of the plaintiff makes it improbable it was the proper vice of the horse; the evidence of the defendants makes it impossible that it was otherwise."

The burthen of proof in such cases would appear to depend upon the question whether or not the defendants were common carriers of animals. If they were so, it would be for them to prove that they had not been guilty of any negligence (o).

(o) Prior v. London and South Western Rail. Co., 2 Times L. R. 89.
In *Nugent v. Smith* (*p*), a common carrier by sea from London to Aberdeen received a mare to be carried to Aberdeen for hire. In the course of the voyage the ship encountered rough weather, and the mare received such injuries that she died. The jury found that the injuries were caused partly by more than ordinary bad weather, and partly by the conduct of the mare herself by reason of fright and consequent struggling, without any negligence of the carrier’s servants. It was held that the carrier was not liable for the death of the mare, on the ground that a carrier does not insure against the irresistible act of nature, nor against defects in the thing carried itself; and if he can show that either the act of nature, or the defect of the thing itself, or both taken together, formed the sole, direct, and irresistible cause of the loss, he is discharged.

In an action to recover damages for injuries sustained by the plaintiff’s cattle whilst being carried by the defendants on their railway, it was held that the plaintiff, who was a drover, was not an expert competent to give evidence as to how the injuries were occasioned, and that the *onus* of proof being on the plaintiff, and no affirmative evidence having been given by him of negligence on the part of the defendants, they were entitled to judgment (*q*). But it is difficult to reconcile this case with *Prior v. London and South Western Rail. Co.* (*r*), except on the assumption that the company were carrying the animals under a special contract, which exempted them from their liability as common carriers.

In *Richardson v. North Eastern Rail. Co.* (*s*), it was assumed, and in *Dickson v. Great Northern Rail. Co.* (*t*), it was expressly decided, that railway companies are not bound to carry animals, but may limit their business of carriers in this respect, and may refuse to carry animals except under special contract. In the former case, the company had given public notice that they were not “common carriers of horses, cattle, sheep, pigs, and other animals,” but would only undertake the carriage of animals under special contract. A greyhound, having on a leathern collar with a strap attached, was delivered to the defendants

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*Proof in action for negligence.*

When carriers may refuse to carry animals.

Rule applies to common carriers by sea.

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*(p)* 1 C. P. D. 423; 45 L. J., C. P. 697; 34 L. T., N. S. 827—C. A.


*(r)* *Ante*, p. 252.

*(s)* L. R., 7 C. P. 75; 41 L. J., C. P. 60; 26 L. T., N. S. 181; and see *Lake Shore Railroad Co. v. Perkins*, 25 Mich. 329.

*(t)* 18 Q. B. D. 176; 36 L. J., Q. B. 111; 55 L. T., N. S. 868—C. A.
for carriage, and the fare paid. In the course of the journey there was a change of trains, and the greyhound was fastened by the strap and collar to an iron spout on the open platform of the station. While so fastened it slipped from the collar and ran upon the line, and was killed. It was held that the fastening of the greyhound by the means furnished by the owner himself, which at the time appeared to be sufficient, was no evidence of negligence on the part of the company.

The *onus* of proving that damage, happening during transit or while the goods were in the carrier's hands, was occasioned by a cause for which he was not responsible, lies upon the carrier (*w*).

All common carriers must carry goods for reasonable charges, and consequently not take more from one than from another for the same service. Therefore one customer or class of customers cannot be charged more than another customer or class of customers, or the public generally (*v*).

Railway companies, being common carriers, are *prima facie* liable at common law for defects in their carriages or trucks, by which damage accrues to the goods entrusted to them to carry (*w*).

But a special contract entered into with a common carrier, by the party who delivers goods to be conveyed, by which contract the carrier is exempted from all liability for any loss occasioned by his negligence, is binding upon both parties (*x*) at common law.

At one period indeed there was a disposition in our Courts to hold that common carriers could not by their notices shake off their common law responsibility; but Mr. Justice Story says (*y*):—"The right of making such qualified acceptances by common carriers seems to have been asserted in early times. Lord Coke declared it in a note to *Southcote's case* (*z*), and it was admitted in *Morse v. Slue* (*a*). It is now fully recognized and settled beyond any reasonable doubt in England.” For this assertion he cites a number of authorities, and the Court of Common Pleas held that he had arrived at a correct conclusion (*b*).


(y) *Story on Bailments*, 549.
(z) *Southcote's case*, 4 Rep. 83.
(a) *Morse v. Slue*, 1 Vent. 238.
(b) See judgment of Court of C. P., *Austin v. Manchester*, *Sheffield*.
It being thus established, that the common law liability of railway companies as common carriers might always be defeated by the express contracts to carry, which were embodied in their notices and tickets (c), the monopoly enjoyed by them led to their unduly restricting their liability by special contracts with customers, who could not afford the time or expense of litigating the right to refuse to carry except upon such contracts, and thus in many cases they were enabled to protect themselves against the legal consequences of the grossest negligence on their part (d).

With the view of remedying the hardships thus occasioned the Railway and Canal Traffic Act was passed in 1854 (e).

By the 7th section of that Act it is enacted that every such company "shall be liable for the loss of or for any injury done to any horses, cattle, or other animals, or to any articles or goods," "in the receiving, forwarding or delivering thereof," "occasioned by the neglect or default of such company or its servants, notwithstanding any notice, condition or declaration made and given by such company contrary thereto, or in anywise limiting such liability; every such notice, condition or declaration made and given, being thereby declared to be null and void; provided always, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the said companies from making such conditions with respect to receiving, forwarding and delivering of any of the said animals or goods that shall be adjudged by the Court or Judge, before whom the question relating thereto shall be tried, to be just and reasonable; provided always, that no greater damages shall be recovered for the loss or for any injury done to any such animals," beyond 50l. for any horse, 15l. per head for any neat cattle, and 2l. per head for sheep or pigs: "unless the person sending or delivering the same to such company shall, at the time of such delivery, have declared them to be respectively of higher value than as above mentioned, in which case it shall be lawful for such company to demand and receive by way of compensation for the increased risk and care thereby occasioned, a reasonable percentage upon the excess of the value so


(d) Carr v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Rail. Co., 7 Ex. 707, and cases there cited.

(e) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 31.
declared above the respective sums so limited as aforesaid, and which shall be paid in addition to the ordinary rate of charge."

It is also provided by this section that such percentage or increased rate of charge shall be publicly notified (f); that the onus of proof of value and injury shall lie with the person claiming compensation, and that "the special contract shall be signed by him or the person delivering the animals or goods for carriage."

The Act only extends to the traffic on a company's own lines, and section 7 does not apply to a contract exempting a company from liability for loss on a railway not belonging to or worked by the company (g). But where the company contract to carry over their own as well as other lines, they must prove that the loss did not occur on their line, in order to avail themselves of a condition of non-liability (h).

The principal points of difficulty in the construction of this ill-drawn and ambiguous section are those restrictions on the common law, which it appears to have been its special object to create. They are these: First, whether general notices given by such companies are valid for the purpose of limiting their common law liability as carriers? Secondly, what, if any, distinction is to be drawn between the words "special contract" and "condition"? And, thirdly, whether this common law liability may be limited by such conditions as the Court or Judge shall determine to be just and reasonable? And, moreover, if this common law liability may be limited by such conditions as the Court or Judge shall determine to be just and reasonable, it is important to consider what conditions have come within that definition.

Notwithstanding a great divergence of opinion among the learned Judges, the construction to be put upon this section, with especial regard to these points of difficulty, has been defined with considerable exactitude by decisions, which it will be necessary to give in some detail.

In the case of Peek v. North Staffordshire Railway Company (i), the whole law on this subject was reviewed

(f) According to the provisions of the Carriers Act, 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 68.
by the House of Lords, and in a great measure settled. It is therefore unnecessary, with regard to those points which it determined, to advert to the judicial decisions which preceded it, and which exhibit considerable variances of opinion.

The defendants in this case had issued a notice, that they would receive, forward and deliver goods solely subject to certain conditions, one being, "That they would not be responsible for the loss or injury to any marbles, &c., unless declared or insured according to their value." The plaintiff's forwarding agent had knowledge of this notice or condition, and on the 1st of August, 1857, by letter, directed the defendants to forward the goods in question (three cases of marbles), "not insured." The marbles sustained injury on the journey from wet impregnated with the rust of the nails of the cases penetrating through, and discolouring the stone, and this action was brought for the damage thus occasioned against the company as common carriers.

By their fourth plea the company pleaded under 17 & 18 Vict. c. 31, s. 7, that the marbles were delivered to be carried by them subject to a certain special contract, whereby it was agreed that they should not be responsible for the loss of or injury to marbles unless declared and insured according to their value, and that the same were not nor was any part thereof so declared or insured; and by their fifth plea, that the marbles were delivered and received on the above condition; that such condition made by the defendants, and assented to by the plaintiff, was a just and reasonable condition.

It having been decided by the Exchequer Chamber (reversing the judgment of the Queen's Bench) that the defendants were entitled to the verdict on these pleas, the House of Lords reversed that decision, and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, holding that no general notice given by a railway company is valid in law for the purpose of limiting the common law liability of the company as carriers; but that such common law liability may be limited by such conditions as the Court or judge shall determine to be just and reasonable.

The majority of the Lords present were of opinion that the condition above cited was neither just nor reasonable, as the effect of such a condition would be to exempt the company from responsibility for injury however caused, whether by their own negligence, or even by fraud or diso.
honesty on the part of their servants; and that the letter of the 1st of August, 1857, did not constitute a special contract in writing, the words "not insured" being insufficient, either expressly or by reference, to embody the condition itself into the letter.

It was held also by the Lord Chancellor (Lord Westbury) and by Lord Wensleydale, Lords Cranworth and Cholmsford dissenting, that the conditions must be embodied in a special contract in writing, to be signed by the owner or person delivering the goods (j). This question therefore remains as decided by M'Manus v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company (k), that in order to give this section (l) its intended extent of remedy, it must be construed, in accordance with the approved principle of interpretation, with reference to the state of the law when the statute was passed. Before that time, every case in which a special limited liability was substituted for the general common law obligation of the carrier, whether by notice acquiesced in, or document signed by the customer, was one of special contract. Therefore, the construction to be put upon the words "special contract" in the act must date back to a state of the law, when a condition signed by the owner or his agent for delivering the goods was held to be a "special contract," except where expressly varied by the words of the statute.

But a railway company cannot repudiate a special contract on the ground that it has not been signed by the consignor; the proviso in section 7 only applies to cases where the company seek to relieve themselves from liability by reason of there being a special contract (m).

Where an agent who is employed to deliver cattle to be sent by a railway company signs the consignment note, he must be taken to have known the contents, and thereby binds his principal (n). If a man who can read sends a man who cannot read to sign a document or to enter into a contract in which a document must to his knowledge be signed, he cannot dispute his liability on the contract so signed, on the ground that his agent could not read the contents; for in such a case the principal must be taken to be

(j) See also Lewis v. Great Western Rail. Co., 3 Q. B. D. 195.
(l) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 31, s. 7.
(m) Bazendale v. Great Eastern Rail. Co., L. R., 4 Q. B. 244; 38 L. J., Q. B. 137.
(n) Kirby v. Great Western Rail. Co., 18 L. T., N. S. 658, per Martin, B.
in the same position as though he had signed it himself without reading it (o).

It was also decided, in the case of McManus v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company (p), that the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 31, s. 7, gave power to the Court or judge trying the cause to decide upon the justice and reasonableness of conditions in a special contract for the carriage of animals or goods on a railway; and the Court expressed their concurrence with the opinion pronounced by Jervis, C.J., in Simons v. Great Western Railway Company (q), that "the company may make special contracts with their customers, provided they are just and reasonable, and signed; and that, whereas the monopoly created by railways compels the public to employ them in the conveyance of their goods, the Legislature have thought fit to impose the further security, that the Court shall see that the condition or special contract is just and reasonable."

Thus then the effect of the 7th section of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act (r) has been determined by the foregoing decisions to be this:—First, to make general notices given by companies under this statute, for the purpose of limiting their common law liability as carriers, invalid; and, secondly, to make the words "special contract" and "condition" in the 7th section synonymous terms, to the extent of permitting the common law liability of such companies to be limited by such conditions, or such special contract, signed by the owner or his agent for delivering the goods, as the Court or judge shall determine to be just and reasonable.

It is therefore important to consider what conditions have been held to be just and reasonable, and what have been held not to be so. For no rule of universal application can be laid down with respect to what is a mixed question of law and fact, inasmuch as a reasonable condition may be applied to a state of facts which makes it unreasonable (s).

In the case of Pardington v. South Western Railway Company (t), a person sending cattle by railway signed a

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(p) See note (k), ante.
(r) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 31, s. 7.
contract containing the following amongst other conditions:—"A pass for a drover to ride with his stock, the company is to be held free from all risks in respect of any damages arising in the loading or unloading, from suffocation or from being trampled upon, bruised, or otherwise injured in transit, from fire, or from any other cause whatsoever." A drover received a pass to go with the cattle. The cattle were not put into proper cattle-trucks, but into vans closing with lids ordinarily used for the conveyance of salt, and this was done with the consent, or, at all events, without any objection on the part of the drover. The lid of one of the vans having become closed in the course of the journey, several of the cattle were suffocated. The drover travelled in the same carriage with the guard, and did not get out during the journey to look at the cattle. The jury having found that the cattle were suffocated during the transit, Alderson, B., directed a verdict to be entered for the defendants, giving leave to the plaintiffs to move to enter a verdict for £351 if the Court thought that the conditions were unreasonable. The Court refused a rule, and considered that the drover had the means of knowing whether the cattle could travel safely in the carriage provided for them, and that the condition was a reasonable one.

In the case of M'Manus v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company (a), a horse was placed by defendants' servants in a truck which was insufficient and unsound, and the horse put its foot through a hole in the floor, and was injured; and the question of liability on the contract turned upon the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the following condition:—This ticket is issued, subject to the owner's undertaking "all risks of conveyance, loading and unloading whatsoever, as the company will not be responsible for any injury or damage (however caused) occurring to live stock of any description travelling upon the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway, or in their vehicles." This condition was held to be neither just nor reasonable, and Williams, J., in delivering the judgment of the Court, said: "In order to bring the defendants within the protection of the special contract, it is necessary to construe it as excluding responsibility for loss occasioned not only by all risks, of whatever kind, directly incident to the transit,

but also for that caused by the insufficiency of the carriages provided by the defendants, though occasioned by their own negligence or misconduct. The sufficiency or insufficiency of the vehicles by which the company are to carry on their business is a matter, generally speaking, which they, and they alone, have, or ought to have, the means of fully ascertaining. And it would, we think, not only be unreasonable, but mischievous, if they were to be allowed to absolve themselves from the consequences of neglecting to perform properly that which seems naturally to belong to them as a duty. It is unreasonable that the company should stipulate for exemption from liability from the consequence of their own negligence however gross, or misconduct however flagrant; and that is what the condition under consideration professes to do. That condition is therefore void; and the case stands simply upon the ground that the plaintiff has employed the defendants to carry his horses safely, and that they have used an insufficient and improper vehicle for that purpose, whereby the horses have been injured.

But where A. knew that there was a certain rate for carrying horses on a railway by passenger train, and in horse-boxes, and that there was a lower rate for carrying them by goods train, and in waggons; it was held that it was a reasonable condition of the contract for conveyance that the horses should be carried entirely at the owner's risk, and that such condition would protect the railway company if the horses were injured on the journey, but would not protect them from the consequences of delay where the contract was to deliver in a reasonable time (x).

Conditions protecting the company against claims for loss unless made within seven days from the time at which the goods should have been delivered, and against liability for the loss of goods untruly or incorrectly declared or described by the sender are reasonable, and binding (y).

In the case of Allday v. Great Western Railway Company (z), the plaintiff delivered some beasts to the station-master at Oxford, with directions to send them to Birming-


Owner's risk at lower rate.

Condition as to time within which loss should be declared to create claim.

As to loss of market coupled with "injury" to cattle.
ham, for the market there, and signed a ticket, containing certain conditions, and amongst others that the defendants were “not to be answerable for any consequences arising from overcarriage, detention or delay in, or in relation to the conveying or delivery of the said animals, however caused.” The company have two stations at Birmingham, one at Bordesley, for the cattle from Oxford and places south of Birmingham, and the other at Hockley, north of Birmingham, which would not be the proper station for the plaintiff’s cattle to be sent to. The plaintiff made inquiries for them the next morning at the Bordesley Station, but inasmuch as they had been carried to the Hockley Station, he did not get them till the middle of the day. The proper time for him to have received them would have been early in the morning, and at the Bordesley Station. By reason of the delay which took place he lost the market; and in addition it was proved that the cattle had become injured by having been kept in the trucks without food or water. The defendants refused to make any compensation, and contended that they were protected by the conditions of the ticket above specified, and that they were therefore not liable in respect of overcarriage. It was held however by the Court of Queen’s Bench that the cattle were “injured” within the meaning of the statute, and also that the condition in the ticket was unreasonable. And Cockburn, C.J., said, “It is admitted that there had been loss of condition to the cattle, and it is clear that that amounts to ‘injury’ within the meaning of the 7th section. I am also of opinion that the condition expressed in the ticket is unreasonable. The defendants claim complete immunity from liability in respect of all delay, overcarriage, &c. They talk of reduced rates, but there is no proof that they charged the plaintiff anything less than the ordinary rates of charge. It might perhaps be reasonable, if they had given the plaintiff the choice of two classes of rates, and had made a special contract limiting their liability in consideration of the lesser rate being charged. But no such thing has been done here.” And Mr. Justice Crompton said, “I am of the same opinion. It is clear that the cattle sustained injury by reason of the conduct of the defendants. It is also clear that the condition is an unreasonable one; it was compulsory upon the plaintiff, no option being given to him, and the defendants cannot in such a manner protect themselves from liability.” In these judgments Mr. Justice Mellor and Mr. Justice Shee
CARRYING HORSES.

concerned. It is important to observe in this case, that the "injury" to the cattle is the only damage adverted to by the learned Judges, so it may be inferred, in accordance with former decisions (a), that the loss of market alone would not have entitled the defendants to compensation.

In Harrison v. London, Brighton and South Coast Railway Company (b), the following condition was called in question:—"The company will not be liable in any case for loss or damage to any horse or other animal above the value of 40l., or any dog above the value of 5l., unless a declaration of its value, signed by the owner, or his agent, at the time of booking, shall have been given to them; and by such declaration the owner shall be bound, the company not being in any event liable to any greater amount than the value declared. The company will in no case be liable for injury to any horse or other animal, or dog, of whatever value, where such injury arises wholly or partially from fear or restiveness. If the declared value of any horse or other animal exceed 40l., or any dog 5l., the price of conveyance will, in addition to the regular fare, be after the rate of two and a half per cent. upon the declared value of above 40l., whatever may be the amount of such value, and for whatever distance the animal is to be carried." In this case the plaintiff delivered to the defendants a dog to be carried, and signed a ticket with this condition annexed. The value of the dog was 21l., but the plaintiff made no declaration of its value, and paid only the regular fare 3s. The dog escaped from the train during the journey, and was lost, without any negligence on the part of the defendants. The plaintiff having sued the defendants for the loss, it was held by the majority of the Court of Exchequer: first, that the meaning of this ticket, the whole of which must be read together, was, that if the value of a dog was above 5l., and its value was not declared, and the extra price paid accordingly, the defendants would not be liable at all, even for loss or injury caused by their own negligence, and that the condition was therefore within 17 & 18 Vict. c. 31, s. 7; secondly, that this condition was not just and reasonable, inasmuch as the extra charge of two and a half per cent. (without proof to the contrary, which it lay on the defendants to give) appeared

excessive and unreasonable; and, thirdly, that the condition being void, the plaintiff, although there was no negligence on the part of the defendants, was entitled to recover the full value of the dog against them as common carriers.

The judgment in this case was reversed in the Exchequer Chamber (c), and, as reversed, was the subject of some discussion in Ashendon v. London, Brighton and South Coast Railway (d), where it was held that a condition that a railway company will not be liable "in any case" for loss or damage to a horse or dog above certain specified values delivered to them for carriage, unless the value is declared, is not reasonable, as it is in its terms unconditional, and would, if valid, protect the company even in case of the negligence or wilful misconduct of their servants; and the Court further gave its opinion that the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber was in effect overruled by Peek v. North Staffordshire Railway Company (e).

Where a condition contained in a ticket signed by a person delivering a dog for carriage to a railway company stated that "the company are not and will not be common carriers of dogs, nor will they receive dogs for conveyance except on the terms that they shall not be responsible for the amount of damages for the loss thereof, or for injury thereto beyond the sum of 2l. unless a higher value be declared at the time of delivery to the company and a percentage of 5 per cent. paid upon the excess of value beyond the 2l. so declared"; it was held that although the railway company were not bound to be common carriers of dogs, yet, being bound by the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854, to afford reasonable facilities for the carriage of dogs, they could only limit their liability in respect thereof by reasonable conditions, and that the above mentioned condition was not just and reasonable within section 7 of that Act; and, therefore, did not protect the company from liability to an amount exceeding 2l. in respect of damage done to the dog through the negligence of their servants (f).

But where the condition as to an increased rate for increased value is not objectionable on the ground of excess or otherwise, a wilfully false statement as to the value of a horse to be conveyed made by the plaintiff in order that

Where value untruly declared.

(c) 31 L. J., Q. B. 113.
(d) 5 Ex. D. 190; 42 L. T., N. S. 586.
(e) Ante, p. 256.
it might be conveyed at the lower rate will disentitle him from recovering in damages, if it is injured, upon any other value than that which was falsely declared to be its real value (g).

In the case of Gregory v. West Midland Railway Company (h), a cow and a heifer had been placed by the defendants' servants without halters in a sheep or calf truck without rails, and during the journey the cow fell or jumped out of the truck and was injured. An action was brought for the damage thus occasioned, and the company relied upon the special contract made by them with the plaintiff, among the conditions of which were these:—That "the company are to be free from all risk and responsibility with respect to any loss or damage arising in the loading or unloading, or injury in the transit from any cause whatever, it being agreed that the animals are to be carried at the owner's risk, and that the owner of the cattle is to see to the efficiency of the waggon, before his stock is placed therein; complaints to be made in writing to the company's officer before the waggon leaves the station." In accordance with the decision of the Exchequer Chamber in M'Manus v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company (i), these conditions were held to be neither just nor reasonable.

In Rooth v. North Eastern Railway Company (k), a contract for the conveyance of cattle by railway, signed by the party sending them, contained the two following, amongst other, conditions:—"The owner undertakes all risks of loading, unloading and carriage, whether arising from the negligence or default of the company or their servants, or from defect or imperfection in the station, platform, or other places of loading or unloading, or of the carriage in which the cattle may be loaded or conveyed, or from any other cause whatsoever."—"The company will grant free passes to persons having the care of live stock, as an inducement to owners to send proper persons with and to take care of them":"—It was held that the first of these conditions was unreasonable, and that its unreasonable character was not removed by the mere fact that the company, under the second condition, granted, and the

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(i) M'Manus v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Rail. Co., 4 H. & N. 327


(k) L. R., 2 Ex. 173; 36 L. J., Ex. 83.
owner accepted, a free passage for a person who travelled with the cattle sent.

If carriers receive a chattel to carry to a particular place, they must be said to have the carrying of it to the end of the journey, whether they themselves carry it all the way or not. Therefore any parties to whom they may hand it over are their agents, and they are clearly liable, unless the facts show that their responsibility has determined

But a company (which is within the Railway and Canal Traffic Act) may divest itself of this responsibility for goods beyond its own limits, as the following conditions have been held to be just and reasonable, viz., that “in respect of goods destined for places beyond the limits of the company’s railway, the company’s responsibility will cease when such goods shall have been delivered over to another carrier in the usual course for another conveyance.” And “that any money, which may be received by the company as payment for the conveyance of goods beyond their own limits, will be so received for the convenience of the consignors, and for the purpose of being paid to the other carrier”

If a railway company puts two conditions into their carrying clause, one of which is unreasonable, they may rely upon the other, which is reasonable. So, too, if part of a condition, which is severable from the rest of it, is reasonable

It has been said that the principle deducible from the authorities is, that a contract, primâ facie unreasonable, becomes reasonable if an alternative rate is offered to the customer, i.e., if the company have two rates, at one of which, the higher, it undertakes the ordinary risk of a carrier, while at the other, the reduced rate, it carries upon condition of being relieved from that risk.

It is the common practice of railway companies to offer alternative rates, and the question of the validity of these rates has frequently been the subject of judicial decision. From these decisions it would appear that conditions are just and reasonable if the company offer a bonâ fide option, and if the higher rate is reasonable as well as the lower.

...
a railway company offer to undertake the ordinary carriers' liability at a price they are not entitled to charge, or to carry at a lower price free from liability, the alternative offer is not reasonable (q). But a condition that the company will not be liable for injuries caused by fear or restiveness of animals, and a limit of liability as regards amount, the amounts being those specified in section 7, and a provision that the company do not admit liability in the case of animals able to walk from the truck, have been held not to invalidate an alternative offer (r).

Where alternative rates are charged for the conveyance of cattle or goods, the lower rate being at owner's risk, a priori the higher rate, if within the parliamentary limit, is not necessarily unreasonable or prohibitory (s). It is a question for the jury whether the higher rate is unreasonable in the sense that it is so high as to be prohibitory; and the mere fact that the lower rate is so low that cattle dealers invariably avail themselves of it is not, standing alone, evidence that the higher rate is unreasonable or prohibitory (t).

The higher rate need not be published in the manner that tolls are directed to be published by the Railway Clauses Act, 1845, s. 93; the posting up the effect of it, e.g., that it is 10 per cent. the owner's risk, is sufficient (u).

When a railway company agrees to carry, at a reduced rate, upon condition of being relieved from the ordinary liability for negligence, and to be responsible only for the consequences of the wilful misconduct of their servants,—a condition which has been held to be reasonable if a higher rate is offered, which is not exorbitant,—it will be for the plaintiff, in an action for injury to the goods carried, to prove more than culpable negligence. There must be evidence of actual wilful misconduct causing the injury (v).


(t) Ibid.

(u) Great Western Rail. Co. v. McCarthy, ubi supra.

"‘Wilful misconduct,’” said Bramwell, L.J. (x), “means misconduct to which the will is a party, something opposed to accident or negligence, the misconduct, not the conduct, must be wilful. It has been said, and I think, correctly, that perhaps one condition of wilful misconduct must be that the person guilty of it should know that mischief will result from it. But to my mind there might be other ‘wilful misconduct.’ I think it would be wilful misconduct if a man did an act not knowing whether mischief would or would not result from it.”

The withholding of cattle under a groundless claim to detain them is not “detention” within the meaning of conditions that the company are not to be liable in respect of loss, or detention, or injury, except upon proof that such loss, detention, or injury, arose from the wilful misconduct of the company or its servants (y).

The onus of proving that a condition is reasonable, lies upon the company (z).

It will have been seen by a consideration of the cases that the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a condition depends upon the nature of the articles to be conveyed, the degree of risk attendant upon their conveyance, the rate of charge made, and all the circumstances of each particular case.

Very slight evidence of non-delivery is sufficient to call upon the defendant to prove delivery (a). If the carrier deliver the goods at the place directed in accordance with the ordinary usage, he has fulfilled his obligation, although he has delivered them to a person the sender did not intend (b). Where cattle sent by railway were kept at the arrival station with the sanction of the plaintiff’s servant, until they could be removed according to the police regulations, it was held that the liability of the railway company as carriers had ceased when the alleged loss and damages occurred (c).

There is no general rule of law requiring carriers to

(b) McKeon v. M’Iver, L. R., 6 Ex. 36; 40 L. J., Ex. 30; 24 L. T., N. S. 559.
give notice to the consignor of the refusal of the consignee to receive goods, but carriers are merely bound to do what is reasonable, under the particular circumstances of each case (d). However, Bramwell, B., said in the case of Hudson v. Baxendale (d), that "the judgment of the majority of the Court" (from which however he dissented) "in Crouch v. Great Western Railway Company (e) seemed to show that it was the duty of the carrier to communicate with the consignor."

If the consignee makes default in receiving the goods the carrier is entitled to recover from him the expenses reasonably incurred in taking care of the goods. A person sent a horse by railway, consigned to himself at a station on the line, and paid the fare. When the horse arrived at the station there was no one on his behalf to receive it, and the railway company therefore placed it with a livery stable-keeper; and it was held that the company could recover from the owner of the horse the reasonable charges which it had paid to the stable-keeper (f).

After goods have been refused at the consignee's address, the carrier becomes an involuntary bailee, and is only bound to act with due and reasonable care and diligence (g).

It is no answer to an action against carriers by the owner of goods lost (who was the consignee), that the consignor, after the loss of the goods, claimed compensation, and that the carriers, without notice, and believing him to be the owner, paid compensation to him (h).

In a case (i) in which the plaintiff sent a horse of great value to the yard of the defendants' railway station at Worcester, for the purpose of its being carried by their railway; and by the direction of a servant of the company, the plaintiff's groom was leading the horse to the platform, when it was startled by another horse, and backed upon some sharp iron girders lying on the spot, receiving such an injury that it was necessary to kill it. No declaration of value had been made, nor had any ticket been taken or fare demanded; the usual practice at that station

(d) Hudson v. Baxendale, 27 L. J., Ex. 93.
(f) Great Northern Rail. Co. v. Swiftfield, L. R., 9 Ex. 132; 43 L. J. Ex. 89; 30 L. T., N. S. 562.
(g) Heugh v. London and North Western Rail. Co., L. R., 5 Ex. 51; 39 L. J., Ex. 48; 21 L. T., N. S. 676.
being to put the horse into the box, in which it was to be conveyed in the first instance. The jury found that the defendants were guilty of negligence in putting the girders where they were, and that there was no negligence on the part of the groom, and found a verdict for the plaintiff for 1,000/. A rule was subsequently obtained, pursuant to leave reserved, calling upon the plaintiff to show cause why the damages should not be reduced to 50%, on the ground that the plaintiff's right to recover was limited to that sum by 17 & 18 Vict. c. 31, s. 7. The Court differed in opinion, but it was held by the majority that the rule should be made absolute to reduce the damages to 50%.

It was held by Cockburn, C.J., who dissented from this judgment, that as the negligence complained of was not the negligence of the defendants in their character of carriers, they were not entitled to the protection of this section; secondly, if they would have otherwise been entitled to the protection, there was no evidence of their having notified the increased rate of charge as required by the section; and thirdly, therefore, on both grounds, the plaintiff was entitled to recover the full value of the horse.

Mr. Justice Mellor was of opinion that the provision in the section applied not only to the risks of carriage and conveyance, but also to those which attend the receiving and delivery; that the injury was done in receiving the horse; and therefore, that as there was no declaration of value, the plaintiff could not recover more than the 50%.

It was held by Mr. Justice Blackburn, that the statute is not confined to neglects and defaults after the relation of carrier and customer has been completely established, and that the real value above 50% cannot be recovered unless the declaration is made before the injury happens, though it happen before the receipt by the railway company is complete.

The mere casual knowledge of a railway company of the excess in value of a horse sent to be carried, derived from a letter of the sender to their traffic manager, does not entitle them to refuse to carry it, except at the increased per centage of charge (k).

A railway company is not responsible for the non-

delivery of live stock, where the owner has, in defiance of the known course of business of the company, permitted them to be delivered at one of the company's stations without an acknowledgment from the proper officer of their receipt for the purpose of their being carried, although they are proved to have been delivered to an officer in the company's employ (f).

Where one railway company undertakes to carry goods from a station on their railway to a place on another distinct railway, with which it communicates, this is evidence of a contract with them for the whole distance, and the other company will be regarded simply as their agents (m). But the first company might by a special contract restrain their liability to the limits of their own rail, where they expressly act as agents for the other company (n). And the question as to which company is liable will depend on the terms of the special contract in each individual case. Thus, in Coxon v. Great Western Railway Company (o), the plaintiff delivered cattle at a station of the Shrewsbury and Hereford Railway Company, to be conveyed to Birmingham, and signed a contract-note with that company, one of the terms of which was, that the company would not be subject to liability for any damage arising on other railways. The cattle were placed on a truck of the defendants lying at the station, and were conveyed in it along the Shrewsbury and Hereford Railway to Shrewsbury, and then on the defendants' line to Birmingham. Between Shrewsbury and Birmingham the cattle were injured by the floor of the truck giving way; and it was held that, as the contract of carriage was with the Shrewsbury and Hereford Company for the entire journey, the defendants were not liable.

In Gill v. Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway Company (p), the Great Northern Railway Company and the Manchester Railway Company had agreed that a complete and full system of interchange of traffic should be established from all parts of one company and beyond its limits, to all parts of the other company and beyond its limits, with through tickets, through rates and invoices,

Gill v. Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway Co. v. Coxon v. Great Western Railway Co.

(f) Slim v. Great Northern Rail. Co., 14 C. B. 647.
(n) Fowles v. Great Western Rail.

Plaintiffs acknowledged receipt as to delivery.

Through carriage on railways, what company liable.
and interchange of stock at junctions, the stock of the two companies being treated as one stock. The agreement provided for the division of the traffic. The plaintiff, wishing to send a cow from Doncaster to Sheffield, went to the station of the Great Northern Railway Company at Doncaster and booked her for Sheffield by the Manchester line. He signed a contract, by which it was agreed that the cow was to be conveyed upon certain conditions, one of which was as follows:—"The Great Northern Railway Company gives notice that they convey horses, cattle, sheep, pigs and other live stock in waggons, subject to the following condition: That they will not be responsible for any loss or injury to any horse, cattle, sheep, or other animal, in the receiving, forwarding or delivering, if such damage be occasioned by the kicking, plunging, or restiveness of the animal." The cow was put into a truck belonging to the Manchester Railway Company, and was conveyed to Sheffield, where their servant, who was in charge of the yard or loading place, let her out of the truck, although he was cautioned by the plaintiff not to do so at that time. The cow rushed out of the truck, and, after running about the yard, got upon the line and was killed. It was held that the Great Northern Railway Company was the agent of the Manchester Railway Company to make the contract for the carriage of the cow, and that, as the Manchester Railway was not protected by the condition above set out, an action was maintainable against them.

In Combe v. London and South Western Railway Co. (q), the plaintiff sent off some horses from Wadhurst, a station on one company's line, in horse boxes belonging to that company in charge of a groom, who was to take them to Farnham, a station on the defendants' line. At Guildford was the junction with the defendants' railway, where it was necessary to book again, and whence there are two routes to Farnham. The groom, on going to take tickets, was told, in answer to his inquiries, that the train direct to Farnham did not go for some hours, but that by paying a little higher fare, he could go on by a train which was about to start immediately, and went round a longer way. He said he would go on at once, and he and the horses proceeded in the same trucks in which they had come from Wadhurst. At Farnham two porters came to unload the

(q) 31 L. T., N. S. 613.
trucks, and the groom told them of the danger of an accident arising from a wide space between the flap and the body of the horse-box, and how at Wadhurst it had been stopped up for the horses to be put in. They accordingly tried to stop it up with straw, while the groom kept the horses quiet inside. When done they said "all right," and he then led out a mare, her foal following. The latter put its foot through the opening and broke its leg.

It was held that the company were bound to provide a truck reasonably fit for the conveyance of the plaintiff's horses, and there was evidence that this was unfit, and that the defendants had adopted it from the other company at Guildford, and, by sending it on to Farnham, became liable for an accident caused by its defects.

The Regulation of Railways Act, 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. 119), Part II., sect. 14, provides that where a company, by through booking, contracts to carry any animals, luggage, or goods from place to place, partly by railway and partly by sea, or partly by canal and partly by sea, a condition exempting the company from liability for any loss or damage which may arise during the carriage of such animals, &c. by sea, from the act of God, the king's enemies, fire, accidents from machinery, boilers and steam, and all and every other dangers and accidents of the seas, rivers and navigations, of whatever nature and kind soever, shall, if published in a conspicuous manner in the office where such through booking is effected, and if printed in a legible manner on the receipt or freight note which the company gives for such animals, &c., be valid as part of the contract between the consignor of such animals, &c., and the company, in the same manner as if the company had signed and delivered to the consignor a bill of lading containing such condition. For the purpose of this section, the word "company" includes the owners, lessees or managers of any canal or other inland navigation.

Section 16 of the same Act contains provisions for securing equality of treatment in respect of tolls where a railway company is authorized to work steam vessels in connection with their lines.

By section 17, "where any charge shall have been made by a company in respect of the conveyance of goods over their railway, on application in writing within one week after payment of the said charge made to the secretary of the company by the person by whom or on whose account the same has been paid, the company shall within fourteen
days render an account to the person so applying for the same, distinguishing how much of the said charge is for the conveyance of the said goods on the railway, including therein tolls for the use of the railway, for the use of carriages, and for locomotive power, and how much of such charge is for loading and unloading, covering, collection, delivery, and for other expenses: but without particularizing the several items of which the last-mentioned portion of the charge may consist."

By section 18, "where two railways are worked by one company, then, in the calculation of tolls and charges for any distances in respect of traffic (whether passengers, animals, goods, carriages, or vehicles) conveyed on both railways, the distances traversed shall be reckoned continuously on such railways, as if they were one railway."

The Regulation of Railways Act, 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 78), section 12, enacts that "where a railway company under a contract for carrying persons, animals, or goods by sea procure the same to be carried in a vessel not belonging to the railway company, the railway company shall be answerable in damages in respect of loss of life or personal injury, or in respect of loss or damage to animals or goods, in like manner and to the same amount as the railway company would be answerable if the vessel had belonged to the railway company; provided that such loss of life or personal injury, or loss or damage to animals or goods, happens to the person, animals, or goods (as the case may be) during the carriage of the same in such vessel, the proof to the contrary to lie upon the railway company."

This section extended the provisions of the 31 & 32 Vict. c. 119, s. 16, ante, p. 273, to the carriage of goods which a railway company contracted to carry in ships not belonging to them; and as the second paragraph of that enactment incorporated the whole of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854, it was held that a condition made by a railway company limiting their liability in respect of animals procured to be carried by them by sea in vessels not belonging to them, was not binding on the consignor unless reasonable (v). But this provision was repealed by section 59 of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 25) and section 28 of the same Act specifically applied to sea traffic the prohibition of undue

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preference only, so that section 7 of the Act of 1854 no longer applies to sea traffic (s).

Section 22 (xxi.) of the Diseases of Animals Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 57), empowers the Board of Agriculture from time to time to make such orders as they think fit, subject and according to the provisions of the Act, for prescribing and regulating the cleansing and disinfecting of vessels, vehicles and pens, and other places used for the carrying of animals for hire or purposes connected therewith. Accordingly, by the Animals (Transit and General) Order, 1895, provisions are made for the cleansing and disinfecting in the mode therein ordered—of every vessel used for carrying animals by sea, or on a canal, river, or inland navigation, after the landing of animals therefrom, and before the taking on board of any other animal, or other cargo—of every horse-box, truck, and van on every occasion after an animal is taken out of the same, and before any other animal is placed therein—of every moveable gangway or other apparatus used for transit of animals on or from a truck or vessel as soon as practicable—and of every loading pen, either on each day on which it is used and after the using thereof, or at some time not later than twelve o’clock at noon of the next following day, unless the following day is Sunday, and then on the following Monday, and before the using thereof. For any contravention of these provisions the owner and master of the vessel in which; and the railway company carrying animals on or owning or working the railway on which; and the owner of the apparatus, in respect of which the same is done, shall each be deemed to be guilty of an offence against the Act (t).

A carrier of goods or cattle is only bound to carry in a reasonable time under ordinary circumstances, and is not bound to use extraordinary efforts, or incur extra expense in order to surmount obstructions caused by the act of God, such as a fall of snow (u). Nor is he responsible for delay arising from causes beyond his control; e.g., a railway company was prevented from unavoidable obstruction on its line from carrying goods within the usual time. The obstruction was occasioned by an accident resulting solely from the negligence of another company, having parliamentary running powers over their line; and it was held that

Steamboat and railway companies, &c., to disinfect carriages, boats, &c.

"Reasonable time."

(s) Hodges on Railways, 7th ed., p. 627.
(t) See Ismay v. Blake, 66 L. T., N. S. 530; 56 J. P. 486.
(u) Bridgen v. Great Northern Rail. Co., 28 L. J., Ex. 51.

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the railway company was not liable to the owner of the goods for damage caused to them by the delay (x). What is, or is not, reasonable time, must be judged with reference to the means at the carrier's disposal for forwarding the goods (y); but if his course of business is inconsistent with reasonable expedition, it is no answer to an action against him for damages arising from delay, that he carried at the ordinary rate at which he conducted business (z). Provided that he carry by a reasonable and usual route he is not bound to carry by the shortest route, even though empowered by statute to charge a mileage rate for carriage (a).

A ferryman is bound not only to provide a safe mode of conveyance, but also proper means for the embarkation and landing of the animals carried by him. The defendants, lessees of a ferry over the river Mersey, ran steamboats across for the conveyance of passengers and goods for hire. They also carried animals, but it was not their practice to take charge of the animals when on board. The plaintiff, having paid his usual fare, led his mare on board at one side of the river, and remained with her until the steam-boat reached the other side. For landing the passengers and animals the defendants had provided a movable slip leading from the boat to a landing-barge. The slip had a hand-rail, which had been twice recently, to the defendants' knowledge, broken by the pressure of a horse on landing; and in the handrail was an iron spike, which appeared whenever the rail gave way. The defendants had also been cautioned that the slip was unsafe. They notwithstanding continued to use the slip, leaving the broken rail slightly tied up, so that it appeared sound. Over this slip the plaintiff proceeded to lead his mare towards the shore; but she pushed against the rail, which immediately gave way, and the iron spike concealed in it injured her severely. It was held that the defendants were bound not only to find a good boat, but also a good slip, and therefrom so to bridge over the space between the boat and the land as to provide means for getting from one to the other. And that although the mare was under the


(c) Myers v. London and South Western Rail. Co., L. R., 5 C. P. 1.
control and management of the plaintiff, they were liable for the injury to her in consequence of their culpable negligence in allowing an improper slip to be used (b).

The damages to be paid will be measured by the value of the animal, if it be killed, or by the loss on the sale, if it be injured, but in respect of companies under the Railway and Canal Traffic Act (c), within the limit of Damages imposed by that statute, viz., for a horse 50l., neat cattle per head 15l., and for sheep and pigs per head 2l., unless at the time of delivery they shall be declared to be of higher value than that above mentioned; in which case however they cannot be estimated upon a higher value than that which has been declared by their owner or his agent in the written declaration required by the company, though the declared value is less than the real value (d).

If horses or cattle are injured on their way to an agricultural show, the chance of obtaining a prize is too remote a ground for damages (e). But such expenses as are reasonably and necessarily incurred by the owner in consequence of unreasonable delay in the delivery of goods, may be recovered against the carrier (f).

In order to recover damages for non-sale, owing to delay in carrying, there must have been an actual contract to buy for a price (g).

A railway company having failed to provide horse-boxes, pursuant to contract, for the conveyance of horses for sale by auction in Dublin on the day but one following, the owner was compelled to send them by road, a distance of twenty-four miles, in order that they might arrive in due time for the sale, and for previous inspection by purchasers. The horses, which were valuable hunters, were in soft condition at the time. They were deteriorated in appearance by the fatigue of the road journey; one of them was lamed: and such as were sold realized prices below what would have otherwise been obtained, the others being left on the owner's hands. It appeared that if they had been in hard-fed condition, they would have borne the journey without injury. The company's station master was, at the time of

(c) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 31.
(e) Watson v. Ambergate, Notting-

(f) Black v. Baxendale, 1 Ex. 410.
(g) Hart v. Baxendale, 16 L. T., N. S. 390, Martin, B.
the contract, aware of the intended sale and of the day on
which it was to take place. It was held that the company
were not liable in damages for the whole of the loss which
the owner sustained in consequence of the injuries occa-
sioned by the road journey; but that the measure of
damages was the deterioration which the horses, if in
ordinary condition and fit to make the journey, would
have suffered thereby, and the time and labour expended
on the road (h).

(h) *Waller v. Midland Great Western Rail. Co.* L. R., 4 Ir. 376;
reversing L. R., 1 Ir. 520.
PART II.

NEGLIGENCE IN THE USE OF HORSES, &c.

CHAPTER I.

THE CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITIES OF PARTIES FOR INJURIES INFLECTED OR INCURRED IN DRIVING, ALSO THE RULE OF THE ROAD, AND NEGLIGENT DRIVING BY A SERVANT.

Negligent Driving.

Negligence is defined to be the omitting to do something which a reasonable man would do, or the doing something which a reasonable man would not do; in either case causing mischief to a third party; not intentionally, for then there would be no negligence (a).

An abstract rule as to what will constitute negligent driving can hardly be laid down. It must depend upon all the circumstances of each case. Thus, it was held by Bayley, J. (b), that a carter sitting inside a cart, instead of attending at the horse's head, was guilty of negligence; and the fact that while he was there sitting, the cart went over a child, who was gathering up flowers on the road, and killed it, made him guilty of manslaughter. And the same point was ruled by Hullock, B. (c). But under other circumstances a driver would be more negligent in being off than on his vehicle.

If a man rides recklessly a wild horse into a crowd, and kills a person, it will be murder, in the same way as it has been so held when bricks were thrown from the top of a house into a thoroughfare, and killed a person (d).

If a person driving a carriage happens to kill another,

(b) Knight's case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 168.
(c) Spring Assizes, 1829, quoted 1 Lewin, C. C. 168.
(d) Liverpool Spring Assizes, 1847, per Alderson, B., Reg. v. Cook, 1 Ld. Raym. 143.
and he saw or had timely notice of the mischief likely to ensue, and yet 

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a person killed by the upsetting of one of them, for which the driver was tried:—Mr. Justice Patteson in summing up said to the jury, "The question here is, whether you are satisfied that the prisoner was driving in such a negligent manner that, by reason of his gross negligence, he had lost command of his horses? And that depends on whether the horses were unruly, or whether you believe that he had been racing with the other omnibus, and had so urged his horses that he could not stop them; because, however he might be endeavouring to stop them afterwards, if he had lost the command of them by his own act, he would be answerable, for a man is not to say, I will race along a road, and when I have got past another carriage, I will pull up. If the prisoner did really race, and only when he got past the other omnibus endeavour to pull up, he must be found guilty; but if you believe that he was run away with, without any act of his own, then he is not guilty. The main questions are, were the two omnibuses racing; and was the prisoner driving as fast as he could in order to get past the other omnibus, and had he urged his horses to so rapid a pace that he could not control them? If you are of that opinion, you ought to convict him; but if his horses ran away of their own accord, without any act of his, he is entitled to an acquittal" (l).

If a man undertakes to drive another in a vehicle, he is bound to exercise proper care in regard to the safety of the man under his charge, and if by culpable negligent driving he causes the death of the other, he will be guilty of manslaughter. But he cannot be found guilty of manslaughter if the deceased himself interfered in the management of the horse and thereby assisted in bringing about the accident (m). Contributory negligence is not an answer to a criminal charge, as to a civil action (n). And even if the doctrine of contributory negligence does apply to criminal cases, yet there is no contributory negligence on the part of anyone in merely getting into a vehicle and allowing himself to be driven, although the driver be perceptibly drunk (o).

When a person has been killed in such a manner that

(l) Rex v. Timmins, 7 C. & P. 500. 4 F. & F. 1087, contra—per Wil- 217; 11 Cox, C. C. 544—Lush, J.

held to be accidental death.
And the driver is not liable.

Trotting a waggon along a road.

Trotting a waggon along a street.

Remarks in East's Pleas of the Crown.

Where streets are unusually crowded.

no want of care could be imputed to the driver, it will be accidental death, and he will be excused (p).

Therefore, if the driver of a conveyance use all reasonable care and diligence, and an accident happen through some chance which he could not foresee or avoid, he is not to be held liable for the results of such accident (q).

Thus, in an old case, where A. was driving a waggon with four horses in the highway at Whitechapel, and he being in the waggon, and the horses upon a trot, they threw down a woman, who was going the same way with a burden upon her head, and killed her, Chief Justice Holt, Justice Tracy, Baron Bury, and the Recorder Lovel, held this to be only a misadventure (r).

But Lord Holt held in that case, if it had been in a street where people usually pass, it would have been manslaughter; but it was clearly agreed that it could not be murder (r).

It must be taken for granted from this note of the case, that the accident happened in a highway where people did not usually pass (s); for otherwise, the circumstance of the driver’s being in his cart, and going so much faster than is usual for carriages of that construction, savoured much of negligence and impropriety; for it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to stop the course of the horses suddenly in order to avoid any person who could not get out of the way in time. And indeed such conduct in a driver of so heavy a carriage might, under most circumstances, be thought to betoken a want of due care, if any, though but few, persons might probably pass by the same road. The greatest possible care is not to be expected, nor is it required; but whoever seeks to excuse himself, for having unfortunately occasioned by any act of his own the death of another, ought at least to show that he took that care to avoid it which persons in similar situations are most accustomed to do (t).

The fact that streets are usually crowded from any public procession or other cause, instead of excusing a driver when proceeding at his ordinary pace and with ordinary care, requires him to be particularly cautious, and may tend to render him criminally answerable for any

(p) 1 Hale, 476; Post. 263; 1 East's Pleas of the Crown, 263.
(q) Reg. v. Murray, 5 Cox, C. C. 509 (Ir.).
(r) O. B. Sess. before Mich. T. 1704, M. S. Tracy, 32.
(s) Unlike Whitechapel of the present day.
(t) 1 East’s Pleas of the Crown, 263.
accidents ensuing from driving at a rate, and with those precautions which he might have ordinarily observed (u).

If any one be maimed or otherwise injured by the "wanton and furious driving or racing," or by the "wilful misconduct" of the driver of any public stage carriage, the person so offending is guilty of a misdemeanor, and indictable under the statute 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 35 (x).

Under 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, s. 54, every person who, within the Metropolitan Police District, "shall ride or drive furiously, or so as to endanger the life or limb of any person, or to the common danger of the passengers in any thoroughfare," is liable to a penalty of not more than 40s.

Police constables are empowered to take a person into custody without warrant, who may commit any such offence "within view of any such constable" (y); and this power is not confined to cases where the offender's name and residence is unknown (z).

A conviction for furious driving under this statute, not alleging the offence to have been committed within view of the police constable, was held not to be a bar to an action of trespass against a police constable for the arrest and detention of the party, although such conviction was unappealed against and acquiesced in (a).

A party who suffers an injury from the careless or negligent driving of another may maintain an action, unless he has himself been guilty of such negligence or want of due care as to have contributed or conduced to the injury (b).

The driver of a public vehicle is bound to be a skilful driver, and any damage arising from his unskilful driving is a ground of action. A less degree of skill is to be looked for from the driver of a private vehicle, but he is bound to drive with reasonable care and skill. Thus, in the case of Collier v. Chaplin (c), which was an action to

Where driver is indictable under 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 35.

Furious driving in the Metropolitan Police District.

Power of police constables.

Conviction no bar to action of trespass.

Where party injured by negligent driving may maintain an action.

Duty of drivers of public and private vehicles.

(u) Reg. v. Murray, 5 Cox, C. C. 509 (Ir.).
(x) Re-enacting 1 Geo. 4, c. 4.
(y) 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, s. 54.
(z) Justice v. Gosling, 16 J. P. 105; 21 L. J., C. P. 94; 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, s. 63.
(b) See per Coltman, J., Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C. B. 130.
recover damages for an injury to the plaintiff, and to her clothes, from being upset by the defendant, when driven by him, it appeared that the plaintiff at the defendant's request took a drive with him in his cart, and that the defendant upset the cart, by reason of which a can of gas-tar, which was in the cart, was spilt over her clothes, and her ankle was injured. Mr. Justice Byles told the jury that the defendant was not bound to bring the same skill and care as a driver of a public vehicle, to the driving of his cart, in which he allowed the plaintiff to accompany him, but he was bound to drive with reasonable care and skill, and that the question for them was whether the accident arose from the defendant's culpable negligence or not.

An action lies for neglect in taking care of vicious horses, cattle, dogs, &c. As if a man ride an unruly horse in Lincoln's Inn Fields (or other public place of resort) to tame him, and he break loose and strike a person (d).

But where damage is done in consequence of a person striking a horse on which another rides, the striker is the trespasser and the rider is not (e).

A man and his wife brought an action of trespass for a battery, and declared that the defendant struck the horse whereon the wife rode, so that the horse ran away with her, whereby she was thrown down, and another horse ran over her, whereby she lost the use of two of her fingers. The jury found for the plaintiffs and gave them 48l. damages (f).

If a man drive furiously round a corner and injure a person on the further side, he is liable to an action for his negligence (g).

One of the mail carts, entering the General Post Office Yard at the rate of five or six miles an hour, knocked down and seriously injured the plaintiff, a widow. On an action being brought the defence was, that the accident was occasioned by the plaintiff's own awkwardness, in not attending to the driver's warning. Lord Campbell told the jury, that the real question was whether that was a

Negligence in the care of vicious horses, &c.
Where another person strikes a horse.
Damages recovered in trespass.

Driving furiously round a corner.
Mail cart rapidly entering Post Office Yard.

(d) See Corn. Dig. Action upon the Case for Negligence, A. 5; and Ferocious and Vicious Animals, post, Part II., Chap. II. See also Michael v. Alestree, 2 Lev. 173.

(e) Gibson v. Pepper, 2 Salk. 637.

(f) Dodwell v. Burford, 1 Mod. 24.

(g) See Mayor of Colchester v. Brooke, 7 Q. B. 359.
proper pace to drive into the yard. And they gave a verdict for the plaintiff, with 50l. damages (h).

Independently of negligent driving, an action will also lie in respect of damage sustained in a collision resulting from the improper harnessing of the defendant’s horse. Where the defendant was driving along a highway a sixteen hand horse in a van which was much too small for it, in consequence of which the horse’s houghs rubbed against the cross bar of the shafts; and the horse, having been startled by a slight collision with a cab, violently collided with an omnibus which was standing at the kerb on its proper side, producing damage; and it was clear that no accident would have happened to the omnibus if the defendant’s horse had not been too large for the van; it was held that the harnessing of the horse to such a van was the negligence which materially and proximately led to the accident (i).

If damage is caused by a horse taking fright at something which is improperly placed in the public street, the person so placing it is liable. Thus, in the following case, the plaintiff, a carman, was proceeding with his master’s cart, heavily laden, along Angel Lane, Stratford, when the horse took fright at a fire-basket, on which some asphaltte was boiling, started to one side, and, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s catching hold of the bridle, threw him down, so that the wheel passed over his leg and produced a compound fracture of the bone. He was taken to the London Hospital, where the bone was set, but hospital gangrene supervened, and he was for some days in danger of losing his leg. He, however, gradually recovered, was discharged after twelve weeks, and continued as an outpatient for a long time. Eventually he was able to walk about with the help of a stick, and earn 10s. a-week, but at the time of the accident he was in the receipt of 1l. a-week, on which he supported himself and two young daughters. The defendant had contracted to lay the floor of a room in the Angel Inn with asphaltte, which he caused to be boiled in the lane, as the smell was too powerful for the house. He had been warned of the danger of having the fire-basket in the street, and had removed it to a different part of the lane, but did not place it in the yard of the inn, where it


(i) Burkim v. Bilezikdi, 53 J. P. 760—Fry, L.J.
had been suggested it would be more out of the way. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff—damages 60l. (k).

In Harris v. Mobbs (l) a house-van attached to a steam-plough was left for the night on the grassy side of a highway by the defendant. The van and plough were four or five feet from the metalled part of the way. During the evening the plaintiff’s testator drove his mare in a cart along the metalled road. The mare was a kicker, but he was unaware of her vice. Passing the van she shied at it, kicked, and galloped, kicking for 140 yards, then got her leg over the shaft, fell, and kicked her driver as he rolled out of the cart. He afterwards died from the kick so received. In an action under Lord Campbell’s Act (9 & 10 Vict. c. 93, s. 1), by his executors for wrongful and negligent obstruction of the highway, the jury found that the van was left where it stood unreasonably, and negligently, and caused some appreciable danger to vehicles passing along the metalled parts of the road; that the death was occasioned by the van standing where it did, and by the inherent vice of the mare combined, and that there was no contributory negligence. It was held on these findings that the verdict and judgment must be for the plaintiffs; for the unauthorized, unreasonable, and dangerous user of the highway by the defendant was the proximate cause of the injury.

So, too, where an engine-driver blew off steam at a spot where a railway crossed a highway on a level, so as to frighten horses waiting to cross the line, such crossing being a place where there was considerable traffic, it was held to be actionable negligence on the part of the company (m).

But where, in an action against a railway company, it appeared that the plaintiffs were leaving a station belonging to the defendants in a carriage, when the horse was frightened by the sight and sound of an engine at the station blowing off steam, and the carriage was upset and the plaintiffs injured; and it did not appear that the engine was defective, or that it was used in an improper manner, or that the approach to the station was inconvenient; but the jury found that the defendants were guilty of negligence

(m) Manchester Rail. Co. v. Fularton, 14 Q. B., N. S. 54; 11 W. R. 764.
in not screening the railway from the roadway leading to the station, and that such negligence had caused the accident. It was held by the Court of Appeal that the defendants were not liable, as there was no evidence of any obligation on their part to screen the railway from the road (n).

Where damage has been caused by collision, there may be negligence on one side only (o); or negligence on both sides (p). Both parties may be to blame (q); or it may be altogether an accident (r). The following rules, which appear fully borne out by the cases hereafter quoted, will fix the liabilities of the parties concerned, under whatever circumstances the damage may be inflicted.

1st. If a party who is taking reasonable and proper care receives damage in consequence of a horse or carriage he encounters being negligently managed, the person who has the control over such horse or carriage is answerable.

2nd. Where damage is not the necessary consequence of a particular wrongful act, the person sustaining damage, though a wrongdoer, may recover against the person causing it, if it be shown that with ordinary care on the part of the latter, the injury might have been avoided.

3rd. But where one party by his improper conduct makes it impossible for the other party, who is also acting improperly, to avoid doing him damage, the person inflicting the injury is not liable, because the negligence of both parties concurs in producing it.

4th. Where damage is the consequence of pure accident, neither party is answerable.

In the following case the jury found for the plaintiff, being of opinion that there was negligence on the side of the defendant only. It appeared that between seven and eight o’clock on the evening of the 30th of November, the plaintiff, who was a female servant, was intending to cross High Street, Aldgate, and was stepping off the curbstone for that purpose, when a cabriolet, which came up at a pace of nine or ten miles an hour, struck against her and knocked her down, by which she was injured. In summing up, Mr. Justice Coleridge said, “If the plaintiff

(o) Negligence on one side only, infra.
(p) Negligence on both sides, post, p. 289.
(q) Both parties to blame, post, p. 298.
(r) Altogether an accident, post, p. 300.
has contributed to the accident by her own neglect, she cannot recover in this action. I will put this case. If a person in Oxford Street sees an omnibus coming, however furiously, and he will be headstrong enough to try to cross the street, and is run over, he cannot recover in an action against the proprietors of the omnibus, as no one has a right of action if he meets with an accident which by ordinary care he might have avoided. The cabriolet, it is said, was coming at the rate of nine or ten miles an hour, which was a most improper pace at such an hour and in such a place. Even a much less pace would be too fast at that time of the evening in such a place as High Street, Aldgate. If the plaintiff took reasonable and proper care, and it was on account of the extraordinary speed of the cabriolet that she could not save herself, and thus met with the accident, she is entitled to your verdict; but if she, by her own negligence and want of care, contributed to the accident, she cannot recover in this action, even though you should think the driver of the cabriolet was driving too fast, and was therefore guilty of negligence as well as the plaintiff. If, however, the plaintiff took reasonable and proper care, and it was the negligence of the driver which caused the accident, you ought to find a verdict for the plaintiff” (s).

So, also, where it appeared that the plaintiff was a passenger on the top of an omnibus, which was struck by the defendant's omnibus, and the consequence was that the omnibus on which the plaintiff sat, continuing its course, ran against some obstacle, and the plaintiff was thrown off with considerable violence, it was held by the Court of Exchequer that the defendant was liable (t).

If a horse and cart are left standing in the street, without any person to watch them, the owner is liable for any damage done by them, though it be occasioned by the act of a passer-by, in striking the horse. Thus, where damage had been done under such circumstances, Chief Justice Tindal said, “If a man chooses to leave a cart standing in the street, he must take the risk of any mischief that may be done” (u). And in like manner a master is liable if his cart be so left by his servant (x).

(s) Woolf v. Beard, 8 C. & P. 373.
(t) Rigby v. Hecott, 5 Ex. 242.
(u) Illidge v. Goodwin, 5 C. & P. 193.
(x) Lynch v. Nurdin 1 Q. B. 33.

The correctness of this decision has, however, been doubted. See Mann v. Word, 8 Times L. R. 699—per Lord Esher, M.R. See also Lygo v. Newbolt, 9 Ex. 302.
The owner of a cart or carriage is bound to have good tackle, and he is liable for an accident in consequence of its breaking; as where the chain-stay of a cart broke, and the horse being frightened ran away and did damage \((y)\); and where, in consequence of the reins breaking, a foot passenger was run over and injured \((z)\).

So, also, in the following case, in which it appeared that the defendant was driving his cart down a hill, and the horse, which was usually quiet, suddenly commenced kicking, and proceeded at a furious pace. Eventually the shafts broke, and the horse and cart came into collision with the plaintiff’s gig, and injured it. It was held that as the breaking of the shafts showed a defect in the cart, which raised a presumption of negligence in the owner, he was liable for the damage sustained by the plaintiff \((a)\).

The subject of negligence on both sides was fully considered by the Court of Exchequer in Bridge v. The Grand Junction Railway Company \((b)\), and Mr. Baron Parke there said, “the rule of law is laid down with perfect correctness in the case of Butterfield v. Forrester \((c)\), that although there may have been negligence on the part of the plaintiff, yet unless he might by the exercise of ordinary care have avoided the consequence of the defendant’s negligence, he is entitled to recover. But if by ordinary care he might have avoided them, he is the author of his own wrong.” And in a later case \((d)\) the law as deducible from preceding decisions was thus laid down by Wightman, J., delivering the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber:— “It appears to us that the proper question for the jury is, whether the damage was occasioned entirely by the negligence or improper conduct of the defendant, or whether the plaintiff himself so far contributed to the misfortune by his own negligence, or want of ordinary and common care and caution, that but for such negligence or want of ordinary and common care and caution on his part, the misfortune would not have happened. In the first place, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover; in the

\[(y)\] Welsh v. Lawrence, 2 Chit. 262.
\[(z)\] Cotteril v. Turley, 8 C. & P. 693.
\[(c)\] Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 O. East, 60; 10 R. R. 433.

Damage from tackle breaking.

Or from a defect in the carriage.

Negligence on both sides.
Where negligence of the injured party did not contribute to the accident.

Where such negligence occasioned part of the mischief.

Contributory negligence of children.

latter not, as but for his own misconduct the misfortune would not have happened. Mere negligence or want of ordinary and common care and caution would not however have disentitled him to recover, unless it was such that but for the negligence and want of ordinary care and caution the misfortune would not have happened; or if the defendant might, by the exercise of caution on his part, have avoided the consequences of the neglect or carelessness of the plaintiff."

Where the negligence of the party injured did not in any degree contribute to the immediate cause of the accident, such negligence ought not to be set up as an answer to an action brought against the person who committed an injury (e).

A person who is guilty of negligence, and thereby produces injury to another, cannot set up as a defence that part of the mischief would not have arisen if the person had not himself been guilty of some negligence (f).

The extent to which the rule relating to contributory negligence applies to the case of a child who is so young as to be incapable of exercising ordinary care and caution is somewhat doubtful. In Lynch v. Nurdin (g), the Court of Queen's Bench, after taking time to consider their judgment, held that the rule in question had no application in such cases. There, the defendant's servant had negligently left a horse and cart unattended in a public street, and the plaintiff, a child under seven years of age, during his absence, had climbed on the wheel, whereupon another child incautiously led the horse on, with the result that the plaintiff was thrown down and hurt; and it was held that the defendant was liable in an action for negligence, although the plaintiff was a trespasser and contributed to the mischief by his act; and that it was properly left to the jury to say whether the conduct of the defendant's servant was negligent, and, if so, whether his negligence caused the injury. But the authority of this case has been doubted (h), and a distinction has been drawn between cases in which the conduct of the child amounts to what in an adult would be mere negligence, and those in which it

(e) See Greenland v. Chaplin, 5 Ex. 248. See also Brownlow v. Metropolitan Board of Works, 2 F. & F. 604.

(f) Greenland v. Chaplin, 5 Ex. 243.

(g) 4 P. & D. 672; 1 Q. B. 29.

amounts to intentional trespass (i). If a child of very tender years is guilty of what in an adult would be mere negligence and nothing more, as, for instance, where it is exercising a right of passage on a public way but in a careless manner, and in so doing is injured by an act of which the negligence of another is the proximate cause, it seems clear that the conduct of the child can afford no defence to an action to recover damages on its behalf (k). But where such a child is guilty, not of mere carelessness in the doing of a lawful act, but of a wholly unlawful act such as a wilful and intentional trespass (l), it is doubtful whether such conduct will not afford a defence to an action for negligence. If Lynch v. Nurdin (m) is good law, it is clear that it would not do so, but if, on the other hand, the ruling in more recent cases is to be accepted, it would seem to be equally clear that it would (n).

As a general rule of law, every one in the conduct of that which may be harmful to others if misconducted, is bound to use due care and skill, and the wrongdoer is not without the pale of the law for this purpose (o).

Therefore, where the defendant negligently drove his horses and waggon against and killed an ass, which had been left in the highway fettered in the fore feet, and was thus unable to get out of the way of the defendant’s waggon, which was going at a smartish pace along the road, Mr. Justice Erskine told the jury, that though the act of the plaintiff in leaving the donkey on the highway so fettered as to prevent his getting out of the way of carriages travelling along it might be illegal, still if the proximate cause of the injury was attributable to the want of proper conduct on the part of the driver of the waggon, the action was maintainable against the defendant; and his could not maintain an action. See also Mongan v. Atterton, L. R., 1 Ex. 239; 35 L. J., Ex. 161, where the same conclusion was arrived at in the case of a child of four who had injured its head in meddling with a machine exposed by the defendant, unfenced, in a public place. But see as to this case the observations of Cockburn, C.J., in Clark v. Chambers, 3 Q. B. D. 338, 339. See also Pollock on Torts, 3rd ed., pp. 419, 420, 533, n.

(o) See per Lord Denman, C.J., Mayor of Colchester v. Brooke, 7 Q. B. 377.
Lordship directed them, if they thought that the accident might have been avoided by the exercise of ordinary care on the part of the driver, to find for the plaintiff, which they accordingly did.

The Court of Exchequer refused a rule for a new trial which was applied for on the ground of misdirection; and Mr. Baron Parke said, "The correct rule is laid down in Bridge v. The Grand Junction Railway Company (p), namely, that the negligence which is to preclude a plaintiff from recovering in an action of this nature, must be such as that he could by ordinary care have avoided the consequences of the defendant's negligence. Although the ass may have been wrongfully there, still the defendant was bound to go along the road at such a pace as would be likely to prevent mischief. Were this not so, a man might justify the driving over goods left on a public highway, or even over a man lying asleep there, or the purposely running against a carriage going on the wrong side of the road" (q).

In an action for damage occasioned by the defendant's negligence, a material question is, whether or not the plaintiff might have escaped the damage by ordinary care on his own part (r).

There is negligence, and a want of ordinary care, if a person riding a vicious horse, applies the spur when in close proximity to a bystander, and the horse kicks out and injures him: but there would not be negligence nor a want of ordinary care, if the person riding the horse is not aware that it is a vicious one, and it suddenly kicks out without provocation, and kills a bystander (s).

The defendant however is not excused merely because the plaintiff knew that some danger existed through the defendant's neglect, and voluntarily incurred such danger; the amount of danger, and the circumstances which led the plaintiff to incur it, are for the consideration of the jury (r).

Therefore, where Commissioners of Sewers had made a dangerous trench in the only outlet from a mews, putting up no fence, and leaving only a narrow passage, on which they heaped rubbish, and a cabman, in the exercise of his calling, attempted to lead his horse out over the rubbish, and the horse fell and was killed, for which loss he brought

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(q) Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 546.

(r) Clayards v. Dethick, 12 Q. B. 439.

(s) North v. Smith, 10 C. B., N. S. 572.
an action:—It was held by the Court of Queen's Bench that the plaintiff was not disentitled to recover because he had, at some hazard created by the defendants, brought his horse out of the stable. Also, that the case was properly left to the jury on the question whether or not the plaintiff had persisted, contrary to express warning at the time (as to which there was contradictory evidence), in running upon a great and obvious danger (r).

The mere fact of an accident happening to a very young child will not raise a presumption of negligence any more than in the case of an adult. In a case in which a child three years old strayed upon a railway, and had its leg cut off by a passing train, it was therefore held that in the absence of any evidence to show any negligence on the part of the company, they were not responsible for the injury (t). If a person using ordinary care is injured by falling over a heap on a highway, the person who left it there is liable (u).

But a person who is injured by an obstruction, against which he may fall on a highway, cannot maintain an action, if it appear that he was riding with great violence and want of ordinary care, without which he might have seen and avoided the obstruction. Thus Lord Ellenborough, C.J., said, "a party is not to cast himself upon an obstruction which has been made by the fault of another, and avail himself of it, if he do not himself use common and ordinary caution to be in the right" (x).

The opportunity, however, of seeing stones during the day is no defence to an action for damage caused by running over them at night (y).

When a railway company constructs its line across a highway on a level under the sanction of an Act of Parliament, it is the duty of the company to keep the crossing in a proper state for the passage of carriages across the rails; if, therefore, a carriage is damaged in consequence of the rails being too high above the surface of the roadway, the company is liable (z).

If a person leaves the highway and sustains injury, he cannot recover any damages. Thus, where a person stepped aside at night from a highway, and fell into the foundation of a house, and broke his leg, and brought an action against the defendant, Mr. Justice Cresswell held that there was a wilful departure from the highway, and, in summing up, directed the jury that the first question for them to consider was, whether the excavation made by the defendant prevented the public from passing in safety along the highway. A second question, involved in the first, was, whether the defendant was bound to have fenced off the excavation; and, thirdly, had the defendant tumbled into the hole while passing along the highway. The evidence was that he had departed from the road. The jury found a verdict for the defendant (a).

But when the newly-made and unfenced excavation for a house adjoins an immemorial public way, which is found by the jury to render the way unsafe to those who use it with ordinary care, it is a public nuisance, though the danger consists in the risk of accidentally deviating from the road; for the danger thus created may reasonably deter prudent persons from using the way, and thus the full enjoyment of it by the public is, in effect, as much impeded, as in the case of an ordinary nuisance to a highway (b). And a private injury arising from a public nuisance is the subject-matter of an action for damages (c).

Where a steam roller, though lawfully on the highway, constitutes a nuisance, the owners are liable for damage caused thereby although they have not been guilty of any negligence, and it is a question for the jury in each case whether the steam roller was or was not a nuisance on the occasion complained of (d).

It by no means follows that, because the person injured is a trespasser on the land at the time the injury was sustained, he cannot maintain an action. A trespasser is liable to an action for the injury which he does; but he does not forfeit his right of action for an injury sustained (e).

(a) Firth v. Ackroyd, before Mr. Justice Cresswell, York Spr. Ass. March 10, 1853.
(b) Barnes v. Ward, 9 C. B. 392; Hadley v. Taylor, L. R., 1 C. P. 53.
The proper and true test of legal liability in these cases is, whether the excavation be substantially adjoining the way. When an excavation is made adjoining a public way, so that a person walking on the public way might, by making a false step, or being affected with sudden giddiness, or, in the case of a horse or carriage, who might by the sudden starting of the horse be thrown into the excavation, it is reasonable that the person making such an excavation should be liable for the consequences. But it would not be reasonable that he should be liable for the consequences, when the excavation is made at some distance from the way, and the person falling into it would be a trespasser upon the defendant's land, before he reached it (e).

But it is not only when injury results to persons using a public way from the negligence of adjoining proprietors, that an action lies. It lies also against the owner of a private way for injury to persons lawfully, and by his permission, using it, if caused by the negligence of his servants, and if not arising from the risks attendant on the ordinary nature of the business carried on, as where the injury was caused by negligently lowering goods from a warehouse, under which the private way passed (f).

Where the defendant's horse by the negligence of his servant ran away with a cart and turned into the yard of the defendant's house, which opened on to the highway, and the plaintiff's wife who happened to be paying a visit at the house ran out into the yard to see what was the matter, when she was met and knocked down by the horse and cart, it was held that as the defendant's servant was not bound to anticipate that the woman would be in the yard, there was no duty on the part of the defendant towards her, and that the action was therefore not maintainable (g).

Where one person having a right over a private road causes an obstruction which results in an injury to another person having a similar right, the person causing the obstruction is liable. In Clark v. Chambers (h), the defen-

(g) Tolhausen v. Davies, 58 L. J., Q. B. 98—C. A. See also Batchelor v. Fortescue, 11 Q. B. D. 474—C. A.
 Liability of contractor.

dant, who was in the occupation of certain premises abutting on a private road consisting of a carriage and footway over which he had a right of way, which premises he used for the purposes of athletic sports, had erected a barrier across the road to prevent persons driving vehicles up to the fence surrounding his premises and overlooking the sports. In the middle of this barrier was a gap, which was usually open for the passage of vehicles, but which, when the sports were going on, was closed by means of a pole let down across it. It was admitted that the defendant had no legal right to erect this barrier. Some person, without the defendant's authority, removed a part of the barrier armed with spikes, commonly called chevaux-de-frise, from the carriage-way where the defendant had placed it, and put it in an upright position across the footpath. The plaintiff, on a dark night, was lawfully passing along the road on his way from one of the houses to which it led. He felt his way through the opening in the middle of the barrier, and getting on the footpath was proceeding along it when his eye came in contact with one of the spikes of the chevaux-de-frise and was injured. It was not suggested that the plaintiff was guilty of any negligence contributing to the accident, and the jury found that the use of the chevaux-de-frise in the road was dangerous to the safety of the persons using it. It was held, that the defendant, having unlawfully placed a dangerous instrument in the road, was liable in respect of injuries occasioned by it to the plaintiff, who was lawfully using the road, notwithstanding the fact that the immediate cause of the accident was the intervening act of a third party in removing the dangerous instrument from the carriage-way (h).

Although where a contractor does what he contracts to do, the act of the employed is the act of the employer; yet where the act to be done is lawful, the contractor is liable for anything done negligently, or beyond his contract (i). But a contractor lawfully employed to construct a sewer under a road, is not liable for injury caused to an individual, through a hole having formed in the roadway from the natural subsidence of the ground, the work having been properly completed by the defendant (k).


(i) Ellis v. Sheffield Gas Co., 23 L. J., Q. B. 42; Gray v. Pullen, 32

(k) Hyams v. Webster, L. R., 2 Q. B. 264; L. R., 4 Q. B. 138—Ex. Ch.
So, if a man employs another to do a thing, and there are several ways of doing it, one criminal and another innocent, and he does it in a criminal manner, the employer is not liable (l).

If a contractor, however, is employed to do an unlawful act, the employer is liable, because in such case the act of the employed is the act of the employer. Therefore, where the defendants had employed a contractor to open, without legal authority, the streets of Sheffield, and the plaintiff was injured by the rubbish, it was held that this being the act from which the injury arose, the defendants were liable (m). And where a duty is imposed on the defendant by common law (n), or by a statute (o), he cannot excuse himself by throwing the blame on his contractor.

The question in such cases is, whether the injury was the act of the party as the employer’s servant, or in the character of contractor; because in the first place the employer would be liable to an action, and in the second he would not (p). And the test applicable to the determination of this fact is whether the employer has any control over the persons employed as to the manner in which their work should be performed (q).

Thus the defendant with the consent of the owner of the soil and the surveyor of the district, employed P., who was an ordinary labourer, but nevertheless a person particularly skilled in the construction of drains, to cleanse a drain, which ran from the defendant’s garden under the public road, and paid P. five shillings for the job. The defendant had never before employed P., and did not in any way interfere with or direct him in doing the job. But it was held that the relationship of master and servant had been established between the defendant and P., so as to render the defendant liable for an injury occasioned to the plaintiff, whilst riding on the public road, by reason of the


(p) Knight v. Fox, 5 Ex. 725; Overton v. Freeman, 21 L. J., C. P. 52.

negligent manner in which P. had left the soil of the road over the drain, because P. was not a person exercising the independent business of making and repairing drains, but only a labourer chosen by the defendant in preference to any other person (r).

But in a case in which the defendants were employed by A. to pave a district, and contracted with B. to pave one of the streets, and B.'s workmen, in the course of paving the street, left some stones at night in such a position as to constitute a public nuisance, and the plaintiff was injured by falling over these stones; it was held that, as no personal interference of the defendants with, or sanction of, the work of laying down the stones was proved, the defendants were not liable (s).

When a surveyor of highways has been ordered by a vestry to do certain works on a highway, and during the performance of those works an accident occurs in consequence of the road being left in a dangerous condition, the surveyor is guilty of neglect of a statutory duty, under 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50, s. 56, and will be liable in an action for damage, notwithstanding that he has contracted with a third party for supplying the necessary labour, and has not personally interfered with the work (t).

If in the execution of works authorized by Act of Parliament damage be sustained, and the Act provides a special mode in which compensation for such damage may be recovered, no action will lie for it. But this only relates to works carefully and skilfully executed, and if there be a want of proper skill on the part of those executing the works an action for the negligence, to recover damages for the injury thus sustained, will lie (u).

Where the negligence of both parties concurs in producing the damage, so that both are to blame, neither party

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(s) Overton v. Freeman, 21 L. J., C. P. 52; Gray v. Pullen, 32 L. J., Q. B. 169; this latter case was reversed in the Exchequer Chamber, 34 L. J., Q. B. 265; but the reasoning on which the decision was founded has been disapproved; see Wilson v. Merry, L. R., 1 H. L. 326, 341.


can recover. Thus, where the plaintiff, in crossing a road, was knocked down and seriously injured by the defendant's cart, Chief Justice Tindal told the jury that they must be satisfied that the injury was attributable to the negligence of the driver and to that alone, before they could find a verdict for the plaintiff; for if they thought that it was occasioned in any degree by the improper conduct of the plaintiff in crossing the road in an incautious and imprudent manner, they must find their verdict for the defendant (x). And where an action was brought for an injury to the plaintiff's chaise by the defendant's carriage, Mr. Justice Alderson left it to the jury to say whether the injury was occasioned by negligence on the part of the defendant's servant, without any negligence on the part of the plaintiff himself; for that if the plaintiff's negligence in any way concurred in producing the injury, the defendant would be entitled to the verdict (y). So, also, if a person sees another carriage coming furiously on the wrong side of the road, and does not get out of the way when he has the opportunity, he cannot recover for any injury he may sustain (z).

In an action brought by an infant plaintiff against a railway company for an injury from an accident, which was caused by the joint negligence of the defendants and the grandmother of the child, who had charge of it, the child being unable to take care of itself, it was held by the Exchequer Chamber, affirming the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, that the child could not maintain an action against the company, as a complete identification was constituted between the plaintiff and the party whose negligence contributed to the damage (a).

In the case of Thorogood v. Bryan (b), where a person was run over and killed by an omnibus which was racing, and the negligence of the driver of the omnibus, in which the deceased was a passenger, was relied on as a defence to the action brought by the widow of the deceased, it was held that the deceased having trusted the party by selecting the particular conveyance, he had so far identified himself with the carriage in which he was travelling, that want of care on the part of its driver was a defence for the driver

\[ (a) \text{Hawkins v. Cooper, } 8 \text{ C. & P. 473.} \]
\[ (b) \text{Thorogood v. Bryan, } 8 \text{ C. B. 190.} \]
\[ (x) \text{Identification of child with person in charge of it.} \]
\[ (y) \text{Doctrine of identification of passenger with driver exploded.} \]
\[ (z) \text{See Reed v. Tute, post, p. 307.} \]
of the other carriage, which directly caused the injury; and that this was in accordance with the opinion expressed by the Court of Exchequer in Bridge v. The Grand Junction Railway Company (c). The soundness of this doctrine was, however, doubted from the first in this country (d), and subsequently in Scotland (e) and America (f), and the former case has now been finally overruled (g). The direction to the jury in an action by a passenger on an omnibus against the owner of another vehicle for compensation for damages sustained by collision should therefore be, “was there negligence on the part of the driver of the other vehicle which caused the accident? if so it is no answer to say that there was also negligence on the part of the omnibus driver,” the plaintiff in such case not being disentitled to recover by reason of the negligence of the driver of the omnibus on which he was a passenger (h).

Where the injury arises altogether from accident the defendant is not liable (i). Thus, where an action of trespass was brought for injury done to a horse by a pony and chaise running against it, the plaintiff called witnesses who said they saw the pony and chaise standing half an hour in the street without any person to take care of them, and also they afterwards saw the pony run away with the chaise and run against the plaintiff’s horse; but they did not know the cause of the pony’s starting. It was sworn on the part of the defendant, that his wife was holding the pony by the bridle, when a Punch and Judy show coming by frightened the pony, which ran away, and almost pulled down the defendant’s wife while she tried to hold it in, and she was obliged at length to let go the rein. Lord Denman, C.J., in summing up, said to the jury, “If the facts are true as suggested for the defence, I very much think you would be disposed to consider this as an inevitable accident, one which the defendant could not prevent.”

(c) Bridge v. The Grand Junction Rail. Co., 3 M. & W. 244.
(d) 1 Sm. L. C. 3rd ed. by Willis and Keating, at p. 132 a., 9th ed. p. 323. In this doubt Parke, B., seems to have concurred. See The Bernina, 12 P. D. at p. 71—per Lord Esher, M.R. See also The Milen, Lush. 388.
(i) Per Alderson, J., Plucknett v. Wilson, 6 C. & P. 375.
However, the jury disbelieved the defendant’s evidence, and found a verdict for the plaintiff (f).

In the following case, a servant was sent with a van and a horse on some errand by the defendant, with directions to bring back with him another horse, which had been left on the road. When the servant obtained possession of the second horse, which seemed to have been in the habit of following the van without being tied, he gave a boy permission to ride him. As the servant drove on, he came upon the plaintiff who was returning home late at night with a hand-barrow, and, seeing him, he turned his horse’s head out of his direct line to avoid him. The boy and horse behind, however, went on without noticing the plaintiff, and the consequence was they both fell over him and severely injured him. On the trial Chief Baron Pollock nonsuited the plaintiff, being of opinion that the defendant was not liable for this, and ruled that the declaration was not supported, as the horse which did the injury was not conducted or driven by the servant of the defendant. And the Court of Exchequer afterwards held that the Chief Baron’s ruling was correct, and that the facts clearly showed that the injury sustained by the plaintiff was the result of the purest accident (k).

This was held to be the case, where the defendant’s horse, being frightened by the sudden noise of a butcher’s cart, which was driven furiously along the street, became ungovernable, and plunged the shaft of a gig into the breast of the plaintiff’s horse (/). So, too, where a horse ridden by the defendant was frightened by a clap of thunder, and ran over the plaintiff, who was incautiously standing with others in the carriage-road (m).

In Hammack v. White (n), the defendant having bought a horse at Tattersall’s, the next day took him out to try him in Finsbury Circus, a much-frequented thoroughfare. From some unexplained cause the horse became restive, and notwithstanding the defendant’s well-directed efforts to control him, ran upon the pavement, and killed a man. It was held that these facts disclosed no evidence of negligence, which the Judge was warranted in submitting to the jury; Erle, C.J., saying, “I am of opinion that the

(f) Goodman v. Taylor, 5 C. & P. 213.
(h) Bird v. Sharpe, Ex. Nov. 5, 1853.
(l) Wakeman v. Robinson, 1 Bing.

(m) Gibbons v. Pipper, 1 Ld. Raym. 38.
plaintiff in a case of this sort is not entitled to have his case left to the jury, unless he gives some affirmative evidence that there has been negligence on the part of the defendant. The sort of negligence imputed here is either that the defendant was unskilful in the management of the horse, or imprudent in taking a vicious animal, or one with whose propensities or temper he was not sufficiently acquainted, into a populous neighbourhood. The evidence is, that the defendant was seen riding a horse at a slow pace, that the horse seemed restless and the defendant was holding the reins tightly, omitting nothing he could do to avoid the accident; but that the horse swerved from the roadway on to the pavement, where the deceased was walking, and knocked him down, and injured him fatally. I can see nothing in this evidence to show that the defendant was unskilful as a rider or in the management of a horse. There is nothing which satisfies my mind affirmatively that the defendant was not quite capable of riding so as to justify him in being with his horse at the place in question. It appears that the defendant had only bought the horse the day before, and was for the first time trying his new purchase,—using his horse in the way he intended to use it. It is said that the defendant was not justified in riding in that place a horse whose temper he was unacquainted with. But I am of opinion that a man is not to be charged with want of caution because he buys a horse without having had previous experience of him. There must be horses without number ridden every day in London of whom the riders know nothing. A variety of circumstances will make a horse restive. The mere fact of restiveness is not even prima facie evidence of negligence” (o).

Where a horse drawing a brougham under the care of the defendant’s coachman in a public street suddenly, and without any explainable cause, bolted, and, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the driver to control him, swerved on to the footway and injured the plaintiff, it was held that there was no evidence of negligence to go to the jury: and that the fact that the horse had cast a shoe shortly after he bolted, and that the driver did not under the circumstances in which he was placed call out or give any warning, did not alter the case (p).

(p) Manzoni v. Douglas, 6 Q. B.

D. 145; 40 L. J., C. P. 289; upholding Hammack v. White, ubi supra.
In all cases, therefore, where a horse runs away and
inflicts an injury, if the rider or driver have not acted in
such a manner as would lead a jury to suppose that his
conduct must have contributed to the accident, he is not
answerable (q).

But the rule that a person is not answerable for injury
resulting from circumstances over which he has no control
admits of this qualification, namely, that if a person is
aware beforehand that the circumstances in which of his
own free will he is about to place himself, will put him in
a position over which he has no control, and in which he
will probably cause injury to others, he will then be
answerable for an injury so caused; thus, if in the case
quoted above of Hammack v. White, the defendant had
been proved to have known beforehand that the horse was
vicious and unmanageable (r), he would have been held
responsible.

Where a passenger in an omnibus was injured by a
blow from one of the horses, which had kicked through the
front panel of the vehicle, and there was no evidence on
the part of the passenger that the horse was a kicker; but
it was proved that the panel bore marks of other kicks, and
that no precaution had been taken by the use of a kicking
strap or otherwise against the possible consequences of a
horse striking out, and no explanation was offered on the
part of the owner of the omnibus; it was held that there
was evidence of negligence proper to be submitted to a
jury (s).

The proof of negligence must be affirmative. Therefore
where there is a perfectly even balance of evidence there is
no negligence. Thus, in the case of Cotton v. Wood (t),
the plaintiff's wife, on a dark night, and in a snowstorm,
proceeded slowly, accompanied by another female, to cross
a crowded thoroughfare, whilst the defendant's omnibus
was coming up on the right side of the road, and at a
moderate pace. There was abundant time for the women
to have got safely across, and they had got so far across
as to have passed in front of the omnibus, when they were
alarmed by the approach of another vehicle from the

(q) See ante, p. 281: Rex v. Tim-
martin, 7 C. & P. 500; and see Holmes
v. Mather, L. R., 10 Ex. 261; 44
L. J., Ex. 170; 33 L. T., N. S. 361.
(r) See judgment of Willes, J.,
Hammack v. White, 11 C. B., N. S.
597. See also Villiers v. Avey, 3
(t) Cotton v. Wood, 8 C. B., N. S.

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Horse running away.

Qualification of rule.

Proof of neg-
ligence must
be affirmative.
opposite direction, and turned back; the result of which was that the plaintiff's wife was knocked down and run over by the omnibus, and was so injured that she died. The only circumstance which was at all suggestive of negligence on the part of the defendant was that, though he saw the women cross in front of his omnibus, he had at the moment when they turned back looked round to speak to the conductor, and therefore was not aware of their danger, until warned by a cry of a bystander, when it was too late to avert the mischief.

It was held that there was in this case no proof of negligence on the part of the defendant, for it was not shown that there existed some duty owing from the defendant to the plaintiff, of which there had been a breach. And Erle, C.J., said, "Where it is a perfectly even balance upon the evidence whether the injury complained of has resulted from the want of proper care on the one side or on the other, the party who founds his claim upon the imputation of negligence fails to establish his case."

"One of the plaintiff's witnesses stated that the driver was looking round at the time to speak to the conductor. That clearly would be no affirmative proof of negligence. The man was driving on his proper side, and at a proper pace. As far as the evidence goes, there appears to me just as much reason for saying that the plaintiff's wife came negligently into collision with the defendant's horses and omnibus as for saying that the collision was the result of negligence on the part of the defendant's servant."

"A scintilla of evidence, or a mere surmise that there may have been negligence on the part of the defendants, clearly would not justify the Judge in leaving the case to the jury. (u) There must be evidence upon which they might reasonably and properly conclude that there was negligence." "The very vague use of the term negligence has led to many cases being left to the jury, in which I have been utterly unable to find the existence of any legal duty, or any evidence of a breach of it."

And in the same case (x) Williams, J., said, "There is another rule of the law of evidence, which is of the first importance, and which is fully established in all the

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Where evidence is equally consistent with negligence and no negligence.


(x) Cotton v. Wood, 8 C.B., N.S. 568, ante, p. 303.
Courts, viz., that where the evidence is equally consistent with either view,—with the existence or non-existence of negligence,—it is not competent to the Judge to leave the matter to the jury."

So, in a case in which the defendant's horse, being on a highway, kicked the plaintiff, a child who was playing there. There being no evidence to show how the horse got to the spot, or that the defendant knew that he was there, or that the defendant knew that he was accustomed to kick, or that the horse was accustomed to kick, or what induced him to kick the child, it was held that there was no evidence from which a jury would be justified in inferring that the defendant had been guilty of actionable negligence (y).

In Abbott v. Freeman (z), the defendant was the proprietor of a yard and premises used for the sale of horses. The plaintiff attended a sale, and was walking up the yard behind a row of spectators, who were watching a horse then on sale. In order to show the horse's pace, a servant of the defendant led it with a halter down a lane formed by the spectators on one side, and a blank wall on the other. There was no barrier between the horse and the spectators, and when the horse was about ten yards from the plaintiff, another servant of the defendant struck it with a whip in order to make it trot. On being struck the horse swerved into and through the crowd, and kicked and injured the plaintiff. It was a usual thing for a man to be stationed with a whip at the particular point when horses were brought out for sale. There was no evidence as to the kind of blow that was given, nor the character of the horse, nor how it was being led, nor that it was customary to put a barrier for the protection of the public in yards where horses were being sold. The plaintiff sued the defendant to recover damages for injuries caused by the negligence of the defendant's servant; and it was held that there was no evidence upon which the jury could reasonably find negligence on the part of the defendant.

But there are cases in which the mere occurrence of an accident is prima facie proof of negligence, the presumption depending upon the nature of the accident. Thus in a case in which the plaintiff, while walking in a street in front of the house of a flour-dealer, was injured

When a horse standing in a highway kicked a child.

Horse kicking at sale.

Accident itself sometimes affirmative proof of negligence.

(z) 35 L. T., N. S. 783—C. A.

Reversing 34 L. T., N. S. 544—Ex. D.

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by a barrel of flour falling upon him from an upper window, it was held that the mere fact of the accident without any proof of the circumstances under which it occurred was evidence of negligence to go to the jury in an action against the flour-dealer, the declaration alleging that the plaintiff was injured by the negligence of the defendant’s servants. And Pollock, C.B., said, “There are certain cases of which it may be said res ipsa loquitur, and this seems to be one of them. The Courts have held that from certain occurrences negligence may be presumed, railway accidents, &c.” (a).

It may be taken as a rule that the same evidence is required to establish a case of negligence as would suffice to convict a man of manslaughter (b).

Rule of the Road.

The customary rules of driving are, first, that in meeting each party should bear or keep to the left; secondly, that in passing, the foremost person bearing to the left, the other shall pass on the off-side; thirdly, that in crossing, the driver coming transverse, shall bear to the left-hand, so as to be behind the other carriage (c). And these rules are judicially recognised without proof (d). It is customary for foot passengers to take the right-hand side.

In the case of highways not regulated by special Acts, the law of the road is a statutory enactment under 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50, s. 78; and by section 85, sub-section (1) of the Local Government Act, 1888, “bicycles, tricycles, velocipedes, and other similar machines,” are declared to be carriages within the meaning of the Highway Acts.

If there be no peculiar circumstances to the contrary, it is the duty of each party to keep the regular side of the road. However, a person riding or driving is not bound to keep his side; but if he does not, he must use more care, and keep a better look-out, to avoid collision, than would be necessary if he were on the proper part of the road (e).


(b) See judgments of Williams, J., and Wilde, J., Hammack v. White, 11 C. B., N. S. 588.

(c) 2 Steph. N. P. 984.

(d) 1 Taylor on Evidence, 9th ed. 6.

But the mere fact of a man driving on the wrong side of the road is no evidence of negligent driving in an action brought against him for running over a person, who was crossing a road on foot (f).

If a person driving on the wrong side of the road in the dark accidentally injures another carriage or person, he is answerable for it (g).

If a person driving a gig on his proper side sees a gig coming down on the wrong side of the road, he must not let himself be run down, but if he have time and room, must get out of the way; for if he does not, he cannot bring an action and recover damages (h).

And where an action was brought for negligently driving against the plaintiff's horse, and it appeared that the defendant's chaise came out of another road, and in crossing over to its right side broke the leg of the plaintiff's horse, which was then on the wrong side of the road. Lord Ellenborough held that the circumstance of the person being on the wrong side of the road was not sufficient to discharge the defendant; for though a person might be on his wrong side of the road, if the road was of sufficient breadth, so that there was full and ample room for the party to pass, he was of opinion that he was bound to take that course which would carry him clear of the person who was on his wrong side; and that if an injury happened by running against such a person he would be answerable. A person being on his wrong side of the road could not justify another in wantonly doing an injury which might be avoided. The question, therefore, to be left to the jury was, whether there was such room, that, though the plaintiff's servant was on his wrong side of the road, there was sufficient room for the defendant's carriage to pass between the plaintiff's horse and the other side of the road (i).

And in another similar case it was held by the Court of King's Bench, that whatever might be the law of the road, it was not to be considered as inflexible and imperatively governing cases where negligence was the question. In the crowded streets of the metropolis, situations and circum-

(f) Lloyd v. Ogleby, 5 C. B., N. S. 697.

(g) See Handyside v. Wilson, 3 C. & P. 530; Alexander v. Lidley, ante, p. 306; Elwin v. Chapman, Cor. Lord Campbell, C. J., Norwich Spr. Assizes, 1853. See also Leane v. Bray, 3 East, 593.

(h) Per Paterson, J., Reed v. Tate, Newcastle Spr. Ass. 1846; and see Case of the Commerce, 3 Rob. Adm. Cas. 287.


Driving on the wrong side in the dark.

Seeing a person coming on his wrong side.

Does not justify a wanton injury.

Rule of the road not inflexible.
stances might frequently arise where a deviation from what is called the law of the road would not only be justifiable but absolutely necessary. Of this the jury are the best judges; and, independently of the law of the road, it is their province to determine from whose negligence the accident has arisen (j).

On the same principle, apparently, it has been laid down in the United States that a traveller on foot or on horseback must give way to, and, if necessary, cross the road for a vehicle with a heavy load (k), and that a lightly-loaded vehicle must, in like manner, give way to a heavily-loaded one (l).

Though the rule of the road is not to be adhered to, if by departing from it an injury can be avoided, and there is clear space enough to get out of the way, yet in cases where parties meet on a sudden, and an injury results, the party on the wrong side is answerable, unless it clearly appear that the party on the right side had ample means and opportunity to prevent it (m).

The rule of the road as to keeping the proper side applies to saddle horses as well as to carriages; and if a carriage and a horse are to pass, the carriage must keep its proper side and so must the horse. But if the driver of a carriage is on his proper side, and sees a horse coming furiously on its wrong side of the road, it is the duty of the driver of the carriage to give way and avoid an accident, although in so doing he goes a little on what would otherwise be the wrong side of the road (n).

The introduction of tramways has been said to have considerably modified the rule of the road as above stated. There is no reported case on this point in any of the English Reports, but in Scotland Lord President Inglis, in delivering judgment in Jardine v. Stonefield Laundry Co. (o), said, "There is one rule of the road which has been very much altered by the appearance of these new vehicles, viz., that one carriage overtaking another is bound to pass it upon the right-hand side. The new rule requires that when a carriage is coming up behind a tramway car, and the car stops, the driver of the other vehicle shall

(k) Beach v. Parmeter, 23 Penn. St. 196.
(m) Chaplin v. Hawes, 3 C. & P. 554.
(n) Turley v. Thomas, 8 C. & P. 103.
(o) 14 Rettie, 839.
pass upon the left-hand side. That is the opposite of
the old rule. The new rule has been introduced from con-
siderations of convenience and safety; and the reason is
very obvious, because tramway cars pass upon two lines
of tramways, one in one direction, and another in the
other. If vehicles were to pass a car on the right-hand
side, there would be very great danger of their coming into
collision with another car coming the opposite way. That
is the reason of the rule."

In America it has been held that the rule of the road
had no application to the meeting of ordinary vehicles with
street cars; the ground for such decision being, that the
latter cannot turn off their path, and the former should
turn to that side which appears, under the circumstances,
to be the safest, without regard to the usual rule; and the
fact that either was on the left of the road at the time of a
collision is no evidence of negligence (p). And for the
same reason, when a collision occurs between an ordinary
vehicle and a street car, travelling side by side, the pre-
sumption is that the driver of the vehicle was negligent,
the car being unable to turn out (q). This rule appears
to be dictated by common sense, and to be applicable to
similar cases of collision between an ordinary vehicle and a
tramcar in England.

The law as to foot passengers is laid down in the follow-
ing case, where an action of trespass was brought for
running over a foot passenger with a carriage which was
on its wrong side of the road, and Mr. Justice Patteson
said to the jury, "A foot passenger has a right to cross a
highway; and it was held in one case (r) that a foot pas-
senger has a right to walk along the carriage way. But
without going that length, it is quite clear that a foot pas-
senger has a right to cross, and that persons driving car-
rriages along the road are liable if they do not take care
so as to avoid driving against the foot passengers who are
crossing the road; and if a person driving along the road
cannot pull up because his reins break, that will be no
ground of defence, as he is bound to have proper tackle."

"With respect to what has been said about the car-
rriage being on the wrong side of the road, I think you
should lay it out of your consideration, as the rule as to

(q) Snyden v. Grand St. Rail. Co., 41 Barb. 365; Siegel v. Eisen,

40 Cal. 109.
407.
the proper side of the road does not apply with respect to foot passengers; and as regards the foot passengers, the carriages may go on whichever side of the road they please’’ (s).

It is the duty of a person who is driving over a crossing for foot passengers at the entrance of a street, to drive slowly, cautiously, and carefully; but it is also the duty of a foot passenger to use due care and caution in going upon such crossing, so as not to get among the carriages, and so receive injury (t).

A person dismounting from a tramcar is just as much bound to look after his own safety as if he were crossing from one side of the street to the other. It is just as much a carriage way as the whole street, and while vehicles are bound to go at a steady pace, and not to be driven furiously, foot passengers crossing carriage ways are bound to look after their own safety, and not to run obvious and unnecessary risk (u).

If there be a nuisance in a public highway, a private individual cannot of his own authority abate it, unless it does him a special injury, and he can only interfere with it so far as is necessary to exercise his right of passing along the highway; and he cannot justify doing any damage to the property of the person who has improperly placed the nuisance in the highway, if, avoiding it, he might have passed on with reasonable convenience (x).

A tradesman may remove a horse and cart or carriage from before his door, if it impedes his business. Thus if a hackney coach stands before a shopkeeper’s door, and hinders customers, he may lawfully take hold of the horses and lead them away, and is not bound to take his remedy for damages (y).

(e) Catterill v. Turley, 8 C. & P. 693. See also Lloyd v. Ogley, 5 C. B., N. S. 667.


(y) Slater v. Swann, 2 Str. 872. But see the remarks of Jessel, M.R., in Original Hartlepool Coll. Co. v. Gibb, 5 Ch. D. at pp. 721, 722, from which it would appear that the tradesman could only act in the manner above indicated upon the assumption that the obstruction was unreasonable.
Negligent Driving by a Servant.

It was formerly held that the master was liable only where his servant caused injury by doing a lawful act negligently, but not where he wilfully did an illegal one; and, therefore, in cases of negligent driving, where the servant had the authority of his master to do the particular act, namely, to drive along the highway, which is perfectly lawful in itself, it was held by Mr. Justice Patteson that the master was chargeable, because the act so authorized by him had been done negligently; but that if the servant drove wilfully against another, the master was not chargeable for the injury done (z).

But this definition is not an exhaustive one, for the liability of the master extends beyond the lawful acts of his servant. And the test of his liability is, not whether the acts of his servant are illegal and wilful, or the contrary, but whether they are within the scope of the servant’s employment and in the execution of the service for which he is engaged (a).

In the case of Limpus v. The General Omnibus Company (a), decided in the Exchequer Chamber, which fixed and defined the law on this subject, the driver of the defendant’s omnibus drove it across the road in front of a rival omnibus belonging to the plaintiff, which was thereby overturned. The driver said, that he pulled across the plaintiff’s omnibus to prevent it passing him. The defendants had given printed instructions to their driver not to obstruct any omnibus.

Mr. Baron Martin, before whom the case was tried, directed the jury that, “When the relation of master and servant existed, the master was responsible for the reckless and improper conduct of his servant in the course of the service; that if the jury believed that the defendant’s driver, being dissatisfied and irritated with the plaintiff’s driver, acted recklessly, wantonly, and improperly, but in the course of the service and employment, and doing that which he believed to be for the interest of the defendants, then they were responsible; that if the act of the defendants’ driver, although a reckless driving on his part, was nevertheless an act done by him in the course of his service

When the master was liable according to former decisions.

Liability now held to be more extensive.

Limpus v. The General Omnibus Company.

Acts done within employment and for master’s interest.

(z) Lyons v. Martin, 8 A. & E. 515; S. C., 3 Nev. & P. 509; and see M’Manus v. Cricket, 1 East, 106; (a) Limpus v. The General Omnibus Co., 1 H. & C. 526.
and to do that which he thought best to suit the interest of his employers, and so to interfere with the trade and business of the other omnibus, the defendants were responsible; that the instructions given to the defendants’ driver by them were immaterial if he did not pursue them; but that, if the act of the defendants’ servant was an act of his own, and in order to effect a purpose of his own, the defendants were not responsible.” This direction was held to be right by all the Judges with the exception of Mr. Justice Wightman.

Mr. Justice Williams in the course of the argument said, “If a driver in a moment of passion vindictively strikes a horse with a whip, that would not be an act done in the course of his employment; but in this case the servant was pursuing the purpose for which he was employed, viz., to drive the defendants’ omnibus. Suppose a master told his servant not to drive when he was drunk, but he nevertheless did so, would not the master be responsible?” And in his judgment he said: “If a master employs a servant to drive and manage a carriage, the master is responsible for any misconduct of the servant in driving and managing it, which must be considered as having resulted from the performance of the duty entrusted to him, and especially if he was acting for his master’s benefit and not for any purpose of his own.”

Mr. Justice Willes said, with reference to the question whether the injury was done by the driver in the course of his employment, “It may be said that it was no part of the duty of the defendants’ servant to obstruct the plaintiff’s omnibus, and moreover the servant had distinct instructions not to obstruct any omnibus whatever. In my opinion, those instructions are immaterial. If disobeyed, the law casts upon the master a liability for the act of his servant in the course of his employment; and the law is not so futile as to allow a master, by giving secret instructions to his servant, to discharge himself from liability. Therefore, I consider it immaterial that the defendants directed their servant not to do the act. Suppose a master told his servant not to break the law, would that exempt the master from responsibility for an unlawful act done by his servant in the course of his employment? The act of driving as he did is not inconsistent with his employment, when explained by his desire to get before the other omnibus,” which desire was prompted by the fact “that he was employed not only to drive the omnibus, which alone would
not support this summing-up, but also to get as much money as he could for his master, and to do it in rivalry with other omnibuses on the road.”

Mr. Justice Bylès, after expressing his agreement with the direction of Mr. Baron Martin, said, “The direction amounts to this, that if a person acts in the prosecution of his master’s business for the benefit of his master, and not for the benefit of himself, the master is liable, although the act may in one sense be wilful on the part of the servant. It is said that what was done was contrary to the master’s instructions; but that might be said in ninety-nine out of a hundred cases in which actions are brought for reckless driving. It is also said that the act was illegal. So, in almost every action for negligent driving, an illegal act is imputed to the servant. If we were to hold this direction wrong, in almost every case a driver would come forward and exaggerate his own misconduct, so that the master would be absolved. Looking at what is a reasonable direction, as well as at what has been already decided, I think this summing-up perfectly correct.”

And Mr. Justice Blackburn said, with reference to the act being done by the defendant when “in the course of his service and employment,” it is “not universally true that every act done for the interest of the master is done in the course of the employment. A footman might think it for the interest of his master to drive the coach, but no one could say that it was within the scope of the footman’s employment, and that the master would be liable for damage resulting from the wilful act of the footman in taking charge of the horses. But, in this case, I think the direction given to the jury was a sufficient guide to enable them to say whether the particular act was done in the course of the employment. The learned Judge goes on to say, that the instructions given to the defendants’ servants were immaterial if he did not pursue them (upon which all are agreed); and at the end of his direction he points out that, if the jury were of opinion ‘that the true character of the act of the defendants’ servant was, that it was an act of his own and in order to effect a purpose of his own, the defendants were not responsible.’ That meets the case which I have already alluded to. If the jury should come to the conclusion that he did the act, not to further his master’s interest nor in the course of his employment, but from private spite, and with the object of injuring his enemy, the defendants were not responsible. That removes
all objection, and meets the suggestion that the jury may have been misled by the previous part of the summing-up."

Generally speaking, the relationship of master and servant will not be inferred. Thus where the plaintiff’s horse was injured by another horse which became restive owing to the noise of the band of the Salvation Army in the public street, and he thereupon brought an action against the head of the Salvation Army for damages; it was held, that in the absence of evidence to show what the relationship was between the particular members of the Army and the defendant, it could not be inferred that such members were his servants, or were acting under his authority (b).

Under the London Hackney Carriages Act, 1843 (6 & 7 Vic. c. 86), so far as the public is concerned, the registered proprietor of a hackney carriage is responsible for the acts of his driver whilst he is plying for hire as if the relationship of master and servant existed between them, even though it does not, in fact, exist (c).

The registered proprietor of a cab in London is therefore liable for the loss of a passenger’s luggage through the negligence of the driver (d), or for personal injury to the passenger or a stranger (e), or damage to the horse or carriage of another (f), caused by the negligence of the driver, where there is no wrongful user of the cab by the driver. The fact that the driver through whose negligence the injury was caused is really the servant of a person to whom the cab has been let by the proprietor is immaterial, for the latter cannot, by letting his cab, escape from his liability under the statute. But the right of action against the proprietor which the statute gives to the injured party in such a case does not interfere with any right of action which the latter may have at common law against the driver’s master in the ordinary sense of that word (g).

(b) *London General Omnibus Co. v. Booth*, 63 L. J., Q. B. 244.

(c) *King v. London Improved Cab Co.*, 23 Q. B. D. 281; 58 L. J., Q. B. 456; 61 L. T., N. S. 34; 37 W. R. 737; 53 J. P. 788—C. A., approving *Venables v. Smith*, 2 Q. B. D. 279; 46 L. J., Q. B. 470; 36 L. T., N. S. 509; 25 W. R. 584; and overruling *King v. Spurr*, 8 Q. B. D. 104, where it was held that there is only a *prima facie* presumption of such relationship which may be rebutted by the circumstances of the case. See also *Keen v. Henry*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 292; 63 L. J., Q. B. 211; 69 L. T., N. S. 671; 42 W. R. 214; 58 J. P. 262—C. A., where the effect of the ruling in *King v. London Improved Cab Co.* upon the decision in *King v. Spurr* was pointed out by the Court.


(e) *Venables v. Smith*, ubi supra; *King v. London Improved Cab Co.* ubi supra.

(f) *Keen v. Henry*, ubi supra.

(g) *Keen v. Henry*, [1895] 2 Q. B. 292, 294—per Lord Esher, M.R.
If an injury is caused by the negligence of the driver whilst wrongfully using the cab, or doing anything contrary to the terms of the bailment as between himself and the proprietor, the latter will not be liable, as his liability only exists with respect to acts done by the driver within the scope of his employment. Where a driver, who had no specified time for starting or returning to the proprietor's stables, made a short deviation, for his own convenience, at the close of his day's work, and while returning to the stables, and after such deviation, he was again returning when he ran over and injured the plaintiff; it was held, that the driver was not on an independent journey, and must be considered to be in the proprietor's employ at the time of the accident \((k)\). In that case it was contended on behalf of the proprietor that the driver was not acting within the scope of his employment, and Cockburn, C.J., said \((i)\), "To determine whether the driver was so acting or not, it is necessary to consider what the terms were upon which the cab was entrusted to the driver. If the employment of the cab by the driver at the time when the mischief was done was wrongful, in the sense that it was beyond the scope of the bailment, then the master would not be responsible; because it is with regard to the employment of the cab within the scope of such bailment that the relation of master and servant is created by the statutes for the protection of the public. But it appears that the cab was entrusted to the driver to use entirely at his discretion, provided that he used it properly and returned it to the proprietor's stables when the day's work was over, paying the sum agreed upon between them for the hire of it. I cannot see that the driver did anything wrongful, or contrary to the terms of the bailment as between himself and the proprietor."

Where in an action for personal injury against a cab proprietor it appeared that the plaintiff was knocked down and injured by a cab belonging to the defendant, the licensed driver being inside drunk, and the vehicle being driven by an unlicensed man also drunk, but not the servant of the defendant, a nonsuit was ordered to be entered \((k)\).

In *Smith v. Bailey* \((l)\) it was sought to extend the construction placed on the Hackney Carriages Act in the cases

\[(k)\] Venables v. Smith, ubi supra.
\[(i)\] 2 Q. B. D. 283.
\[(k)\] Mann v. Ward, 8 Times L. R. 699.

\[(l)\] 1891] 2 Q. B. 403; 60 L. J., Q. B. 779; 65 L. T., N. S. 331; 40 W. R. 28—C. A.

Liability of owner of traction engine.
just cited to sections 3 and 7 of the Locomotives Act, 1865 (28 & 29 Vict. c. 83), the former of which requires the name and address of the owner to be affixed to a traction engine, the contention being that the legislation was analogous. But the Court declined to do so, Lord Esher, M.R., (m) saying, "I do not think that the construction which has been placed on the Hackney Carriages Acts is any authority for the construction of this Act. Each Act must be construed according to its own language. I see nothing in this Act to show that the Legislature intended that, if a traction engine is let out and negligently used by the person to whom it is let, the owner of it shall be responsible to a person thereby injured." And it was accordingly held that the owner of a traction engine, to which his name and address were duly affixed, was not liable in respect of injuries occasioned to the plaintiff through the negligent management of the engine whilst it was being used upon a highway by a person to whom it had been let.

Where a master and servant are together in a vehicle, and an accident occurs from which an immediate injury ensues, the master is liable, although the servant is driving, and there is no evidence of any interference on the master’s part; and even where the evidence on the part of the defendant strictly negatives an interference, the mere presence of the master with the servant will constitute him a trespasser if the act of the servant amount to a trespass (n).

So where a carriage and horses are hired, and the post-boys are servants of the owner, and an accident ensues in consequence of their negligence, the biker, if he sit outside and have a view of their proceedings, and do not endeavour to stop their misconduct, is a co-trespasser with them (o).

A master is liable in an action for damage resulting from the negligence with which his cart has been driven, although it should appear that his servant was not driving at the time of the accident, but had entrusted the reins to a stranger who was riding with him, and who was not in the master’s service (p).

It is doubtful whether the servant of the proprietor of a public vehicle has an implied authority, in cases of sudden emergency, to appoint another person to act as servant on his master’s behalf (q), but it is clear that a servant

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(m) [1891] 2 Q. B. at p. 406.
(n) Chandler v. Broughton, 1 Cr. & M. 29.
(p) Booth v. Mister, 7 C. & P. 66.
(q) In Gwilliam v. Twist, [1895] 2 Q. B. 84, Lord Esher said that he was very much inclined to agree with the view that the doctrine of
employed to drive such a vehicle has no authority to delegate the performance of his duty to another person, unless there is a necessity for so doing. This was so held by the Court of Appeal in the recent case of *Gwilliam v. Twist* (r). There, the defendant's omnibus was being driven by his servant through a public street when a policeman, thinking that the driver was drunk, ordered him to discontinue driving, the omnibus being then only a quarter of a mile from the defendant's yard. The driver and the conductor of the omnibus thereupon authorised a person who happened to be standing by to drive the omnibus home. That person through his negligence while so driving injured the plaintiff. It was held, reversing the judgment of a Divisional Court, that as the defendants might have been communicated with, there was no necessity for their servants to employ the other person, and the employment of such person in the absence of necessity, being clearly beyond the scope of their duty, the defendants were not liable for the negligence of the person so employed.

If a servant driving his master's carriage, in order to effect some purpose of his own, wantonly strike the horse of another person, and produce an accident, the master will not be liable. But if in order to perform his master's orders he strikes, but injudiciously, and in order to extricate himself from a difficulty, that will be negligent and careless conduct, for which the master will be liable, being an act done in pursuance of the servant's employment. And where a coachman, in consequence of his master's carriage having become entangled with another, struck the other horses, which were standing still without a driver, upon which they ran away and upset the carriage, the jury thought that the entangling arose originally from the fault of the coachman, and that as he was acting within the scope of his employment in endeavouring to extricate himself, the master was liable (s).

The fact that a passenger in an omnibus is struck by the driver's whip is prima facie evidence of negligence by the driver in the course of his employment; and even if it appears that the blow was struck at the servant of another omnibus, with whom there had been a dispute, and who

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(r) [1895] 2 Q. B. 84; 64 L. J., Q. B. 474; 72 L. T., N. S. 579; 43 W. R. 566.

(s) Per curiam in *Croft v. Alison*, 4 B. & Ald. 592.
had jumped on the omnibus step to get his number, it is a question for the jury whether the blow was struck by the driver in private spite, or in supposed furtherance of his employer's interests (t).

It was held by the Exchequer Chamber in the case of *Seymour v. Greenwood* (u) that the master was liable, where the guard of an omnibus belonging to him, in removing therefrom a passenger, whom he deemed to be drunk, dragged him out with undue violence, and threw him upon the ground, whereby he was seriously injured; for the master, by giving the guard authority to remove offensive passengers, necessarily gives him authority to determine whether any passenger had misconducted himself. And inasmuch as the master puts the guard in his place because it is not convenient for him personally to conduct the omnibus, if the guard forms a wrong judgment, the master is responsible (x).

But where a van was standing at the door of the plaintiff, from which the plaintiff's goods were being unladen, and the plaintiff's gig was standing behind the van: and the defendant's coachman drove her carriage up, and there not being room for the carriage to pass, the coachman got off his box and laid hold of the van horse's head; and this caused the van to move, and thereby a packing-case fell out of the van and broke the shafts of the gig; it was held, with the assent of the Barons sitting in the Exchequer Chamber, that the defendant was not liable, as the coachman was not acting in the employ of his mistress, that is, within the scope of his employment, at the time this matter occurred (y).

If a servant does what his master employs him to do in a negligent, improper, or round-about way, and damage is done, his master is liable (z).

If a servant driving his master's cart, on his master's business, make a *detour* from the direct road for some purpose of his own, his master will be answerable in damages for any injury occasioned by his careless driving while so out of his road (a). Because wherever the master has intrusted the servant with the control of the carriage, it is

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(u) *Seymour v. Greenwood*, 7 H. & N. 355.


(a) *Joel v. Morrison*, 6 C. & P. 501.
no answer that the servant acted improperly in the management of it; but the master in such case will be liable, because he has put it in the servant's power to mismanage the carriage by entrusting him with it. And this was so held by Mr. Justice Erskine, where a servant, having set his master down in Stamford Street, was directed by him to put up in Castle Street, Leicester Square; but in so doing, he went to deliver a parcel of his own in Old Street Road, and in returning along it he drove against an old woman and injured her (b).

So, in Whatman v. Pearson (c), the defendant, a contractor under a district board, was engaged in constructing a sewer, and employed men with horses and carts. The men so employed were allowed an hour for dinner, but were not permitted to go home to dine, or leave their horses and carts. One of the men went home, about a quarter of a mile out of the direct line of his work to his dinner, and left his horse unattended in the street before his door. The horse ran away and damaged certain railings belonging to the plaintiff; and it was held that it was properly left to the jury to say whether the driver was acting within the scope of his employment, and that they were justified in finding that he was.

But where a servant is acting, and knows that he is acting, contrary to his trust, and to his master's employment, the master is not liable for any damage which may be done by him (d).

Thus if a servant without his master's leave or knowledge take his cart or carriage when it is not wanted, and drive it about for his own purposes, the master is not answerable for any injury he may do, because he has not in such case entrusted him with the cart or carriage (e). So where it was the duty of the defendant's carman, after having delivered his master's goods for the day, to return to the house, get the key of the stable, and put up his horse and cart in a mews in an adjoining street; on his return one evening he got the key, and instead of going to the mews, and without the defendant's leave, he drove a fellow-servant in an opposite direction, and on his way back injured the

(b) Sleath v. Wilson, 9 C. & P. 608.  
(c) L. R., 3 C. P. 422; and see Burns v. Poulsen, L. R., 6 C. P. 563; 42 L. J., C. P. 302.  
(e) Joel v. Morrison, 6 C. & P. 501; Sleath v. Wilson, 9 C. & P. 608.
plaintiff by his negligent driving; it was held that the defendant was not liable (f).

And this is further illustrated by Storey v. Ashton. In that case the defendant, a wine merchant, sent his carman and clerk with a horse and cart to deliver some wine, and bring back some empty bottles; on their return, when about a quarter of a mile from the defendant’s offices, the carman, instead of performing his duty and driving to the defendant’s offices, depositing the bottles, and taking the horse and cart to stables in the neighbourhood, was induced by the clerk (it being after business hours) to drive in quite another direction on business of the clerk’s; and while they were thus driving the plaintiff was run over, owing to the negligence of the carman; it was held that the defendant was not liable, for that the carman was not doing the act, in doing which he had been guilty of negligence, in the course of his employment as a servant (g).

But Cockburn, C.J., in delivering judgment in this case, said, “I think that the judgments of Maule and Cresswell, J.J., in Mitchell v. Crassweller (h), express the true view of the law, and the view which we ought to abide by: and that we cannot adopt the view of Erskine, J., in Sleath v. Wilson (i), that is, because the master has entrusted the servant with the control of the horse and cart that the master is responsible. The true rule is, that the master is only responsible so long as the servant can be said to be doing the act, in the doing of which he is guilty of negligence, in the course of his employment as a servant. I am very far from saying, if the servant, when going on his master’s business, took a somewhat longer road, that, owing to his deviation, he would cease to be in the employment of the master, so as to divest the latter of all liability; in such cases it is a question of degree as to how far the deviation could be considered a separate journey.”

The case of Rayner v. Mitchell (k) is another instance of a servant acting beyond the scope of his authority. There a carman, without his master’s permission, and for a purpose of his own wholly unconnected with his master’s business, took out his master’s horse and cart, and on his way home negligently ran against a cab and damaged it.

(g) Storey v. Ashton, L. R., 4 Q. B. 476; 38 L. J., Q. B. 223; 17 W. R. 727.

(h) See note (f), ante.
(i) See note (e), ante.
(k) 2 C. P. D. 359; 25 W. R.
The course of the employment of the carman was, that, with the horse and cart, he took out beer to his master's customers, who was a brewer, and in returning to the brewery, he called for empty casks wherever they would be likely to be collected, for which he received from his master a gratuity of 1d. each. At the time of the accident the carman had with him two casks, which he had picked up on his return journey at a public-house which his master supplied, and for which he afterwards received the customary 1d.: and it was held, that the carman had not re-entered upon his ordinary duties at the time of the accident, and, therefore, the master was not liable.

Where a master sent his servant on an errand, and he took and rode a horse belonging to another person without his master's permission, and on his way back inflicted an injury on the plaintiff, Mr. Justice Park said, "I cannot bring myself to go the length of supposing that if a man sends his servant on an errand without providing him with a horse, and he meets a friend who has one, who permits him to ride, and an injury happens in consequence, the master is responsible for that act. If it were so, every master might be ruined by acts done by his servant, without his knowledge or authority (l).

But where (m) the general manager of the defendant, a horsedealer, had a horse and gig of his own, which he used for the defendant's business as well as his own, and was allowed to keep them on the defendant's premises at the defendant's expense; and, on one occasion, the manager, on putting the horse into the gig, told the defendant that he was going to S. to collect a debt for him and afterwards to see his own doctor; and before he got to S. he drove against and killed the plaintiff's horse; it was held that there was abundant evidence to make the defendant responsible, although he had not expressly requested the manager to use the horse and gig on that occasion; and that it is not necessary in cases of this sort that there should be any express request, as the jury may imply a request or assent from the general nature of the servant's duty and employment (n). And it was also held in the same case (m) that the proper question to leave to the jury is, whether at the time of the act complained of, the servant was driving on his master's business and with his authority.

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(m) Patten v. Rea, 26 L. J., C. P. 1 Lord Raym. 264, per Holt, C.J.

(n) See also Turberville v. Stampe,
According to the language used in the report of the case of *Stables v. Eley* (o), it has been held that if, in an action for negligent driving, it appears that the defendant has held himself out to the world as the owner of a cart by suffering his name to remain painted on it, and over the door of the house of business to which it belongs, an action is maintainable against him in respect of the negligence of the driver, although it is proved that he had for some days ceased to be the owner of the cart, or to be concerned in the business. But this case was recently commented on and disapproved of in the Court of Appeal (p), Lord Esher, M.R., remarking that it must either be misreported or wrong, and that the utmost effect that can be given to the decision is that under such circumstances there would be *primâ facie* evidence of liability, which might be met, however, by showing the truth of the matter (q), and in this opinion Bowen and Kay, L.JJ., concurred.

Where a carriage strikes against another, and a person who sees the transaction demands the address of the owner, the address given by a person in the carriage is admissible in evidence; but a statement that any damages done will be paid for is not so (r).

If a servant, in the course of his master's employ, drives over any person and does a wilful injury (described by Martin, B., as an act of his own, and in order to effect a purpose of his own (s), the servant, and not the master, is liable; if the servant, by his negligent driving, in the course of his employment, causes an injury, the master is liable; if the master himself is driving, or though not actually driving is sanctioning the conduct of his servant, he is liable whether the damage be the effect of negligence or of a wilful act done or sanctioned by him (t).

It is a well-established rule of law that a servant cannot ordinarily sue his master for an injury sustained through the negligence of a fellow-servant (u). And a stranger

(q) [1891] 2 Q. B. at p. 406.
(s) *Limpus v. General Omnibus Co.* ante, p. 311.
(u) *Tarrant v. Webb*, 25 L. J., C. P. 261; *Waller v. South Eastern Rail. Co.*, 32 L. J., Ex. 205; *Hall v. Johnson*, 13 W. R. 411; *Wiggett v. Fox*, 25 L. J., Ex. 188. The law relating to the liability of employers to make compensation for injuries suffered by workmen in their service is extended and regulated by the *Employers' Liability Act*, 1880 (43 & 44 Vict. c. 42); but that act does
invited by a servant, or one who volunteers to assist a servant in his work, while engaged in giving such assistance, bears the same relation to the master as a servant, and is subject to the same disabilities in this respect.

But in all cases the master is bound to use due care in the selection of competent servants, and is liable for negligence in employing incompetent persons to his servants and to those acting as such. Nevertheless he is not bound to warrant the competency of his servants; and in an action against him for an injury done by one of his servants to another, the question for the jury is, not whether the servant was incompetent, but whether the master exercised due care in employing him.

The usual terms on which a cab proprietor lets a cab to a driver are, that the owner feeds the horse, and exercises no control over the driver after he leaves the yard, for which the driver pays a fixed sum a day. Under such circumstances the relation between the parties is that of bailor and bailee; and the proprietor is liable to the driver if he do not take reasonable precautions to provide a horse reasonably fit for the purpose, and injury is thereby caused to the driver.

This was the conclusion arrived at by Byles and Grove, JJ., Willes, J., dissenting, upon motion to enter judgment for the defendant after verdict for the plaintiff in an action by the driver against the proprietor of a cab for injury sustained by reason of the former having been supplied with a vicious and unmanageable horse. This judgment was appealed from, but the Judges in the Exchequer Chamber being divided in opinion delivered no judgment on the point of law, though they ordered a new trial in order that the question whether the plaintiff had taken on himself the risk with respect to the horse's fitness might be submitted to a jury. On the new trial coming on for hearing the jury found that there had been personal negligence on the part of the defendant in the selection of the horse; and on this a third trial was refused. So

(z) Fowler v. Lock, L. R., 7 C. P. 272; 41 L. J., C. P. 99; 26 L. T., N. S. 476.
(a) L. R., 9 C. P. 751, n.; 43 L. J., C. P. 394, n.; 30 L. T., N. S. 800.
(b) L. R., 10 C. P. 90; 43 L. J., C. P. 394, n.; 31 L. T., N. S. 844; 23 W. R. 415.
that the judgment of Byles and Grove, JJ., still holds good, and the law is as above stated (c).

Formerly, if a person were killed, no action could be maintained by his representatives. Now, however, deodands are abolished (d), and under Lord Campbell’s Act (e) a party causing death is liable to an action in all cases where the party injured might himself have maintained one, if death had not ensued. And such action is to be brought, within twelve calendar months of the death of the injured party, by his executor or administrator, and to be “for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child of the person whose death shall have been so caused,” and among whom the damages are to be divided as the jury shall direct (f). A child en ventre sa mère is entitled to sue under this Act on the death of its father by negligence (g).

This Act is amended by and is to be read with the 27 & 28 Vict. c. 95, called “An Act for compensating the families of persons killed by accident,” by the first section of which, where no action has been brought within six months of the death by the executor or administrator of the person killed, then the action may be brought by the persons beneficially interested in the result of the action. The action may be maintained by a relative of the deceased, though brought within six calendar months from the death, unless there be at the time an executor or administrator of the deceased (h). By the second section, the money paid into court may be paid in one sum, without regard to its division into shares (i).

The condition contained in Lord Campbell’s Act (e), that the action is maintainable in all cases when the party injured might himself have maintained one, if death had not ensued, has reference not to the nature of the loss or injury sustained, but to the circumstances under which the bodily injury arose, and the nature of the wrongful act, neglect or default complained of (h). Thus, if the deceased has by his own negligence materially contributed to the accident by which he lost his life, as he, if still living, could not

(c) See also Gibbon v. Standon, 16 L. T., N. S. 497—per Byles, J., at N. P.
(d) 9 & 10 Vict. c. 62.
(e) Ibid., c. 93.
(f) Ibid., ss. 1, 2, 3.
(g) The George and Richard, L. R., 3 Adm. 466; 24 L. T., N. S. 717.
(h) Hoil and Bagnell, L. R., 4 Ir. 740—C. P. D.
(i) 27 & 28 Vict. c. 95.
have maintained an action in respect of any bodily injury thus sustained, notwithstanding there might have been negligence on the part of the defendants, an action cannot be maintained under Lord Campbell's Act. But supposing the circumstances of the negligence to be such that, if death had not ensued, the deceased might have brought his action in respect of any injury arising to him from it, his representative, or a person beneficially interested in the result of the action, might maintain an action in respect of an injury arising from a pecuniary loss occasioned by the death, although that pecuniary loss would not have resulted from the accident to the deceased, if he had lived (q). But in order to maintain the action the persons on whose behalf it is brought must prove that during the lifetime of the deceased a pecuniary advantage accrued to them owing to their relationship with him. They are not entitled to compensation under the statute, if the only pecuniary benefit to them from his life was derived from a contract which they had entered into with him (m).

In an action for negligent driving, a plan, which is to be put into the hands of the witnesses, should merely show the street, the pavement, the turnings, corners, &c., and not the supposed position of the carriages; for if it is allowed, the Judge will not allow it to be used (n).

An award of compensation by a magistrate against the driver of a hackney or metropolitan stage-carriage upon an information for furious driving under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 86, s. 28 (the London Hackney Carriages Act, 1843), is a bar to a subsequent action against such driver’s employers by the party injured in respect of his injuries. And if the party accepts such compensation he is barred from further proceedings, even where he did not lay the information, or, in the first instance, request the magistrate to award compensation (o).

Damage to goods and injury to the person, although they have been occasioned by one and the same wrongful act,

are infringements of different rights, and give rise to distinct causes of action; and therefore the recovery in an action of compensation for damage to the goods is no bar to an action subsequently commenced for the injury to the person. Thus where the plaintiff brought an action in a county court for damage to his cab occasioned by the negligence of the defendant’s servant, and, having recovered the amount claimed, afterwards brought an action in the High Court against the defendant, claiming damages for personal injury due to the same negligence; it was held, by Brett, M.R., and Bowen, L.J., Lord Coleridge, C.J., dissenting, that the latter action was maintainable, and was not barred by the previous proceedings in the county court (p).

Generally speaking, where an injury arises from the misconduct of another, the party who is injured has a right to recover from the injuring party for all the consequences of that injury. And it is quite clear that every person who does a wrong is at least responsible for all the mischievous consequences that may reasonably be expected to result, under ordinary circumstances, from such misconduct (q).

A servant, in breach of the Metropolitan Police Act (2 & 3 Vict. c. 47), s. 54, washed a van in a public street, and allowed the waste water to run down the gutter towards a grating leading to the sewer, about twenty-five yards off. In consequence of the extreme severity of the weather, the grating was obstructed by ice, and the water flowed over a portion of the causeway, which was ill-paved and uneven, and there froze. There was no evidence that the master knew of the grating being obstructed. A horse, while being led past the spot, slipped upon the ice and broke its leg. It was held that this was a consequence too remote to be attributed to the wrongful act of the servant (r). And Bovill, C.J., said, “No doubt, one who commits a wrongful act is responsible for the ordinary consequences which are likely to result therefrom; but, generally speaking, he is not liable for damage which is not the natural or ordinary consequence of such act, unless it be shown that he knows, or has reasonable means

(q) Rigby v. Hewitt, 5 Ex. 243.
(r) Sharp v. Powell, L. R., 7 C. P. 253; 41 L. J., C. P. 98; 28 L. T., N. S. 436.
of knowing, that consequences not usually resulting from
the act are, by reason of some existing cause, likely to
intervene so as to occasion damage to a third person. Where there is no reason to expect it, and no knowledge
in the person doing the wrongful act that such a state of
things exists as to render the damage probable if injury
does result to a third person, it is generally considered that
the wrongful act is not the proximate cause of the injury,
so as to render the wrongdoer liable to an action" (s).

A.'s carriage was driven against the wheel of B.'s chaise,
and the collision threw a person who was in the chaise upon
the dashing-board. The dashing-board fell on the back of
the horse, and caused him to kick, and thereby the chaise
was injured. It was held that B. was entitled to recover
in trespass against A. damages commensurate with the
whole of the injury sustained (t).

Where a horse has been injured by negligent driving,
the jury must give as damages the expenses of curing the
horse and of his keep during that time, in addition to the
difference between the value of the horse before he was
injured, and his value after he had been cured. Thus in
an action for negligent driving, whereby the plaintiff's horse
was injured, it appeared that the horse was sent to a
farrier's for six weeks for the purpose of being cured. At
the end of that time it was ascertained that the horse was
permanently damaged to the extent of 20l. And it was
held by Mr. Justice Coleridge, that the proper measure of
damages was the keep of the horse at the farrier's, the
amount of the farrier's bill, and the difference between
the value of the horse at the time of the accident and at the
end of six weeks; but that the plaintiff ought not to be
allowed also for the hire of another horse during the six
weeks (u).

In an action by the personal representatives of a deceased
person, to recover damages for his death under 8 & 10
Vict. c. 93, the jury, in assessing the damages, are confined
to injuries of which a pecuniary estimate can be made, and
cannot take into their consideration the mental suffering or
the loss of society occasioned to the survivors by his
death (x).

(s) See note (r), ante.
(t) Gilbertson v. Richardson, 6
(u) Hughes v. Quentin, 3 C. & P.
703.
(x) Blake v. Midland Rail. Co.,
21 L. J., Q. B. 233; Pym v. Great
Northern Rail. Co., 4 B. & S.
396.
Such an action cannot be maintained without some evidence of actual pecuniary damage (y), or the loss of the reasonable probability of pecuniary benefit from the continuance of the life of the deceased (z).

The expectation of life of the deceased is an element to be considered by the jury in assessing damages (a). But the jury are to give a fair compensation, and not to treat the damages on the footing of the value of an annuity (b).

Where the widow of the deceased is the plaintiff, and her husband has made provision for her by a policy on his own life in her favour, the amount of such policy is not to be deducted from the amount of damages previously assessed irrespective of such consideration; as she is benefited only by the accelerated receipt of the amount of the policy, and that benefit being represented by the interest of the money during the period of acceleration, may be compensated by deducting premiums from the estimated future earnings of the deceased (c).

No damages can be given for funeral expenses or mourning. For the subject matter of the statute is compensation for injury by reason of a relative not being alive, and there is no language in the statute referring to the cost of the ceremonial of respect paid to the memory of the deceased in his funeral, or in putting on mourning for his loss (d).

The remedy given by Lord Campbell’s Act (e) is not given to a class but to individuals; and, therefore, on the death of a person, whose income arose from land and personality independent of any exertion of his own, although no portion of it was lost to his family, as a whole, by his death, the action is maintainable, if, in consequence of that death, the mode of its distribution is changed to the detriment of some of the members of the family, though to the advantage of others (f).

(z) Pyn v. Great Northern Rail. Co., 4 B. & S. 396.
(e) 9 & 10 Vict. c. 33.
(f) Pyn v. Great Northern Rail. Co., 4 B. & S. 396.
CHAPTER II.

FEROCIOUS AND VICIOUS ANIMALS.

It is laid down that "there is a difference between things _feræ nature_, as lions, bears, &c., which a man must always keep up at his peril, and beasts that are _mansuetæ nature_, and break through the tameness of their nature, such as oxen and horses" (a).

Thus in the case of _Besozzi v. Harris_ (b), the defendant was owner of a bear, which he left fastened by a chain six feet long, on a part of his premises accessible to persons frequenting his house. The plaintiff walking past his house was seized by the bear, and injured. An action being brought for damages for this injury, it appeared at the trial that there was no notice or caution, written or verbal, to those visiting the premises, but the bear was proved to have been always tame and docile in its habits up to the time of this attack being made on the plaintiff. The evidence was contradictory as to the plaintiff's knowledge of the bear being there. Mr. Justice Crowder thus laid down the law to the jury, "The statement in the declaration, that the defendant knew the bear to be of a fierce nature, must be taken to be proved, as every one must know that such animals as lions and bears are of a savage nature. For though such nature may sleep for a time, this case shows that it may wake up at any time. A person who keeps such an animal is bound so to keep it that it shall do no damage. If it be insufficiently kept, or so kept that a person passing is not sufficiently protected, the owner is liable. If the plaintiff, with knowledge that the bear was there, put herself into a position to receive the injury, she could not recover. But, assuming such knowledge, it is for you to say, whether she had such notice of the proximity of the bear as would amount to negligence disentitling her to recover." The jury found for the plaintiff.

(a) _Rex v. Huggins_, 2 Ld. Raym. 1583.  
(b) _Besozzi v. Harris_, 1 F. & F. 92.
An elephant kept for the purpose of exhibition cannot be said to belong to a class of animals which, according to the experience of mankind, is not dangerous to man, and therefore the owner of such an animal keeps it at his own risk, and his liability for damage is not affected by his ignorance of its dangerous character (c). The broad principle which governs cases of this nature is, according to Bowen, L.J. (d), that laid down in Fletcher v. Rylands (e), that a person who brings upon his land anything that would not naturally come upon it, and which is in itself dangerous, must take care that it is kept under proper control.

It would appear, however, only fair and right that whoever keeps an animal of any description, should keep it at his risk, and that for any injury occasioned by it he ought to be civilly responsible, whether he know of its mischievous propensities or not. And it ought only to be necessary to prove a scienter, where it is sought to make him criminally responsible.

Neither the Athenian nor Roman law required it to be proved, that the owner had notice of the mischievous propensities of the animal. They probably thought that for civil purposes, when A. sustains damage by the horns, hoofs or teeth of an animal in which B. has a beneficial property, and over which he has the exclusive control, it is for B., and not for A., an innocent stranger, to ascertain that which should determine the degree of care which ought to be exercised (f).

So also in the French code, neither knowledge in the owner of the mischievous qualities of the animal, nor even the existence of these qualities, is regarded (g).

In arguing the case of Mason v. Keeling (h), it was said, "If a man have an unruly horse, which breaks through his close or stable and does mischief, an action will lie for it; and it is hard that one should thus have a remedy for the least trespass done in his land, and none for a trespass done to his person, by wounding or maiming. Suppose one keeps several mastiffs, shall he be exempt from an action for mischief done by every one of them, till he knows

(d) 25 Q. B. D. at p. 261.
(e) L. R., 1 Ex. 265; L. R., 3 H. L. 330.
(g) Code Civil, No. 1385; Card v. Case, 5 C. B. 627, n.; see also Exodus, chap. 21, vv. 21, 29, 30, 31, 32, 36.
(h) Mason v. Keeling, 12 Mod. 333; S. C., 1 Id. Raym. 606.
that he has done a prior mischief? Is no care to be taken to prevent a first mischief?"

And in accordance with this common sense view of the case, it was decided in Scotland, that a scienter was not necessary; and Lord Cockburn said, "I have always thought that if a dog worries sheep, his master is liable. I do not attach any weight to the law of England. I am told that knowledge on the part of the owner is requisite to make him liable. This is absurd; he cannot know it until it is done. This would allow each dog to have one worry with impunity" (i).

But this case was carried to the House of Lords, where Lord Cockburn's judgment was reversed on the ground of there being no allegation of a scienter nor of negligence on the part of the defendant, it being held that blame can only attach to the owner of a dog, when, after having ascertained that the animal has propensities not generally belonging to his race, he omits to take precautions to protect the public against the ill consequences of those anomalous habits. However, in this case Lord Campbell said, "If in Scotland it is sufficient to allege negligence on the part of the owner, without averring or proving his knowledge of the animal's habits, it is not that the foundation of the action is different, but that the Scotch law does not so readily permit the owner of the animal to rely on the general consequences from its being supposed to be an animal mansuetae nature, a supposition which experience shows to be very often far from the truth, and which I am inclined to think that we in England have sometimes too readily acted on" (j).

By the law of England, as laid down in a large number of cases, a scienter is held necessary (k); and therefore, as there is practically no efficient means of keeping snapping dogs, &c., off the highways, every dog has the opportunity of indulging once in the luxury, not, since the 28 & 29 Vict. c. 60 (as to which see post, p. 334), of worrying sheep, as suggested by Lord Cockburn, but of biting men, women and children. But it was the opinion of the Court in Smith v. Cook (l) that the rule requiring proof of scienter

(j) Ibid., 25 L. T. 73.
in the case of injuries by animals *mansuetae naturae* is an artificial rule which ought not to be extended.

Thus, where the plaintiff was severely bitten by a fierce mongrel mastiff, which the owner allowed to range the streets of London unmuzzled, it was held that to recover damages the plaintiff must prove that the defendant knew the dog to be of a mischievous nature (*m*).

In an action to recover damages for injuries caused by a savage dog, it is not necessary that the dog should belong to the defendant; if he harbours it or allows it to resort to his premises, he sufficiently keeps it to render himself liable (*n*). But where the defendant has done all that is reasonable to get rid of a stray dog which has come on to his premises, he will not be liable for any injury it may do (*o*).

In an action on the case for keeping a mischievous dog, by which the plaintiff’s child was bitten, report of the dog having been bitten by a mad dog was held to be evidence to go to the jury, that the plaintiff knew the dog was mischievous and ought to be confined, and particularly as by tying up the dog he had shown some knowledge or suspicion of the fact (*p*).

It was held also in the case of *Gething v. Morgan* (*q*), that where a dog had bitten a girl four years before he worried the plaintiff’s sheep, an action would lie.

It is not necessary to show that the dog has bitten another man before it bit the plaintiff; it is sufficient to show that the defendant knew it had evinced a savage disposition by attempting to bite (*r*). But a mere habit of bounding upon and seizing persons, not so as to hurt or injure them, though causing some annoyance and trivial accidental damage to clothes, will not sustain an action (*s*).

Where the defendant was a milkman, and his wife occasionally attended to his business, carried on in the premises where he kept the dog, it was held that a complaint that the dog had bitten a person, made to the wife on the pre-

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(*m*) Mason v. Keeling, 12 Mod. 332.
(*p*) Jones v. Perry, 2 Esp. 482.
(*r*) Worth v. Gilling, L. R., 2 C. P. 1. See also Judge v. Cox, 1 Stark. 285; 18 R. R. 769; Beck v. Dyson, 4 Camp. 198; 16 R. R. 774; and Thomas v. Morgan, 4 D. P. C. 223, appear to be to the contrary effect.
(*s*) Line v. Taylor, 3 F. & F. 731.
mises, to be communicated to the husband, was evidence of *scienter* (t). But the converse 'does not hold good, and a notice to the husband will not, taken alone, be sufficient proof of *scienter* to render the wife liable after her husband’s death (u).

If the owner of a dog appoints a servant to keep it, the servant’s knowledge of the dog’s ferocity is the knowledge of the master (v). But notice to an ordinary servant is not sufficient of itself to charge the master, (x) though, if under the circumstances it would be the duty of such servant on becoming aware of the animal’s ferocity to inform the master, which in each case is a question for the jury (y), then the fact of the notice to the servant would be some evidence of actual knowledge on the part of the master (z).

With respect to questions of *scienter*, there is no difference between a corporation and an individual; and whatever is notice to a person competent to receive it is notice to the corporation. Thus, where a passenger by a steam-boat went to the premises of the company to which it belonged, to inquire for his luggage, and while there was bitten by a dog of the company, which had to the knowledge of persons in their employ (but who had no control over their business or authority with respect to the dog), previously bitten another person; it was held that, assuming the company to be aware of the dangerous nature of the dog, they were liable in damages, but that there was no evidence of a *scienter* to enable the passenger to maintain an action (a). It is doubtful whether a promise by the owner of the dog, on being informed of the injury it has done, to make compensation, is evidence of *scienter*. In *Beck v. Dyson* (b) it was held that it was not so. But in *Thomas v. Morgan* (c) it was held that it was evidence, though of the slightest degree.

An action may be maintained against a person for damages done to the plaintiff’s game by his dog, which

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(v) Baldwin v. Casella, L. R., 7 Ex. 325; 41 L. J., Ex. 167; 26 L. T., N. S. 707; 21 W. R. 16.
(w) Ibid. See also Colket v. Norris, 2 Times L. R. 471—C. A.
(x) Applebee v. Perey, L. R., 9 C. P. at p. 658—per Lord Coleridge, C.J. See also Cleverton v. Ufford, 3 Times L. R. 509.
(a) 4 Camp. 198; 16 R. R. 774.
(b) D. P. C. 233.
was in the habit of hunting game on its own account, and in a peculiarly destructive manner, a fact known to the defendant, who also knew that the plaintiff preserved game (d).

In the case of injury by a dog to sheep or cattle, evidence of a mischievous propensity of the dog or of the owner's knowledge thereof is rendered unnecessary by the 28 & 29 Vict. c. 60; and the Act also simplifies in such cases the proof of the ownership of the dog.

By sect. 1, "the owner of every dog shall be liable in damages for injury done to any cattle or sheep by his dog, and it shall not be necessary for the party seeking such damages to show a previous mischievous propensity in such dog, or the owner's knowledge of such previous propensity, or that the injury was attributable to neglect on the part of the owner." The word "cattle" in this section includes horses and mares (e).

By sect. 2, "The occupier of any house or premises, where any dog was kept or permitted to live or remain at the time of such injury, shall be deemed to be the owner of such dog, and shall be liable as such, unless the said occupier can prove that he was not the owner of such dog at the time the injury complained of was committed, and that such dog was kept or permitted to live or remain in the said house or premises without his sanction or knowledge; provided always, that where there are more occupiers than one in any house or premises, let in separate apartments or lodgings or otherwise, the occupier of that particular part of the premises in which such dogs shall have been kept or permitted to live or remain at the time of such injury shall be deemed to be the owner of such dog."

Sect. 1 of the 34 & 35 Vict. c. 56 (The Dogs Act, 1871), provides that any police officer may take possession of any dog that he has reason to suppose to be savage or dangerous straying on any highway, and not under the control of any person, and may detain such dog until the owner has claimed the same, and paid all expenses incurred by reason of such detention. By sect. 2, any Court of Summary Jurisdiction may take cognizance of a complaint that a dog is dangerous, and not kept under proper control, and if it appears to the Court having cognizance of such complaint that such a dog

(e) Wright v. Pearson, L. R., 4

is dangerous, the Court may make an order in a summary way directing the dog to be kept by the owner under proper control or destroyed, and any person failing to comply with such order shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding twenty shillings for every day during which he fails to comply with such order. It is not necessary to show knowledge by the owner that a dog is dangerous in order to support a complaint under this section (f). The Court may order a dangerous dog to be destroyed, without giving the owner the option of keeping it under proper control (g). Whether a dog is under control or not is a question of fact, not of law (h). By sect. 3, power is given to the local authority to make, and when made vary or revoke an order placing restrictions upon dogs being at large, if danger from mad dogs is apprehended (i). In the absence of any special provision for the mode of publication of such an order it is enough to show that such an order has been posted up in five or six places within a borough (k).

By sect. 22 of the Diseases of Animals Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 57), (xxx) and (xxxi), the Board of Agriculture may make such orders as they think fit, subject and according to the provisions of the Act, for prescribing and regulating the muzzling of dogs, and the keeping of dogs under control; and for prescribing and regulating the seizure, detention, and disposal (including slaughter), of stray dogs and dogs not muzzled, and of dogs not kept under control, and the recovery from the owners of the dogs of the expense incurred in respect of their detention.

Where a horse which had strayed upon a highway without apparent reason kicked a child, it was held, independently of any question of negligence on the part of the owner, that in the absence of any proof of knowledge of a vicious disposition, the latter was not liable (l); the apparent reason for this decision being, that it is not in accordance with the ordinary nature of horses to kick human beings.

But where, through the defect of a gate which the defendant was bound to repair, the defendant's horse

(f) Parker v. Walsh, 1 Times L. R. 583.
(g) Pickering v. Marsh, 43 L. J., M. C. 143; 22 W. R. 798.
(i) As to proof of ownership under this section, see Wren v. Pocock, 34 L. T., N. S. 697.
(k) R. v. Huntingdon JJ., 4 Q. B. D. 522.
strayed into a field belonging to the plaintiff, and kicked his horse; it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover without any proof of \textit{sciente} \textit{(m)}. So where the defendant's horse injured the plaintiff's mare by biting and kicking her through the fence separating the plaintiff's land from the defendant's \textit{(n)}; the reason for the decision in each case being, that the damage was the natural and direct consequence of a trespass for which the defendants were liable. In both cases there was evidence of negligence, but in the latter case it was held that the defendants were liable, apart from any question of negligence on their part \textit{(o)}.

The result of the authorities dealing with the liability of the owners of animals for damage done by them under such circumstances is stated to be, "That in the case of animals trespassing on land, the mere act of the animal belonging to a man, which he could not foresee, or which he took all reasonable means of preventing may be a trespass, inasmuch as the same act if done by himself would have been a trespass" \textit{(p)}.

This rule does not, however, apply to damage done by cattle straying off a highway on which they are being lawfully driven, whether such highway is a country road \textit{(q)}, or a town street \textit{(r)}; the owner in such case being liable only on proof of negligence.

Whether the owner of a dog is answerable in trespass for every unauthorized entry of the animal into the land of another, as is the case with an ox, is an undecided point. The better opinion would appear to be that he is not \textit{(s)}.


\textit{(o)} The ruling in these cases is inconsistent with that in Scottellet v. Eltham (Freem. 634 C. P.) as reported. According to the report, the declaration stated that the defendant kept his horse so negligently that it broke into the plaintiff's close, and bit some of his horses so that "they were spoilt, and died," and a verdict was found for the plaintiff, but judgment was arrested because no \textit{sciente} was alleged. It is, however, suggested either that the report is erroneous, and it was really an action on the case, or that the decision must be considered as bad law.

\textit{(p)} Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co., L. R., 10 C. P. at p. 13, per Brett, J.


FEROCIOUS AND VICIOUS ANIMALS.

Where the plaintiff was digging a well in a garden adjoining that of the defendant, and the defendant's dog jumped over the wall separating the two gardens, and fell down the well and injured the plaintiff; it was held that, as the dog was not shown to be mischievous to the knowledge of the owner, the plaintiff had no cause of action either for trespass or breach of duty (t).

In Card v. Case (w), Maule, J., is reported to have said that it might be that an allegation of negligence, coupled with consequent damage to the plaintiff, would show a cause of action; and this view appears to have been adopted by the Court in Jones v. Owen (x), where it was held that the finding by an arbitrator that the defendant had been guilty of negligence in allowing his two greyhounds, coupled together, to be at large on a highway, with the result that they rushed against and severely injured the plaintiff, was good in law although there was no evidence of scienter; Willes, J., saying that it was not a case in which the Court had to deal with the acts of dogs by themselves, as the cause of the accident was partly the act of the master and partly that of the dogs.

Where a servant breaking an ungovernable pair of horses in Lincoln's Inn Fields, ran over and hurt a man, it was held that no scienter was necessary, as a place so frequented by the public was an improper place for horse-breaking (y).

But where a bull made mad, from having been "cut or hoxed," escaped through the defendant's negligence, and tossed, gored and wounded the plaintiff, and a verdict was found for him, the judgment was arrested, because there was no scienter alleged in the declaration (z).

And where a bull passing along a highway, seeing the plaintiff with a red handkerchief, ran at and gored him, the decision turned upon the question, whether or not the owner of the bull knew that he had a tendency to run at any person wearing red (a).

So, too, in a case in which a ram, which is an animal known to be mischievous at certain seasons, butted and injured the plaintiff's wife in the street, the Court of Exchequer held that the owner of the animal was not liable

(5) 5 C. B. at p. 634.
(6) 24 L. T., N. S. 587.
(8) Bayntine v. Sharp, 1 Lutw. 90.
(9) Hudson v. Roberts, 6 Ex. 697.

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to an action in the absence of evidence that he was aware of its propensity to attack passers-by (b).

If through negligence a vicious beast goes abroad, after warning or notice of his condition, and kills a person, it is the opinion of Hale, that it is manslaughter in the owner (c). And if he purposely let him loose, and wander abroad, with a design to do mischief, even though it were merely to frighten people and make sport, and the beast kills a man, it is murder in the owner (c).

The owner of a vicious animal, after notice of its having done an injury, is bound to secure it at all events, and is liable in damages to a party subsequently injured, if the mode he has adopted to secure it proves insufficient (d).

A person who keeps an animal accustomed to attack and bite mankind, with knowledge that it is so accustomed, is primâ facie liable in an action at the suit of any person attacked and injured by such animal (e).

The gist of the action being the keeping of the animal after knowledge of its mischievous propensities (e).

And it is not necessary to prove negligence or default in the securing or taking care of it (e).

No action lies for an injury done by a fierce dog to a person trespassing on the owner's premises (f); or incautiously entering them by night, knowing the dog to be let loose for the protection of the premises (g). But though a person has a right to keep a fierce dog to protect his property, he must not place it in the open approaches to his house, so as to injure persons lawfully coming there (h). If the person injured has no means of knowing the danger, and is not otherwise in fault, he may recover, although the owner has attempted to give notice, and it is, therefore, no answer to such an action, that a printed notice was put up, if it appears that the plaintiff could not read (i); and it is immaterial that he has, on a previous

(b) Jackson v. Smithson, 15 M. & W. 563.
(d) Blackman v. Simmons, 3 C. & P. 138.
(f) See also Besozzi v. Harris, 1 P. & F. 92, ante, p. 329. See also Fletcher v. Rylands, L. R., 1 Ex. 265, 281.
(g) Sarch v. Blackburn, M. & M. 505; 4 C. & P. 297.
(h) Brock v. Copeland, 1 Esp. 203; 5 B. R. 730; Deane v. Clayton, 1 B. Moo. 225, 245.
(i) Ibid., M. & M. 505; 4 C. & P. 297.
day, been warned against going near the dog, if the jury thinks that the injury was not occasioned by his own carelessness and want of caution (k).

In an action for an injury by a vicious bull, the plaintiff recovered, although it appeared that the bull was attracted by a cow, the plaintiff was driving past the field in which the bull was, and that the plaintiff first struck the bull on the head to drive him away from the cow (l).

To justify a person in shooting a dog for worrying his sheep, it is not necessary to prove that he was shot in the act; it having been held that it is sufficient if it appear that he has been accustomed to worry sheep, and that just before he was shot he had been worrying sheep, and could not have been otherwise restrained from further doing so (m).

In that case the act of shooting would appear to have been done in the protection of the defendant's property; but where the owner of sheep which had been worried by a dog, shot the dog in a field at some distance from that in which his sheep had been worried, it was held that there was no justification as the act was not done in the protection of his property (n).

It has, moreover, been held that a person cannot justify shooting a dog worrying his fowls, unless it appear that the dog was in the very act at the time, and could not otherwise be prevented (o). But it would seem that if the transaction had taken place in the person's poultry-yard, it would be enough to show that the dog was pursuing the fowl. Because when a dog is killed pursuing conies in a warren, it is sufficient to state that the dog was pursuing conies there, and it is not necessary to prove that the dog could not otherwise be prevented killing them (p).

The servant of the owner of an ancient deer park may justify shooting a dog that is chasing the deer, although such shooting may not be absolutely necessary for the preservation of the deer; and notwithstanding that the dog may not have been chasing deer at the moment when it was shot, if the chasing of the deer and the shooting of the dog were all one and the same transaction (q).

To justify shooting the dog of another person, it is not sufficient to show that it was of a ferocious disposition,

*(l) See note (d), ante.*
*(m) Kellett v. Stanward, 4 Ir. Jur. 50 (Ex. Ir.).*
*(n) Wells v. Head, 4 C. & P. 568.*
*(o) Janson v. Brown, 1 Camp. 41;*
and was at large; but it must be actually attacking the party at the time. Therefore, where the defendant was passing the plaintiff's house, and the plaintiff's dog ran out and bit his gaiter, and on the defendant turning round and raising his gun, the dog ran away, it was held that the defendant was not justified in shooting it (r). It is a question for the jury whether a person who has struck or killed a dog has done so for his own preservation, or whether it was a wilful and malicious trespass on his part (s).

(s) Hanway v. Boulbee, 4 C. & P. 350; 1 M. & Rob. 15.
CHAPTER III.

THE LIABILITIES OF PARTIES HUNTING OR TRESPASSING UPON THE LANDS OF ANOTHER.

Hunting and Trespassing.

Where the fox, gray, or otter, and other noxious animals, are pursued as vermin, and the governing object of the pursuers is their extirpation, as such, and not merely the amusement of "a run," the law, as laid down in the older authorities, is to a certain extent correct at the present day.

It is laid down that one may justify hunting foxes over the ground of another because they are noisome vermin (a); and also gray or otter and other noxious animals, as they are injurious to the commonwealth (b). And in Gundry v. Feltham (c), Lord Mansfield, C.J., said, "By all the cases as far back as the reign of Henry the Eighth, it is settled that a man may follow a fox into the grounds of another."

But a person so hunting must not unnecessarily trample down another man's hedges, nor maliciously ride over his grounds; for if he does more than is absolutely necessary he cannot justify it (c). Therefore, pursuing an animal as vermin does not justify fifty or sixty people following the dogs (d).

A man cannot justify entering a close or digging up the soil to hunt or take a fox, badger, &c., though it be for the public good (e). So that it appears a person cannot enter another's grounds to find vermin, nor can he dig it out when it has run to earth.

Persons hunting for their own amusement, and going over the lands of another, are trespassers; and fox-hunters, like all other hunters, may be warned off (f).

(b) Com. Dig. Pleader, 3 M. 37.
(c) Gundry v. Feltham, 1 T. R. 337; 1 R. R. 215.
(d) Earl of Essex v. Capel, Hertford Summer Assizes, 1809.
(e) Com. Dig. Pleader, 3 M. 37, and the authorities there cited.
This point was decided by Lord Ellenborough in the case of The Earl of Essex v. Capel (g), which settled the law on the subject and has never been questioned. An action of trespass was brought for breaking, entering and hunting over the plaintiff's lands, and the defence was that the fox was pursued as vermin. But Lord Ellenborough said: 'The defendant states in his plea that the trespass was not committed for the purpose of diversion and amusement of the chase merely, but as the only way and means of killing and destroying the fox. Now if you were to put it upon this question, which was the principal motive? Can any man of common sense hesitate in saying that the principal motive and inducement was not the killing of vermin, but the enjoyment of the sport and diversion of the chase? And we cannot make a new law to suit the pleasures and amusements of those gentlemen who choose to hunt for their diversion. These pleasures are to be taken only where there is the consent of those who are likely to be injured by them, but they must be necessarily subservient to the consent of others. There may be such a public nuisance by a noxious animal as may justify the running him to his earth, but then you cannot justify the digging for him afterwards; that has been ascertained and settled by the law. But even if an animal may be pursued with dogs, it does not follow that fifty or sixty people have therefore a right to follow the dogs and trespass on other people's lands. I cannot see what it is that is contended for by the defendant. The only case which will at all bear him out is that of Gundry v. Feltham (h); if it be necessary I should be glad that that case should be fully considered. I have looked into the case in the Year Book (i); that seems to be nothing more than the case of a person who had chased a stag from the forest into his own land, where he killed it; and on an action of trespass being brought against the forester who came and took the stag, he justified, that he had made fresh suit after the stag; and it was held that he might state that he was justified, and the plaintiff took nothing by his writ. This is the case upon which that of Gundry v. Feltham (h) is built, but it is founded only on an obiter dictum of Justice Brook, and it

\[ (g) \text{The Earl of Essex v. Capel, Hertford Summer Assizes, 1809, cited in Chitty on Game Laws, 31. See also Paul v. Summerhayes, 4 Q. B. D. 9; 48 L. J., M. C. 33; 39 L. T., N. S. 574; 27 W. R. 215, in which this case was discussed and approved.} \]

\[ (h) \text{Gundry v. Feltham, 1 T. R. 337; 1 R. R. 215.} \]

\[ (i) \text{12 Hen. 8, p. 9.} \]
does not appear to me much relied on. But even in that case it is emphatically said by the Judge, that a man may not hunt for his pleasure or his profit, but only for the good of the common weal, and to destroy such noxious animals as are injurious to the common weal. Therefore, according to this case, the good of the public must be the governing motive” (k). The jury, under his lordship’s direction, found a verdict for the plaintiff.

And in an action against a huntsman for hunting over the lands of another, Lord Ellenborough, C.J., held that damages might be recovered, not only for the mischief immediately occasioned by the defendant himself, but also by the concourse of people who accompanied him (l).

And in another case it was laid down by Lord Ten- terden, C.J., that if a gentleman sends out his hounds and his servants, and invites other gentlemen to hunt with him, although he does not himself go on the lands of another, but those other gentlemen do, he is answerable for the trespass they may commit in so doing, unless he distinctly desires them not to go on those lands (m).

If A. starts a hare in the ground of B., and hunts it into the ground of C. and kills it there, the property is in A. the hunter; but A. is liable to an action of trespass for hunting in the grounds as well of B. as of C. (n).

And where a stag hunted by the hounds of B. was run into the barn of A., it was held that B. and his servants had no right to enter the barn to take the stag, and that if they did so they would be trespassers (m).

But where a deer strayed from a park on to the plain- tiff’s land, and ate his grass, and he hounded it with grey-hounds, which pursued it into the owner’s park, and killed it there, the Court of Common Pleas held that he was justified in doing so (o).

Game taken on land, as soon as killed there, becomes the property of the owner of the land (p), though up to the time of its being killed, he has no property in it, yet he has a right to have it kept undisturbed (q); therefore he has a

(m) Baker v. Berkley, 3 C. & P 32.
(n) Sutton v. Moody, Id. Raym. 250.

Huntsman liable for damage done by the field.

Master of hounds, when responsible for the field.

Killing a hare on another’s land.

Taking a stag on another’s land.

Hunting a stray deer.

Dead game property of owner.

He has a right to have
right of action against the master of a dog, which is in the habit of disturbing and destroying it, after having received due notice of the fact, and taken no steps to restrain it (q).

The customary right of pasture in a manor, or cattlegate, gives the owners no right to possession of the soil; but the ownership of it remains in the lord of the manor, subject to the right of several pasture upon it by the cattlegate owners, and therefore the lord may maintain trespass against a cattlegate owner for sporting over it without his permission (r).

The reservation of the rights of the lords of the manor under Enclosure Acts reserves the right of shooting; therefore in the case of Graham v. Ewart (s), in which Sir James Graham was entitled under a private enclosure Act “to all mines and minerals within and under the soil, and to other rights, royalties, liberties and privileges in and over the same,” it was held by the Exchequer Chamber, reversing the decision of the Court below, and overruling Greathead v. Morley (t), that the right of hunting, fishing, shooting and fowling over the allotment in question was thereby intended to be included, and that this right must be exclusive, for that was the character of the right existing before the Act passed, and the object of the proviso was expressly to preserve the former right unimpaired by the consequences of the enclosure. It was also held in this case, that a subsequent concurrent enjoyment of sporting for more than twenty years by the owners of the allotments, claiming to do so as of right, did not deprive the original lord of his exclusive right.

Persons in the occupation of enclosed ground, and in certain cases owners, may kill (u) hares without a game certificate (x). The owner may also give authority to kill hares, to be limited to one person at the same time in any one parish. This authority is to be sent to the clerk of the peace for registration, who is also to receive notice of revocation (y).

And now by the Ground Game Act, 1880 (43 & 44 Vict. c. 47), every occupier of land has a right, inseparable from his occupation, to kill hares and rabbits concurrently with

(r) Rigge v. Earl of Lonsdale, 1 H. & N. 923.
(s) Graham v. Ewart, 26 L. J., Ex. 97.
(t) Greathead v. Morley, 3 M. & G. 139.
(u) Not to authorize the laying of poison, 11 & 12 Vict. c. 29, s. 5.
(x) Ibid. s. 1.
(y) Ibid. s. 2.
any other person entitled to kill the same on land in his occupation (section 1); where the occupier is otherwise entitled to kill ground game on land in his occupation, he cannot divest himself wholly of such right (section 2); and all agreements in contravention of the right of the occupier to destroy game are declared void (section 3). The occupier and the persons duly authorized by him do not require a game licence for the purpose of killing ground game under the Act. But they are not exempt from the Gun Licence Act, 1870 (section 4).

And it is "lawful for any person to pursue and kill, or join in the pursuit and killing of, any hare by coursing with greyhounds, or by hunting with beagles or other hounds, without having obtained an annual game certificate" (z).

Where acts terminate in themselves, and once done cannot be done again, there can be no continued trespass, as hunting and killing a hare or five hares. But hunting may be continued as well as spoiling, consuming or cutting grass (a).

When two persons are engaged in a common purpose, what one does is the act of both. Therefore, in a case in which A. and B. were driving in a trap along the turnpike road for a lawful purpose, and A. got out of the trap, went into a field, and shot a hare, which he gave to B., who had remained in the trap, it was held that there was sufficient evidence that B. was present aiding and abetting A. in a trespass in pursuit of game (under 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 5), and that he was not the less an aider and abettor, because he might have been convicted as a principal (b).

Under 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 32 (c), trespassers in pursuit of game may be required to quit the land, and to tell their names and abodes, and in case of refusal may be arrested and brought before a justice within twelve hours. And any trespasser, on conviction before a justice, is to forfeit a sum not exceeding 5l., together with the costs of conviction (c).

But hunters in fresh pursuit of deer, hare or fox (with hounds or greyhounds) started on other lands, are exempted from the provisions of 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 32, against trespassers (d).

(z) 11 & 12 Vict. c. 20, s. 4.
(a) Monkton v. Tusley, 2 Salk. 639.
(b) Stacey v. Whitchurst, 13 W. R. 384; Mayhew v. Wardley, 14

Any person may hunt hares.
Continued trespass.
Two persons engaged in a common purpose.
Trespass in search of game.
Hunting with hounds or greyhounds.
By 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 32, s. 30, it is provided that "any person charged with any such trespass shall be at liberty to prove, by way of defence, any matter which would have been a defence to an action at law for such trespass." But the jurisdiction of the justices is not ousted by the claim of a prescriptive right in gross to kill game on the land, there being no colour for such a claim; nor by the assertion that the land is not in the occupation of the lord of the manor, but is vested in other persons, as the claim of title to oust the jurisdiction of the justices must be a claim of title in the party charged, and not in a third person (e).

In a case in which a prescriptive right in gross to kill game is set up, which is an impossible right, unknown to the law, the bonâ fides is immaterial; but where a bonâ fide and probable right of property is set up, the justices are bound to hold their hands (f). The mere belief, however, on the part of the alleged trespasser that he has such a right, is not a bonâ fide claim of right (g).

A landlord may give verbal permission to another to take game on his land, and such permission is a justification for a fresh pursuit of game on an adjoining field within the meaning of section 30 (h).

It is a trespass in pursuit of game within the meaning of this statute to fire at it from the highway (i). But merely sending a dog into an adjoining cover in search or pursuit of game, is not a trespass by entering and being in or upon such cover, the Act requiring a personal trespass (k).

A person who from his own land shoots a pheasant in the land of another, and goes on such land to pick the bird up, commits a trespass in pursuit of game within the Act, the shooting and the picking up the game being one transaction (l). But it is not a trespass in pursuit of game to pick up dead game, which rose from the person’s own land, and fell dead within the land of another (m).

(e) Cornell v. Sanders, 3 B. & S. 206.
Under 25 & 26 Vict. c. 114, s. 2, a person may be convicted of having obtained game by unlawfully going on land in search or pursuit of game, without evidence of his having been on any particular land (n).

The owner of a close must first request a trespasser to depart before he can lay hands on him to turn him out, because every *impositio manuum* is an assault and battery, which cannot be justified on the ground of a person breaking into the close, without a request (o).

But in case of actual force, as in burglary or breaking open a door or gate, it is lawful to oppose force to force; and if one breaks down the gate, or comes into my close *vi et armis*, I need not request him to be gone, but may lay hands on him immediately, for it is but returning violence with violence (o).

Therefore to trespass for an assault and battery, it was held that the defendant might plead that the plaintiff, with force and arms and with a strong hand, endeavoured forcibly to break and enter the defendant's close, whereupon the defendant resisted and opposed such entrance, &c.; and it was held that if any damage happened to the plaintiff it was in consequence of the defence of the possession of the close (p). And it is also a good defence to an action for an assault that it was committed in an attempt to take from the plaintiff dead rabbits of the defendant's master, which he refused to give up (q).

A horse cannot be distrained *damage feasant* if there be a rider upon him; for if such a distress were permitted, it would perpetually lead to a breach of the peace (r). And indeed if a man or woman be riding a horse, it cannot be distrained at all (s).

A man has an action of trespass against another for riding over his ground, though it do him no damage; for it is an invasion of his property, and the other has no right to come there (t).

But where a dog jumps into a field without the consent of the owner, the owner may not recover damages for *trespassing* for the breach of peace (s). However, if the owner of a dog has any cause of action against the owner of the land where the dog enters the field, it does not follow that the owner of the dog is not liable for damages caused by the dog (t).

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(o) Green v. Goddard, 2 Salk. 640.


(s) Co. Litt. 47 n, cited Parsons v. Ginyell, 4 C. B. 550. And see Webb v. Bell, 1 Sid. 440.

(t) See per Holt, C.J., Ashby v. White, 1 Smith's L. C. 125.
of its master, it is not a trespass for which an action will lie (w).

The obligation to make and maintain fences, both at common law and by the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act (x), is only as against the owners or occupiers of the adjoining close. If the company neglect to fence, neither they nor their servants can recover for injury caused by animals straying on their land (y), nor can the tenants of the land (z). And where the plaintiff’s sheep, trespassing on A.’s close, strayed upon the defendant’s railway which adjoined, through a defect of fences which the defendants were bound as against A. to make and maintain, and was killed; it was held by the Court of Common Pleas that the plaintiff could not recover (a).

But a person using the lands of an adjoining owner by his permission is in the same position as he is (b).

A person whose field adjoins a highway may leave his field open and permit cattle to pass over it. He cannot restrain them if he has suffered them to come there; but he commits no breach of duty by leaving the field open (c).

The following important case decided that where a railway company is by statute bound absolutely to keep the gates of its level crossings closed, it is liable for damage occurred to a trespasser in consequence of one of these gates having been left open. It appeared that the Y Railway passed over a highway on a level, and that there were gates across each end of the road so crossed by the line of railway. Some horses belonging to the plaintiff leaped over the fence of a field, in which they had been placed, into a second field, and from that over a broken gate into a third field, all three being the plaintiff’s fields; they then strayed through an open gate of the third field into the highway crossed by the railway on a level. One of the gates across the end of the road where it was crossed by the line of railway having been left open, the horses strayed through


(y) Child v. Heavn, L. R., 9 Ex. 176; 43 L. J., Ex. 100; 22 W. R. 864.

(z) Wiseman v. Booker, L. R., 3 C. P. D. 184; 38 L. T., N. S. 392; 26 W. R. 634.


(b) Dawson v. Midland Rail. Co., L. R., 8 Ex. 8; 42 L. J., Ex. 49; 21 W. R. 56.

it on to the railway, where they were soon afterwards killed by one of the company's trains. An action was brought by the plaintiff against the railway company, who contended that the horses were, under the circumstances, trespassers on the highway. But it was held by the Court of Queen's Bench, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the value of his horses from the company, because the obligation imposed on them by 5 & 6 Vict. c. 55, s. 9, to keep the gates closed, was not only against cattle travelling on the road but also against all cattle straying there (d).

A very similar conclusion was arrived at in Charman v. South Eastern Railway Company (e), which was an action for not properly fencing the defendants' line at a level crossing in accordance with their statutory obligation under section 47 of the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act (8 & 9 Vict. c. 20), whereby two horses belonging to the plaintiff strayed on to the line and were killed. At the trial, it appeared that there were gates at the level crossing of the full width of the road properly so called, but that a swing gate had been placed by the defendants upon a piece of land beyond the limit of the road, on the same line with the gates, for the convenience of foot-passengers using the crossing, and that plaintiff's horses after straying from his land arrived at the gates at the level crossing, and finding them closed, turned aside to the swing gate, and forcing their way through it, owing to the defective condition of the posts, got on to the line and were killed by a passing train. It was held that there was evidence of a breach of the defendants' obligation to fence in the railway from the road, and that they were therefore liable.

The provisions of the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 55, s. 9, and presumably of the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 20, s. 47, as to making and maintaining gates where a railway crosses a road on a level, do not apply to a railway belonging to a private owner, and not constructed under parliamentary powers, nor used for the conveyance of passengers (f).

In the preceding cases it will be observed that there was an express statutory obligation to keep the gate closed across the road under all circumstances; consequently, the company were guilty of committing a wrong, in omitting

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(e) 21 Q. B. D. 524; 57 L. J., Q. B. 597; 37 W. R. 8—C. A.
to do so. But under section 68 of the last-mentioned Act, the obligation of a railway company is merely to fence against the owners and occupiers of adjoining lands, and therefore where some horses strayed into a high road, and thence into the yard of a railway station, the gate of which was open, from which they got on the line through a gap in the fence, and were killed by a train, it was held that the company were not responsible for the injury, inasmuch as their obligation under section 68 is co-extensive only with the common law prescriptive obligation to repair fences, which would only render them responsible, if the horses were using the highway according to the dedication of the owner of the soil (g). So, where a colt had strayed on to a highway, and whilst being driven home escaped into a railway-yard and thence on to the line, and was killed, the company were held liable, as the colt was then lawfully using the highway (h). But if the adjoining land belongs to the company, and cattle stray thence on to the line, and are killed, the company are not liable; nor if cattle are by the permission of the company grazing on the slopes or embankments of the railway, or in a yard belonging to the company, and stray thence on the line, and are injured (i).

There is no obligation upon a railway company carrying cattle to provide fences or guards at the station where the cattle may be landed, between the line and the station-yard, so as to prevent them straying on the line (k).

(g) Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Rail. Co. v. Wallis, 14 C. B. 213.  
PART III.
RACING, WAGERS, AND GAMING.

CHAPTER I.
THEIR HISTORY, RISE, AND PROGRESS IN THIS COUNTRY.

During the Pharaoh Dynasty the Egyptians seem to have been well acquainted with the use of the war-horse, and from dealers out of Egypt Solomon derived a great supply of horses, not only for his own use, but also for the purposes of resale to the people living between Palestine and the Euphrates (a). It has been thought, from the name given by the Egyptians to the horse, that it was introduced into Egypt originally from Persia (b).

The most striking feature in the Biblical notices of the horse is the exclusive application of it to warlike purposes (c), with one exception, when it is mentioned as employed in threshing by trampling upon the strewed grain (d).

The first mention of the British horse is made by Julius Caesar; and when he invaded the island, he was opposed by a host of war-chariots, which must have been drawn by active powerful horses. They seem to have been pretty numerous, as Cassivelaunus, on dismissing the main body of his army, retained four thousand war-chariots (e).

Athelstan, who was second in succession from Alfred the Great, received from Hugh Capet of France, as an acceptable present, several German running horses (f); and in A.D. 930, he decreed that no horses should be

(a) 1 Kings, x. 28.
(b) Smith's Dictionary of the Bible, tit. Horse.
(c) Ibid.
(d) Isa. xxviii. 28.
(f) See Markham's Maister-Peece, 16th edition.
sent abroad for sale, or on any account, except as Royal presents (g).

William the Conqueror was very much indebted to his superiority in cavalry for the victory at Hastings; he introduced the Spanish horse, and his favourite charger was a Spaniard. In his reign there was a marked improvement in the breed of horses, and about A.D. 1066, we have on a piece of tapestry wove at Bayonne, the figure of a man driving a horse and harrow, being the earliest notice of the use of horses in field labour (g).

In the reign of Henry the First, A.D. 1121, the first Arabian horse on record was introduced by Alexander King of Scotland, who presented it and its furniture to a church (g).

In the reign of Henry the Second, forty years afterwards, Smithfield was celebrated as a horse market. Fitz Stephen gives the following animated account of the manner in which hackneys and charging steeds were tried there by racing against one another: “When a race is to be run by this sort of horses, and perhaps by others, which also in their kind are strong and fleet, a shout is immediately raised and the common horses are ordered to withdraw out of the way. Three jockeys, or sometimes only two, as the match is made, prepare themselves for the contest. The horses on their part are not without emulation; they tremble, and are impatient, and are continually in motion. At last the signal once given, they start, devour the course, and hurry along with unremitting swiftness. The jockeys, inspired with the thought of applause and the hope of victory, clap spurs to their willing horses, brandish their whips and cheer them with their cries” (h).

An old Metrical Romance records the excellence and great value of two horses belonging to Richard Cœur de Lion, which he purchased at Cyprus, and which therefore were probably of Eastern origin (i).

John accumulated a very numerous and valuable stud of horses; and he formed our breed of draught horses by importing one hundred chosen Flemish stallions (j).

Edward the Second, one hundred years afterwards, in the beginning of the fourteenth century, purchased thirty Lombardy war horses, and twelve heavy draught horses.

(h) See Fitz Stephen, and Lib.
(j) Ibid. 25.
Lombardy, Italy and Spain at that time supplied the most valuable cavalry or parade horses (j).

Edward the Third devoted one thousand marks to the purchase of fifty Spanish horses, and formal applications were made to the kings of France and Spain for their safe conduct. The king had many running horses (k), the precise meaning of which term is not quite clear; and he prohibited the exportation of horses under very heavy penalties (l).

In the reign of Richard the Second, the price of horses rapidly increased, and to such an extent, that in A.D. 1386, a proclamation was issued regulating their price; and it was ordered to be published in Lincolnshire, Cambridgeshire, and the East and West Ridings of Yorkshire (m). In this reign games are first mentioned in the statute book; and we find that in A.D. 1389, servants in husbandry or labourers were prohibited wearing any sword, buckler, or dagger; or playing at tennis, football, quoits, dice, casting of stone kails, and such like importune games (n).

This statute was confirmed and extended in the reign of Henry the Fourth, A.D. 1409, and an additional penalty of six days' imprisonment was imposed (o).

In the reign of Henry the Seventh, A.D. 1494, we find the legislature paying much attention to the breed of horses, as being of great importance to the defence of the kingdom. It appears that horses had at this time become scarce and expensive, and it was supposed to be the consequence of many horses and mares having been exported. To remedy this evil an Act was passed which prohibited any horse or mare being carried out of the realm without the king's licence. But any denizen might carry a horse beyond the sea on making oath that it was for his own use; and any mare of three years old or upwards, whose price was not above six shillings and eight pence, might be exported, the owner, however, being compelled to sell her at the port to any person who should bid him seven shillings (p).

In the reign of Henry the Eighth, A.D. 1530, it was further enacted, that any person conveying any horses, (j) Ibid. 25.
(k) See Markham's Maister-Peece, 16th edition, and Lawrence on "The Horse," vol. i, cap. 5.
(m) Ibid. 26.

Reign of Edward the Third.
Reign of Richard the Second.
Reign of Henry the Fourth.
Reign of Henry the Seventh.
Reign of Henry the Eighth.
geldings or mares to any parts beyond the sea, without the king's licence, should forfeit forty shillings for every poll (q). It appears, however, that notwithstanding these enactments, good horses continued to be scarce, and the breed of "good, swift and strong horses" was supposed to have decayed on account of "little horses and nags of small stature and value being suffered to depasture and also to cover mares and felys of very small stature." To remedy this, an Act was passed in a.d. 1535, compelling the owners and occupiers of deer-parks of a mile or upwards in circumference, to keep a certain number of foal mares, in proportion to the extent of their grounds, such mares to be at least thirteen hands in height, and to be covered by horses of fourteen hands or upwards (r). This Act did not extend to the counties of Westmoreland, Cumberland, Northumberland and the bishoprick of Durham (s).

The breed, however, still continued to decay and diminish; and it was supposed to be in consequence of "little stoned horses and nags, of small stature and of little value," being suffered to depasture in "the forests, chases, moors, marshes, heaths, commons and waste grounds in the realm," and also to cover mares feeding there. The legislature, to remedy this evil, passed another Act in a.d. 1540, which prohibited any stoned horse, under fifteen hands, being pastured on such lands throughout the greater part of England and the whole of Wales, or under fourteen hands elsewhere (t). Any person, on measuring a horse which was under the lawful height, might seize and retain it for his own use (u); the pastures were to be driven once a year, and any unlikely looking beasts were to be killed (v); and the owner of every horse, mare or gelding infected with the scab, at any time pasturing on these grounds, was to forfeit ten shillings (w). An Act was also passed prescribing the number of stoned trotting horses for the saddle each man was to keep, according to his degree (x). However, these enactments do not seem to have had the desired effect, as the breed of horses had sadly degenerated; for Blundeville, who wrote in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, tells us that

(q) 22 Hen. 8, c. 7.
(r) 27 Hen. 8, c. 6, ss. 2, 4, repealed by 26 & 27 Vict. c. 125.
(s) 27 Hen. 8, c. 6, s. 5.
(t) 32 Hen. 8, c. 13, s. 2, repealed by 19 & 20 Vict. c. 64.
(u) 32 Hen. 8, c. 13, s. 3.
(v) Ibid. ss. 6, 7.
(w) Ibid. s. 9.
(x) 33 Hen. 8, c. 5, now virtually repealed by 21 Jac. 1, c. 28.
they consisted principally of strong clumsy beasts, the few lighter ones being weak and without bottom.

It appears that in this reign races were first established in various parts of England, and the first meetings were held at Chester and Stamford, but there was no regular system, and all sorts of horses ran. The prize was usually a wooden bell adorned with flowers; and this afterwards was exchanged for a silver bell, and "given to him who should run the best and furthest on horseback on Shrove Tuesday." Hence the phrase of "bearing away the bell" (y).

In this reign also a variety of regulations were made with regard to gaming, some of which are in force at the present day. The object of the legislature was to encourage archery, and in A.D. 1511 it was enacted, that "all sorts of men under the age of forty years" should "have bows and arrows and use shooting," and that "unlawful games" should not "be used." This, however, was followed by a much more comprehensive Act, which was passed in A.D. 1541; namely 33 Hen. 8, c. 9, being a "bill for the maintaining artillery and the debarring unlawful games." It professes in its preamble to be founded on a petition from the bowmen and others concerned in the making of implements of archery; and they complained that "many and sundry new and crafty games and plays, as logetting in the field, slide-thrift, otherwise called shovegr oat," had caused the decay of archery (z). It made various regulations concerning the use of bows and arrows, and imposed a penalty of forty shillings a day for the maintenance of "any common house, alley or place of bowling, coytina, cloysheayles, half-bowl, tennis, dicing table or carding," or any game previously prohibited by statute, or any unlawful new game which might afterwards be invented (a).

There was a penalty of six shillings and eightpence each time for using and haunting any of the above-mentioned "houses or plays and there playing" (b).

Any justice of the peace, mayor, sheriff, bailiff, &c., had authority to enter any houses or places where unlawful games were suspected to be held, and take and imprison both the keepers and persons resorting and

(z) 33 Hen. 8, c. 9 (now virtually repealed by 3 Geo. 4, c. 41, s. 4, and 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 1), ss. 1, 2. See Appendix.
(a) 33 Hen. 8, c. 9, s. 11.
(b) Ibid. s. 12.
playing there, until the keepers should find sureties and
the other parties should give security to abstain from such
practices for the future (c). The chief authorities in
towns were to make weekly search in such places as
were suspected of being gaming-houses, or, at the furthest,
once a month, under a penalty of forty shillings (d); and
the leases of houses used for unlawful games were to be
void (e).

”No manner of artificer or craftsman, husbandman,
apprentice, labourer, servant at husbandry, journeyman,
mariners, fishermen, watermen or any serving man,” was
to play at “the tables, tennis, dice, cards, bowls, closh,
coyting, logating, or any other unlawful game out of
Christmas, under the pain of twenty shillings forfeit each
time;” and in Christmas they were to play in “their
master’s houses or in their master’s presence,” and no
person was to play at any “bowl or bowls in open places
out of his garden or orchard,” under the penalty of six
shillings and eightpence (f).

Under certain restrictions and regulations, however, and
on giving sufficient security, a person might sue for a
placard to have common gaming in his house (g). And a
master might license his servant to play with him or any
other gentleman at his own house or in his presence (h).
Also a nobleman or person with an income of 100l. a-year
might license his servants to play among themselves at his
or their houses, gardens or orchards (i).

In the reign of Edward the Sixth, it was found that a
great many horses had been exported to foreign countries,
and particularly to Scotland, which was supposed to have
been “the occasion of strength to the king’s enemies,”
and to have caused the decay of the breed of good horses;
and consequently the legislature in a.d. 1547 passed “An
Act for not conveying horses out of the realm;” by
which every person endeavouring to convey a horse into
Scotland, not only forfeited the animal, but became liable
to a penalty of forty pounds (j). But every person was
permitted to take abroad with him horses or geldings, on
making oath that he took them for his own use on the
journey, and not with intent to sell them (k); and any

Reign of
Edward the
Sixth.

(c) 33 Hen. 8, c. 9, s. 14.
(d) Ibid. s. 15.
(e) Ibid. s. 21, repealed by 26 &
27 Vict. c. 125.
(f) Ibid. s. 16.
(g) Ibid. s. 13.
(h) Ibid. s. 22.
(i) Ibid. s. 23.
(j) 1 Edw. 6, c. 5, s. 1, now re-
peated by 3 Geo. 4, c. 41.
(k) Ibid. s. 6.
mare whose value did not exceed ten shillings might be exported (7).

It appears that so far the statutes on the subject of gaming had been directed against it, because it was supposed to withdraw men from the practice of archery, which seems to have been neglected, where these other sports had obtained popularity. But in the reign of Philip and Mary, gaming had become very inconvenient on other grounds; for it appeared, that “by reason of divers sundry licenses theretofore granted to divers persons, as well within the city of London and the suburbs, as elsewhere,” for “keeping of houses, gardens and places for bowling, tennis, diceing, white and black, making and marring, and other unlawful games, many unlawful assemblies, conventicles, seditions, and conspiracies,” had been daily and secretly practised, and robberies and other misdemeanours had been committed by idle and misruled people resorting there. To remedy these evils an Act was passed in A.D. 1555, “to avoid divers licences for houses where unlawful games be used,” and all placards, licences or grants were made void (9). In the same year of the reign an Act was passed, “against the buying of stolen horses,” and certain regulations were prescribed for the sale of horses at markets and fairs (9).

Notwithstanding the regulations made in the reign of Edward the Sixth, it appears that a large number of horses were exported by persons who unscrupulously took the required oath, and the difficulty of punishing them was so great, that in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, A.D. 1562, the permission to persons to take horses abroad for their own use was repealed (o).

It was now found that in the Isle of Ely and in the counties of Cambridge, Huntingdon, Northampton, Lincoln, Norfolk and Suffolk, the fens were so wet and rotten that they could not carry stoned horses of the size mentioned in the Act of Henry the Eighth (p), without danger of their being mired or drowned. The horses of many poor men had been seized as being beneath the statutable height, and the breed of horses and all the tillage and carriage within

(7) 1 Edw. 6, c. 5, s. 1, now repealed by 3 Geo. 4, c. 41, s. 9.
(u) 2 & 3 Ph. & M. c. 9, repealed by 26 & 27 Vic. c. 125.
(vi) 2 & 3 Ph. & M. c. 7, Appendix; and see Stolen Horses, ante, Part 1, Chap. III.
(o) 5 Eliz. c. 19, repealed by 26 & 27 Vic. c. 125.
(p) 32 Hen. 8, c. 13.
the district had been very much hindered. To remedy these evils, an Act was passed in this reign, A.D. 1565, by which the statutable height of stoned horses in those ten counties was reduced to thirteen hands (q).

We have seen that in the reign of Philip and Mary, certain forms were prescribed to give publicity to the sale of horses at markets and fairs, so that if the horse had been stolen, the owner might have an opportunity of claiming it (r). But these forms seemed to have entirely failed in their object, because in this reign, horse-stealing had grown so common, that horses were not safe in pastures or closes, and hardly so in their stables; and there was always a ready sale for them in distant fairs and markets. However, in A.D. 1589, an Act was passed prescribing certain additional forms to be observed in sales at such places, and making it a matter of greater difficulty to sell a stolen horse (s). This is the Act now in force, and which we have already considered.

In the reign of James the First, an immaterial and trifling alteration was made in the law of gaming by the repeal of the statute of Richard the Second in A.D. 1623 (t). But an important change took place with regard to horse racing. Before this time, horse races were mere trials of speed and strength, without any acknowledged system, and were mixed up with other exercises of skill and activity. The pastime had continued on the same footing since the time of Henry the Eighth, but this reign may be considered the era in which racing began to be ranked as a distinct sport. James the First was extremely fond of field sports; he established races on a new footing; under his patronage rules were promulgated for their regulation, and his favourite courses were Croydon and Enfield Chase. From this period also began the practice of breeding a distinct kind of horse for the especial purpose. And we find that about this time an Arabian horse, and also the White Turk, the Helmsly Turk, and Fairfax's Morocco Barb, were brought into the kingdom; and a considerable improvement in the breed of the animal was thus effected (u).

Charles the First established races in Hyde Park and at

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(q) 8 Eliz. c. 8, repealed by 19 & 20 Vict. c. 64.
(r) 2 & 3 Ph. & M. c. 7.
(s) 31 Eliz. c. 12, Appendix; and see Stolen Horses, ante, Part 1, Chap. III.
(t) 21 Jac. 1, c. 28, s. 11, repealed by 19 & 20 Vict. c. 64.
Newmarket; yet, although these were discontinued during the Protectorate, attention was not withdrawn from breeding, and Cromwell had his stud of race horses (\(a\)).

On the Restoration, a new impulse was given to gaiety and amusement of every kind, and the Newmarket meetings were revived. Charles, who was a great patron of horse racing, encouraged it by the gift of royal plates at the principal courses. He purchased brood mares and stallions in the Levant, which were principally Barbs and Turks; and the breed was also much improved by horses brought over from Tangiers, as part of the dowry of his queen, Catherine of Braganza (\(y\)).

No sooner had horse racing been fully established, than we find an Act was passed to endeavour to prevent the evils which have unfortunately always attended it. This Act was 16 Car. 2, c. 7, which came into operation A.D. 1664, and in it horse racing is mentioned for the first time in the statute book. It is intituled "An Act against deceitful, disorderly and excessive gaming," and recites that "all lawful games and exercises should not be otherwise used than as innocent and moderate recreations, and not as constant trades or callings to gain a living or make unlawful advantage thereby; and that by the immoderate use of them many mischiefs and inconveniences arise, to the maintaining and encouraging of sundry idle, loose and disorderly persons in their dishonest, lewd and dissolute course of life, and to the circumventing, deceiving, couzening and debauching of many of the younger sort, both of the nobility and gentry, and others, to the loss of their precious time and the utter ruin of their estates and fortunes, and withdrawing them from noble and laudable employments and exercises" (\(z\)). By this Act persons winning by fraud, or cheating at cards, dice, tables, tennis, bowls, kittles, shovel-board, cock-fightings, horse racings, dog-matches, foot races, and all other games and pastimes, were to forfeit treble the sum or value of the money so won (\(a\)).

Every person losing above 100l. on ticket or credit at these or any other games and pastimes, either by bearing a part in them or betting, was discharged from paying any part of the money; all securities given for it were to be

\(y\) Lib. U. K. "The Horse," 29; and Martin, argnendo, Apple-
garth v. Colley, 10 M. & W. 728.
\(z\) 16 Car. 2, c. 7, now repealed by 9 Anne, c. 19, and 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 41.
\(a\) Ibid. s. 2.
void; and the winner was to forfeit treble the sum above 100l. so won (b); and it was held that an agreement to run a horse race for more than 100l. a-side was prohibited by this statute (c).

In the reign of William the Third, A.D. 1699, it appears that certain games called lotteries had been set up throughout England and Wales, by means of which great sums of money had been fraudulently got from unwary persons, and from the children and servants of several gentlemen and merchants; to remedy this, an Act was passed "for suppressing lotteries," which declared them to be public nuisances, and imposed a penalty of 500l. on every keeper of a lottery, and 20l. on every player (d).

In the reign of Queen Anne the Darley Arabian was introduced by Mr. Darley, which tended very much to form our present breed of horses. People began to pay more attention to pedigree and breed, and we find it noticed as remarkable, that a horse called Bay Bolton was got by a farmer's horse without a pedigree (e).

It was found in this reign that the Act of Charles the Second was insufficient to prevent the mischiefs arising from the spirit of gambling then existing, and which it appears had become so very prevalent that further legislation was required. Therefore, in A.D. 1710, 9 Anne, c. 14, was passed, being "an Act for the better preventing of excessive and deceitful gaming." It recited that "the laws now in force for preventing the mischiefs which may happen by gaming have not been found sufficient for that purpose:" and enacted, that all mortgages and securities, where the consideration was for money won by gaming or betting, or for repayment of money lent at gaming or betting, were to be void; that all property so encumbered was to devolve to such person as would have been entitled to it in case the owner were dead; and that all grants or conveyances made to prevent this were to be deemed fraudulent and void (f).

The loser of 10l. or upwards by playing or betting at any game might sue for the money so lost within three months; and if he did not sue within that time any other person might do so, and recover treble the value, one

(b) 16 Car. 2, c. 7, now repealed by 9 Anne, c. 19, and 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 41.
(c) Edgebury v. Rosindale, 2 Lev 94; S. C., 1 Ventn. 253.
(d) 10 & 11 Will. 3, c. 17.
(e) Lawrence on "The Horse," vol. 1. p. 222.
(f) 9 Anne, c. 14, s. 1.
moiety to go to the informer and the other to the poor of the parish where the offence was committed (g); any person winning by fraud by betting or playing at any game, or any person winning above 10l. at one sitting, might be indicted, and on conviction forfeit five times the value so won, and if he had cheated, be deemed infamous, and suffer such corporal punishment as in cases of wilful perjury (h).

Two justices might cause persons suspected of having no visible estate or calling, and who appeared to support themselves by gaming, to be brought before them, and find sureties for their good behaviour for the space of twelve months (i); during which time, if they played or betted to the amount of twenty shillings at any one time or sitting, they were to forfeit their recognizances (j); and any person assaulting or challenging another on account of money won at play was to forfeit all his goods, and be imprisoned two years (k). But this Act was not to prevent gaming in any of the Queen’s palaces during her residence there (l). The word “games” used in this Act was held to comprehend horse races (m) and other games mentioned in 16 Car. 2, c. 7, and therefore any race for 10l. a-side or upwards was illegal. In this reign two Acts were passed to enforce 10 & 11 Will. 3, c. 17, with regard to lotteries (n).

In A.D. 1721, and the following year of the reign of George the First, an attempt was made by further legislation to suppress unlawful lotteries (o), and to prevent foreign lotteries being carried on in this kingdom (p).

In the reign of George the Second it appears that there was an excessive increase in gaming, and to remedy the evil, 12 Geo. 2, c. 28, was passed, A.D. 1739, being “An Act for the more effectual preventing of excessive and deceitful gaming.” This Act declares the games of the ace of hearts, pharaoh, bassett and hazard to be games or lotteries by cards or dice within the meaning of the Act, and imposes a penalty of 200l. on every person

(g) Ibid. s. 2; Frederick, Burt. v. Lookng, 4 Burr. 2018.
(h) Ibid. s. 5.
(i) Ibid. s. 6.
(j) Ibid. s. 7.
(k) Ibid. s. 8.
(l) Ibid. s. 9.
(m) Blaxton v. Pye, 1 Wils. 309;
Clayton v. Jennings, 2 W. Bla. 706.
(n) These were 9 Anne, c. 6, ss. 56, 57, now virtually repealed; and 10 Anne, c. 26, s. 109, repealed by 49 Geo. 3, c. 109, and 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 36.
(o) 8 Geo. 1, c. 2, ss. 36, 37.
(p) 9 Geo. 1, c. 19, virtually repealed by 7 Geo. 3, c. 48, ss. 4, 5.
setting up such games or lotteries, and a penalty of 50l. on every person adventuring at them (q). An Act was also passed to make more effectual 33 Hen. 8, c. 9 (r); and another to prevent the selling chances in foreign lotteries (s).

It was found after the passing of 9 Anne, c. 14, that the number of horse races had very much increased; and in consequence of their being run under 10l. a-side, and therefore for small plates, they had contributed very much to the encouragement of idleness, and the breed of strong and useful horses was supposed to have been much prejudiced. The legislature, endeavouring to remedy these evils, passed 13 Geo. 2, c. 19, in a.d. 1740, which was "An Act to restrain and prevent the excessive increase of horse races." By this Act all horses were to be entered by their real owners, and no person was to start more than one for the same plate, under pain of forfeiting the horse (t). No plate was to be run for under the value of 50l., and any person starting a horse for a plate of smaller value was to forfeit 200l., and any person advertising such a race was subject to the penalty of 100l. (u). An arbitrary standard of weights was fixed: a five-year-old horse was to carry ten stone, a six-year-old eleven stone, and a seven-year-old twelve stone, under a penalty of 200l. (x), and every race was to be begun and ended in the same day (y). The entrance money was to be repaid to the second best horse (z). And gifts left for annual races were not to be altered (a).

There appears to have been a distinction in this statute between a match and a race, for at whatever place a race might be run, it must always have been for a plate of 50l. or upwards (b). But it seems that a match was either to be run at Newmarket or Black Hambleton, or the plate was to be worth 50l. or upwards (c). This Act also prohibited a game called passage, which had just then been invented, and was in great vogue, and also all games with dice except backgammon (d).

These enactments with regard to weights were probably found so very inconvenient and useless, that in a.d. 1745,

(q) 12 Geo. 2, c. 28, ss. 1, 2, 3.  
(r) 2 Geo. 2, c. 28, s. 9, Appendix.  
(s) 6 Geo. 2, c. 35, ss. 29, 30.  
(t) 13 Geo. 2, c. 19, repealed in so far as it relates to horse-racing by 3 & 4 Vict. c. 5.  
(u) 13 Geo. 2, c. 19, s. 2.  
(x) 13 Geo. 2, c. 19, s. 7.  
(y) Ibid. s. 3.  
(z) Ibid. s. 4.  
(a) Ibid. s. 8.  
(b) Ibid. s. 2.  
(c) Ibid. s. 5.  
(d) Ibid. s. 9, Appendix.
18 Geo. 2, c. 34, was passed, which was "An Act to explain, amend and make more effectual the laws in being to prevent excessive and deceitful gaming; and to restrain and prevent the excessive increase of horse races." It appears that a game called roulet or rolopoly was then very much played, and though many had been ruined by it, the law was found insufficient to prevent it. This statute therefore enacted, that any person keeping a place for playing roulet or other games with cards or dice, or himself playing at any of these games, should be liable to the several penalties of 12 Geo. 2, c. 28 (e). The privilege of parliament was taken away from persons against whom proceedings had been commenced either for keeping a common gaming-house, or for playing at unlawful games (f). And any person winning or losing by play or by betting the value of 10l. at one time, or 20l. within twenty-four hours, might be indicted and fined five times the value so won or lost (g).

It appears that the circumstance of thirteen Royal Plates of one hundred guineas each being annually given to be run for, and the high prices which were constantly paid for horses of strength and size, was considered a sufficient encouragement to breeders to raise their cattle to the utmost possible size and strength; and, therefore, some of the restrictions which had been thought favourable to the breed of horses were removed, and it was made lawful for a person to run any match, or to start and run for any plate worth 50l. or upwards, at any weights, and at any place, without being liable to the penalties of 13 Geo. 2, c. 19, relating to weights (h), and in the same manner as if that Act had not been made. And it was held that this sum might be made up by two parties staking 25l. a-side (i).

In the reign of George the Third, A.D. 1774, it having been found by experience that making insurances on lives or other events in which the assured had no interest, had introduced a mischievous kind of gambling, an Act was passed "for regulating insurances upon lives, and for prohibiting all such insurances, except in cases where the persons insuring shall have an interest in the life or death of the person insured" (k). In the same reign, A.D.

(e) 18 Geo. 2, c. 34, ss. 1, 2, repealed by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 15. (h) Ibid. s. 11. (i) Bidmead v. Gale, 4 Burr. 2432. (f) Ibid. s. 7. (k) 14 Geo. 3, c. 48. (g) Ibid. s. 8.
1787, an Act was passed to render more effectual the laws then in being for suppressing unlawful lotteries \((l)\); but the Government raised money by state lotteries. In A.D. 1802 an Act was passed to suppress certain games or lotteries called littlegoes, under very heavy penalties \((m)\). In this reign there was no legislative interference with regard to racing, but the breed of horses continued to improve. In A.D. 1809 an Act was passed by which the duty payable on the exportation of a horse, mare or gelding was fixed at two guineas each \((n)\), and on the importation at four guineas each \((o)\). But in ten years this Act was repealed, and six pounds thirteen shillings was fixed as the duty payable on importing a horse, mare or gelding, and they were not mentioned in the table of commodities paying duty on exportation \((p)\).

George the Fourth was a great patron of horse-racing, and was owner of some first-rate horses. In this reign, A.D. 1823, an Act was passed authorizing the infliction of imprisonment and hard labour on persons convicted of keeping a common gaming house \((q)\); and people playing or betting on any game of chance in the street or highway are to be deemed rogues and vagabonds, and be liable to imprisonment with hard labour for any term not exceeding three calendar months \((r)\).

In the reign of William the Fourth an Act was passed, A.D. 1835, which is now in force. It is 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 41, being “An Act to amend the law relating to securities given for considerations arising out of gaming, usurious, and certain other illegal transactions.” It repealed so much of 16 Car. 2, c. 7, and 9 Anne, c. 14, as made void any note, bill or mortgage given for any illegal consideration, or made such securities enure for the benefit of parties in remainder, and enacted that such securities should not be deemed void, but to have been given for an illegal consideration \((s)\). So that money, paid to the holder of any such security, shall be deemed and taken to have been paid on account of the person to whom the same was originally given on such illegal consideration, and to be deemed a debt due from

\((l)\) 27 Geo. 3, c. 1, repealed by 46 Geo. 3, c. 148, s. 64.  
\((m)\) 42 Geo. 3, c. 119.  
\((n)\) 49 Geo. 3, c. 98, Sched. (A.).  
\((o)\) Ibid. Inwards.  
\((p)\) 59 Geo. 3, c. 52, s. 1, and

Table (B.), Inwards, repealed by 6 Geo. 4, c. 105.  
\((q)\) 3 Geo. 4, c. 114.  
\((r)\) 5 Geo. 4, c. 83, s. 4, Appendix.  
\((s)\) 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 41, ss. 1, 3, Appendix.
the last-named person to the person who has paid the money, and be recoverable accordingly in an action at law (t). In this reign also an Act was passed to prevent the advertising of any foreign or illegal lottery under a penalty of 50l. (u).

When Queen Victoria ascended the throne, the law of racing, wagers and gaming was in a most unsatisfactory condition; but the Judges began to look more favourably upon sporting transactions. Formerly, the tendency of the Courts was towards an extension of the prohibitory enactments, and a corresponding strict construction of any relaxations of them. But now the current of judicial opinion took another direction, and a different view of the subject prevailed. Racing and matters connected with it were no longer regarded in Westminster Hall with an unfavourable eye, and it is, perhaps, hardly going too far to assert, that some transactions were supported which former Judges would barely have allowed to be argued (x). Steeple-chases were held to be legal (y), as also trotting matches along a road (z). We have at length, however, had the law on these subjects simplified and put upon a rational footing; and for this change we are indebted to the common informers who brought *qui tam* actions against certain influential individuals.

In A.D. 1840, 3 & 4 Vict. c. 5 was passed, which repealed so much of 13 Geo. 2, c. 19, as relates to the subject of horse racing (a); and persons sued for penalties under that Act might, on application to the Court, have an order granted for the discontinuance of the suit (b). At this period then the statutes in force with regard to racing and gaming were nearly the whole of 33 Hen. 8, c. 9, so much of 16 Car. 2, c. 7, and 9 Anne, c. 14, as had not been repealed and altered by 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 41; 2 Geo. 2, c. 28, s. 9; 12 Geo. 2, c. 28; so much of 13 Geo. 2, c. 19, as does not relate to racing; 18 Geo. 2, c. 34; 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 41; and 3 & 4 Vict. c. 5.

Such being the state of the law, the famous case of *Applegarth v. Colley* (c) came before the Court of Exchequer on special demurrer; and after taking time to consider, an

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(t) Ibid. s. 2, and see Gaming, post, Chap. IV.  
(u) 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 66.  
(x) 31 Law Mag. 72.  
(z) *Challand v. Bray*, 1 Dowl. N. S. 783.  
(a) 3 & 4 Vict. c. 5, s. 1.  
(b) Ibid. s. 2.  
(c) *Applegarth v. Colley*, 10 M. W. 728; and see post, Chap. IV.
elaborate judgment was delivered by Mr. Baron Rolfe, in which it was held that at that time a horse race for money of any amount whatever, given by third persons by way of prize, was not illegal; that a horse race might be run for a sweepstakes of 2l. each, as there could not be any loser to the amount of 10l., and therefore it was not within section 2 of 9 Anne, c. 14, and probably not within section 5 of the same statute; and that, though in balancing the earlier decisions there might be some doubt whether, under 9 Anne, c. 14, not only the securities given for a gaming debt, but the contract itself, was avoided, at all events this must be taken to be the case since 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 41.

Soon after this decision, numerous *qui tam* actions were brought by common informers and others for penalties incurred under 16 Car. 2, c. 7, and 9 Anne, c. 14, by betting on horse races and running coursing matches, &c.; and to stop these proceedings 7 & 8 Vict. c. 3 was passed, which was afterwards extended by 7 & 8 Vict. c. 58. By these Acts all proceedings were to be stayed, on application to the Court, which had been commenced by common informers or persons other than the actual losers, for penalties incurred by playing at, or betting on, certain sports, pastimes, and games, viz., horse races, foot races, boat races, regattas, rowing matches, sailing matches, coursing matches, fencing matches, golf, wrestling matches, cricket, tennis, fives, rackets, bowls, quoits, curling, putting stone, football, or any *bona fide* variety, or any *similar* description of these sports, pastimes, and games (d); no common informers, but only the actual loser, or his representatives, were to commence any proceedings for penalties under 16 Car. 2, c. 7; 9 Anne, c. 14, or any other Act, for playing at, or betting on, any of the sports or pastimes above enumerated (e). And if such proceedings were in the nature of an indictment, the consent in writing of her Majesty's Attorney-General must first have been obtained (f).

These Acts were to continue in force until the end of that session of parliament. Before the expiration of that time, however, 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109 was passed, intituled "An Act to amend the law concerning Games and Wagers," and received the royal assent on the 8th of August, 1845. It recites that "The laws heretofore made in restraint of unlawful gaming have been found of no avail to prevent

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8 & 9 Vict.
c. 109.

(d) 7 & 8 Vict. c. 3, s. 1.
(e) Ibid. s. 3.
(f) Ibid. s. 4.
the mischief which may happen therefrom, and also apply to sundry games of skill from which the like mischiefs cannot arise." It repeals so much of 33 Hen. 8, c. 9, whereby any game of mere skill is declared unlawful, or which enacts a penalty for playing at any such game, or for lacking bows or arrows, or for not making and continuing buts or which regulates the making, selling, or using of bows and arrows, and also so much of the Act as requires the mayors, sheriffs, bailiffs, constables, and other head officers within every city, borough, and town in the realm, to make search weekly, or at the furthest, once a month, in all places where houses, alleys, plays, places of dicing, carding or gaming shall be suspected to be had or kept, and also so much of the Act as makes it lawful for every master to license his servant, and for every nobleman or other person worth 100l. a year, to license his servants or family to play (g). It repeals the whole of 16 Car. 2, c. 7, and so much of 9 Anne, c. 14, as was not altered by 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 41, and also so much of 18 Geo. 2, c. 34, as relates to 9 Anne, c. 14, or as renders any person liable to be indicted and punished for winning or losing at play or by betting at any one time the sum or value of 10l., or within the space of twenty-four hours the sum or value of 20l. (h). This statute, and the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 38, which is supplementary to it, make a variety of regulations and enactments, which will be considered, both with reference to the decisions which have been come to under the old law, and as showing the present state of the law of racing and gaming.

By the 19 & 20 Vict. c. 82, the duty of 3l. 17s. payable on every horse kept or used for the purpose of racing (i) was made payable for every horse which should start or run for any plate, prize, or sum of money, or other thing (k).

The whole of this Act is, however, repealed by the 37 & 38 Vict. c. 16, ss. 11, 21, and the duty on race horses is abolished.

By an Act passed in this reign the duty on importing a horse was reduced to 1l. (l); and now horses may be imported duty free (m). Acts were passed from time to time

(g) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 1, Appendix.
(h) Ibid. s. 15, Appendix.
(i) 16 & 17 Vict. c. 90.
(k) 19 & 20 Vict. c. 82, s. 2.
(l) 5 & 6 Vict. c. 47, Table (A.), Class 1, repealed by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 84.
(m) 9 & 10 Vict. c. 23, Table IV.)
time to indemnify persons connected with Art Unions from certain penalties (n); and at last an Act was passed under which they may be legalized by charter (o), which was supplemented by another Act to remove certain doubts which had arisen as to their legality (p). The 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 66, was also amended so as more effectually to prevent the advertising of foreign and other illegal lotteries (q).

After the passing of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, an attempt was made to set up racing lotteries and sweeps, and it was suggested during the argument of the case of Gatty v. Field (r), that under the proviso of the 18th section of the above statute, Derby lotteries were no longer illegal. They were however held to be on the same footing as other lotteries, and after that time were gradually superseded by offices kept for the purpose of betting. In these places lists were exhibited and odds given in sums high or low, to suit each customer. Every person was required to stake his money at the time, and leave it to abide the event of the race. The natural consequence ensued; persons entrusted with money embezzled it, to make a venture, and clerks, servants, and mere children were thus corrupted and ruined.

To remedy these evils, 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119, was passed, being "An Act for the suppression of betting houses," which received the royal assent on the 20th of August, 1853. It recites that "a kind of gaming has of late sprung up, tending to the injury and demoralization of improvident persons, by the opening of places called betting houses or offices, and the receiving of money in advance by the owners or occupiers of such houses or offices, or by other persons acting on their behalf, on their promises to pay money on events of horse races and the like contingencies." It prohibits any such betting houses being kept (s) and makes them gaming houses within 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109 (t). It forbids any person using a place for the purpose of betting with persons resorting there, or using a place for the purpose of receiving deposits on bets (u), and imposes penalties on persons connected with betting

(n) 7 & 8 Vict. c. 109; 8 & 9 Vict. c. 57.  
(o) 9 & 10 Vict. c. 48, Appendix.  
(p) 21 & 22 Vict. c. 102, repealed.  
(q) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 74.  
(r) Gatty v. Field, 9 Q. B. 431; S. C., 15 L. J., Q. B. 408.  
(s) 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119, s. 1, Appendix.  
(t) Ibid. s. 2.  
(u) Ibid. ss. 1, 3, Appendix.
houses (x), or exhibiting placards or advertising them (y). This most stringent Act (z), containing various other provisions, has had the effect of putting down betting houses in those parts of Great Britain to which it extends. It does not extend to Scotland (a).

The 36 & 37 Vict. c. 38 (The Vagrant Act Amendment Act, 1873), extends the provisions of the 5 Geo. 4, c. 83, to gaming in any street, &c. with coin, &c.

The 37 Vict. c. 15 (The Betting Act, 1874), amends the 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119, and extends its provisions to Scotland, and by section 1 it shall be construed as one with that Act, which is referred to as "the principal Act." By section 3, where any letter, circular, telegram, placard, handbill, card, or advertisement is sent, exhibited or published, (1) whereby it is made to appear that any person, either in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, will, on application, give information or advice for the purpose of or with respect to any such bet or wager, or any such event or contingency as is mentioned in the principal Act, or will make on behalf of any other person any such bet or wager as is mentioned in the principal Act; or (2) with intent to induce any person to apply to any house, office, room or place, or to any person, with the view of obtaining information or advice for the purpose of any such bet or wager, or with respect to any such event or contingency as is mentioned in the principal Act; or (3) inviting any person to make or take any share in, or in connexion with, any such bet or wager; every person sending, exhibiting or publishing, or causing the same to be sent, exhibited or published, shall be subject to the penalties provided in the seventh section of the principal Act with respect to offences under that section (b).

The 42 & 43 Vict. c. 18, after reciting that "the frequency of horse races in the immediate neighbourhood of the metropolis is productive of much mischief and inconvenience, and the holding of such races in thickly-populated places near the metropolis is calculated to cause, and does in fact cause, annoyance and injury to persons resident near to places where such races are held;" and (section 1) enacting that "a horse race within the meaning of this Act shall mean any race in which any horse, mare, or gelding shall run, or be made to run, in competition with any other

(x) 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119, ss. 3, 4.  
(y) Ibid. s. 7.  
(z) See post, Chap. V.  
(a) Ibid. s. 20.  
(b) 37 Vict. c. 15, Appendix.
horse, mare, or gelding, or against time, for any prize of what nature or kind soever, or for any bet or wager made or to be made in respect of any such horse, mare, or gelding, or the riders thereof, and at which more than twenty persons shall be present," proceeds (section 2) to declare all horse races unlawful within ten miles of Charing Cross unless licensed pursuant to the provisions contained in sections 3 and 4 of the Act. The Act also imposes certain penalties on persons convicted of taking part in unlicensed horse races, and on the owners and occupiers of the ground where the unlicensed horse races take place; and (section 7) enacts that every horse race held or taking place in contravention of the provisions of the Act shall be deemed to be a nuisance, and shall be liable accordingly (c).

The 55 Vict. c. 4, renders penal the sending documents to infants inciting them to betting or wagering. The provisions of this statute, so far as it deals with this subject, will be found fully set out post, Chapter V.

By 55 Vict. c. 9, s. 1, an Act to amend the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, any promise, express or implied, to pay any person any sum of money paid by him under or in respect of any contract or agreement rendered null and void by the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, or to pay any sum of money by way of commission, fee, reward, or otherwise in respect of any such contract, or of any services in relation thereto, or in connexion therewith, shall be null and void, and no action shall be brought or maintained to recover any such sum of money.

This enactment supersedes the ruling of the Court of Appeal in Read v. Anderson (d), the effect of which was that the employment of a turf commission agent, being a member of Tattersalls', to make a bet in his own name on behalf of his principal, implied an authority to pay the bet if lost, so that on the making of the bet that authority became irrevocable.

(c) 42 & 43 Vict. c. 18, Appendix.
CHAPTER II.

RACING, STAKEHOLDERS, AND STEWARDS.

Racing.

There are now no longer any restrictions with regard to racing, and transactions of this description are governed by the same laws as all other contracts.

Race horses may be owned by two persons as tenants in common, claiming under different titles, and each having the right to take the horse, and to use it exclusively, not destroying it. And such being their rights, money expended by one according to a previous arrangement for their common benefit, is recoverable from the other (a). Thus in a case in which the plaintiff and defendant, owning a horse in this way, agreed that the plaintiff should have the entire management of the horse, and that the expenses of keeping, training, and running him should be borne, and his winnings shared, by both equally; and the horse having won nothing, the plaintiff paid the whole expenses; it was held that even if a partnership existed between the plaintiff and defendant (and it was held by Cockburn, C.J., that it did) in the management and running of the horse, half the sum expended by the plaintiff was in the nature of an advance by him of capital on behalf of the defendant, and which he was entitled to recover from the defendant (a).

A custom for the freemen and citizens of a particular town to enter upon a certain piece of land on a particular day for the purpose of horse-racing is a good custom, and in pleading it, it is not necessary to aver that the particular day was a seasonable one (b). But such a customary right can only be applicable to certain inhabitants of the district where the custom is alleged to exist, and cannot be claimed by the public at large; and therefore if alleged to be in all the Queen's subjects, it is bad (c).

(a) French v. Styriiig, 26 L. J., 729.
C. P. 181.
(c) Earl of Coventry v. Willes, 9 B. B. 2
A right to race, and a right to resort to races, are on the same footing; accordingly where a person pleaded to an action of trespass on Newmarket Heath during the races a common right for all persons to go and remain for a reasonable time for the purpose of witnessing the races, the plea was held to be a bad one (c). Nor does a right of highway include a right to race (d), or a right in the public to resort to races (e).

But though it is a good custom at common law for the citizens of a particular town to enter upon a certain piece of land on a particular day for the purpose of horse-racing, this is not "an easement" within the Prescription Act (e), the words of which are "no claim which may be lawfully made at common law by custom, prescription, or grant, to any way or other easement, or to any water-course, or to the use of any water to be enjoyed upon any land, &c., when such way or other matter shall have been actually enjoyed by any person claiming right thereto without interruption for twenty years, shall be defeated or destroyed by showing only that such way, &c. was first enjoyed at any time prior to such period of twenty years." To make this custom to race a claim of right within the term "easement" in this section, it must be one analogous to that of a right of way, and a right of watercourse which follows it, and must be a right of utility and benefit, and not one of mere recreation and amusement (f).

The rights of common customarily enjoyed by the tenants of a manor over the waste lands of a manor, or of the inhabitants of an ancient borough, over waste lands to the soil of which they are not entitled, does not include the right of exercising or training horses not belonging to such tenants or inhabitants, but taken in by them from strangers to the manor or borough, nor the right of carrying on the business of a trainer of horses by exercising or training horses on such waste for profit, without the licence of the lord of the manor or the owner of the soil (g). Quære, whether they include the right of such tenant or inhabitant to exercise or train his own horses otherwise than as a person carrying on the business of a trainer.

(c) Earl of Coventry v. Willes, 9 L. & T., N. S. 384.
(d) Sowerby v. Wadsworth, 3 F. & F. 734.
(e) 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 71, s. 2.
(f) Per Martin, B., Mouney v. Isnay, 34 L. J., Ex. 52.
(g) Lancashire v. Hunt, 11 Times L. R. 49, affirming the decision of Wright, J., 10 Times L. R. 310, 348.
Stakeholders.

A sweepstakes is a stake or fund for which at least three entrances must be made. There may be any number of subscribers or contributors, and the whole stake or fund becomes, under certain regulations, the property of the winner (h).

Many races run with horses are matches; that is, where the horse of one person runs against the horse of another for certain stakes to be awarded to the winner. Such matches are no doubt lawful, but it seems that the winner would not be entitled to recover the stakes from the stakeholder, or from the loser, if they were in his hands, as the transaction is simply a wager, and void under the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 18 (i).

The "Act for the Suppression of Betting Houses" (j) does not "extend to any person receiving or holding any money or valuable thing by way of stakes or deposit to be paid to the winner of any race, or lawful sport, game or exercise, or" to be paid "to the owner of any horse engaged in any race," as, for instance, to the second horse.

The 18th section of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, which makes void all contracts or agreements by way of gaming or wagering, and prohibits the winner in such transactions from recovering either at law or equity, does not "apply to any subscription or contribution, or agreement to subscribe or contribute, for or towards any plate, prize, or sum of money to be awarded to the winner or winners of any lawful game, sport, pastime, or exercise," and the entry for a race which is to be run within a year of the time of such entry may be effected in the usual manner.

Many of the great races are not run within a year from the time the horses are entered, and therefore to attach a liability to a loser who has not paid his entrance, it would appear necessary, under 29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 4, that some memorandum or note in writing of the agreement to pay the entrance money, signed by the party to be charged, or

(h) Batty v. Marriott, 5 C. B. 831.
(i) Batson v. Newman, 1 C. P. D. 573; 25 W. R. 85; and see Diggle v. Higgs, 2 Ex. D. 422; 46 L. J., Ex. 721. A contrary opinion was expressed in the third edition of this work; but the authority for that opinion, viz., Batty v. Marriott, 5 C. B. 831, has since been overruled by Diggle v. Higgs. See post, p. 377.
(j) 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119, s. 6, Appendix. And see Wagers, post, Chap. III.; Betting Houses, post, Chap. V.
by some other person lawfully authorized by him to do so, should be given to the stakeholder at the time of entry (k). However, this need not cause any trouble, as it may be effected by letter (l).

The owner of a horse entered for a race can withdraw, or, as it is termed, "scratch" him before the race is run. A curious application was made to Vice-Chancellor Knight-Bruce on this point. The racing stud of the late William Charles Earl of Albemarle, including a valuable racehorse and the stallion "Emperor," was bequeathed to his wife Charlotte Susannah Countess of Albemarle. The executor filed a bill, alleging, among other things, that the personal estate of the late earl was insufficient to pay his debts, and considering that the two horses in question and the racing stud, unless sold immediately, would be greatly depreciated in value, and that the Countess was unwilling they should be sold, it was prayed that a sufficient part of them might be sold, and that the Countess might be restrained from withdrawing or erasing the above-mentioned racehorse from the book in which his name was entered for the Derby or St. Leger Stakes, or any other race.

The Countess also filed a bill in the Court of the Vice-Chancellor of England, stating that the personal estate was sufficient, and praying the executor might be restrained from selling or removing the racehorse, or the stallion "Emperor," or the racing stud of the late Earl.

The executor by his petition prayed the direction of Vice-Chancellor Knight-Bruce's Court as to the manner in which these two horses and the stud should be dealt with, and that the Dowager Countess might be ordered to concur in any sale which the Court might direct, and for the injunction as to erasing the name of the racehorse from the race-book, or otherwise deprecating his value.

An arrangement was eventually made between the parties, and in the meantime an undertaking was given on behalf of the Countess, that no step should be taken to "scratch" or withdraw the racehorse from the book (m).

The clerk of the course usually is the stakeholder at races, and he is bound to retain the stake till some party be clearly entitled to receive it; and if he pays it to a party not entitled to it, he is still liable to pay it to the party who has a proper

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(k) See Bentinck v. Connop, 5 Q. B. 693; 1 Dav. & M. 536.

(l) See Requisites of the Statute of Frauds, ante, Part I., Chap. I.

(m) Keppel v. Countess Dowager of Albemarle, before Vice-Chancellor Knight-Bruce, Feb. 18, 1850.
title to it, and until all disputes are settled he is the proper person to keep it (n).

But he has no right to the stakes till he gets the money into his hands; he is never more than a mere stakeholder. Indeed, if he could bring actions for unpaid stakes, he would be liable to have actions brought against him for every stake that was won, whether he had received it or not; and his situation would not be a very enviable one (o).

The competitors in a race may choose their own stakeholder or select a substitute for the one nominated by the rules of the race. Thus, where by the rules of the race the stakes should have been paid to the treasurer of the Jockey Club, but the plaintiff insisted on their being retained by the defendant, it was held that the former could not make the latter liable, as he had acquiesced in the change (p).

In order to enable one of the parties to maintain an action against a stakeholder to recover the amount of stakes deposited with him to abide the determination of the stewards, the plaintiff must either have the decision in his favour, or show that it was no longer practicable to obtain it (q).

The position of the stakeholder towards the parties, where the race has not and cannot be run, is that of a debtor to each party for the amount deposited by each. It appears, therefore, that in that case a specific demand of the stake from the stakeholder is unnecessary; but where the race might still be run and decided, each party must make a specific demand of his stake from the stakeholder before he can recover from him, because in this case it is necessary to inform the stakeholder that the authority given to him to keep the money has been revoked (r).

He cannot set off a claim of an unpaid stake due from a person on one race against a stake won by the same person in another race (s).

If he cashes a cheque deposited with him, he is not guilty of a breach of duty, if the parties agreed to treat the cheque as money (t).

Has no right to the stakes.

Competitors may choose their own stakeholder.

Ground of action against stakeholder.

Position of stakeholder towards the parties, if the race is not to be, or cannot be, run.

Cannot set off an unpaid stake.

Where he may cash a cheque.

(o) Per Patteson, J., Charlton v. Hill, 5 C. & P. 147.  
(p) Dines v. Wolf, L. R., 2 P. C. 289; 5 Moore P. C. C., N. S. 382; 20 L. T., N. S. 251.  
(s) Charlton v. Hill, 5 C. & P. 147.  
When the entrance money has been paid or agreed to be paid to the stakeholder, it must, according to the general principle of all contracts, abide the result of the race, which, being a legal contract, it cannot be recovered by the party who has made the entry, unless there be a mutual agreement for the rescission of the contract, which is called being "off by consent." On this point an opinion was expressed by Mr. Baron Parke, where an action had been brought by a party to recover back his own entrance money, after a race had been run, for which his horse had not started. It was held he could not recover it, because he had given no notice before the race; and his Lordship said, "Even if the plaintiff had given notice in due time that he should require his stake to be returned, this being a legal horse race, I have great doubts that it would be recoverable, the agreement being that it should be deposited to abide the event, which agreement cannot, as it seems to me, be varied without the assent of all parties. But here there was no demand made; no rescission of the contract before the race" (u).

And where before 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, the sum of ten shillings was deposited with a stakeholder to abide the event of a foot race, Mr. Baron Parke said, "The transaction is valid and the contract binding; and therefore one of the parties cannot determine it by a simple countermand, without the consent of all the other parties depositing" (v).

After the passing of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, where two persons agreed to run a foot race, and each of them deposited 10% with a third person, the whole 20% to be paid by him to the winner of the race; it was held by the Court of Common Pleas that the loser could not recover back his deposit from the stakeholder; a foot race being a lawful game, sport, or pastime within the meaning of the proviso contained in section 18 of the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109 (x).

This case appears to have been decided on the ground that the game was not an unlawful one, and that there was nothing in the case that was struck at by the Act of Parliament; but the true test appears to be whether the deposit was in the nature of a wager or of a subscription or contribution to a prize to be awarded to the winner of any lawful game, sport, pastime, or exercise. And this

(v) Emery v. Richards, 14 M. & W. 729.
(x) Batty v. Marriott, 5 C. B. 818.
has been so held by the Court of Appeal in the comparatively recent case of *Diggle v. Higgs* (y), overruling *Batty v. Marriott* (z), on very similar facts. The law on the subject being very clearly laid down in the following judgment of Lord Cairns, L.C.:

"The first question which we must ask ourselves is, was this contract a wager? It seems to me beyond a doubt that it was a wager; it was a wager between two men for a walking match. They agreed to walk at the Higginslaw Grounds for 200l. a-side; it is not the less a wager because the money was deposited with the defendant as stakeholder. When the wager was decided, the winner would be paid the 200l. deposited by the loser and receive back his own 200l. Now upon that, what is the construction of section 18 of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109? Is a contract of this kind excepted by the proviso? We start with this, that the contract was clearly a wager, and was within the first part of the section. But the section says all contracts and agreements, whether by parol or in writing, by way of gaming or wagering, shall be null and void; and then there is a proviso which follows upon an intervening sentence in these words—'And no suit shall be brought or maintained in any court of law or equity for recovering any sum of money or valuable thing alleged to have been won upon any wager, or which shall have been deposited in the hands of any person to abide the event on which any wager shall have been made.' Then comes the proviso on which this question mainly rests—'Provided always, that this enactment shall not be deemed to apply to any subscription or contribution, or agreement to subscribe or contribute, for or towards any plate, prize or sum of money to be awarded to the winner or winners of any lawful game, sport, pastime, or exercise.'

"It is clear that there may be in scores of forms 'subscriptions or contributions' towards a plate or prize without there being any wager, and I cannot read this proviso, which has a natural and intelligible meaning, in a different way, and one which would have the effect of neutralizing the enactment. The Legislature, I think, never intended to say that there should be no action brought to recover a sum of money which shall have been deposited in the hands


(z) 5 C. B. 818.
of any person to abide the event on which any wager shall have been made, and yet that if the wager is in the form of a subscription or contribution the winner may recover it. I read the proviso thus—'Provided that so long as there is a subscription which is not a wager, the second part of the section shall not apply to it.' There is no authority in favour of the view of the defendant, except Batty v. Marriott (a), and if that authority is to be followed, it cannot be denied it is a very strong authority for the defendant. What the Court had in their minds in that case was the question whether the game was a lawful or an unlawful game, and having come to the conclusion that it was a lawful game, they were of opinion that there was nothing in the case which was struck at by the Act of Parliament, and that the Act was only intended to strike at unlawful games. That view seems to me to be erroneous, and I think that the Court overlooked the first part of the section, which applies to all contracts, lawful or unlawful, by way of gaming or wagering. When Batson v. Newman (b) came before this Court, although there was a certain degree of difference between that case and Batty v. Marriott (a), yet it is obvious that Batty v. Marriott did not meet with approval. I cannot follow that case. I therefore think that, although there was a deposit of money, the contract in this case was a wager, and that all the consequences which are imposed by section 18 on contracts by way of wagering follow.

"Then it is said that this is an action by a party to the contract, and that he has revoked the authority given to the defendant to pay over the money, on the ground that the contract is void, and that section 18 has taken away his right to maintain an action under that part of the section which says no suit shall be brought for recovering money which shall have been deposited in the hands of any person to abide the event on which any wager shall have been made. On that I must observe that in Hampden v. Walsh (c) the Queen's Bench Division appeared to have been of opinion that an action under similar circumstances could be maintained; and in Batty v. Marriott (d), the objection was not taken. Be that as it may, I am of opinion that that objection cannot be maintained. The

(a) 5 C. B. 818.
(b) 1 C. P. D. 573; 25 W. R. 339; L. T., N. S. 552; 24 W. R. 697.
(c) 1 Q. B. D. 189; 45 L. J.
(d) 5 C. B. 818.
section amounts to this: All contracts by way of gaming and wagering are null and void; and then, dealing with those contracts, it says that no action shall be brought with respect to them; that is to say, all gaming contracts are void, and the winner of the game or wager shall not maintain a suit against his antagonist or the stakeholder. This construction makes one member of the section in unison with the other. What legal right there may be to recover back money paid under a contract that is void, the statute leaves it untouched. The decision of the learned Judge was wrong, and I think that judgment ought to be entered for the plaintiff.”

Transactions of this nature are not affected by the Gaming Act, 1892 (55 Vict. c. 9), s. 1, as to which see ante, p. 370, it having been held that money deposited by A. with B. as stakeholder to abide the result of a foot race between A. and a third party was not money paid under or in respect of a wagering contract within the meaning of the Act, and therefore that A., having demanded the deposit back from B. before it had been paid over by him to the third party, was entitled to maintain an action against B. for its recovery (e); Wright, J., saying—“The expression ‘money paid by him’ does not appear properly to apply to a revocable deposit. And it seems difficult to disregard the consideration that a different construction would tend directly and almost necessarily to defeat the very object of the Act, by preventing a revocation of the deposit, and so giving to the winner of the wager a practical certainty of being paid his bet, which advantage he did not previously possess” (f).

If two parties enter into an illegal or void contract, and money is paid upon it by one to the other, or to a stakeholder, it may be recovered back before the execution of the contract, but not afterwards (g); unless, if paid to a stakeholder, the stakeholder has paid it over contrary to notice given to him by one of the parties not to do so (h).

A person who has staked his money on an illegal or void transaction, and wishes to recover it, should do some act to put an end to the affair. And he should demand

(f) [1895] 1 Q. B. at p. 701.
(g) Hastelow v. Jackson, 8 B. & C. 226; and see Mearing v. Hellings,


Right to recover not affected by Gaming Act, 1892.

Recovery of money paid on an illegal contract.

What the party should do.

(e) Hastelew v. Jackson, 8 B. & C. 226; Bone v. Ekless, 5 H. & N. 925.
back his deposit before the illegal or void transaction has
taken place (i), and the money has reached the other party’s
hands (j), because, if he does not, he permits the stakeholder
to dispose of it (k).

It was held in the case of Hastelow v. Jackson (l) that
where the event in such case has been decided, but before
the money has been paid over, and one party expresses his
dissent from the payment, he may recover it from the
stakeholder. For although the event has happened, yet
the contract is not completely executed until the money
has been paid over, and therefore the party may retract at
any time before that has been done. Some doubt, in-
deed, has been thrown upon this case, Mr. Baron Alderson,
in Mearing v. Hellings (m), saying of it, “I accede to its
authority, though I think it a very strong decision. It
does not convince me. It overcomes me.” And Pollock,
C.B., in the same case, said: “With respect to the case of
Hastelow v. Jackson, I forbear saying anything about it at
present; it is binding upon us until reviewed by a Court of
Error. If the same question arose before me, I should
certainly advise a bill of exceptions.” And, in the case of
McElwaine v. Mercer (n), Hastelow v. Jackson was held by
the Irish Court of Common Pleas to be irreconcilable with
the law as established by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 18. But
it has never been expressly overruled, and indeed with
these exceptions it has been treated uniformly, both from
the Bench and by text-writers, as an authority (o).

If it be pleaded to an action, for money had and received,
that the money was staked on an illegal game, the plaintiff
must show in answer that he demanded back the stake
before it was paid over, the mere bringing an action before
payment over not being a sufficient demand (p).

(i) Martin v. Hewson, 10 Ex. 737.
(k) See Gatty v. Field, 9 Q. B. 440.
(n) McElwaine v. Mercer, 9 Ir. C. L. R. 13. The judgment in this
case appears to be founded upon a
misconception of the principle which
rules the English decisions and of the
facts in the case of Hastelow v. Jackson.
(o) Per Bramwell, B., Bone v. Ekless, 5 H. & N. 928. Per Cock-
(p) Gatty v. Field, 9 Q. B. 431.
But although the contract be illegal or void, yet if the event happens, and the money is paid over by the stakeholder without dispute, there is a complete execution of the contract, and the money cannot be reclaimed (q).

If a person pays his entrance money to the clerk of the course bona fide and without any attempt to impose upon the other subscribers, and then finds his horse disqualified, he may recover his stake (r).

But the owner cannot recover his own stake after the race, if before the race he knew that his horse was disqualified. Thus where the conditions of a race were that the horses were not to be thorough-bred, nor to have started against thorough-bred horses, nor to have run for a plate, the plaintiff started his mare Funny, and she came in first, but the clerk of the course refused to pay the stakes, as it appeared that under the name of Flashy Moll she had started against thorough-bred horses, run for plates, and had won many races. Upon this the plaintiff brought an action to recover back his own entrance money. However, Mr. Baron Vaughan said to the jury, "It will be for you to say whether the plaintiff has been guilty of an attempt to impose upon the other subscribers to the race by a misrepresentation of his mare; for if so, he will not be entitled to recover back any share of the stake. If the plaintiff knew of the disqualification of his mare the law will not assist him in the recovery of the deposit." A verdict was found for the defendant (r).

A stakeholder should pay the stakes to the winner or his agent. For where the holder of a ticket in a Derby lottery sold it to the plaintiff before the race, and the horse named in it was ultimately declared the winner, it was held that, even supposing the lottery were legal, the plaintiff could not sue the stakeholder, in an action for money had and received, for the amount to which the holder was by the conditions of the lottery entitled. Because a ticket of this sort could not be negotiable like a promissory note, and parties could not, by agreement among themselves simply, make a transfer of such a ticket, so as to give the assignee a right of action (s). But now, by section 25, subsection 6 of the Judicature Act, 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66), the owner of any debt or other chose in action may assign

Where the money is paid over without dispute. Where a horse is disqualified. Where owner knows the disqualification. Proper party to receive the stakes.

the same to a third person absolutely, and place such person in the position he himself was in at the time of the transfer, and with the same legal and equitable rights.

The actual winner may maintain an action against a stakeholder for all moneys actually in his hands, and against the party who has agreed to subscribe or contribute to the stakes, where it has not been paid up, and this however great the amount may be; provided that the game is lawful and that the transaction is not in the nature of a wager. But it is a good answer to an action for money had and received, that the money was deposited in the hands of the defendant to abide the event on which a wager was made, and was claimed by the plaintiff as the winner of the wager, and that he did not repudiate the wager, or demand back his money before the event thereof, and had never repudiated the wager, or claimed the money on any ground than as winner of the wager, and that no part of the money was a subscription or contribution, or due on any agreement to subscribe or contribute towards any plate, prize or sum of money to be awarded to the winner or winners of any lawful game, sport, pastime, or exercise (\(t\)).

Where five shillings a head had been staked by the eleven players on each side in a cricket match, an action was tried, and the winners recovered the stake from the stakeholder (\(u\)).

But Lord Tenterden refused to try an action to recover back a deposit on a wrestling match (\(x\)).

Where fraud has been practised the loser of a race may recover his stake from the stakeholder, and produce the agreement without a stamp. In the following case the plaintiff entered into a written agreement with a third party to race their horses upon certain terms, and he deposited the amount of his stake with the defendant. The race was run and the plaintiff’s horse was beaten; but he afterwards discovered that the whole transaction was a concocted fraud. After notice had been given not to pay over the amount, an action was brought to recover the stakes, and it was held by the Court of Exchequer, that the written instrument, although unstamped, was properly admitted in evidence in proof of the fraud (\(y\)).


\(u\) Walpole v. Saunders, 7 D. & R. 130.

\(x\) Kennedy v. Gad, 3 C. & P. 376.

\(y\) Holmes v. Sixsmith, 7 Ex. 802.
But if a person once affirms the contract by claiming the stake, he cannot afterwards turn round and claim a return of his money on the ground of the agreement being void by reason of fraud (a).

Where, however, the stakes have been paid over to a fraudulent winner, they may even then be recovered from him in an action by the stakeholder. Thus a bitch called Emily Deans was entered for the "Great Open Puppy Stakes" in Northumberland. The stakes were run for and a bitch described as Emily Deans won them, and the money was paid over by the secretary to the defendant. It was subsequently ascertained that the bitch which had run was not Emily Deans, but one called Miami. An action was brought by the secretary, who was also stakeholder, to recover the stakes from the defendant. It was submitted by the counsel for the defendant that the plaintiff was not the proper person to bring the action, and also that, Miami being in every way qualified in point of age to run for the stakes, there was no fraud committed. But Mr. Baron Martin was of opinion that Emily Deans being the animal entered for the match, the defendant had no more right to substitute another dog in her place, than a person entering a hunter for a sweepstakes had to run a racehorse instead. A verdict was found for the plaintiff, and a rule for a new trial was refused by the Court (a).

A sum of money deposited with stakeholders, to abide the result of a wager, which sum was repaid by them on the death of the party depositing to the administratrix, was held not to pass under the words "I give all my moneys, household furniture," &c. &c., because this sum of money, being in the hands of stakeholders, could not be said, after being so deposited, to have been in the possession or power of the testator at any subsequent moment of his existence (b).

Stewards.

The stewards are generally the proper parties to decide all disputes in a race, and all matters which, according to the conditions of the race, are to be referred to them. In order to their award being a satisfactory one, they should hear both sides and all join in making it; or if one make an

How he may waive his claim.

Where a stakeholder may recover from the winner.

Money in the hand of stakeholder does not pass as "his moneys" under the depositor's will.

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Their duties.
award for all, the disputing parties, and probably also the clerk of the course or stakeholder, should expressly submit themselves to his authority; though it would appear that without a strict adherence to this procedure their award might be a legal one (c). The judgment of the stewards should, if possible, be obtained; and recourse should not be had to legal proceedings, unless it can be shown that it is no longer practicable to get judgment from the stewards (d). But if the stewards are unable or incompetent to determine it, the case must go to a jury, and the stakes in the meantime must remain in the hands of the clerk of the course where he is the stakeholder. The law as to the decision of stewards is fully laid down in the following cases:—

There was a sweepstakes at Newport Pagnell races for horses not thorough-bred. Before the race was run, the plaintiff, who was owner of a horse afterwards second in the race, gave notice to the defendant, who was clerk of the course, that a horse belonging to one Shaw, which afterwards came in first for the races was thorough-bred, and therefore disqualified to start. The rule of the races was, that all disputes were to be settled by the stewards A. and B., whose decision was to be final; and B. had agreed to acquiesce in whatever A. did as steward. Neither of the stewards were present, and on A. being referred to, he submitted the question to the Jockey Club, who refused to entertain it, on the ground that it was a mere question of fact, and referred it back to the decision of the stewards. A. afterwards wrote a letter to the plaintiff, saying he considered him entitled to the stakes; but no proof was given that the first horse was thorough-bred.

It was decided that the letter was no authority, but that there ought to have been an express award by both stewards; or to make an award by A. binding, there ought to be clear proof that both the disputing parties, and probably also the clerk of the course, submitted to his authority. And Mr. Baron Parke said:—

"The stakes, therefore, remain in the defendant's hands until it be determined by due course of law who is winner; that is, by the stewards, if they are competent to determine it, if not, by a jury. The plaintiff may now submit the case to the stewards if they are competent to entertain it; if not, he may bring an action and show himself the winner,

(c) See post, p. 385.  
by showing that Shaw's horse was thorough-bred and that
his own was not" (e).

The decision of the stewards is not invalidated by the
fact of one of them being interested in the decision, inasmuch as it does not appear to be in the contemplation of the parties, that they should be excluded on that ground, nor are they arbitrators in the strict legal sense (f'), the intention of the parties being to constitute a tribunal for
the termination of any dispute without litigation of any
kind either by arbitration or action, and therefore the
principle of law as to interested judges is not applicable
to them.

Thus in the case of Ellis v. Hopper (g), where a steeplechase was run according to certain rules and conditions, one of which was that all disputes should be settled by the stewards, whose decision was to be final, it was held that the fact that one of the stewards joined in the award, where the winning or not of his own horse was in question, did not render the award void. And Bramwell, B., said in his judgment, "If in the betting code no such implied condition exist, that the appointed arbitrators or judges shall cease to be empowered to act, if one of them becomes interested in the event; the only remaining question is, is there a general proposition of law, that whenever a matter is referred to one or several persons his or their powers shall cease, if one of them becomes interested in the event? I know of no such rule. When parties agree to refer a matter, they may, if they please, put in a condition to that effect; but if they do not, why should the law make such a condition for them."

It appears to be at present undecided whether, on one of
the stewards becoming disqualified, the tribunal would still be in its integrity (h). But it has been held that a decision made by two of the stewards, three having been appointed, was valid and binding, although it was made in the absence of the third steward, and although he dissented from that decision (i).

In the case of Parr v. Winteringham (i), Lord Campbell, C.J., thus defined the position of stewards:—"If stewards

Legal position of stewards.

Decision not necessarily invalidated by one of them being interested.

Decision of two out of three stewards held binding.

Stewards differ from legal arbitrators.

(g) Ellis v. Hopper, 4 Jur., N. S. 1025; 28 L. J., Ex. 1.
(h) Ibid.
were in the position of arbitrators, they would have to meet together, to deliberate together, and to give a joint judgment. But they are judges of a peculiar character, and to avoid the technicality of a legal proceeding, it is intended that each should give a final judgment, and not that they should give a joint judgment. Accordingly it is not necessary that they should meet together and make a joint decision. And it may be stated as a general principle, that if that decision is a fair and honest one, it will be upheld by the Courts of Law" (j).

Where the printed conditions of a steeplechase contained the following (amongst other) stipulations: "No groom or professional jockey will be allowed to ride," and "all disputes and other matters shall be decided by the steward, whose decision shall be final, and who shall have the power of appointing an umpire: " the plaintiff who had a horse to run, which he intended should be ridden by one Walker, was informed by order of the steward, before the day of the race, that the steward considered Walker as a professional jockey, and that the horse, if ridden by him, would be no horse in the race. On the day of the race, Walker appeared in the field, mounted and prepared to ride the plaintiff’s horse, when the steward intimated to the plaintiff and others near him that his horse would be no horse in the race, as Walker had been forbidden to ride. Notwithstanding this intimation, Walker rode the plaintiff’s horse, and came in first. On the following day the steward pronounced the second horse to be the winner and entitled to the stakes. The plaintiff then brought an action against the defendant, who was secretary to the race committee, and holder of the stakes. A verdict was found for the plaintiff, reserving leave to the defendant to enter a nonsuit. The Court of Exchequer made the rule absolute to enter a nonsuit, and Chief Baron Pollock said, “The question is, whether the steward has decided this point, and whether his decision is good in point of law. I am of opinion that he has come to a decision, and that that decision is sufficient.” And Mr. Baron Alderson said, “It would be strange, if in a case like this a formal and solemn decision was necessary; if, for instance, it were requisite that a point should be regularly raised before the steward, that witnesses should be examined upon oath, and the same

strictness required as in arbitrations under the sanction of a Court of Justice" (k).

The rule, in short, is, that in cases of this kind, no mere errors of judgment in the decision, or in the conduct of the inquiry, will defeat the award of the stewards if they have in fact intended to do right. This rule is further illustrated by the judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Dines v. Wolfe (l). In that case the plaintiff agreed with one Doyle to run a match between their respective horses for 500/- a side, weight for age, under the Australian Jockey Club rules, and under the auspices of the club; the stakes to be deposited with the defendant fourteen days previous to the race. According to an unwritten rule of the Jockey Club, the stakes ought to have been deposited with the treasurer of the club. But the plaintiff refused to allow this to be done. Doyle's horse won; and after the race the plaintiff wrote to the stewards protesting against his being declared the winner, on the ground that he was only weighted as a four-year-old whereas he was in fact five years old. According to the rules of the Jockey Club, in the event of the age or qualification of a horse being objected to, either before or after the running, the stewards should call for such evidence as they may require, and their decision is to be final. The stewards held an inquiry in the manner prescribed by the rules, and after the meeting had been several times adjourned the plaintiff asked for a further adjournment which was refused, and Doyle's horse was declared to be the winner, the stakes being subsequently paid over to him by the defendant. The plaintiff then sued the latter for the stakes, contending that the rules of the Jockey Club had not been complied with as the stakes had not been deposited with the treasurer, and the race was therefore not run under the agreement, and that the stewards had not fairly decided the case, having refused his application for a further adjournment. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, whereupon the defendant moved for and obtained an order for a new trial, which order was affirmed on appeal, the Judicial Committee being of opinion that the plaintiff could not maintain his objection that the race had not been run under the agreement as he had refused to

(l) L. R., 2 P. C. 280; 3 Moore 251.
allow the stakes to be paid over to the treasurer, and by writing to the stewards had acknowledged that it was run under the rules; and further, that the stewards having acted fairly, and being the judges as to what evidence should satisfy their minds, their decision could not be impeached.

At a steeplechase, weight for age—run under certain rules, one of which made the decision of the stewards final, and another required that upon entering a horse his age should be stated—the defendant’s horse was entered as “aged;” he came in first, but was objected to as being a “six-year-old,” and not an “aged” horse; the stewards decided that, though, as a matter of fact, the horse was a “six-year-old,” and not “aged,” the misstatement in the entry was immaterial, inasmuch as the weight imposed on a “six-year-old” and on an “aged” horse was the same. The Irish Court of Exchequer Chamber held, that the stewards had not exceeded their jurisdiction, that there being no question as to the *bona fides* of their judgment, their decision on the construction of the rules, as well as on the matters of fact, was final and conclusive between the parties, and accordingly that the defendant’s horse was entitled to the stakes (*m*).

Where by the conditions of a race the decision of the stewards in all cases of dispute is to be final, they need not decide on the whole case at once, but may come to a provisional decision on the facts before them, and subsequently reopen the question and decide on the whole case, and such ultimate decision will be final. Thus, in *Smith v. Littledale* (*n*), the plaintiff’s horse ran in a race subject to the following conditions, viz.:—that he had been fairly hunted with certain hounds during the season; that he had been a certain time in the possession of his owner; and the stewards were to disqualify any horse that they did not consider to have been hunted in a genuine *bona fide* manner, and their decision in all cases of dispute to be final. The horse came in first, and the owner claimed the stakes. On an objection that the horse had not been fairly hunted, the stewards at once went into the question in the weighing-room, and held that he had, leaving the question whether the plaintiff was owner within the conditions for future decision. They subsequently decided that

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*(m) Newcomen *v.* Lynch, 10 Jr. R., C. L. 248—Ex. Ch. Reversing the decision of the Queen’s Bench, 9 Ir. R., C. L. 1.

*(n) 15 W. R. 69—C. P.*
he was such owner, but at the same time disqualified the horse as not being fairly hunted because he had not been ridden by his owner. In an action for the stakes, the jury found that the decision in the weighing-room was in favour of the horse subject to the question of ownership, and that the stewards afterwards decided that question in favour of the plaintiff, and at the same time disqualified the horse. Cockburn, C.J., told the jury that in his opinion the stewards could not make a conditional decision, and that the decision in the weighing-room was a provisional decision only, and directed the verdict to be entered for the defendant, leaving it to the plaintiff to move to enter it for him, if on the findings of the jury on the facts of the case the Court should think him entitled to it. The plaintiff's counsel moved accordingly, and contended that the decision of the stewards in the weighing-room was conclusive, and that as no further evidence was brought before them, they could not reopen it. Erle, C.J., said, "I am of opinion that there should be no rule: the action is against a stakeholder; the race was run, and the stewards decided that the stakes should not be given to the plaintiff, but to another person. The race was subject to this condition: 'The stewards will strictly carry out the object of this meeting by disqualifying any horse they do not consider to have been hunted in a genuine and bona fide manner, and their decision in all cases of dispute will be final.' That makes them absolute judges of fact and law and they have ultimately decided against the plaintiff's horse. The decision in the weighing-room was an inchoate decision only. A stakeholder is not to be made liable to an action where there is a stipulation in such terms as these." Willes and Keating, JJ., concurred, and the rule was therefore discharged.

The stewards of a race are the proper parties to appoint the judge, who may decide which is the winning horse; and if they are paid for their trouble, or enter upon their duties, they are liable to an action for not doing so (o).

But a person gratuitously undertaking the duties of steward of a horse race, is not liable for negligent non-feasance in not appointing a judge, unless it appears that he commenced to perform the duties of the office (p).


225.
Where by the conditions of a race the decision of the umpire or committee is to be final, the parties are bound by it in the same way as in the case of stewards. Thus where a match was made between two mares under the following agreement:

"Pratt and Evans.

"Thomas Holyoake, Esq., Umpire.

"Frederick Pratt bets Thomas Evans 100l. to 25l. p.p. [play or pay], Mr. Ryley’s brown mare, [late his property] beats Thomas Evans’s mare, Matilda, four miles across a country, thirteen stone each. To come off 1st March, 1841. The umpire’s decision to be final.

(Signed) "Thomas Evans,
"Frederick Pratt."

The match came off on the day appointed. Mr. Ryley’s brown mare came in first; but Mr. Holyoake, the umpire, decided that the other mare was the winner, in consequence of the former having passed through a gateway instead of going over the hedge, which the rules of steeplechasing seem to require. It was held that it was not competent to either party to dispute the decision of the umpire, as they had constituted him judge of the law and the fact (q).

Also where a race was run, subject to certain conditions, one of which was, that the riders should be “gentlemen farmers, or tradesmen, being persons never having ridden as regular jockeys or paid riders.” Another, that the decision of the committee on any dispute that might arise should be final. At the trial it appeared that the rider of the plaintiff’s horse, which came first to the winning chair, had been in the habit of riding at races, sometimes receiving his expenses, but never having been paid for his services, and that the plaintiff’s right to the stakes was disputed on the ground of an alleged cross. Immediately after the race, the jockey was required to attend before the committee, but omitted to do so. The committee therefore entered upon the inquiry, and ultimately came to the resolution, that unless the plaintiff would produce evidence before them on the following morning to induce them to alter their minds, their decision was that

(q) Evans v. Pratt, 4 Scott, N. R. 378.
the second horse was the winner. This was communicated to the plaintiff, but no evidence was offered, and nothing more was done.

Mr. Justice Coleridge told the jury, that they must consider, first, whether the committee had, before the commencement of the action, decided the dispute; secondly, whether or not the jockey was a rider qualified within the language of the issue; thirdly, whether he unfairly crossed. And he further told them, that if the committee had decided the matter, their decision would be conclusive, but that it must have been come to before action brought, as to which the evidence was not satisfactory; and, in his opinion, the jockey’s disqualification had not been established. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the Court of Common Pleas discharged a rule for a new trial (r).

But where the judge or referee takes upon himself to act as such notwithstanding the non-performance of a condition precedent to his jurisdiction, his decision will of course not be final, and the party against whom his award is made will be entitled to recover the amount of his deposit. The case of Carr v. Martinson (s) is an example of an occurrence of this nature. There the plaintiff and H. agreed to run a match between their respective horses, on a specified day, with a specified judge and starter. The stakes were deposited with the defendant, to be paid to the winner according to the decision of the judge. On the day fixed the plaintiff and H. were present, but the starter did not appear, and H. refused to run the race. The plaintiff’s horse was trotted over the course, and the judge declared the plaintiff the winner, but the defendant refused to hand over the stakes to him, whereupon he brought an action for their recovery; and it was held that as the race was not run according to the conditions agreed upon, it must be taken not to have been run at all, and therefore the judge’s jurisdiction never arose and his decision was invalid.

A similar point arose in Sadler v. Smith (t). In that case the plaintiff and K., watermen on the Thames, agreed to row a right-away sculler’s race, according to the recognised rules of boat-racing, the decision of the referee to be final.

When jurisdiction has not attached.

(r) Walmsley v. Matthews, 3
(t) 10 B. & S. 17; L. R., 5 Q. B. Scott, N. R. 584.
(s) 1 E. & B. 466; 28 L. J., Q. B. N. S. 502; 18 W. R. 148—Ex. Ch. 126; 7 W. R. 293.
In sculling races between professional watermen it is the custom for the competitors to start themselves, but if either should make default in starting, and any question should in consequence arise, it would be in the power of the referee to determine that question. The plaintiff and K. attempted, unsuccessfully, to start, and K. rowed to the referee, who ordered him to tell the plaintiff that if he would not start K. must start without him. K. rowed over the course without the plaintiff, and the referee awarded the race and stakes to him, without hearing any evidence or taking any steps to ascertain if his order had been communicated to the plaintiff, and without having any means of acquiring the knowledge of the fact. The plaintiff brought an action to recover his deposit. The jury found that the order of the referee was not communicated to him, and that he had not a fair opportunity of starting. It was held that the jurisdiction of the referee never attached, and therefore his decision was not final, and the plaintiff was entitled to recover.

All the parties whose horses are entered must of course adhere to the terms of the race, such as the weights, payment of entrance money, &c., because no single condition can be waived without the unanimous consent of the subscribers (u).

According to the rules by which a regatta was regulated, and which had been signed by all the parties taking part in the race, the prize, which was a boat, was not to be delivered up, unless it was fairly won to the satisfaction of the managers. In consequence of some fouling the managers were dissatisfied, and called upon both parties to stop the race. One of the parties, however, continued to row on alone, until he reached the goal; and then, assisted by his friends, he took possession of the prize boat, and deposited it in the defendant’s yard. An action of trover was brought against the defendant by the managers to recover the boat, and Lord Denman being of opinion that the evidence of conversion on the part of the defendant was very strong, the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff (x).

Neither the stewards, clerk of the course, nor any other persons, can waive or vary the published conditions of any race without the consent of all the subscribers. Thus

(u) Waller v. Doakins, 2 C. & P. 618. And see Lacev v. Umbers, 2 Stewards, &c. cannot waive any condition of a race.


where an action for money had and received was brought against the defendant, who was clerk of the course at the Mostyn Hunt Races, for the amount of stakes held by him as the stakeholder on a race won by a mare of the plaintiff's called Funny: the following was the printed advertisement of the race:—"A sweepstakes of ten guineas each, five forfeit, for horses not thorough-bred that have never started against a thorough-bred one or run for a plate; that have been regularly hunted with Sir Thomas Mostyn's, the Duke of Beaufort's or the Duke of Grafton's hounds, up to the day of naming, and are bona fide the property of the subscribers, &c. One guinea entrance. Horses to be named by Mr. E. Deakins on or before the 22nd of March." The plaintiff paid his share of the stake, and his mare came in first; but it appeared that the mare had been only once hunted with the hounds of Sir Thomas Mostyn. A witness proved that about half-an-hour before the race was run, the plaintiff said to the defendant, that he hoped he was satisfied about the mare's hunting, and that the defendant replied, "Quite so: you run your mare, we have arranged that." But Mr. Baron Vaughan said, "It must be shown that the clerk of the course had authority from the subscribers to waive the conditions of the race. It is not enough for the clerk of the course to say, half-an-hour before the running, that he would waive a particular condition. I take it that there was a printed proposal to run horses on certain terms; what the clerk said after this was published cannot have the effect of waiving any of those terms without all the other subscribers are proved to have consented to it" (y).

Where a match had been run between two horses under the Australian Jockey Club rules but the stakes had at the request of the loser, and with the consent of the winner, been deposited with his nominee instead of with the treasurer of the Jockey Club, as required by the rules, it was held that the loser could not maintain an objection that the rules of the club had not been complied with (z).

Where, in an action against a stakeholder for the recovery of the stakes deposited with him to abide the event of a horse-race, it appeared that an objection to the plaintiff as the winner of the race, on the ground of his being on the unpaid forfeit list, had not been lodged within

(z) *Dines v. Wolfe*, L. R., 2 P. C.
the time limited by one of the rules under which the race
was run, but the plaintiff had omitted to raise this point at
the inquiry held by the committee, whereupon the objection
was sustained; it was held that he could not do so in the
action, as he had, by his conduct, waived the benefit of the
rule in question (a).

On those courses which are governed by the rules of the
Jockey Club (b), the stakeholders, stewards, and all persons
concerned in the races, must regulate their proceedings
accordingly, unless there be a waiver of any of these rules
by mutual consent. But the Jockey Club will not enter-
tain any mere matter of fact submitted to them, but will
send it back for the decision of the stewards (c); and the
Courts will receive the rules of the Jockey Club as evidence
with respect to the laws of racing (d).

A submission to the arbitration of the Jockey Club of a
disputed account, amounts to an agreement which cannot
be impeached under the acts against gaming, if any part of
the accounts between the parties is legal.

Thus, the plaintiff in 1833 gave a post obit security on
his expectancy in a certain fund, payable on the death of
his father to W., in consideration of certain gaming debts.
He subsequently won a larger sum of W. by bets on horse
races, and both parties having submitted to the arbitration
of the Jockey Club in 1837, the steward decided that one
debt should be set off against the other, and the security
given up. And on the plaintiff filing his bill to have the
security delivered up to be cancelled, the Master of the
Rolls received in evidence the entry of the transaction in
the books of the Jockey Club, and also the testimony of
Mr. Greville, the steward (e).

The Courts will not take judicial notice of sporting
phraseology, but they will admit evidence to explain it.
Thus, where a match was made between two mares
“across a country,” it was held that although the Court
could not take judicial notice of such phrase, yet evidence
was admissible to show that in sporting phraseology it
means over all obstructions, and prohibits the rider from
availing himself of an open gate (f). And in another case

(a) Evans v. Sumner, 35 J. P. 761.
(b) For the Rules of the Jockey Club, see Racing Calendar for
1896.
(c) Marryat v. Broderick, 2 M. & W. 369.
(d) Greville v. Chapman, 5 Q. B. 745.
(f) Evans v. Pratt, 4 Scott, N. R. 378.
evidence was admitted to show that the letters "P. P." signified that the parties were bound either to run the match or forfeit the stakes (g).

So, also, where the race was what is termed a "selling" race, evidence was admitted to explain that it meant a race for which horses were entered upon the terms that the horse which won the race was to be sold by auction to the highest bidder, but the owner was only to receive the price put upon the horse when it was entered, the balance going to the racing fund. That horses thus entered were weighted according to the amount put upon them, those of the highest price carrying the greatest weight (h).

Where by the terms of a race the riders were to be persons who had never ridden as regular jockeys or paid riders, it was held by Chief Justice Tindal, in the Court of Common Pleas, that a regular jockey or paid rider is a person who follows the business of a jockey or rider as a means of gaining a livelihood. But that a person who had sometimes received his expenses, but had never been paid for his services, was clearly not disqualified (i).

Where by the terms of a race the horse must have been regularly hunted with some particular hounds, it is not necessary to qualify a horse to run that he should have been hunted every day the hounds went out. It is sufficient to show that the horse has been hunted frequently, but one day's hunting is decidedly not enough (k).

Where a match is made for a particular meeting which depends upon weather or other circumstances, of course the match must be run when such meeting actually takes place. Thus where an agreement in writing was made between the plaintiff and the defendant to run a match with greyhounds "on the Wednesday during the Newmarket Meeting, 1841, P. P." It appeared that the Newmarket meetings were meetings of a coursing club; that the power of appointing and adjourning them was vested in the stewards, who were governed by printed rules; and that the practice of the club was to hold the February meetings on the first or second Tuesday in that month, weather permitting; and if at the meeting the ground proved unfit for coursing, their practice was to

A "selling" race.

A professional jockey.

Horse regularly hunted with hounds.

Match for a particular meeting.

(g) Daintree v. Hutchinson, 10 M. & W. 89.
RACING, STAKEHOLDERS AND STEWARDS.

adjourn to a given day, or the first open day. At the time when the contract in question was made, the day appointed for the February meeting was Tuesday the 2nd of February, 1841. On Wednesday the 3rd, the plaintiff and defendant were there, but frost prevented the meeting from being then held, and it was adjourned to Tuesday the 9th, weather permitting. The frost, however, continued beyond that day, and the meeting was ultimately held on Tuesday the 16th. On Wednesday the 17th the plaintiff came with his dog ready to run the match, but defendant did not appear.

It was held, first, that the construction of the contract was, that the match should be run on the Wednesday during the February meeting, whenever it should be actually held, and that the plaintiff performed his part of the contract by being ready to run on Wednesday the 17th; secondly, that the plaintiff was not bound to produce the printed rules, but that it was enough for him to show that the February meeting was then actually held; and also that evidence was admissible to show what the parties intended by the letters "P. P." subjoined to the agreement (l).

The steward of a race-course can order any person off the grand stand or inclosure, though he has paid for his ticket; but in such case the steward or his agent had better tender the price of the ticket to the party at the time of giving him notice to quit the stand or inclosure to which the ticket has given him admittance. But the person who sold it to him should return the money, for otherwise the holder of it would probably have a right of action against the person from whom he had purchased it, or against those who had authorized its being issued and sold; such action however would be founded on a breach of contract, and not on his having acquired by the ticket any right to go on the stand or inclosure in spite of the owner of the soil. The authority of the steward was confirmed in the following case, where the question was fully discussed before the Court of Exchequer.

In 1843, Lord Eglinton being steward of Doncaster races, tickets were sold in Doncaster at one guinea each, which were understood to entitle the holders to admission into the grand stand and its inclosure, and to remain there during the races. They were issued with Lord Eglinton's

(l) Daintree v. Hutchinson, 10 M. & W. 87, 89.
privity, but they were not sealed nor signed by him. It appeared that the plaintiff, Wood, having purchased one of these tickets, came to the stand during the races of the year 1843, and was there in the inclosure while the races were going on; and while there, and during the races, the defendant, by the order of Lord Eglinton, desired him to depart, and gave him notice that if he did not go away force would be used to turn him out. The plaintiff had in no respect misconducted himself; and it was admitted that, if he had not been required to depart, his coming upon and remaining in the inclosure would have been an act justified by his purchase of the ticket. The plaintiff refused to go, and thereupon the defendant, by order of Lord Eglinton, forced him out, using no unnecessary violence. It was held, that even assuming the ticket to have been sold to the plaintiff under the sanction of Lord Eglinton, still it was lawful for Lord Eglinton, without returning the guinea, and without assigning any reason for what he did, to order the plaintiff to quit the inclosure; and that if the jury were satisfied that notice was given to the plaintiff requiring him to quit the ground, and that before he was forcibly removed by the defendant a reasonable time had elapsed, during which he might conveniently have gone away, then the plaintiff was not, at the time of the removal, on the place in question by the leave and licence of Lord Eglinton.

On this direction a verdict was found for the defendant, and a rule nisi having afterwards been obtained by the plaintiff to have this verdict set aside on the ground of misdirection, the Court of Exchequer, after hearing both sides and taking time to consider, in an elaborate judgment delivered by Mr. Baron Alderson, discharged the rule (m).

In ordering goods or work for the purpose of races, the stewards should expressily inform the parties who it is that intends to be answerable for the payment, otherwise they will be personally liable. In the case of Storr v. Scott (n), it appeared that the defendant, being one of the stewards of Lichfield races, at the request of the clerk of the course chose a gold cup at Storr and Mortimer's, who brought an action against him for the price; it being, however, shown that they had given credit for it to the clerk of the course, and had accordingly sent him an invoice, a verdict was found for the defendant.

(m) Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. 838. (n) 6 C. & P. 241
CHAPTER III.

WAGERS.

All wagers which were not against the principles of morality, public decency or sound policy, were held good at common law; and a wager or bet was defined to be a contract entered into without colour or fraud, between two or more persons, for a good consideration, and upon mutual promises to pay a stipulated sum of money, or to deliver some other thing to each other, according as some prefixed and equally uncertain contingency should happen within the terms upon which the contract was made (a).

A wager by which A. received from B. one hundred guineas on the 31st of May, 1802, in consideration of paying him a guinea a day so long as Napoleon Bonaparte (then first Consul of the French Republic) should live, was held to be void on the grounds of immorality and impolicy. This bet arose out of a conversation upon the probability of his coming to a violent death by assassination or otherwise (b).

So also a wager made, before the poll began, between two voters with respect to the event of an election of a member to serve in Parliament, was held to be void, as such contract is corrupt in the eye of the law and against the fundamental principles of the constitution (c).

Until the Act of Victoria (d), wagers above a certain amount were declared to be illegal by statute, now, however, the illegality no longer exists, and therefore betting on a race may be practised to any extent without any penalty being incurred.

But by the above-mentioned Act (e) it is provided, that “all contracts or agreements, whether by parol or in writing, by way of gaming or wagering, shall be null and void; and no suit shall be brought or maintained in any Court of Law or Equity for recovering any sum of money or valuable

(a) Jones v. Randall, Cowp. 39; 2 Hawk. c. 92.
(b) Gilbert v. Sykes, 16 East, 150; 14 R. R. 327.
(c) Allen v. Hearn, 1 T. R. 56; 1 R. R. 149.
(d) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 15.
(e) Ibid. s. 18.
thing alleged to be won upon any wager, or which shall have been deposited in the hands of any person to abide the event on which any wager shall have been made;” but this enactment is not “to apply to any subscription or contribution, or agreement to subscribe or contribute, for or toward any plate, prize, or sum of money, to be awarded to the winner or winners of any lawful game, sport, pastime, or exercise” (e).

However, a party depositing a sum of money with a stakeholder, by way of wager and not as a stake (f), may recover his money back, if he give notice to the stakeholder, before the event comes off, that he will break off the bet, and require him to return his money. In a case tried before Chief Justice Wilde at nisi prius in the Court of Common Pleas, Westminster, Nov. 30th, 1846, it appeared that a match in harness had been made between one Isaacs and the plaintiff, and on the event of this race they had made a wager of 20l. a-side, which each party had deposited with the defendant. Previous to the race, the plaintiff gave notice to the defendant that he should “break off” the bet, and he should require back his money. The defendant, however, did not return it, but paid the whole deposit to the other party after he had walked over the course; an action was then brought to recover the 20l. which had been deposited by the plaintiff.

At the trial, it was contended on the part of the defendant that, under 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 18, the action was not maintainable. But the learned Judge overruled the objection, and held that the statute was not meant to apply to a case like the present, in which the party depositing the money had given notice to the stakeholder to pay him it back before the time had arrived for the wager to be decided. And the jury, on the evidence, found a verdict for the plaintiff (g).

A rule nisi for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection, was afterwards obtained in the Court of Common Pleas, and in discharging the rule Mr. Justice Maule said: “Looking at the whole section (h), critically and grammatically, I am of opinion that it does not apply to any action like this, where a party seeks to recover his deposit from a stakeholder upon a repudiation of the wager.

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 Deposit recoverable before the event.

Decision of the Court of Common Pleas.

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(e) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 18.
(f) Distinction taken in Connor v. Quick; cited 2 W. Bla. 708.
(g) Varney v. Hickman Nov. 30, 1846; 5 C. B. 281.
(h) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 18, Appendix.
This cannot be considered as an action brought for recovering a sum of money alleged to be won upon a wager; nor do I think it is an action brought to recover a sum deposited in the hands of the defendant to abide the event of a wager. That must necessarily mean an action to be sustained on the ground of the existence and the determination of the wager. Here the money is not claimed on that ground. Quite the reverse. The plaintiff insists that the sum he seeks to recover is money which belongs to him, and which the defendant has no right to keep, and which he is under no legal or moral obligation to pay to anybody else. As soon as the defendant received notice from the plaintiff that he declined to abide by the wager, the money ceased to be money deposited in the hands of the former to abide the event, and became money of the plaintiff's in his hands, without any good reason for detaining it. Upon these grounds I think this point ought to be determined in favour of the plaintiff. It was said in the course of the argument that the general scope of the Act is to prohibit gaming and wagering; and that this object would be best attained by holding moneys deposited with stakeholders not to be recoverable in this way. But I see no pretence for construing the Act to mean anything so penal without express words." And in this opinion Cresswell and V. Williams, JJ., agreed (i).

To adopt the language of Hawkins, J., in delivering his considered judgment in Carlill v. Carbolie Smoke Ball Co. (k), "It is not easy to define with precision what amounts to a wagering contract, nor the narrow line of demarcation which separates a wagering from an ordinary contract, but according to my view, a wagering contract is one by which two persons, professing to hold opposite views touching the issue of a future uncertain event, mutually agree that, dependent upon the determination of that event, one shall win from the other, and that other shall pay or hand over to him, a sum of money or other stake; neither of the contracting parties having any other interest in that contract than the sum or stake he will so win or lose, there being no other real consideration for the making of such contract by either of the parties. It is essential to a wagering contract, that each party may under it either win or lose,

(i) Varney v. Hickman, 5 C. B. 282. And see further, ante, pp. 376—380, "Stakeholders."

(k) [1892] 2 Q. B. 484, at pp. 490, 491, affirmed in C. A., [1893] i Q. B. 256.
whether he will win or lose being dependent on the issue of the event, and, therefore, remaining uncertain until that issue is known. If either of the parties may win but cannot lose, or may lose, but cannot win, it is not a wagering contract.

It is also essential that there should be mutuality in the contract. For instance, if the evidence of the contract is such as to make the intentions of the parties material in the consideration of the question, whether it is a wagering one or not, and those intentions are at variance, those of one party being such as if agreed in by the other would make the contract a wagering one, whilst those of the other would prevent it from becoming so, this want of mutuality would destroy the wagering element of the contract, and leave it enforceable at law as an ordinary one: see Grizzlewood v. Blane (l), Thacker v. Hardy (m), Blaxton v. Pye (n). No better illustration can be given of a purely wagering contract than a bet on a horse-race. A. backs Tortoise with B. for 100/. to win the Derby. B. lays ten to one against him—that is, 1000 to 100. How the event will turn out is uncertain until the race is over. Until then A. may win 1000/; or he may lose 100/.; B. may win 100/. or he may lose 1000/.; but each must be a winner or a loser on the event. Under the wager neither has any interest except in the money he may lose or win by it. True it is that one or both of the parties may have an interest in the property of the horse; but that interest is altogether apart from the bet, and each party is in agreement with the other as to the nature and intention of his engagement . . . . One other matter ought to be mentioned, namely, that in construing a contract with a view to determining whether it is a wagering one or not, the Court will receive evidence in order to arrive at the substance of it, and will not confine its attention to the mere words in which it is expressed, for a wagering contract may be sometimes concealed under the guise of language which, on the face of it, if words were only to be considered, might constitute a legally enforceable contract."

The test applicable in some cases to the determination of the question whether a contract is a wagering contract or not within the statute, is, whether the price of the subject-matter is to vary according to the issue of an event

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(l) 11 C. B. 526.  
(m) 4 Q. B. D. 685.  
(n) 2 Wils. 309.
totally unconnected with its actual value. Thus in a case in which the plaintiff and defendant, while conversing as to some rags, which the plaintiff proposed to sell, and defendant to buy, disputed as to the price of a former lot of rags, the plaintiff asserting the price to have been lower than the defendant asserted it to have been. They agreed that the question should be referred to M., a spirit merchant, and that whichever party was wrong, should pay M. for a gallon of brandy, and that if the plaintiff was right, the price of the lot now on sale should be 6s. per cwt., but, if the defendant was right, it should be 3s. per cwt. M. decided that the plaintiff was right. The plaintiff thereupon sent the rags to the defendant, but the defendant refused to accept them at 6s., offering 5s. An action having been brought for goods bargained and sold, it was held by the Court of Queen’s Bench, that this was a wagering contract, which could therefore not be enforced by legal process, and that it made no difference that there was a real intention to part with the goods (o).

An agreement for the sale of a horse for 200/. if he trotted eighteen miles within an hour, within a month, and for 1s. if he failed to accomplish the task, was held to be nothing more nor less than a mere wagering contract (p).

If money is advanced upon the security of a deed in pursuance of a stipulation or agreement between the plaintiff and defendant, that out of it money lost by the defendant to the plaintiff on betting transactions should be paid to the plaintiff, it is a mere colourable loan and evasion of the statute, and the deed is invalid; but if there be no such stipulation or agreement, and the plaintiff advance the money as a loan for the defendant to dispose of as he pleased, though the plaintiff expected to be paid out of the money so lent, the deed is valid (q).

In Wilson v. Cole (r), the plaintiff had agreed to take the defendant’s house, and had paid a deposit of 25l. Afterwards the defendant offered the plaintiff 25l. to be off the bargain. They then tossed whether the defendant should pay the plaintiff 50l., or 75l. The defendant won, and when he was sued for the 50l. and the 25l. deposit, set up that the contract of rescission was a wagering one and therefore void under the statute. The jury found that the deposit was

(o) Rourke v. Short, 5 E. & B. 904.
(q) Hill v. Fox, 4 H. & N. 459 —Ex. Ch.
(p) Brogden v. Marriott, 3 Bing. 36 L. T., N. S. 702.
(r) N. C. 88.
not in contemplation of the parties, but that a rescission of the contract was in fact made; and it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover both the 50% as consideration for the rescission, and also the 25% deposit.

In a case where the plaintiff and defendant agreed that the plaintiff should take the defendant's mare in exchange for that of the plaintiff; and that the defendant should give the plaintiff half of the winnings of her first two races, or, in case she should be sold before then, that the defendant should pay the plaintiff one-third of what she should have been sold for; it was held by the Irish Court of Common Pleas, that the above agreement, being one simply to give an increased price for the mare, upon the occurrence of a state of facts, which might add to her value, was a legal contract, and not in the nature of a wager (s).

Where the defendants, the proprietors of a medical preparation called "The Carbolic Smoke Ball" issued an advertisement in which they offered to pay 100% to any person who contracted the influenza after having used one of their smoke balls in a specified manner and for a specified period, and the plaintiff on the faith of the advertisement bought one of the balls, and used it in the manner and for the period specified, but nevertheless contracted the influenza, it was held that these facts established a contract by the defendants to pay the plaintiff 100% in the event which had happened, and that such contract was neither a wager within 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, nor a policy within 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, s. 2, as to which see post, p. 413; and that, therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to recover (t).

Where an action was brought to recover a sum of money lost by playing in the ordinary way with two persons at billiards, the players having staked sums of money on successive games; it was held that such a transaction was not within the proviso of the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 18, inasmuch as the players did not contribute or agree to contribute any sum to be awarded to the winner (u).

Where the plaintiff and W. deposited each 500£ with the defendant, on an agreement that if W. on or before the 15th of March, 1870, proved the convexity or curvature to and fro of the surface of any canal, river, or lake, by actual

(s) Crofton v. Colgan, 10 Ir. C. L. R. 133.
(u) Parsons v. Alexander, 1 Jur. N. S. 660.
measurement and demonstration to the satisfaction of the defendant, W. would receive the two sums deposited; but if W. failed in doing this, the two sums were to be paid to the plaintiff—it was held that the agreement was a wager, and consequently null and void within the statute (x).

So where H. and the plaintiff deposited 50£ each with the defendant and entered into a written agreement that the 100£ should be paid to H. if his horse trotted eighteen miles in an hour, and if not then to the plaintiff; it was held that the transaction was simply a wager, and did not come within the proviso in 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 18, as to contributions to a prize or sum of money to be awarded to the winner of any lawful game, sport, pastime or exercise (y).

And a wager under the disguise of a contract to pay a reward for information will not evade the Act. In Higgins v. Simpson (z), the plaintiff was a tipster, i.e. gave information as to the probable winners of horse races. Upon his giving the name of a horse to the defendant as the probable winner of a certain race, it was agreed between them that the plaintiff should have 2£ on the horse at 25 to 1, that is to say, that if the defendant backed the horse and won, the plaintiff should have 50£ out of his winnings, but if the horse lost the plaintiff should pay the defendant 2£. The defendant did back the horse and it won, and the plaintiff thereupon claimed 50£ out of the defendant's winnings; and it was held that the agreement was void, and that the 50£ could not be recovered.

It was laid down in the case of Batty v. Marriott (a), that though there be but two subscribers to a plate, prize or sum of money to be awarded to the winner of a lawful game, and those two subscribers the competitors themselves, yet it is not less a contribution within the exception in the statute, (8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 18,) if the agreement be, that the whole sum subscribed shall be paid over to the winner, and if it be a bona fide subscription or contribution on the part of those two persons. But what the court had in their minds in that case was the question whether the game was a lawful or unlawful game, and having come to the conclusion that it was a lawful game, they were of opinion that

(z) 2 C. P. D. 76; 46 L. J., C. P. 192; 36 L. T., N. S. 17; 25 W. R. 303.
(a) 5 C. B. 832.
there was nothing in the case which was struck at by the Act of Parliament, and that the Act was only intended to strike at unlawful games (b). This view has, however, been held by the Court of Appeal to be erroneous (c); and it has been decided that an agreement to walk a match for 200l. a-side, the money being deposited with a stakeholder, is a wager, and null and void under the statute; and that the deposit of the money is not a subscription or contribution for a sum of money to be awarded to the winner of a lawful game within the proviso.

And in a case in which the plaintiff agreed with B. and others, that a match should be made between a mare, the property of M., and a mare, the property of the plaintiff, and that the party nominating the winner should receive from the others 100l., and that 100l. should be forfeited by the party making default in causing the mare nominated by him to run, it was held by the Irish Court of Queen's Bench that no action was maintainable upon such an agreement, inasmuch as it did not come within the proviso of the section (d), which excepts "any subscription or contribution, or agreement to subscribe or contribute, for or toward any plate, prize, or sum of money, to be awarded to the winner or winners of any lawful game, sport, pastime, or exercise," from the operation of the previous part of the section; and that this contract was a mere wager depending upon an accidental circumstance, and not upon the running of a race (e).

The proviso that the foregoing part of this section shall not apply to any subscription or contribution, for or towards any plate, &c. to be awarded to the winner or winners of any lawful game, is not the less applicable where the entire sum of money subscribed is not awarded to the first horse. Therefore where the conditions of a race were that a subscription should be made up of the sum of 3l. each, subscribed by the owners of the horses, and a sum of thirty sovereigns added thereto out of the race fund, out of which the expenses and a sum of 1l. 10s. were to be deducted and paid to the treasurer, and 3l. 3s. to the owner of the second horse, they were held to be good, and satisfied the requirements of the proviso (f).

(c) Diggle v. Higgs, ubi supra.
(d) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 18.
(e) Irwin v. Osborne, 5 Ir. C. L. R. 494.
(f) Crofton v. Colgan, 10 Ir. C. L. R. 133.
The onus of proving the consideration to be a good one does not lie with the subsequent holder of a promissory note given in payment of money lost on a wager, such wager not being within the statutes to which the 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 41, is applicable, and being therefore simply void within 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 18. Thus in a case (g) in which a promissory note was given in payment of a bet (upon the amount of hop duty payable in 1854, which was not therefore within 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 41 (h)), and an action was brought upon it, it was held that it lay upon the defendant to prove the absence of consideration for it; for, though proof that a negotiable instrument was affected with fraud or illegality in the hands of a previous holder raises a presumption that he would indorse it away to an agent without value, and consequently calls on the plaintiff for proof that he gave value, yet the presumption does not arise, when the previous holder merely held without consideration. “The note was given to secure payment of a wagering contract, which even before 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, the law would not enforce, but it was not illegal, and there is no penalty attached to such a wager; it is not in violation of any statute nor of the common law, but is simply void, so that the consideration was not an illegal consideration, but equivalent in law to no consideration at all” (i).

So where an action was brought to recover the amount due on two promissory notes given by the defendant to one B. in respect of certain gambling transactions on the stock exchange, and indorsed over by B. to the plaintiff for valuable consideration; it was held that the plaintiff’s right to recover was not affected by the fact that he had notice of the notes having been given by the defendant in respect of such transactions, the consideration for the notes not being illegal, but falling within the category of void contracts under the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109 (k).

In an action brought by the holder for value of a cheque with notice that it was drawn for the purpose of paying certain betting losses to the person in whose favour it was drawn, the defendant was given unconditional leave to

(g) Fitch v. Jones, 5 E. & B. 238; 24 L. J., Q. B. 293.
(h) As to the scope of this Statute, see post, Chap. IV., and see also the Statute, Appendix.
(i) Per Lord Campbell, C.J., Fitch v. Jones, 5 E. & B. 238. And see Lynn v. Bell, 10 Ir. R., C. L. 487; Pyke, Ex parte, Lister, In re, 8 Ch. D. 754; 47 L. J., Bk. 100; 38 L. T., N. S. 923; 26 W. R. 806 —C. A.
defend under Order XIV. r. 1; the Court being of opinion that as the plaintiff knew that the only consideration for the cheque was money lost in bets the matter came within the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 18, and that in any case the plaintiff was entitled to raise this point by way of defence (kk). Having regard, however, to the decisions in Fitch v. Jones (l), and Lilley v. Rankin (m), it is apprehended that the proper defence in this case would have been the illegality of the consideration under 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 41, as to which see post, Chapter IV.

The Act for the suppression of betting houses (n), which is treated of in the chapter on Betting Houses and Gaming Houses (o), has made various important provisions with respect to betting, and with respect to receiving money, &c., as the consideration for any assurances, &c., to pay money, &c. (p)—or as a deposit on any bet, on condition of paying any money, &c.—"on the happening of any event or contingency of or relating to a horse race, or any other race, or any fight, game, sport, or exercise" (q).

The Stock Jobbing Act (7 Geo. 2, c. 8), invalidated all time bargains in the Public Funds (r), but time bargains relating to shares (s), or in foreign funds (t), were held not to be void either under the Act or at common law. The Act was repealed in 1860 by the 23 & 24 Vict. c. 28.

Where each party means to break the contract, but to give the other a remedy against him for the difference of price, according as the market may rise or fall, it is a gambling transaction, being a mere bet upon the future price, and the contract is therefore void under 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109 (u).

Thus in a time bargain in shares, if it is understood by both parties that the shares are never to be delivered into the hands of the purchaser, it is nothing more than a wager made between the parties upon the difference of the price at the time that the supposed purchase is made, and the price on the settlement day. If the shares rise one party is to receive, and if they fall he is to be at a loss.

(l) Note (q), supra.
(m) Note (k), supra.
(n) 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119, Appendix.
(o) See Betting Houses and Gaming Houses, post, Chap. V.
(p) 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119, s. 1, Appendix.
(q) Ibid. ss. 3, 5.

(r) Oakley v. Rigby, 3 Scott, 194.
(t) Wells v. Porter, 3 Scott, 141.
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A real time bargain appears to be of very rare occurrence (a), if not entirely unknown (y) on the Stock Exchange. "But what are called time bargains," said Lindley, J. in delivering judgment in Thacker v. Hardy (z), "are, in fact, the result of two distinct and perfectly legal bargains, namely, first, a bargain to buy or sell; and, secondly, a subsequent bargain that the first shall not be carried out; and it is only when the first bargain is entered into upon the understanding that it is not to be carried out, that a time bargain, in the sense of an unenforceable bargain, is entered into."

A time bargain is not necessarily invalid, as in the case of a contract to sell next year's apple crop in a particular orchard (a), where the parties may be respectively gainers or losers, according to the happening of a future event, but one of the essential elements of a wagering contract is wanting (b).

Grizeivood v. Blane (c), affords an instance of a real time bargain (d). In that case, the declaration alleged a contract for the sale by the defendant to the plaintiff of railway shares at a certain price, and a subsequent contract for the sale by the plaintiff to the defendant of other railway shares at an advanced price, and an agreement that the two sets of shares should be set off against each other, and the differences paid by the defendant to the plaintiff. At the trial, it appeared that the plaintiff was a stockjobber and that the defendant had, through his broker, contracted to sell and to re-purchase the shares mentioned in the declaration; and that there had been former dealings between the parties of the same character, no shares passing, but merely settlements of differences. It was objected on behalf of the defendant, that, it being evident that the sales were a mere colour for payment and receipt of differences one way or the other, the contract was one by way of gaming and wagering within the meaning of the statute. Jervis, C.J. left it to the jury to say what was the intention of the parties at the time of making the contract—whether either party really meant to purchase or to sell the shares in question; telling them that if they did not, the contract was, in his opinion, a gambling transaction and void.

(x) Thacker v. Hardy, 4 Q. B. D. at p. 692—per Bramwell, L.J.
at p. 689—per Lindley, J.
(y) Ex parte Grant, 13 Ch. D. at p. 671.
(z) 4 Q. B. D. at p. 689.
(a) Thacker v. Hardy, 4 Q. B. D. at p. 689—per Lindley, J.

(b) Ibid. at p. 696—per Cotton, L.J.
(c) 11 C. B. 526.
(d) See Thacker v. Hardy, 4 Q.
Upon this the jury found a verdict for the defendant; and upon an application for a new trial this direction was held right and the verdict justifiable by the evidence (e).

Cooper v. Neil (f), as understood by the jury, afforded another instance of a real time bargain (g). In that case, the defendant employed one B., a broker, to enter into contracts on the Stock Exchange for the purchase of shares. As B. knew, the defendant did not intend to accept the shares, but only to receive or pay differences according to the rise or fall in the market price of the shares. B. entered into contracts with jobbers for the purchase of shares in pursuance of the defendant's instructions; and upon these contracts, according to the rules of the Stock Exchange, became personally liable. He afterwards became insolvent, and the plaintiff, as his trustee, sued upon an implied contract of indemnity against the claims of the jobbers. At the trial the jury found that the contracts with the jobbers were mere time bargains, and judgment was given for the defendant. This judgment was upheld by the Queen's Bench Division, but a new trial was eventually ordered by the Court of Appeal on the ground that the verdict was unsatisfactory.

In Byers v. Beattie (h) it was held by the Irish Court of Exchequer Chamber that a contract between stockbrokers and their customer that the brokers should, at the customer's direction, buy shares and sell them, and that the profits should belong to the customer, the brokers being personally liable to him for their payment; and that the losses should be borne by the customer, the brokers personally, and not by way of indemnity, receiving them; was a wagering contract within the meaning of the statute; and that the fact that the brokers were in either case to receive their commission and charges would make no difference. At first sight it is somewhat difficult to reconcile the ruling in this case with the law as laid down in Thacker v. Hardy (i) and other more recent cases of a similar nature, but it should be borne in mind that the judgment turned entirely on the construction of the contract as set out in the plaint.

(e) Doubts have, however, since been expressed as to whether the jury really understood the nature of the evidence before them. See Marten v. Gibbon, 33 L. T., N. S. at p. 563 —per Bramwell, L.J.; Thacker v. Hardy, 4 Q. B. D. at pp. 695, 696 —per Brett and Cotton, L.JJ.

(f) W. N. 1 June, 1878; 27 W. R. 159.

(g) See Thacker v. Hardy, 4 Q. B. D. at p. 689 —per Lindley, J.

(h) 2 Ir. R. C.L. 220; 16 W. R. 279.

(i) 4 Q. B. D. 685—C. A.
which contained no statement as to where the plaintiffs were stockbrokers, in what markets, if any, they were to deal, or what, if any, were the usages of such markets; the Court being of opinion upon such construction that it was intended that the defendant should never be liable for anything but the differences, which would make the purchases and sales nominal merely so far as the defendant was concerned.

In Thacker v. Hardy (j), the plaintiff, a broker, was employed by the defendant to speculate for him on the Stock Exchange. To the knowledge of the plaintiff the defendant did not intend to accept the stock bought for him, or to deliver the stock sold for him, but expected that the plaintiff would so arrange matters that nothing but differences should be payable by him. The plaintiff knew that unless he could arrange matters for the defendant as the latter expected, the defendant would be unable to meet the engagements which he might enter into for him. The plaintiff accordingly entered into contracts on behalf of the defendant, upon which he became personally liable, and sued the defendant for indemnity against the liability incurred by him and for commission as broker. It was held by the Court of Appeal, affirming the judgment of Lindley, J., that the employment of the plaintiff by the defendant was not against public policy, and was not illegal at common law, and, further, was not in the nature of a gaming and wagering contract against the provisions of the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 18; Bramwell, L.J. (jj), saying that assuming the principal to be entitled by the terms of the bargain, to call on the broker to re-sell the stock, so that instead of taking and paying for it, the former would have to pay only the differences that would not infringe the provisions of the statute, for the principal might take the stock, and hold it as an investment, and adding: "I have no doubt that it continually happens that stock which is bought for a rise is really taken up and held when the market falls. But the broker might be unable to re-sell, if, for instance, he had been ordered to buy shares in an insolvent bank; so that the transaction really comes to this, that the principal is bound either to take or deliver the stock (as the case may be), but the broker is to endeavour to relieve the principal from liability by buying or selling.

(j) 4 Q. B. D. 685; 48 L. J., 27 W. R. 158.
Q. B. 289; 39 L. T., N. S. 595; (jj) 4 Q. B. D. at pp. 691, 692.
again. There is no gaming or wagering in a transaction of that kind; the broker has no interest in the stock, and it does not matter to him whether the market rises or falls; but when a transaction comes within the statute against gaming and wagering, the result of it does affect both parties" (k).

The Court having arrived at the conclusion that the transaction was not a contract by way of gaming and wagering, the broker was entitled to recover on the general principle that an agent is entitled to indemnity against all lawful liabilities incurred by him on behalf of his principal; but Lindley, J., went still further, and held, adopting the opinion expressed by Brett, L.J., in Cooper v. Neil (l), that even assuming that the contract was a wagering one, the statute only affected the contract which made the wager (m), and that the plaintiff having incurred a lawful liability at the request, and on behalf of the defendant, was therefore entitled to be indemnified (n). But since The Gaming Act, 1892, as to which see post, p. 418, it is apprehended that the broker would be precluded from recovering under such circumstances, as the implied promise by the principal to pay the broker would be rendered null and void by that Act.

Where the defendant instructed the plaintiffs, who were stockbrokers, to sell the prospective dividends on certain railway stock, which they accordingly sold to certain jobbers, calculating the dividend at a certain rate per cent; but the dividend, when declared, amounted to a higher rate than that which the plaintiffs had calculated, and according to the usage of the Stock Exchange, they therefore paid the jobbers the difference; it was held that they were entitled to recover this difference from the defendant, as the contract was no more a wager than, as suggested by Blackburn, J., the purchase from a fisherman of the next haul of his net at a fixed price would be, and was not prohibited by the existing rules of the Stock Exchange (o).

(k) These remarks, as well as those of Cotton, L.J., as to the essence of a gaming contract, 4 Q. B. D. at p. 695, were recently adopted by Lord Herschell, L.C., in delivering the judgment of the J. C. in the very similar case of Forget v. Ostigny, [1805] App. Cas. 318.

(l) 27 W. R. 159.

(m) 4 Q. B. D. 687.


(o) Marten v. Gibbon, 33 L. T., N. S. 561; 24 W. R. 87—C. A. Since
Real time bargains are of more frequent occurrence in transactions with outside brokers, than they are with authorized brokers on the Stock Exchange. The advertisements or circulars by which outside brokers seek to attract the public to deal with them sometimes stipulate that all bargains shall be settled by payment of differences, and there can be no doubt about the wagering nature of a contract entered into upon such a basis, as it is nothing more than a bet upon the future price of the stock or shares dealt with \((p)\), though sometimes it is sought to veil the true nature of the transaction by the use of so-called forms of application \((q)\). But where a written contract was entered into by an outside jobber with his customer, that \(bona fide\) purchases and sales of stocks and shares should be made between them; and no subsequent bargain was in fact come to between them that the purchases and sales should not be carried out, and merely the differences paid, but it was contemplated that this might be so; and in the actual dealing no delivery of stock took place, although the jobber did offer to deliver some; it was held that although the parties might have contemplated that as a whole, there would be a mere payment of differences between them, yet, inasmuch as the actual contracts entered into involved liability for the actual delivery of the stock dealt with, they were not wagering contracts within the meaning of the statute \((r)\).

In Fuller v. Perryman \((s)\), the plaintiff sought to recover two sums of 50\(l\). each. The defendant was an outside broker and as such had acted for the plaintiff. The defendant told the plaintiff that he was going to speculate in certain stock, and said that if the plaintiff would advance him two sums of 50\(l\). he would get the benefit of the speculation if it was successful, and if not the defendant would bear the loss and repay the plaintiff the 100\(l\). The plaintiff advanced the money, but the speculation turned out unsuccessful, and the defendant refused to repay the 100\(l\). on the ground that the speculation was a gambling transaction and his promise to repay, therefore, void under the Gaming Act, 1892, as to

\[this\ \textit{decision},\ \text{however},\ \text{the}\ \textit{Stock}\ \textit{Exchange}\ \textit{rule}\ \text{has}\ \text{been}\ \text{amended},\ \text{and}\ \text{is}\ \text{now}\ \text{prohibitive.} \ \text{See}\ \text{R.}\ 64,\ \text{Stutfield's}\ \textit{Rules}\ \text{and}\ \textit{Usages}\ \text{of}\ \text{the}\ \textit{Stock}\ \text{Exchange},\ \text{2nd}\ \text{ed.}\ \text{at}\ \text{p.}\ 39.}\]

\[\textit{(p)}\ \textit{Reggio v. Steven}, 4\ \textit{Times}\ L.\ R. 326.\]

\[\textit{(q)}\ \textit{Egleton v. Barclay}, 11\ \textit{Times}\ L.\ R. 174.\]

\[\textit{(r)}\ \textit{Universal Stock Exchange v. Stevens}, 66\ \textit{L. T.}, N.S. 612; 40\ \textit{W. R.} 494—Romer, J. \ See also \textit{Show v. Caledonian Rail. Co.}, 17\ \text{ct.}\ \text{of}\ \text{S. Cas.} 4th\ Series, 466; \textit{Lowenfeld v. Howat}, 19\ \text{ct.}\ \text{of}\ \text{S. Cas.}, 4th\ Series, 128.\]

\[\textit{(s)}\ 11\ \text{Times}\ L.\ R. 350—C.\ A.\]
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which see post, p. 418. In the absence of any evidence that the defendant entered into contracts that there should be no delivery of the stock, and that differences only should be paid, the Court assumed that he entered into proper contracts, and held that the plaintiff was therefore entitled to recover (t).

Where securities are deposited as cover in respect of wagering transactions in stocks and shares, the depositor can maintain an action for their return. Such a deposit is not a deposit to abide the event upon which a wager has been made, as the statute applies only to the deposit of that which becomes the property of the winner of the wager the moment that the event shows that he has won (u).

It is enacted by 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, s. 1, that "No insurance shall be made by any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate, on the life or lives of any person or persons, or on any other event or events whatsoever, wherein the person or persons for whose use, benefit, or on whose account such policy or policies shall be made, shall have no interest, or by way of gaming or wagering; and that every assurance made, contrary to the true intent and meaning hereof, shall be null and void to all intents and purposes whatsoever."

An agreement in the form of a policy upon the sex of a person is a wagering policy within the meaning of this statute (v). So is an engagement, in consideration of forty guineas, to pay 100l. in case Brazilian shares should be done at a certain sum on a certain day, subscribed by several persons, each for themselves (w); but a promise to purchasers of a preventive of influenza to give 100l. to any purchaser not finding the prevention effectual is not (z).

Where a wager was made that war would be declared against France within three months, it was held by the Courts of Queen's Bench and Common Pleas, although the Court of Exchequer was of a contrary opinion, that the wager was void under 14 Geo. 3, c. 48. No judgment. however, was ever given on the case (a).

Where money was advanced upon an assignment of an expected devise, with a condition that if there should not

(t) Fuller v. Ferryman, 11 Times L. R. 350—C. A.

(u) Strachan v. Universal Stock Exchange, [1895] 2 Q. B. 329; 14 R. 223; 73 L. T., N. S. 6; 43 W. R. 611—C. A. As to the recovery of money deposited as cover, see Strachan v. Universal Stock Exchange (No. 2), [1895] 2 Q. B. 697 

—C. A.


(y) Paterson v. Powell, 9 Bing. 320.

(z) Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [1893] 1 Q. B. 256—C. A.

be such a devise, then that the money should be repaid without interest; it was held not to be a policy on the life of the testator within 14 Geo. 3, c. 48 (b).

As no wager can be tried in any Court of Law or Equity, the winner cannot compel payment from the loser (c); and therefore if the money be paid, it is in fact giving a gratuity.

If a note, bill, or mortgage be taken as a security for money, either won by betting on the sides and hands of persons gaming, or knowingly lent for the purpose of such betting, or where such betting is going on, the consideration is illegal under 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 41. But any other security under seal would appear to be good, where the gaming is not illegal (d).

A bond given to persons to whom the obligor has lost bets on horse-races, which he is unable to pay, in order to prevent them from taking the steps which, under the conventional code established among betting men, they are entitled to take, and which would be followed by consequences involving the obligor in considerable pecuniary loss, is valid (e).

If a note or bill be given in payment of any bet, except such as has been made on the sides or hands of persons gaming, it is in reality a gift, and its value will depend upon circumstances. Thus where a bill had been given gratuitously, Lord Abinger, C.B., in delivering the judgment of the Court of Exchequer, in Easton v. Pratchett (f), said, "If a man give money as a gratuity, it cannot be recovered back, because the act is complete; yet a man who promises to give money cannot be sued on such promise; and if so, I do not see how a promise in writing not under seal can have any binding effect. The law makes no difference between such a promise and a verbal one. There is the same distinction as to a bill of exchange. If a party gives to another a negotiable instrument on which other parties are liable, the man who makes the gift cannot recover the bill back, and the man to whom the bill is given may recover against the other parties on

(b) Cook v. Field, 15 Q. B. 475.
(c) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 18. And see per Lord Cairns, L.C., Diggle v. Higgs, 2 Ex. D. 422; 46 L. J., Ex. 721; 37 L. T., N. S. 27.
(d) See Gaming, post, Chap. IV.
(e) Bubb v. Velverton, L. R. 9 Eq. 471; 39 L. J., Ch. 428; 22 L. T., N. S. 258; 18 W. R. 512.
(f) Easton v. Pratchett, 1 C. M. & R. 798; 3 Dow. 472; 1 Gale, 83; and see the same case in error, 2 C. M. & R. 542; 4 Dow. 549; 1 Gale, 260; 6 C. & P. 736.
the bill; but it is a very different question whether the giver binds himself by the indorsement so as to make himself liable thereupon to the person to whom he gives it. There is no decision that he does, and there is a strong authority the other way; and the prevailing opinion in the profession is, that a parol promise of a gift, whether verbal or in writing, will not be binding."

A race-course is a mart where stolen or lost notes may be readily disposed of, and therefore a party should always use due caution in taking a bank note from a stranger, either in payment of a bet, or in change out of payment for bets lost, and the larger the amount of the note the greater the care required.

A bonâ fide holder of a stopped note, or other negotiable security, that is to say, a person who has given value for it, and who has had no notice at the time that the party from whom he takes it has no title, is entitled to recover upon it, even though he may at the time have had the means of knowledge of that fact, of which means he neglected to avail himself. Thus, where a money-changer at Paris, twelve months after he had received notice of a robbery of bank-notes at Liverpool, took one of the stolen notes (for 500l.) at Paris, giving cash for it, less the current rate of exchange, from a stranger, whom he merely required to produce his passport, and write his name on the back of the note, it was held that the circumstance of his forgetting or omitting to look for the notice was no evidence of mala fides (g).

In Goodman v. Harvey (h), the Court of Queen's Bench held that there must be actual mala fides to invalidate the right of the holder of a bill or bank note, received from a person having no title to it. And also that the existence even of gross negligence was unimportant, except so far as it might be evidence of mala fides (h).

This decision was confirmed by the case of Uther v. Rich (i), where the Court of Queen's Bench held that mala fides in the holder of a negotiable security, if relied on, must be distinctly alleged. And that the only proper way of implicating him in an alleged fraud, is by averring that he had notice of it, and that an allegation that he

Taking a stolen bank note in payment.

Taking stopped note in payment.

What invalidates the holder's right.

Male fides must be distinctly proved.

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(g) Raphael v. Bank of England, 1882, ss. 29, 30, 90.
(h) Goodman v. Harvey, 4 A. & E. 870. See also Bills of Exchange Act, 17 C. B. 161.
Money borrowed to pay bets.

A betting partner.

was not a bonâ fide holder, is not equivalent to an aver-
ment of such notice.

Formerly money borrowed for the express purpose of
settling losses on a race to the amount of 10l. or upwards
could not be recovered by the lender, although he bore no
part in the transaction (k). This was so held on the
ground of illegality; but as that no longer exists, it would
appear that a person borrowing money for the purpose of
paying his betting losses on a race, whatever their amount
may be, is as completely indebted to the lender as if he
had borrowed it for any other purpose whatsoever. For
in a case where an I. O. U. afforded primâ facie evidence
of a debt, and an injunction was sought to restrain the
party from suing on it, on the ground that a great part
of the consideration was money lent for gambling pur-
poses; on its appearing that the transaction had taken
place in a foreign country, where such games were not illegal,
the injunction was refused (l).

The 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 18, does not make gaming
contracts illegal, but null and void, and therefore it would
be contrary to public morality to lay down that a party
who has received money lost in a wager should by pleading
this statute escape paying over the fair share to his
partner (m). Where, therefore, the plaintiff and A. had
jointly made bets on a horse-race, and A. had received the
winnings, and given the plaintiff a bill accepted by the
defendant, who was no party to the betting, for his share;
it was held that the plaintiff was not precluded by the
statute from suing the defendant on the bill (m).

Beeston v. Beeston (n) was a case of a very similar nature
to that last cited. The plaintiff had paid money to the
defendant to be employed by the latter, with certain money
of his own in betting on horse-races, the plaintiff to receive
a certain proportion of the winnings. The defendant so
employed the money and won, giving the plaintiff a cheque
for his share of the winnings. The cheque having been
dishonoured, the plaintiff brought his action on it. The
defendant set up a plea of gaming, contending that the

(k) McKimell v. Robinson, 3 M. & W. 434; Cannan v. Bryce, 3 B. &
Ald. 179; 22 R. R. 342.

(l) Quarrrier v. Coleston, 1 Turn. &
Ph. 147. And see Pyke, Ex parte,
Lister, In re, 8 Ch. D. 754; 47
L. J., Bk. 100; 38 L. T., N. S.
923; 26 W. R. 806—C. A.

(m) Johnson v. Lansley, 12 C. B.
468.

(n) 1 Ex. D. 13; 45 L. J., Ex.
230; 33 L. T., N. S. 700; 24 W. R.
96.
transaction was void under S & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 18, and
that the cheque was an illegal security under 5 & 6 Will. 4,
c. 41. But this plea was held bad, as the agreement was
not one by way of gaming and wagering within the meaning
of the former statute, neither was the consideration for the
cheque illegal under the latter; Pollock, B., remarking
that the statutes relied on applied only to contracts and
securities between the parties to the wager.

So where A. and B. had entered into an agreement of
partnership, under which they were to share the profits
upon bets to be made by B. upon horse-races, and A. had
advanced money for the purposes of the partnership, it
was held that, as B. had received money on account of A.,
and the betting part of the transaction was purely collateral,
A. was entitled to have an account taken of what was due
to him under the agreement (o).

Independently of any question of partnership, a princi-
pal who employs an agent for a commission to make bets
for him is entitled to recover from such agent any sums
received by him on account of such bets, as the contract
between the parties is not a contract by way of gaming and
wagering within the meaning of the S & 9 Vict. c. 109,
s. 18 (p). In actions against agents for money received
under such circumstances the defence of gaming and wager-
ing is frequently raised, it being contended that the bet
was made by the plaintiff with the defendant, and not by
the defendant with a third person as agent for the plaintiff.
The defendant, will, however, be estopped from denying
that he acted as the plaintiff’s agent in the transaction if it be
proved that the contract between the parties was ostensibly
one of agency, and that he from time to time rendered
accounts to the plaintiff, showing bets to have been made,
and money received or paid on his behalf (q). In such
cases the plaintiff, must, of course, prove the agreement
between himself and the agent, that the latter made the
bets on his behalf, and that he received the winnings. But
the plaintiff need not, in every case, in order to show that
the bets were made as agent and not principal, prove with

(p) Bridge v. Savage, 15 Q. B. D. 363; 54 L. J., Q. B. 464; 53
L. T., N. S. 129; 33 W. R. 891—
C. A., overruling Beyor v. Adams,
26 L. J., Ch. 841. See also Savage
v. Muirder, 36 L. J., Ex. 178; 16
L. T., N. S. 600; 16 W. R. 910.
(q) Moore v. Peachey, 7 Times
L. R. 748—Charles, J. See also
Potter v. Codrington, 9 Times L. R.
54, where the facts proved were
held insufficient to constitute an
estoppel.
whom the bookmaker made the bets in fact. Where the latter by his course of business holds himself out as a commission agent, the plaintiff has a *prima facie* right to recover the bets from him (*r*). The principal cannot maintain an action against the agent for damages for breach of contract in failing to make a bet pursuant to the principal's instructions, as the bet being irrecoverable at law the principal can suffer no loss from the failure of his agent to make it (*s*).

In *Read v. Anderson* (*t*) it was held by the Court of Appeal (*u*), affirming the decision of Hawkins, J. (*x*), that the employment of a turf commission agent, being a member of Tattersall's, to make a bet in his own name on behalf of his principal implied an authority to pay the bet if lost, and on the making of the bet that authority became irrevocable; the result being that an agent who had paid money under such circumstances could maintain an action against the principal for its recovery.

But this ruling has been superseded by the Gaming Act, 1892 (*y*), which enacts that, "any promise, express or implied, to pay any person any sum of money paid by him under or in respect of any contract or agreement rendered null and void by the Act of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, or to pay any sum of money by way of commission, fee, reward, or otherwise in respect of any such contract, or of any services in relation thereto or in connexion therewith, shall be null and void, and no action shall be brought or maintained to recover any such sum of money."

This Act is not retrospective (*z*). Neither does it affect the right of a principal to recover from his agent the amount of bets won and received by him (*a*). But money paid by one person for another at his request to persons to whom the latter has lost bets is money paid "in respect" of a gaming contract within the meaning of the Act, even though the former was no party to the betting; and cannot, therefore, be recovered from the party at whose request it was paid (*b*).

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(*r*) *Grimerd v. Wiltshire*, 10 Times L. R. 505, 506—Charles, J.


(*x*) 10 Q. B. D. 100.

(*y*) 55 Vict. c. 9, s. 1.


Money deposited with a stake-holder to abide the result of a foot-race between the depositor and a third person is not money paid under or in respect of a wagering contract within the Act, and, therefore, if demanded by the depositor from the stake-holder before payment over to the third person, can be recovered by action (c).

Where bills of exchange were accepted without a drawer's name and handed to B. in payment of bets; and B. subsequently, for consideration, handed them to the plaintiff, who signed his own name to them and sued the defendant on them; it was held that the Act did not apply, and that the defendant was liable (d).

In the case of Reg. v. Orbell (e), it was held to be an indictable offence to get a person to lay money on a race, and prevail with the party to run booty; for though the cheat was private in this particular, yet it was public in its consequences. Cheating, however, is now specially provided against by the 17th section of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, where it is enacted that "every person who shall by any fraud or unlawful device or ill practice, in wagering on the event of any game, sport, pastime, or exercise, win from any other person to himself, or any other or others, any sum of money or valuable thing, shall be deemed guilty of obtaining such money or valuable thing from such other person by a false pretence with intent to cheat or defraud such person of the same, and being convicted thereof shall be punished accordingly;" and therefore every such person is guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction is liable at the discretion of the Court to penal servitude for any period not less than three years or exceeding five years (f), or to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years (g), and the prosecutor is entitled to his costs under 7 Geo. 4, c. 64, s. 23 (h).

What is commonly known as "welsing" is also an indictable offence. Thus, where the prisoner laid odds against a particular horse at a race meeting, and, upon its winning, decamped with the money deposited with him by the prosecutor to abide the event of the wager, it was

(d) Faulks v. Atkins, 10 Times L. R. 178—Wills, J.
(c) Reg. v. Orbell, 6 Mod. 42. (f) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 88; 54 & 55 Vict. c. 69, s. 1, sub-s. (1).
(g) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 88; 54 & 55 Vict. c. 69, s. 4, sub-s. (2).
(h) Per Patteson and Talhford, J.J., Reg. v. Gardner, Worcester Spr. Ass. 1851

Welshing.
held that as it appeared that the latter parted with his money with the intention that in the event of the horse winning it should be repaid, while the former obtained possession of the money fraudulently, never intending to repay it in any event, there was no contract by which the property in the money could pass, and therefore there was evidence of larceny by a trick (i).

CHAPTER IV.

GAMING.

Gaming, by playing at cards, dice, or any other games, when practised without fraud and as a recreation, is not an offence at common law; such transactions, however, have never met with much encouragement when brought into a Court (a).

By the custom of London, it is a sufficient cause for a master to turn away his apprentice, that he frequents gaming, and he may justify it before the chamberlain (b).

The dismissal of a confidential commercial clerk before the expiration of the term of his engagement, upon the discovery that he had for many years previously been engaged in speculating in “differences” upon the Stock Exchange to a large extent, has also been held justifiable (c).

But it is laid down that the Bishop cannot refuse to induct a clergyman when presented to a living, merely because he is a player at unlawful games, or a haunter of taverns (d); because, as Sir Simon Degge says, each of these is not malum in se, but only malum prohibitum (e).

It appears to be somewhat doubtful whether excessive gaming is, at the present day, unlawful in itself. In Bacon’s Abridgment, tit. Gaming (A), it is said that, “it seems that by the common law the playing at cards, dice, &c., when practised universally and as a recreation, the better to fit a person for business, is not at all unlawful nor punishable as any offence whatever.” In Rex v. Rogier (f) Abbott, C.J., said that “the playing for large and excessive sums of money would of itself make any game unlawful;” Best, J., adding that “it is quite clear that any practice that has a tendency to injure public morals is a common law

(a) Bac. Abr. tit. Gaming, A.; Dalton, c. 23; Sherbon v. Colebach, 2 Vent. 175.
(b) Woodruff v. Farnham, 2 Vern. 291.
(c) Pearce v. Foster, 17 Q. B. D. 536 ; 55 L. J. Q. B. 306—C. A.
(d) Specot’s case, 5 Rep. 58 a, p. 118.
(e) Degge’s P. C., Part 1, Chap. 1.
(f) 1 B. & C. at p. 275 ; 2 D. & R. 431.
offence. No game is unlawful in itself; but every game may be rendered so by playing at it for an excessive stake; for it is the amount played for, and not the name or nature of the game which is the essence of it, and which constitutes an offence in the eyes of the law (g)." In Jenks v. Turpin (h), however, Hawkins, J., said that since the repeal of the statutes of Anne and 18 Geo. 2, c. 34, (as to which, see ante, pp. 360, 363), he did not think that excessive gaming upon any game would in itself render the game unlawful; "for excessive gaming per se is not any longer a legal offence. It was not one at common law, and there now exists no statute against it." But a different conclusion was arrived at by A. L. Smith, J., the latter learned judge being of opinion that the dictum of Best, J., in Rex v. Rogier (i), is still good law, notwithstanding the repeal of the statutes in question (k).

"Common players and hazarders with false dice" are indictable (l), and even an infant may be indicted for cheating with false dice (m).

The winning of exorbitant sums of money has been discouraged both by Courts of Law and Equity. Thus, in the case of Sir Basil Firebrasse v. Brett (n), it appeared that the defendant and Sir William Russell dined with the plaintiff at his house, and after dinner fell into play. When they began, the defendant and Sir William Russell had not above eight guineas between them, but they won about 900l. in ready money, which the defendant brought away with him. The plaintiff, upon losing this, being somewhat inflamed by wine, brought down a bag of guineas, containing about 1,500l., which the defendant also won; but as he was leaving the house with it in his possession, the plaintiff and his servants seized upon it, and took it from him. The plaintiff had brought an information against the defendant for playing with false dice, but he was acquitted. The defendant then brought an action of trespass against the plaintiff for taking from him in a forcible manner this bag of guineas. The Lord Chancellor granted an injunction to stay these proceedings at law, though the defendant had by answer denied all the circumstances of

(g) 2 D. & R. at p. 435.
(i) Note (g), supra.
(k) 13 Q. B. D. at p. 532.
(l) 2 Rol. Abr. 78; Leeser's case, Cro. Jac. 497.
(m) Bac. Abr. Infant (II.).
(n) Sir Basil Firebrasse v. Brett, 1 Vern. 489; Sir Basil Firebrasse v. Brett, 2 Vern. 70.
fraud charged in the bill. And his Lordship said, that he thought the sum very exorbitant for a man to lose at play in one night, and that if it was in his power he would prevent it; and cited the case of Sir Cecil Bishop v. Sir John Staples in the time of Lord Chief Justice Hale, about a wager upon a foot race, and that the Chief Justice said, in that case, that those great wagers proceeded from avarice and were founded in corruption, and decided that he would give the defendant leave to imparl from time to time. His Lordship then said, that if such discouragement was given to gaming at common law, it ought much more to be done in a Court of Equity.

Cheating in a game or at play is now an indictable offence; for by the 17th section of 8  & 9 Vict. c. 109, it is enacted, "that every person who shall by any fraud or unlawful device or ill practice in playing at or with cards, dice, tables, or other games, or in bearing a part in the stakes, wagers, or adventures, or in betting on the sides or hands of them that do play, or in wagering on the event of any game, sport, pastime, or exercise, win from any other person to himself, or any other or others, any sum of money or valuable thing, shall be deemed guilty of obtaining such money or valuable thing from such other person by a false pretence with intent to cheat or defraud such person of the same, and being convicted thereof shall be punished accordingly" (o).

Tossing coins for wagers is a sport, pastime, or exercise, if not a game within this section (p).

The "fraud or unlawful device" must be practised during the game itself to support an indictment for obtaining money by a false pretence, and it is not sufficient that a fraud was resorted to, to induce the prosecutor to play (q).

Where several persons confederated and combined together to play at skittles, so that the play of one of them should betoken his skill to be much less than it really was, in order that the prosecutor (a looker-on) might be induced to play with him, and thereby lose to him his money, it was held to be an indictable conspiracy (r).

In order to support a conviction on a count alleging a conspiracy by false pretences and fraudulent devices to cheat

(o) See Cheating in a Wager, ante, p. 419. In the case of Burnett v. Allen (4 Jur., N. S. 488), the Court of Exchequer were equally divided as to whether the term "blackleg" was per se defamatory or not.

(p) Reg. v. O'Connor, 45 L. T., N. S. 512—C. C. R.

(q) Reg. v. Bailey, 4 Cox, C. C. 397.

(r) Reg. v. Bailey, 4 Cox, C. C. 390.
the prosecutor of his money, it is not necessary to give in
evidence such a false pretence as would, if money had been
obtained on it by one prisoner alone, have been sufficient
to sustain an indictment against him for obtaining money
by false pretences; and it is no bar to a conviction that
the prosecutor had the intention of cheating the prisoner if
he could (s).

A criminal information was refused by the Court of
King’s Bench for a conspiracy to cheat, where it appeared
that the persons making the application, as well as the
other parties against whom it was made, were a set of
cheats and gamblers (t).

By 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109 (w), “all contracts and agreements,
whether by parol or in writing, by way of gaming or
wagering,” are null and void.

And where money has been paid to a stakeholder, in
pursuance of a contract by way of gaming, either party
may recover back his share before it has been paid over (x).
But in no case can the whole be recovered by the winner.

The French law does not allow an action for a debt at
play. But games proper in the exercise of feats of arms,
foot races, horse or chariot races, tennis, and other sports of
the same nature, which require address and agility of body,
are excepted, subject to the power of the Court to reject
the demand where the sum appears to be excessive (y).

Under the proviso in the 18th section of 8 & 9 Vict.
c. 109, the enactment in that section is “not to be deemed
to apply to any subscription or contribution, or agreement
to subscribe or contribute, for or towards any plate, prize,
or sum of money to be awarded to the winner or winners of
any lawful game, sport, pastime or exercise” (z). It
is not clear what is excepted by the word game in that
proviso, but it seems probable that the “sum of money to
be awarded to the winner” at the termination of “any
lawful game, sport, pastime, or exercise,” is meant to be
a sum ascertained before the commencement of such game,

(s) Reg. v. Hudson, Bell, C. C. 263; 29 L. J., M. 145.
(t) Rex v. Peach, 1 Burr. 548.
(u) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 18, Appendix.

474; hastelow v. Jackson, 8 B. & C. 221; Hudson v. Terrell, 1 C. & M. 392;
Hawgood v. Walsh, 1 Q. B. D. 189; 45 L. J., Q. B. 238; 33 L. T.,
N. S. 852; 24 W. R. 607; Diggle
v. Higgs, 2 Ex. D. 422; 46 L. J.,
Ex. 721; 37 L. T., N. S. 27; 26
W. R. 777—C. A.; Trumble v. Hill,
5 App. Cas. 342. See ante, pp. 376
—381.

(y) Code Civil, Book 3, tit. 3,

(z) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 18,
Appendix; and see Wagers, ante,
Part III., Chap. III.
&c., as distinguished from the case where it is uncertain what sum may be won or lost until the game has concluded. It would appear, therefore, that so long as the money won is a stake and not a bet, and the game, &c. is lawful, and perhaps the sum ascertained before the commencement of such game, &c., the winner may maintain an action against a loser for his subscription or contribution to the stake (a).

The following are lawful games, sports, pastimes, or exercises:—horse races (b), steeple chases (c), trotting matches (d), coursing matches (e), foot races (f), boat races (g), regattas (h), rowing matches (h), golf, wrestling matches (i), cricket (k), tennis, fives, rackets, bowls (l), skittles (m), quoits, curling, putting stone, football (n), and presumably, every bona fide variety, or similar description of such games, &c. The winner therefore, in any of these, may recover from the loser, or each of the losers, his subscription or contribution to the stake (o).

The following lawful games when played for money (p) may, prima facie, be called lawful gaming or play:—Whist and other lawful games at cards, backgammon (q), billiards (r), bagatelle (r), chess (s), drafts (s), dominoes (s), &c.

By the 72nd section of the Highway Act (t) a penalty is imposed upon any person “who shall play at football or any other game on any part of the highway, to the annoyance of any passenger or passengers.” Therefore where a number of persons assembled together in a public highway


(b) See the Law as to Racing, ante, Part III., Chap. II.

(c) See Evans v. Pratt, 4 Scott, N. R. 378.

(d) See Holmes v. Sisemore, 7 Exch. 802.

(e) See Daintree v. Hutchinson, 16 M. & W. 87; Emerson v. Dickson, ante, p. 383.

(f) See Betty v. Marriott, 5 C. B. 818; Coates v. Hatton, 3 Stark. 61.

(g) See Chesebro v. Hart, ante, p. 392.


(i) See Kennedy v. Gad, 3 C. & P. 376; Manby v. Scott, 1 Mod. 136.


(m) See Manby v. Scott, 1 Mod. 136.

(n) See 8 & 9 Vict. e. 109, s. 18, Appendix.

(o) If money is not staked, it is not gaming, Reg. v. Ashdon, 22 L. J., M. C. 1.

(p) See 13 Geo. 2, e. 19, s. 9, Appendix.

(q) See 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 15, Appendix. See also Parsons v. Alexander, 1 Jur., N. S. 660.

(r) See Reg. v. Ashdon, 22 L. J., M. C. 1, Q. B.

(s) 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50.
to enjoy a diversion called "a stag-hunt," which consisted in one of the number representing a stag, and the others chasing him, whereby an obstruction was caused, it was held that this was "a game" within the meaning of the Act (a).

A variety of games are prohibited by statute. Thus all lotteries are declared to be public nuisances in whatever way they may be drawn or arranged (x). The games of the ace of hearts, pharaoh, basset and hazard (y) are to be deemed games, or lotteries by cards or dice, and are unlawful, whether played at a public table or in private (z). Also the game of passage and every other game with dice, except backgammon and other games played with backgammon tables, are to be deemed games or lotteries by dice within 12 Geo. 2, c. 28 (a). The game of rolypoly, or roulet, is also prohibited under the same penalties (b).

To these may be added any game of chance, or mixed game of chance and skill, when played for money in a common gaming house, at all events within the meaning of the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 38, s. 4, which imposes a penalty upon the keeper of a house for the purpose of unlawful gaming being carried on therein (c). Baccarat, whether "banque" (d) or "chemin de fer" (e), is a game of chance, and, therefore, an unlawful game in this sense. The question whether or not games of chance when played for money in a gaming house are unlawful, in the sense that they render the players subject to a criminal prosecution, has not yet been decided. In Jenks v. Turpin (f), Hawkins, J. committed himself to no opinion on this point, on the ground that it was unnecessary under the circumstances of the case (g); but A. L. Smith, J. said that in his opinion gaming in a common gaming house was unlawful in the sense of being criminal, and that the law would punish it accordingly (h).

The statutes containing provisions concerning lotteries

(a) Pappin v. Maynard, 9 L. T., N. S. 327.
(b) 18 Geo. 2, c. 34, s. 1, Appendix.
(c) 10 & 11 Will. 3, c. 17, s. 1.
(d) 18 Geo. 2, c. 34, s. 1, Appendix.
(f) Ibid.
(g) Ubi supra.
(h) Jenks v. Turpin, 13 Q. B. D. at p. 532.

Unlawful games.

Lotteries.

(3) 12 Geo. 2, c. 28, s. 2, Appendix; and see M. Kinnell v. Robinson, 3 M. & W. 441; Rex v. Liston, 5 T. R. 240.
(4) 13 Geo. 2, c. 19, s. 9, Appendix.

(11) Ubi supra.
(12) 13 Q. B. D. at p. 526.
and littlegoes are 10 & 11 Will. 3, c. 17; 9 Ann. c. 6; 8 Geo. 1, c. 2; 9 Geo. 1, c. 19; 2 Geo. 2, c. 28, s. 9; 6 Geo. 2, c. 35; 12 Geo. 2, c. 28; 13 Geo. 2, c. 19; 42 Geo. 3, c. 119; 46 Geo. 3, c. 148; 4 Geo. 4, c. 60; 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 66; 8 & 9 Vict. c. 74; and 9 & 10 Vict. c. 48, and are to be found set out at length in Chitty's Statutes, 5th ed., under the heading "Games and Gaming."

The statute 10 & 11 Will. 3, c. 17, recites the mischiefs arising from Lotteries under colour of certain patents and grants; and then enacts, not only that all such lotteries, but also that all other lotteries, are public nuisances (k).

It imposes a penalty of 500l., to be recovered in any of her Majesty's Courts at Westminster, upon every person who may "exercise, expose, open or show to be played, thrown or drawn at, any such lottery, play, or device, or other lottery" (l).

Also a penalty of 20l. to be recovered in like manner upon every person who "shall play, throw or draw at any such lottery, play or device, or other lotteries" (m).

The statute 9 Geo. 1, c. 19, s. 4, imposes a penalty of 200l. for setting up any lottery by virtue of a grant from any foreign prince, state, or government, or issuing any advertisement for the same, or for selling tickets in this country for any foreign lottery; and the like penalty is imposed by 6 Geo. 2, c. 35, for selling or procuring any ticket, receipt, chance, or number in any foreign lottery, or in or belonging to any class, part, or division of such lottery, or any ticket for any duplicate of any foreign lottery. The 9 Geo. 1, c. 19, s. 4, only applies to the erection of foreign lotteries in this country. An agreement to purchase a concession conferring the right to erect lotteries in a foreign country is, therefore, not within the scope of the section (n).

The statute 12 Geo. 2, c. 28, s. 1, imposes a penalty of 200l. upon every person erecting, setting up, continuing, or keeping "any office or place under the denomination of a sale or sales of houses, land, advowsons, presentations to livings, plate, jewels, ships, goods or other things by way of lottery," or advertising for advances of "small sums of money by several persons, amounting in the whole to large

(k) 10 & 11 Will. 3, c. 17, s. 1; and see Allport v. Nutt, 1 C. B. at p. 989.
(l) 10 & 11 Will. 3, c. 17,

Lotteries declared nuisances.

Penalty for keeping a lottery.

Penalty for drawing at a lottery.

Foreign lotteries.

Penalty for setting up sales by lottery.

12 Geo. 2, c. 28.

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sums to be divided among them by chances of the prizes in some public lottery or lotteries established or allowed by Act of Parliament," or exposing for sale any of the above things by any game, method, or device whatsoever, to be determined by any lot or drawing.

By section 2, the games of ace of hearts, pharaoh, basset, and hazard are declared to be games or lotteries by cards or with dice within the meaning of the statutes 10 & 11 Will. 3, c. 17; 9 Ann. c. 6, s. 56; and 8 Geo. 1, c. 2, s. 36, with the same penalties for setting up the same.

By section 3, a penalty of 50l. is imposed upon every person who shall be an adventurer in any of the said games, lotteries, or sales, or shall play at either of the said games of the ace of hearts, pharaoh, basset, and hazard.

By section 4, all sales by lotteries are declared void, and the subject matter of any such sale is to be forfeited to the person who shall sue for the same.

And by section 11, nothing contained in the Act is to affect any interest in lands, &c. held by any allotment or partition by lots. But all who may at any time become "part owners, joint tenants, or tenants in common," of any land, &c., may take such interest as they might have done by virtue of "any lot, scroll, chance, or allotment whatsoever," if the Act had never been passed.

By 13 Geo. 2, c. 19, s. 9, the game of passage, and all games, invented or to be invented, with dice, except backgammon, are to be deemed to be lotteries within the meaning of the 12 Geo. 2, c. 28, supra, and all persons who "set up, maintain, or keep any office, table, or place," (save as in the said Act is provided and declared), for such games, or who "play, set at stake, or adventure at" them shall respectively be liable to the penalties inflicted for the like offences against the said Act.

And by 13 Geo. 2, c. 34, ss. 1 and 2, the like penalties are imposed upon persons keeping any house, room, or place, or permitting it to be used, for playing at roulet, or rolopoly, or any game with cards or dice, already prohibited by law, or playing at the same.

The statute 42 Geo. 3, c. 119, recites the mischiefs occasioned by certain lotteries called littlegoes, and declares that "all such games or lotteries called littlegoes are public nuisances" (o).

Persons keeping lotteries within the meaning of this Act,

(o) 42 Geo. 3, c. 119, s. 1: and see Allport v. Nutt, 1 C. B. at p. 989.
or 10 & 11 Will. 3, c. 17, are liable to indictment for the
nuisance notwithstanding the pecuniary penalties im-
posed (p).

And it is enacted that no person "shall publickly or
privately keep any office or place, to exercise, keep open,
show, or expose to be played, drawn, or thrown at or in,
either by dice, lots, cards, balls, or by numbers or figures,
or by any other way, contrivance, or device whatsoever,
any game or lottery called a littlego, or any other lottery
whatsoever not authorized by parliament," under a penalty
of 500l., to be recovered in the Court of Exchequer at the
suit of the Attorney-General (q).

The same penalty is also incurred by any person who
"shall knowingly suffer to be exercised, kept open, shown,
or expose to be played, drawn, or thrown at or in, either
by dice, lots, cards, balls, or by numbers or figures, or by any
other way, contrivance, or device whatsoever, any such
game, or lottery, in his or her house, room, or place" (r).

Before the passing of the Vagrant Acts, 3 Geo. 4, c. 40,
and 5 Geo. 4, c. 83, offenders not proceeded against for
the above penalty were punishable as rogués and vagabonds,
under 17 Geo. 2, c. 5 (s). But though by 5 Geo. 4,
c. 83, s. 1, it is enacted "That all provisions heretofore
made relative to rogués and vagabonds" are repealed, yet
it would appear that the combined operation of 3 Geo. 4,
c. 40, s. 21, and 5 Geo. 4, c. 83, s. 21, continues to justices
of the peace their jurisdiction under 42 Geo. 3, c. 119 (t).

Under s. 4 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879,
justices may inflict a fine in lieu of imprisonment on per-
sons convicted as rogués and vagabonds, but they have no
power simply to convict him of keeping a lottery, and
fine him for so doing (u).

The statute 42 Geo. 3, c. 119, s. 4, further empowers
any justice of the peace upon information on oath, to issue
a warrant authorising any person (but if by night then in
the presence of a constable), to break open and enter any
house or place where they have information of any offence
being committed within the Act, and to apprehend all
offenders, and all persons aiding and abetting in any such

(p) R. v. Crawshaw, 30 L. J., M.
C. 58; 3 L. T., N. S. 510; 9 W. R.
68.

(q) 42 Geo. 3, c. 119, ss. 1, 2; and
see Allport v. Nutt, 1 C. B. at p. 989.
(r) 42 Geo. 3, c. 119, s. 2.
(s) See 42 Geo. 3, c. 119, s. 3.

(t) Reg. v. Justices of Bristol,
Jun. 11, 1854, Q. B.; Youdan v.
Crookes, 22 J. P. 287; Taylor v.
Smetten, 11 Q. B. D. at p. 212.

(u) Taylor v. Smetten, 11 Q. B.
D. at p. 212.
offence, and provides for the punishment of persons obstructing any such officer in the execution of his duty; aiders and abettors, and persons employing others in carrying on such lotteries being deemed rogues and vagabonds, and punishable as such.

By s. 5, no person is to agree to pay money or to deliver goods on any event or contingency relative to the drawing of any tickets, lots, or numbers in any such lottery, or to publish any proposal for any such purposes under a penalty of 50L.

By 4 Geo. 4, c. 60, s. 41, any person selling tickets in any lottery authorised by any foreign potentate or state, or to be drawn in any foreign country, or in any lottery not authorised by Act of Parliament, or publishing any proposal or scheme for the sale of tickets, is rendered liable to a fine of 50L., and to be dealt with as a rogue and vagabond.

And by s. 60 of the same Act, the word "place" is declared to extend to any place in or out of an enclosed building, whether on land or water.

By 46 Geo. 3, c. 148, s. 59, all penalties under that Act, or any Act concerning lotteries, are to go to the Crown, and to be sued for only in the name of the Attorney-General.

Previously to this enactment proceedings for the recovery of penalties under the 42 Geo. 3, c. 119, could be taken before magistrates, except in cases of state lotteries (x); but all proceedings for the recovery of penalties under the Lottery Acts must now be taken in the name of the Attorney-General, whether the lotteries are private or state lotteries (y).

The statute 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 66, imposes a penalty of 50L. on any person who shall print or publish any advertisement or other notice relating to the drawing of any foreign or other lottery not authorised by Act of Parliament, or for the sale of tickets or chances in any such lottery, or concerning or in any manner relating to any such lottery, or any ticket, chance, or share therein. By the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 74, all penalties incurred under the last-mentioned Act are to go to the Crown, and proceedings in respect of the same to be taken in the name of the Attorney-General.

A general statement in the prospectus of a company that it was formed to acquire and work concessions granted

by a foreign prince for lottery loans, and that "at least five issues have to be made annually" in the foreign country, is not an advertisement or notice of a foreign lottery within the meaning of 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 66 (z).

By 9 & 10 Vict. c. 48, s. 1, the Act legalising Art Unions, it is provided that voluntary associations constituted for the distribution of works of art are to be deemed legal, where a Royal Charter has first been obtained.

In Webster's Dictionary a lottery is defined to be a "distribution of prizes by lot or chance," and a similar definition is given in Johnson. "Such definitions," said Hawkins, J., delivering the judgment of the Court in Taylor v. Smetten (a), "are in our opinion correct, and in such sense we think the word is used in the statute (b), and in this view we are justified by the language of the earlier statutes directed against unlawful games and lotteries;" and then proceeded to make special reference to the provisions of the 12 Geo. 2, c. 28, ss. 1, 2, ante, p. 427, 428.

Derby lotteries or sweeps on races, &c., are illegal, and within the express words, and clear intention, of the statutes against lotteries (c). And this was so held by the Court of Queen's Bench in a case, where subscribers paid 1/ each, on condition that the subscriber whose name should be drawn out of a box, next after the name of the horse, which afterwards should be placed first in the race, was drawn out of another box, should be entitled to receive 100l. (d).

The mischief intended to be remedied by the laws against lotteries was not the gain acquired by the individual keeping a lottery, but the introduction of a spirit of speculation and gambling, tending to the ruin and impoverishment of families. Therefore if a horse were sold by tickets amounting in the aggregate to no more than his true value, that would be a raffle or lottery (e).

Where an announcement was made by a dramatic performer that the holder of a certain ticket of admission to the theatre should be entitled to a gold watch of a specified value, and the price of tickets had been consequently raised, it was held that the holder of the ticket could not

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(a) Macon v. Persian Investment Corporation, 44 Ch. D. 306; 59 L. J., Ch. 695; 62 L. T., N. S. 894; 38 W. R. 596.
(c) The proviso in s. 18 of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 102, has no relation to racing lotteries, and therefore does not make them legal; Gatty v. Field, 15 L. J., Q. B. 498.
(d) Allport v. Nutt, 1 C. B. 974.
(e) See Allport v. Nutt, 1 C. B. at p. 981.
recover the value of the watch, as such a proceeding was in point of fact a lottery (f).

So, too, the distribution of presents, according to a previous announcement after a musical entertainment to persons occupying certain numbered seats, who with the rest of the audience had paid a sum of money for admission generally to the room, the numbers of the fortunate recipients being called out, and the presents handed to them, was held to be a lottery within 42 Geo. 3, c. 119, s. 2 (g).

A scheme for the distribution of prizes by chance is not the less a lottery because each of the ticket-holders is to receive some value for his money. Thus where the defendant announced a bazaar to be conducted according to the principles of the Art Union, at which tickets were to be drawn by subscribers of one shilling, which entitled them, at all events, to what professed to be a shilling’s worth of goods, and also to the chance of certain bonuses of greater value; it was held that the case came within the mischief against which the Lottery Acts were directed, inasmuch as the subscribers parted with their money in the hope of obtaining not only their alleged shilling’s worth of goods, but one of the more valuable bonuses, the right to which was to be ascertained by chance (h).

A similar conclusion was arrived at in Taylor v. Smetten (i). That was an appeal from a conviction for keeping a lottery. The appellant erected a tent, in which he sold packets, each containing a pound of tea. In each packet was a coupon entitling the purchaser to a prize, and this was publicly stated by him before the sale, but the purchasers did not know until after the sale what prizes they were entitled to, and the prizes varied in character and value. It was held that this constituted a lottery; Hawkins, J., delivering the considered judgment of the Court, saying that it could not be doubted that in buying a package, the purchaser treated and considered it as a purchase of the tea and the coupon, whatever its value might turn out to be. “In other words he bought the tea coupled with the chance of getting something of value by way of a prize, but without the least idea what that prize might be. In making his purchase he exercised no choice

(g) Morris v. Blackman, 10 Jur., N. S. 520.
(h) R. v. Harris, 10 Cox, C. C. 352, per M. Smith, J.
(i) 11 Q. B. D. 207; 52 L. J. M. C. 101; 48 J. P. 36.
—what he got he got without any option or action of his own will, but as the result of mere chance or accident."

Where a person kept a shop for the sale of sweets in packets and sold penny packets of caramels, several of which contained a halfpenny, in addition to a fair pennyworth of sweets, it was held that he was rightly convicted of keeping a lottery, notwithstanding that there was no advertisement of the prizes (k).

The case of *Barclay v. Pearson* (l) is another instance of an unsuccessful attempt to evade the law. In that case, the defendant, who was the proprietor of a newspaper, carried on in connection therewith a competition under the following conditions. He published in his paper a paragraph omitting the last word, and a coupon containing a direction that persons wishing to enter the competition must cut it out, fill in the word missing from the paragraph, together with their names and addresses, and send it with a postal order for a shilling, to the office of the paper. It was further stated in the paper that the missing word was in the hands of a chartered accountant, enclosed in a sealed envelope; that his statement with regard to this would appear, with the result of the competition, in a subsequent issue of the paper; and that the whole of the money received in entrance fees would be divided equally amongst those competitors who filled in the missing word correctly. The successful competitors brought an action against the defendant and the unsuccessful competitors, seeking administration of the trusts of the moneys in the hands of the defendant, for the purpose of the competition, and distribution among the persons entitled thereto. It was held that the competition constituted a lottery within the meaning of 42 Geo. 2, c. 119, *ante*, pp. 428, 429, and was therefore illegal, and that, so far as the money in the hands of the defendant was impressed with a trust, it was one which had arisen out of an illegal transaction, and the Court would not render any assistance in its administration.

This case is easily distinguishable from *Caminada v. Hulton* (m), and *Stoddart v. Sugars* (n), in both of which the legality of the racing coupon competitions promoted

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(l) [1893] 2 Ch. 154; 62 L. J., Ch. 636; 68 L. T., N. S. 709; 42 W. R. 74—Stirling, J.
(m) 60 L. J., M. C. 116; 64 L. T., N. S. 572; 39 W. R. 540; 55 J. P. 27.
(n) [1895] 2 Q. B. 474; 64 L. J., M. C. 234.
by the proprietors of sporting newspapers was questioned. In the former case, the proprietor of such a paper issued weekly, at the price of a penny, in connection with the paper, a handicap book or racing record, the last page of which was a coupon in which six races to come were selected, and prizes offered to any purchaser who filled it up with the names of six, five, or four winning horses, under certain specified conditions. It was held that this was not a lottery, Day, J., saying, "I am clearly of opinion that this case can in no possible sense be deemed to be a lottery within the meaning of the Lottery Act. There is no contrivance or device to obtain money by chance or by anything in the nature of a chance, and in my judgment, what is done here nowhere approaches the description of a lottery." In Stoddart v. Sagars (o) the defendants published a newspaper containing an advertisement of a coupon competition, which was to be carried out by means of coupons to be filled up by the purchasers of the paper, with the names of the horses selected by them as likely to come in first, second, third, and fourth, in a race. For every coupon filled up after the first the purchaser was to pay a penny, and the defendants promised a prize of 100/ for naming the first four horses correctly. On the part of the prosecution, it was sought to distinguish this case from Caminada v. Hulton (p), on the ground that in that case everyone dealing with the respondent received something of value, as in any event he got the book. But it was held that the transaction did not amount to a lottery, as there was no contrivance or device to obtain money by chance, neither the selection of the winner of a horse-race, nor the selection of the first four horses in a race, being purely matters of chance.

A question also arises as to whether the ballot which takes place in building societies, and other benefit societies of the like nature, for the choice of allotments constitutes a lottery within the meaning of the Lottery Acts, and particularly 12 Geo. 2, c. 28, ante, p. 427. Where a company consisting of a number of persons subscribing small sums was formed for the purpose of buying land, erecting dwellings thereon, and allotting the same to the subscribers, the allotment depending upon the result of a ballot; Pollock, C.B., directed the jury that the scheme was illegal as being contrary to the Lottery Acts. Upon an applica-

(o) Ante, p. 433.  
(p) Ante, p. 433.
tion for a new trial the correctness of this ruling was doubted, but the point was not decided, the company being held illegal upon another ground (q).

In Sykes v. Beadon (r), Jessel, M.R., though not intending to decide the point, expressed grave doubt as to whether an association, formed on the principle of investing the subscriptions of the members, and dividing the capital fund and profits among themselves, by means of certificates convertible by annual drawings by lot into preference dividend bonds bearing interest, with a bonus, was not illegal as being within the Lottery Acts; adding that "Building societies are in a different position; they are loan societies. In an association such as this it is not a case of loans to be returned, but of subscriptions to be divided among the subscribers by drawings by lot, and the prize is a bond with a bonus." But any doubts that may have existed on this point would appear to be set at rest by the decision of the House of Lords in Wallingford v. Mutual Society (s), where it was held that a society constituted avowedly for the benefit of its members, making certain of them entitled to particular benefits by the process of periodical drawings, does not come within the Lottery Acts; Lord Selborne, L.C., (t) saying: "One of those Acts plainly, on the face of its recitals, (the enacting part not departing from those recitals,) had reference to gambling transactions only, and in my judgment this was not a gambling transaction within the meaning of that Act. The other had reference to persons who kept lottery offices, at which the public were invited to pay for lottery tickets; and that Act could have no application to this case."

The case of Barratt v. Burden (a) was an appeal from a conviction for aiding and abetting in keeping a lottery. The lottery was carried on by the sale of sweetmeats in the form of a "turnover," a certain number of which contained sweets enclosing coins. The appellant had supplied these articles wholesale, well knowing for what purpose they were to be used, and had urged upon the retail dealer the purchase of them on the ground that they contained a greater number of money prizes than those supplied elsewhere. It was held that the conviction was right on the ground that the supplying of such materials for a lottery,

Aiding, &c. in keeping a lottery.

(r) 11 Ch. D. 170, 185.
(s) 5 App. Cas. 683; 50 L. J., Q. B. 49; 43 L. T., N. S. 258; 29 W. R. 81.
(t) 5 App. Cas. at p. 697.
(a) 63 L. J., M. C. 33.
knowing how they were to be used, amounted to aiding and abetting in the keeping of such lottery, and that the inciting the retail dealer in such illegal dealing was evidence to support the conviction.

One of the results of lotteries being declared illegal is that not only an agreement which has for its object, or in any way contemplates, the setting up of a lottery, but also any security given for the purpose of carrying out any such agreement, is tainted with illegality, and will, therefore, not be enforced. In Fisher v. Bridges (x) the plaintiff agreed to sell and convey to the defendant certain land for the purpose of its being resold by lottery in contravention of the 12 Geo. 2, c. 28, ante, p. 427. The land having been conveyed to the defendant, but part of the purchase-money being unpaid, the latter entered into a covenant with the plaintiff to secure the payment of the balance. To an action on the covenant the defendant pleaded the illegality of the transaction. It was held by the Exchequer Chamber, reversing the judgment of the Court of Queen’s Bench, that the plea was good; for, the deed being given as a security for the payment of a debt tainted with illegality, the law, which would not enforce the payment of the debt, would not enforce the payment of the money.

The illegality of lotteries raises a question as to the right of a subscriber to a lottery to recover the amount of his subscription. The general rule is that where money is paid upon an illegal contract, it may be recovered back before the execution of the contract, but not afterwards. And we have already seen, when dealing with “Stakeholders,” ante, p. 379, that money paid to a stakeholder to abide an illegal event may be recovered notwithstanding that the event has happened, provided that the depositor gives notice of his claim to the stakeholder before he pays it over; for the contract is not completely executed until the money has been paid over, and therefore the depositor may retract at any time before that has been done. Upon this principle it would appear that a subscriber to a lottery is entitled to recover the amount of his subscription from the person setting up the lottery, when the position of the latter is that of a stakeholder, provided that he gives notice of his claim before the distribution of the prizes (y).

The question whether a subscriber to a lottery, who has

(x) 3 E. & B. 642; 23 L. J., Q. B. 276—Ex. Ch.
(y) Barclay v. Pearson, [1893] 2 Stirling, J.
omitted to give notice of his claim previously to the distribution of the prizes, can recover the amount of his subscription from the keeper of the lottery, depends upon a different consideration, viz., whether or not the parties are in pari delicto. There is no reported decision directly in point, but it would appear that although both have been parties to an illegal contract the delictum is not par, as the subscriber is a member of a class of persons for the protection of whom the Lottery Acts were passed, and is therefore entitled to recover (a). But no action will lie to recover money alleged to be due as the winnings of a lottery (a).

Cock-fighting is illegal, and indictable at common law (b). Cock-fighting and a variety of other cruel sports were prohibited under a penalty by 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 59, s. 3, which however was repealed by 12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, s. 1. By s. 2 of that Act it is enacted that any person "cruelly beating, ill-treating, over-driving, abusing, or torturing, or causing or procuring to be cruelly beaten, ill-treated, over-driven, abused, or tortured, any animal, shall pay a penalty not exceeding 5l." A cock has been held to be "an animal" within this section, and therefore a person who takes an active part in a cock-fight after one or both is disabled, is liable to be convicted under this section for causing or procuring a cock to be cruelly ill-treated, abused, or tortured (c).

And by s. 3 of the same Act it is enacted, that "every person who shall keep or use or act in the management of any place for the purpose of fighting or baiting any bull, bear, badger, dog, cock, or other bird or animal, whether of domestic or wild nature, or shall permit or suffer any place to be so used, shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding 5l. for every day he shall so keep or use or act in the management of any such place, or permit or suffer any place to be used as aforesaid: provided always, that every person who shall receive money, for the admission of any other person to any place kept or used for any of the purposes aforesaid, shall be deemed to be the keeper thereof; and every person who shall in any manner encourage, aid or assist at the fighting or baiting of any bull, bear, badger,

(c) Browning v. Morris, 2 Cwmp. 790, 792, per Lord Maunder, C.J.; Kearley v. Thomson, 24 Q. B. D. 742, 745, per Fry, L.J.; Barlcy v. Pearson, [1893] 2 Ch. 154, 167, per Stirling, J.

(a) Browning v. Morris, ubi supra; Allport v. Nutt, 1 C. B. 974; 14 L. J., C. P. 272.

(b) Bac. Abr. Gaming (A.); 3 Keb. 403, 510.

(c) Bridge v. Parsons, 32 L. J., M. C. 95.
dog, cock, or other animal as aforesaid, shall forfeit and pay a penalty not exceeding 5l. for every such offence."

It has been held to be no offence under this section to assist at a cock-fight unless in a place kept or used for the purpose (d).

Within the Metropolitan District.

By the Metropolitan Police Act, 1839 (2 & 3 Vict. c. 47), s. 47, it is enacted, "that every person who within the Metropolitan Police District shall keep or use or act in the management of any house, room, pit, or other place for the purpose of fighting or baiting lions, bears, badgers, cocks, dogs, or other animals, shall be liable to a penalty of not more than 5l., or in the discretion of the magistrate may be committed to the house of correction, with or without hard labour, for a time, not more than one calendar month; and it shall be lawful for the commissioners of police, by order in writing, to authorize any superintendent, belonging to the Metropolitan Police Force, with such constables as he shall think necessary, to enter any premises kept or used for any of the purposes aforesaid, and take into custody all persons who shall be found therein without lawful excuse, and every person so found shall be liable to a penalty of not more than 5s., and a conviction under this Act of this offence shall not exempt the owner, keeper, or manager of any such house, room, pit, or place from any penalty or penal consequence to which he may be liable for the nuisance thereby occasioned."

By 5 Geo. 4, c. 83, s. 4, people "playing or betting in any street, road, highway, or other open and public place, at or with any table or instrument of gaming, at any game or pretended game of chance," were to be deemed rogues and vagabonds, and to be liable to imprisonment with hard labour for any term not exceeding three calendar months. It having been held that the words "instrument of gaming," here signified things destined for that purpose, and did not, therefore, apply to halfpence used for pitch and toss (e), nor to cards (f), this enactment was amended by the 31 & 32 Vict. c. 52, s. 3, which extended its provisions to persons wagering or gaming in a public place with "any coin, card, token, or other article used as an instrument or means of such wagering or gaming at any game or pretended game of chance." Both of these enact-


(c) Watson v. Martin, 13 W. R. 144.

(f) R. v. Roach, per Erle, J., at Chambers, July 12, 1856.
ments are, however, repealed, the former by the Statute Law Revision Act, 1888 (No. 2), and the latter by the Vagrant Law Amendment Act, 1873 (g), by s. 3 of which it is enacted that, "every person playing or betting by way of wagering or gaming in any street, road, highway, or other open and public place, or in any open place to which the public have or are permitted to have access, at or with any table or instrument of gaming, or any coin, card, token, or other article used as an instrument or means of such wagering or gaming, at any game or pretended game of chance, shall be deemed a rogue or vagabond within the true intent and meaning of 5 Geo. 4, c. 83, and as such may be convicted and punished under the provisions of that Act, or in the discretion of the justice or justices trying the case, in lieu of such punishment, by a penalty for the first offence not exceeding forty shillings, and for the second or any subsequent offence not exceeding five pounds.

A railway carriage while travelling on its journey is within the definition of "an open and public place, to which the public have or are permitted to have access" in this section (h). And so, it seems, is an omnibus, under similar circumstances (i). A field belonging to a company which they allowed their workmen and their families to use for purposes of recreation, and which strangers were allowed to use for the like purposes, was also held to be within this definition (k). Quere, whether the section applies to inclosed grounds to which persons are admitted on payment of a price for admission (l).

Where the defendants were charged with being on a racecourse taking deposits on the bets made and amounts staked on the several horses, and soliciting the bystanders to make bets, charging ten per cent. on the amounts won, for the use of an instrument which displayed the state of the odds, and by a mechanical arrangement varied the announcement from time to time according to the bets made; it was held that such a machine was an instrument or means of wagering within the meaning of the statute (m).

(g) 36 & 37 Vict. c. 38.
(h) Langrish v. Archer, 10 Q. B. D. 44; 52 L. J., M. C. 47; 47 L. T. N. S. 548; 31 W. R. 183. See also Ex parte Freestone, 25 L. J., M. C. 121.
(k) Turnbull v. Appleton, 46 J. P. 469.
(l) Hirst v. Molesbury, L. R. 6 Q. B. 130.
But depositing money as a bet on a race is not playing or betting with a coin as an instrument of gaming (n).

In order to convict under this section, it is necessary to allege and prove that the defendant was guilty of wagering or gaming at some “game or pretended game of chance.” A conviction which only states that the defendant was convicted of betting by way of wagering in a public place, with certain articles used as a means of such wagering, is therefore bad as omitting an essential part of the case (o).

By 30 & 31 Vict. c. 134, s. 23, “any three or more persons assembled together in any part of a street within the Metropolis for the purpose of betting, shall be deemed to be obstructing the street, and each of such persons shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding five pounds; and within the city of London and the liberties thereof, any constable of the City Police Force, and without such limits any constable of the Metropolitan Police Force may take into custody, without warrant, any person who may commit such offence in view of such constable.”

The Licensing Act, 1872 (p), s. 17, enacts that if any licensed person (1) suffers any gaming or unlawful game to be carried on on his premises, or (2) opens, keeps, or uses, or suffers his house to be opened, kept, or used in contravention of the 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119, he shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding for the first offence 10l, and not exceeding for the second and any subsequent offence 20l.

The conviction may be recorded on the licence (q).

It would appear from the authorities that playing any lawful games whether of chance or of skill, or of chance and skill combined, for money or money’s worth, is gaming within the meaning of this enactment, convictions having been held good for suffering cards (r), and skittle pool (s) to be played for money on licensed premises; and ten pins (t), and skittles (u), for beer. So where a licensed person permitted a game of skill to be played on his premises, in which each player contributed a certain sum

(o) Ridgway v. Farndale, [1892] 2 Q. B. 309; 61 L. J., M. C. 199;
67 L. T., N. S. 318; 41 W. R. 128;
56 J. P. 697.
(p) 35 & 36 Vict. c. 94.
(q) 37 & 38 Vict. c. 49, s. 13.
(s) Dyson v. Macou, 22 Q. B. D. 351; 58 L. J., M. C. 55; 60 L. T., N. S. 265.
(u) Luff v. Leaper, 36 J. P. 773.
towards the purchase of a prize to be given to the winner, it was held that he was rightly convicted (x).

A licensed person who plays cards for money with his personal friends on the licensed premises, or, without taking any part in the game, allows them to do so, is liable to conviction for suffering gaming to be carried on (y), even though he be bonâ fide entertaining them at his own expense during closing hours (z). But there is no provision in the Act for the conviction of a guest for gaming on licensed premises, whether during the hours of closing or not; and the fact that a licensed person who suffers friends, whom he is lawfully entertaining during closing hours, to play cards or any other game for money, is guilty of an offence against s. 17, does not render the latter liable to conviction under s. 25, as they are not on the premises in contravention of the Act (a).

Playing a lawful game is not gaming unless money is staked upon it. In order, therefore, to bring a case within section 17, the game in question must either have been played for money or be unlawful in itself. A conviction upon an information which charged that a person licensed under the repealed statute 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, did “knowingly suffer an unlawful game, to wit, the game of dominoes, to be played” in his house, was held bad on the ground that the game of dominoes is not in itself unlawful (b). But a conviction upon an information charging a licensed person with suffering the game of dominoes to be played for money on his premises would be good (c).

In order to support a conviction under section 17, it is necessary to give some evidence of actual or constructive knowledge on the part of the person charged that gaming was carried on on his premises. But the offence may be committed by connivance or negligence either on the part of the licensed person or the person in charge of the premises.

Thus where a game was played for money when the licensed person was ill in bed, and there was no evidence that his wife had any knowledge of the gaming, which was a mere casual frolic, it was held that he could not be con-

(y) Patten v. Rhymer, 3 E. & E. 1; 29 L. J., M. C. 189.
(z) Hare v. Osborne, 34 L. T., N. S. 294.
(a) Cooper v. Osborne, 35 L. T., N. S. 347.
(b) Reg. v. Ashton, 1 E. & B. 286; 29 L. T., M. C. 1.
(c) Ibid.
victed (d). So where a licensed person had been convicted upon proof that cards were being played for money on his premises, but without any evidence that the person in charge knew of the gaming, which took place at a late hour in a private room; it was held that the case must go back to the justices “with an intimation of the opinion of the Court that actual knowledge in the sense of seeing or hearing by the party charged is not necessary, but that there must be some circumstances from which it may be inferred that he or his servants had connived at what was going on (e).” But where the landlady of an hotel went to bed leaving the hall-porter in charge, and he, after closing the house, instead of taking his usual seat in the hall, retired to a part of the house as distant as possible from a room occupied by three persons of evident sporting proclivities, who were subsequently discovered playing cards for money; it was held that the landlady was, under the circumstances, responsible for the conduct of the porter, and that there was sufficient evidence that the latter suspected what was going on, and connived at it, to justify her conviction (f). Upon the same principle, a conviction was held good where gaming had taken place on a skittle-alley which was attached to the licensed premises, to the knowledge of the servant in charge, but without any knowledge or connivance on the part of the licensed person, who had given general directions to the servant not to permit gambling (g). But where the gaming had taken place to the knowledge of a servant employed on the premises, but not in charge of the room where it had occurred, nor in any way “clothed with the landlord’s authority,” and there was no evidence of connivance or wilful blindness on the part of the latter, it was held that the justices were right in refusing to convict (h).

A licensed person who opens, keeps, or uses, or suffers his house to be opened, kept, or used in contravention of the 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119, is liable to the 100% penalty imposed by section 3 of that Act upon any person so offending, notwithstanding the provisions of section 17 of

(d) Awards v. Dance, 26 J. P. 437.
(e) Bosley v. Davies, 1 Q. B. D. 84; 45 L. J., M. C. 27; 33 L. T., N. S. 528; 24 W. R. 140.
(f) Redgate v. Haynes, 1 Q. B. D. 89; 45 L. J., M. C. 65; 33 L. T., N. S. 779. See also Crabtree

(g) Bond v. Evans, 21 Q. B. D. 249; 57 L. J., M. C. 105; 59 N. S. 411; 36 W. R. 767.
the Licensing Act, 1872; and it is for the police to determine under the circumstances of each case under which statute proceedings should be taken (i). But in order to convict a licensed person of suffering his house to be used by another for the purpose of money being received by him by way of betting contrary to sections 1 and 3 of the former Act, the money must actually have been received in the house. A conviction was held bad where bets had been made near a licensed house, and the stakes had been received outside it, although they were afterwards deposited in the house by arrangement with the defendant (k).

By 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, s. 44, every keeper of a refreshment-house within the Metropolitan Police District who knowingly suffers any unlawful game, or any gaming whatsoever therein, is liable to a penalty not exceeding 5l.

And by section 32 of the Refreshment Houses Act, 1860 (l), every person licensed to keep a refreshment-house who shall knowingly suffer any unlawful games or gaming therein shall, upon conviction thereof before two justices, pay, for the first offence a fine not exceeding 40s., for the second offence not exceeding 5l., and for every subsequent offence not exceeding 20l., or be subject to a forfeiture of his licence, at the discretion of the justices before whom he shall be convicted, and in case of such forfeiture of his licence, such person shall be disqualified for the space of one year then next ensuing from obtaining a fresh licence, and such fresh licence, if obtained within the said year, shall be absolutely null and void to all intents and purposes.

Money lent for the purpose of gaming would appear to be now recoverable, unless it is lent where the gaming is unlawful; as, for instance, by a licensed publican to game on his own premises (m); or by any party to play hazard, &c. And the principle is, that the repayment of money lent for the express purpose of accomplishing an illegal act cannot be enforced (n).

The test whether a demand connected with an illegal transaction is capable of being enforced at law, is, whether the plaintiff requires any aid from the illegal transaction to establish his case (o). As where illegality appeared upon

(k) 23 & 24 Vict. c. 27.  
(l) Foot v. Baker, 5 M. & G. 339; and see ante, p. 416.  
(m) M'Kinct v. Robinson, 3 M. & W. 441.  
(n) Simpson v. Bloss, 7 Taunt. 246; 17 R. R. 509; Fivaz v. Nicholls,
the plaintiff's own showing, who was unable to establish his case, without setting up an illegal agreement (p).

Bills of exchange, promissory notes, or mortgages given for money lent knowingly for the purpose of gaming, or playing at any game, or lent at the time and place of such play (q), to persons who during any part of the time may play, are to be deemed to have been given for an illegal consideration (r).

To an action on a promissory note, the defendant pleaded that it was given for a gambling transaction, but gave the plaintiff no notice to produce it, and it was not produced. At the trial, the defendant gave evidence that he had never given the plaintiff any other note than the note in question. It was held that in the absence of the production of the note, this was not sufficient to identify the note referred to in the plea with the note sued on (s).

An I O U being a mere acknowledgment of a debt, does not amount to a promissory note. It is primâ facie evidence of an account stated, but not of money lent (t). And it has been held that a bill in equity will lie to discover whether an I O U was given for money lent for the purpose of gaming (u).

Money lost at play when paid cannot be recovered back again by the loser (v). But if it has not been paid, the winner cannot maintain any action for it, because the contract is null and void (w).

All securities under seal, except mortgages, given for money lost at lawful play, or at any legal game, would now appear to be good (y). But where a promissory note, a bill of exchange, or a mortgage, has been given for money so lost, it is not void as formerly, but is to be deemed and taken to have been given for an illegal consideration (z). The consequence of which is, that they are still void as


(p) See Martin v. Smith, 6 Scott, N. R. 272.

(q) If the money is lent at the time and place, the purpose of the loan is assumed; Foot v. Baker, 5 M. & G. 338.

(r) 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 41, and see Giving a security for a Bet, ante, p. 414.

(s) Meynell v. Bone, 21 L. T. 158.

(t) Fesenmayer v. Adcock, 10 M. & W. 449; Croker v. Walsh, 4 Ir. Jur. 293 (Ex. Ir.); Byles on Bills, 15th ed. 34, and the cases there cited.


(x) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 18.

(y) Formerly void under 9 Ann. c. 14, s. 1, which is altered and repealed by 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 41, ss. 1, 2, and 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 15.

(z) 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 41, Appendix. The word "bill" in this Act includes a cheque, Lynn v. Bell, 10 Ir. R. C. L. 487.
between the original parties, and also as against all persons who have taken them with notice of the illegality, or after they have become overdue, or without giving value for them; but good in the hands of every person who has given value, and taken the instrument bonâ fide, and before it was due (a).

Accordingly where a bond was assigned for a valuable consideration without notice of objection to its validity, the obligor having applied to the assignee for a further advance, and offering to give a mortgage for the whole, but stating no objection to the validity of the bond, was not allowed afterwards to endeavour to avoid the bond by evidence that it was given to secure money lost by a bet on a horse race; for the Court will not allow a person to set up an objection to the validity of his own obligation upon grounds which he suppressed at the time, but against which, if divulged, the obligee could have protected himself (b). It appears, therefore, that bonds are within the equity of 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 41, which makes securities valid in the hands of bonâ fide holders without notice that the consideration was a gaming debt (c).

The effect of the Act, therefore, seems to be, that where a sum of money was won as a stake in a lawful game, or under other circumstances therein mentioned, and a promissory note, bill of exchange, or mortgage is given in payment, or as a security, not only is the instrument void as between the parties themselves, but the circumstance of its having so been given avoids the contract on which it is founded. In such case, therefore, the winner not only loses the benefit of his security in writing, but is deprived of his claim to the consideration upon which it was given.

The Court of Exchequer, however, appear to have gone further in their construction of the statute; for Mr. Baron Rolfe, in delivering the judgment of the Court in Applegarth v. Colley (d), and speaking of 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 41, says, "That Act, while it repeals so much of the statute of Anne as makes the securities void, expressly enacts that they shall be deemed to have been given on an illegal consideration, and it is impossible to impute to the Legislature an intention so absurd as that the consideration should be

(a) Smith, Contr. 186; Fadenilke v. Halroyd, before Chief Justice Wilde, Common Pleas Sittings, Nov. 30, 1846.
(b) Hawker v. Halliwell, 3 Sm. & Giff. 194. See also ante, p. 402, Hill v. Fox, 4 H. & N. 359.
(c) See post, p. 447.
(d) Applegarth v. Colley, 10 M. & W. 732.
good and capable of being enforced until some security is given for the amount, and then that, by the giving of the security, the consideration should become bad."

The necessary conclusion is then arrived at, namely, "that the statute of Anne, in connection with the 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 41, must be taken to avoid all contracts for the payment of money won at play;" and of course all other contracts within the first section of 9 Anne, c. 14.

According to this view, then, every possible consideration within 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 41, for any note, bill, or mortgage is void, and we are reduced to the dilemma of being obliged to hold that the winner of a stake or the lender of money in any lawful game, where his right to recover could never otherwise be disputed, is precluded from his remedy on account of the existence of the possibility of his taking a note, bill, or mortgage within the statute as security for his stake or loan. And therefore the sum agreed to be paid to the winner of a horse race could never be recovered, if we hold that such a race is now meant by the word "game." However, if the point had come directly before the Court, perhaps a different opinion might have prevailed.

In Thorpe v. Coleman (e), the Court of Common Pleas studiously guarded themselves against expressing an opinion on the construction put by the Court of Exchequer upon 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 41, and the case was decided on another ground.

In a later case (f), however, Mr. Justice Coltman makes the following remarks: "It certainly does seem to be a singular anomaly, that the winner of a race should be entitled to recover the stakes, and yet that by the combined operation of 9 Anne, c. 14, and 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 41, if a promissory note or other security were given for the amount, he would be precluded from availing himself of it, by reason of the illegality of the consideration."

The 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 41, is "An Act to amend the Law relating to securities given for considerations arising out of gaming, usurious and certain other illegal transactions." It is founded on 16 Car. 2, c. 7, and 9 Anne, c. 14, both of which are Acts to prevent excessive gaming; and the notion upon which the sections with regard to securities in writing were probably framed appears to have been, that there would be less danger of excessive and immoderate gaming, if people were kept as much as possible to playing

for ready money. The Legislature therefore having encouraged cash or money transactions, it is quite conceiv-able that a contract should be good so long as a money payment was contemplated, but become void between the parties immediately on security being given. This con-struction of the statute seems much more reasonable, than that all contracts within 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 41, in connection with 9 Anne, c. 14, before any security is given, should be void between the actual parties.

To an action against the acceptor of a bill of exchange, drawn by the plaintiff, the defendant pleaded that a bet was lost by the defendant to A. B., and that the said bill of exchange was, at the request of A. B., given and accepted by the defendant in consideration of the said bet, and to secure payment thereof, contrary to the statute, &c., and that there never was any other consideration for the acceptance of the said bill; and that the plaintiff at the time when he drew, and the defendant accepted, the same, had notice of the premises. The evidence was, that the defendant had accepted a prior bill drawn by the plaintiff in consideration of the bet lost to A. B., and that the bill sued upon was given in renewal of that prior bill. The jury found that the bill declared upon was given in con-sideration of the bet, and that the plaintiff had notice of it. And the Court of Queen's Bench held that the plea was good, and was an answer to the action under 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 41 (g).

Under 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 41, s. 2, money paid to the indorsee by the acceptor of a bill of exchange, given for a gaming consideration, may be recovered from the person in whose favour the bill was originally accepted, in an action for money paid by the plaintiff to the use of the defendant at his request (h).

And where such a bill paid by the plaintiff bore interest upon the face of it, it was held by the Court of Queen’s Bench that the plaintiff was entitled to recover back the interest paid, as well as the principal money, both being “secured” by the bill (i).

In an action on a bill of exchange, the defence was, that the money for which a bill was given had been lost in a gaming transaction. The person who let the room in which the gambling took place, was asked a question tend-

(g) Hay v. Ayling, 20 L. J., Q. B. 171; and see Boulton v. Cogh- lan, 1 Bing. N. C. 640.
(h) Gilpin v. Clutterbuck, 13 L. T. 71.
(i) Ib. 159.
Summons to set aside a warrant of attorney.

A post obit security held good.

Deed substituted for one tainted with illegality.

ing, if answered, to render him liable to be proceeded against under 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, when the judge interfered. On a motion for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection, the Court of Common Pleas held that the judge was right, and refused the rule (j).

In *Burnett v. Ravenshaw* (k), an order was made by a judge at chambers, on a summons to show cause why a certain warrant of attorney, alleged to have been given for a gambling debt, should not be set aside.

In 1833, a *post obit* security was given in consideration of certain gaming debts. In 1842, it was assigned to another party for valuable consideration, who gave notice to the trustees of the fund. It was held in 1853, by the Master of the Rolls, that, after the lapse of time, the deed must be considered to have been given for good consideration (l).

In the case of *The Attorney-General v. Hollingworth* (m), it was held, that where, upon an advance of money, a security has been taken, which is tainted with usury (n) or other illegality, and afterwards another security is taken for the same advance, not tainted with the illegality, and obviating any necessity for resorting to the former one for the recovery of the money, such substituted security is valid, and the money really advanced can be recovered thereon.


(l) *Hawker v. Wood*, 1 W. R. 316, M. R.


(n) The 17 & 18 Vict. c. 90, s. 1, repeals all existing laws against usury.
CHAPTER V.

BETTING HOUSES AND GAMING HOUSES.

Betting Houses.

It is quite clear that any practice which has a tendency to injure the public morals, is an offence at common law (a). And it is equally clear that the keeping of a common betting house has such a tendency. For it is found that persons are tempted by such places, not only to spend more of their own money than they can properly afford to lose, but also to embezzle the property of their employers. It would appear therefore that by law a common betting house is a public nuisance.

To remedy the evil which obviously existed by the keeping of such houses, the "Act for the Suppression of Betting Houses" (b) was passed. Referring to this Act, Hawkins, J., in delivering his judgment in Reg. v. Cook (c), says: "I suppose it is common knowledge that before the passing of 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119 in 1853, there existed in London and other populous places, offices and houses where a regular business of betting was carried on. The offices or houses were sometimes conducted by a manager or the owner or occupier whose business it might be said to be, or sometimes the offices or houses were entrusted to a servant, while the managers were elsewhere employed attending races in the country. The business was of this kind: a list of races about to take place, and the current odds against each horse were placarded, and the proprietor, who either himself or by another conducted the business, received deposits from all sorts of persons to abide the event of races on which they were willing and anxious to bet, and they in return for their deposits usually had a ticket handed to them which enabled them when the race was over to receive the money from the office if they won, and if they lost the deposit was gone, and they had no further interest in the bet."

(a) See Rex v. Roger, 1 B. & C. 272; 2 D. & R. 431.
(b) 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119.
(c) 13 Q. B. D. 377, at pp. 381, 382; 51 L. T., N. S. 21; 32 W. R. 796.
"Such was the business, and it was confined chiefly to offices or houses. It was found that those offices or houses had a tendency to bring many persons to ruin, and especially to lead clerks and servants to spend money in gambling. It was for the suppression of that class of betting that the Act was passed. The preamble of it states exactly what the Legislature desired to suppress."

The Act is entitled, "An Act for the Suppression of Betting Houses," and recites that "a kind of gaming has of late sprung up tending to the injury and demoralisation of improvident persons by the opening of places called betting houses or offices, and the receiving of money in advance by the owners or occupiers of such houses or offices, or by other persons acting on their behalf, on their premises to pay money on events of horse races and the like contingencies."

This preamble is repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act, 1892 (d), but such repeal is not to affect the construction of the Act (e), and it may, therefore, still be referred to for such purpose.

For the suppression of such places, the statute 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119, s. 1, enacts that "no house, office, room, or other place shall be opened, kept, or used for the purpose of the owner, occupier, or keeper thereof, or any person using the same, or any person procured or employed by or acting for or on behalf of such owner, occupier, or keeper, or person using the same, or of any person using the same, or of any person having the care or management or in any manner conducting the business thereof, betting with persons resorting thereto; or for the purpose of any money or valuable thing being received by or on behalf of such owner, occupier, keeper, or person as aforesaid, as or for the consideration for any assurance, undertaking, promise, or agreement, express or implied, to pay or give thereafter any money or valuable thing, on any event or contingency of or relating to any horse race, or other race, fight, game, sport, or exercise, or as or for the consideration for securing the paying or giving by some other person of any money or valuable thing, on any such event or contingency as aforesaid; and every house, office, room, or other place opened, kept, or used for the purposes aforesaid, or any of them, is hereby declared to be a common nuisance and contrary to law."

By s. 2, every house, room, office, or place opened, kept,

(d) 55 & 56 Vict. c. 19. (e) Ibid. s. 1.
or used for the purposes aforesaid, or any of them, shall be
taken and deemed to be a common gaming house, within
the meaning of the statute 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109.

And by s. 3, "any person who, being the owner or occu-
pier of any house, office, room, or other place, or a person
using the same, shall open, keep, or use the same for the
purposes hereinbefore mentioned, or either of them; and
any person who, being the owner or occupier of any house,
room, office, or other place, shall knowingly and wilfully
permit the same to be opened, kept, or used by any other
person for the purposes aforesaid, or either of them; and
any person having the care or management of or in any
manner assisting in conducting the business of any house,
office, room, or place, opened, kept, or used for the purposes
aforesaid, or either of them, shall, on summary conviction
thereof before any two justices of the peace, be liable to
forfeit and pay such penalty, not exceeding one hundred
pounds, as shall be adjudged by such justices, and may
further be adjudged by such justices to pay such
costs attending such conviction as to the said justices may
seem reasonable; and on the non-payment of such penalty
and costs, or in the first instance, if to the said justices it
shall seem fit, may be committed to the common gaol or
house of correction, with or without hard labour, for any
time not exceeding six calendar months (f)."

Section 1 of this Act creates two separate and distinct
offences, namely, keeping, &c., the places referred to, first,
for the purpose of betting with persons resorting thereto,
and, secondly, for the purpose of receiving deposits on
bets (g). In order, therefore, to sustain a conviction for
the first of these offences, it is sufficient that the justices
should have been satisfied that the place in question was
kept or used for the purpose of the defendant betting with
persons resorting thereto, without any proof of the receipt
of money by way of deposit on bets (h). The betting

(f) So much of this section as
prescribes the term of imprisonment
for nonpayment of penalty and costs
is repealed by the Summary Jurisdi-
cion Act, 1884 (47 & 48 Vict. c. 43),
s. 5 of the Act of 1879 (42 & 43
Vic t. c. 49), providing a general
scale of imprisonment for nonpay-
ment of any sum of money adjudged
to be paid by a conviction, or in re-
spect of the default of a sufficient
distress to satisfy any such sum.
Under s. 17 of the latter Act, the
defendant may elect to be tried by a
jury instead of being dealt with
summarily.

(g) Bond v. Plumb, [1894] 1
Q. B. 169; 10 R. 44; 70 L. T.,
N. S. 405; 42 W. R. 222; 58 J. P.
168.

(h) Ibid.
aimed at by the first part of the section may or may not be ready-money betting; whilst the second part is more directly aimed at ready-money betting \((i)\). If a person uses a part of a house, \textit{e.g.}, the bar of a public-house, for the purpose of meeting the persons with whom he intends to bet, he is using it for the purpose of betting with persons resorting thereto, and may therefore be convicted under the first part of the section, even if the betting is ready-money betting, and the money is always handed over to him outside the door of the house \((k)\). But in order to sustain a charge under the second part of the section it is necessary to prove the receipt of money by way of deposit on bets inside the house alleged to have been used for the purpose \((l)\).

A licensed person who opens, keeps, or uses, or suffers his house to be opened, kept, or used, in contravention of this Act, is liable to conviction under section 3, notwithstanding the provisions of section 17 of the Licensing Act, 1872, which imposes a lower penalty for the like offence \((m)\).

What constitutes a "place" within the meaning of the Act is a question which has several times occupied the attention of the Courts. Whether or not a locality alleged to have been used for either of the purposes prohibited by section 1 is such a place, is a question of fact to be determined by the tribunal before which the matter comes for adjudication, having regard to the circumstances of each particular case \((n)\).

In the case of \textit{Doggett v. Catterns} \((o)\), the defendant, a betting agent and bookmaker, was in the habit of standing under certain trees in Hyde Park, and there making bets on horse races and receiving deposits. The plaintiff having made a bet with him, and paid his deposit, brought an action for the return of the deposit, and it was held by the Court of Common Pleas that the defendant had brought himself within the meaning of this Act, quite as much as if he had carried on his betting transactions in a room or booth, and that the plaintiff was therefore, under section 5 \((p)\), entitled to recover back his deposit in an action for \textit{money had and received}. But this decision

\begin{quote}
\textit{What is a "place."}
\end{quote}

\textit{Doggett v. Catterns.}

\((k)\) Ibid.  
\((m)\) \textit{Sim v. Tay, 58 L. J., M. C. 39; 60 L. T., N. S. 602; 53 J. P.}  
\((p)\) \textit{See also ante, p. 440.}  
\((n)\) \textit{Reg. v. Preedy, 17 Cox, C. C. 433, at p. 438, per Hawkins, J.}  
\((p)\) \textit{16 & 17 Vict. c. 119. See post, p. 468.}
was reversed by the Exchequer Chamber, and Pollock, C.B., was of opinion that such a construction of the Act was supplemental legislation; but concurred with the judges in the Court below in thinking that a mere spot, although not a "house," "office" or "room," would not alone prevent it from being a place within the Act. But he thought it must be a place capable of having an owner or occupier, which that was not. There the defendant resorted to a spot by a tree. The crowd might push him away in moving about. There was no fixity of tenure even for the daytime. He had no more exclusive occupation of the spot than anyone else in the park.

Crompton, J., Channell, B., and Blackburn, J., were of the same opinion. But Bramwell, B. (Mellor, J. and Piggott, B., concurring), whilst agreeing that the judgment should be reversed, did so on another ground, viz., that the locality in question was not ascertained, and therefore did not constitute a "place" within the meaning of the Act.

Doggett v. Catterns was considered by Hawkins, J., in Reg. v. Preedy (q), saying that the case "has often been cited as deciding that a man who, day after day, at a table placed under a tree in Hyde Park, carried on his business of betting, receiving money in advance on bets on horse races, could not be legally convicted under section 3. It is quite true that there are expressions used in the judgment in the Exchequer Chamber which afford colour to that notion. Carefully considered, however, the case will be found to decide nothing of the sort. It was not the case of a prosecution under section 3 at all, but was an action brought under section 5 of the Act to recover back a sum of money which the plaintiff had deposited with the defendant on bets on horse races." And after referring to sections 4 and 5 of the Act (as to which see post, pp. 467, 468), continuing: "Not a word was said in either of those two sections as to recovering back money received by a person merely using the house or place. As, therefore, money can only be recovered back from the owners or occupiers or persons acting for them, it stands to reason that it is a condition precedent to the recovering back of the money, that the person from whom it is sought to be recovered shall be an owner or occupier of the house. This accounts for the opinion expressed by Pollock, C.B., and assented to by Crompton, J., Channell, B., and Blackburn, J., that a place

(q) 17 Cox, C. C. 433, at pp. 440, 441.
to be within the statute (i.e., sections 4 and 5) must be capable of having an owner or occupier. . . . As a decision upon the question whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover under section 5, it is obviously right. If read as an opinion upon a question not before the Court, viz., whether the defendant might have been convicted under section 3, it is difficult to say that it is satisfactory. For my own part, I think it is not essential to a place within section 3 that it should have an occupier, or that the person who uses it for the illegal purpose should have permission to do so from either owner or occupier. The right or title to be upon the place seems to me to be utterly immaterial, if in fact there is an illegal user of it (r).”

In _Shaw v. Morley_ (s) the facts were as follows:—On land adjoining a race-course, and just outside an inclosure reserved for ticket-holders, was a long strip of ground of six feet wide, bounded on one side by an iron railing, which surrounded the inclosure, on the other side by a permanent wooden paling facing the open ground. Within this strip were placed temporary wooden structures, in which during the races the business of betting was carried on. They had desks fronting both ways, and at each desk was a clerk with a book, and a person standing in front of each desk conducted the business on behalf of the person who rented the strip of land, and the bets were recorded by the clerk. At one of these structures the defendant conducted this business. On appeal from a conviction under section 3, it was contended on behalf of the appellant, that an “office” or “place” to be within the Act, must be _ejusdem generis_ with a “house” or “room,” which this was not, being only a temporary wooden structure, not even covered with a roof, and incapable of answering the purposes served by the betting houses which the Act was meant to suppress; but it was held that it was an “office” and a “place” within the meaning of the statute, and that the appellant was rightly convicted; Kelly, C.B., expressly saying that it did not matter whether there was a roof or none, or whether the structure was moveable or fastened to the earth.

Martin, B., was of the same opinion, adding: “What it

(r) A similar view of the _ratio decidendi_ in _Doggett v. Catterns_ appears to have been adopted by Lindley and Kay, L.JJ., in the recent case of _Liddell v. Lofthouse_, 1896 1 Q. B. 295; 40 S. J. 278. (s) L. R., 3 Ex. 137; 37 L. J., M. C. 105; 19 L. T., N. S. 15; 16 W. R. 763.
most resembles is those movable offices on wheels in which merchants conduct their business of lading and unlading ships in the docks of Liverpool; and I have no doubt that such a structure would be an office or a place within the meaning of the Act. But this was more: it was a fixed place."

In Bowes v. Fenwick (t), the appellant was on a race-course, standing on a stool, over which was a large umbrella, similar to a carriage umbrella, capable of covering several persons, the stock being made in joints like that of a sweep’s brush, so as to be taken in pieces, and it was fastened in the ground with a spike. The umbrella, when opened, was seven or eight feet high. It was a showery day; but the umbrella was kept up rain or dry. On the umbrella was painted in large letters, "G. Bowes, Victoria Club, Leeds." There was also a card exhibited on which were the words "We pay all bets first past the post." Bowes was calling out offering to make bets; and he was seen to make bets, the money being deposited with him, and for which he gave a ticket. On a case stated by justices, the question for the opinion of the Court was, whether the stool and umbrella, used as aforesaid by the appellant, did constitute a "place" within the terms of section 3 of the Act. It was held that they did, and the conviction was therefore affirmed; Lord Coleridge, C.J., in the course of his judgment (u), saying: "It is plain that the appellant was (provided the stool and umbrella constituted an office, room, or place within the meaning of the Act) publicly using them for a purpose prohibited by the Act. The only question raised before us was, whether or not they did constitute an office, room, or other place. Now the thing described clearly was not a house or room. Was it an office or other place? Possibly it might be said to be in some sense an office; but I am of opinion that, at all events, it was a 'place.' It was an ascertained spot where the appellant, for the time at least, carried on the business of betting with all persons who might resort thither for that purpose. The card connected with the umbrella and inscription upon it clearly indicated a fixed and ascertained place used by the appellant for a purpose prohibited by the Act."

In Gallaway v. Maries (v), the respondent and a com-

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Umbrella on race-course. Bowes v. Fenwick.

Moveable

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(u) L. R., 9 C. P. at p. 344.
(v) 8 Q. B. D. 275; 51 L. J., M. C. 58; 45 L. T., N. S. 763; 30 W. R. 151.
box within ring.  
*Gallaway v. Maries.*

panion, having paid for admission, were in a railed enclosure of the grand stand at a race-meeting. The companion stood on a small wooden box not attached to the ground, and he and the respondent called out offering to make and making bets with other persons. The companion received the money for bets made, and the respondent booked the same. They stood together in one place within the enclosure during the races; and it was held that the fixed and ascertained spot, defined in the enclosure by the box at which the respondent orally advertised his willingness to bet, was a "place" used by him for the purpose of betting with persons resorting thereto; Grove, J., in the course of his judgment, saying: "I think all the cases show that a 'place' to be within the statute must be a fixed ascertained place, occupied or used so far permanently that people may know that there is a person who stands in a particular spot indicated by a certain definite mark with whom they may bet. I do not decide whether a person standing on a carriage step or in a circle where the turf was cut away, or where a little heap of stones was put down during the races, would be within the Act if he offered to bet there. But I am far from saying that he would not be so. Here, however, in my opinion, was a place within the meaning of the Act."

*Liddell v. Lofthouse* (y) was an appeal from a decision of justices dismissing an information under section 3 against the respondent for using a certain open space of ground on the bank of the river Tees, called Hubback's Quay, for the purpose of betting with persons resorting thereto. It appeared that upon a part of this open space a timber hoarding for advertisements had been erected some three years previously, which was supported by some sixteen stays driven into the ground at regular intervals. During three days of the Ascot race-meeting, the respondent took up his position at one of these stays, leaning against it, and using it as a rest for his body, and was there seen to make bets. He was not seen to bet on other portions of the quay, the whole of which, including the site of the hoarding, was open to the public. For the appellant it was contended that the respondent was using a place for the purpose of betting, and only went to this particular place to make a book on the races. For the respondent it was contended that this was not a place within the Act.

(y) [1896] 1 Q. B. 295; 31 L. J., N. C. 129; 40 S. J. 278.
There was no evidence of the ownership of the land; it was not inclosed; the public frequenting it were not charged for admission; and it was not sufficiently circumscribed or defined to constitute a place. It was held, distinguishing *Doggett v. Catterns* (2), that the justices ought to have convicted, as the locality was sufficiently defined to constitute a place within the meaning of section 3.

In *Eastwood v. Miller* (a), the appellant was the occupier of certain inclosed grounds, exceeding three acres in extent, in which a pigeon-shooting match, and afterwards a foot race, took place, and into which the public were admitted by ticket. Among the persons admitted to the grounds were two bookmakers who, when the shooting match was about to take place, were shouting out "20 to 2 on the match." Two men went up to one of the bookmakers and made a bet with him, paying a deposit and receiving a ticket in exchange. Whilst the match was proceeding another bet was taken, and persons were shouting all over the grounds. The appellant could hear what the bookmakers and other persons said, but did not take any part or say anything. Betting also took place on the foot-race. It was held that there was evidence to justify the magistrates in coming to the conclusion that the inclosure was a "place" within the meaning of the Act, and also that the appellant permitted it to be used for the purpose of betting.

In *Haigh v. Town Council of Sheffield* (b), the appellant had been convicted of knowingly permitting a place of which he was the occupier to be used for the purpose of illegal betting. At the hearing it was proved that he was the tenant of a piece of inclosed ground used for cricket, foot-racing, and other games and sports. On the day named in the summons foot-racing took place in this inclosure, to which persons were admitted on payment of sixpence. Within the inclosure, and among the spectators, some fifteen or twenty professional bettors stood on chairs and stools in different spots, calling out the odds on the various runners, and betting with different persons. The appellant knew what was going on but took no steps to prevent it, although he might have done so if he had been so minded. On behalf of the appellant recourse was again had to the argument that in order to constitute

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(2) *Ante*, p. 452.


a "place" the *locus in quo* must be *ejusdem generis* with a house, office, or room; and it was also contended that the inclosure could not be said to have been used for the purpose of betting, since the primary object for which it was kept was foot-racing, &c., and it was not shown to have been habitually used for betting. But the Court (Blackburn, Mellor, and Lush, JJ.), were unanimous in holding that the inclosure was a "place," and that the appellant had permitted it to be used for the purpose of betting, and the conviction was affirmed accordingly.

This case and that of *Eastwood v. Miller* would appear to constitute a direct authority for saying that an inclosed area of considerable extent may be a "place" within the meaning of the Act, and that a person using it or permitting it to be used for either of the purposes prohibited by section 1, is liable to conviction under section 3, even though the unlawful user be upon one occasion only, and the primary object for which it is kept be a lawful one (e).

In *Snow v. Hill* (d), the appellant had been convicted upon an information charging him with using a certain place, to wit, a field, for the purpose of betting with persons resorting thereto. At the hearing it was proved that dog-races were held in an inclosed field of about five acres in extent hired for the purpose by a committee, the public being admitted to a reserved portion of the field on payment of a small sum; and that the appellant attended the races, and moved about the reserved portion making bets with persons there. There was nothing to show that he was a professional betting man. It was held that he did not use any place for the illegal purpose charged in the information, and the conviction was quashed accordingly. At first sight it is somewhat difficult to reconcile the decision in this case with those in *Eastwood v. Miller* and *Haigh v. Town Council of Sheffield*, above referred to, but when carefully examined the judgment would seem to turn not so much upon the question whether the reserved portion of the field was a "place," as upon the conduct of the appellant, the Court being apparently of opinion that he was merely one of the persons resorting thereto, and therefore not guilty of any offence against the Act (e).

(d) 14 Q. B. D. 588; 54 L. J., M. C. 95; 52 L. T., N. S. 859; 33 W. R. 475.  
In Scotland, however, the argument that a "place" must be ejusdem generis with a house, office, or room, has been adopted; it having been held that an inclosed race-course some twenty acres in extent was not within the Act, and that even if it were so, the proprietor, who saw that betting was being carried on by a professional betting man (who had resorted thither with others of the general public on the occasion of certain races), and did not attempt to stop the betting, though he gave no special facilities, was not thereby liable under the Act as having knowingly and wilfully permitted the race-course to be used by another person for the purpose of betting (f).

In Reg. v. Preedy (g), Hawkins, J., in the course of a considered judgment in which he submits the cases on this subject to an elaborate and critical review, says:—"In all the cases it will be found that one essential requisite to the constitution of such a place is that it must, to adopt the expression of Brett, J., in Bowes v. Fenwick (h), be 'fixed and ascertained.' It must, too, be a place to which, at the time when the offence is charged to have been committed, persons were resorting, though with what primary object they were so resorting is, in my judgment, immaterial; the Act is silent upon that point. The temptation to gamble by betting was what the Act was intended to check, and the temptation to bet would be equally held out by a professional betting man plying his avocation in a crowd of persons assembled for the most innocent purpose unconnected with sport, as it would in a crowd of persons gathered together to witness the sport of racing. It need not be enclosed within walls or fences, or bounded by any defined line. Furthermore it may extend over a considerable area, even acres of ground. Were it otherwise many race-courses might be pointed out upon which a betting man might with impunity carry on such operations as the statute was intended to suppress. It must not, however, be supposed that I intended to say that a place to come within the statute may be unlimited in its area; on the contrary, I am of opinion that, though it may be bounded by no defined line, it must, nevertheless, be limited in extent, to the area occupied by the persons congregated together, and resorting to it, and to such a space that a

(f) Henretty v. Hart, 13 Ct. of
(g) 17 Cox, C. C. 433, at p. 438.
(h) L. R., 9 C. P. 339.
person carrying on his business there as a betting man, might fairly and reasonably be said to be doing so in the immediate presence of those so congregated together... It is true that in one or two of the cases expressions of judges may be found (not material to the question before them) which might at first sight be thought to indicate their opinion to be that the word ‘place’ in the statute means some particular ascertained spot just sufficient for a man to stand on." The learned Judge then refers to the expressions of Lord Coleridge, C.J., in Bowes v. Fenwick (ante, p. 455), and Greve, J., in Gallaway v. Maries (ante, p. 456), and continues:—"I can hardly think these learned judges intended by these expressions to lay it down as law that nothing would satisfy the word ‘place’ unless it was some particular spot on which a person stood, or which was appropriated by him exclusively for his own use—as a stall or standing at a fair or market would be—or that they meant to convey more than this, that a ‘place’ must be fixed and ascertained. I can find no authority for saying that the word ‘place’ ought to have so limited an interpretation put upon it; indeed there is direct authority to the contrary." In support of this view he then proceeds to cite the cases of Eastwood v. Miller (ante, p. 457), and Haigh v. Town Council of Sheffield (ante, p. 457), where, as we have already seen, inclosed areas of considerable extent were held to be places within the meaning of the Act.

From the foregoing cases it will be seen that it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate the question of a "place" from that of user, in a satisfactory manner. Where the user of a "place" for the purpose of illegal betting is charged both questions have to be considered, as the question whether a given locality is a place would appear to depend to some extent on the use to which it has been put by the party charged. In the case of a house or room, however, the only question to be determined is whether the conduct of the party charged is such as to constitute a user of the premises for either of the purposes prohibited by the Act. Whether there has been such a user is a question of fact to be determined in each case by the circumstances surrounding it (i).

With reference to the question what is unlawful user of a place under section 3, Hawkins, J., in the course of his judgment in Reg. v. Preedy (j), says: "It was certainly

(i) Reg. v. Preedy, 17 Cox, C. C.  
(j) 17 Cox, C. C. at pp. 441, 442. at p. 443, per Hawkins, J.
not the intention of the Act to make all betting illegal, and it is just as lawful now as it ever was for persons to bet together casually at any place, and as often as, and to any extent they please. The mischief the Act was pointed at was as expressed by Erle, C.J., in *Doggett v. Catterns*:

> The habit of using a particular place by persons skilled in gambling and betting, for the purpose of luring the ignorant and imprudent to the ruinous courses to which the vice of gambling so frequently leads,' and for the purpose of checking that habit, it was forbidden to any person to use any place for the purpose of systematically carrying on a business of betting with or receiving deposits on bets from persons resorting thereto. It is not the mere act of betting frequently, or with many persons; it is the carrying on the business of betting and announcing such business to those assembled, and inviting the persons resorting to the place to bet with such bettors, which the law was intended to suppress."

> "With reference to what constitutes a user of a place," says the same learned Judge (k), "I am of opinion that it is not necessary that it should be confined to one particular spot within the ambit of the place, or that the business should be announced in any particular manner, or that the use should be confined to one particular person. A man may just as well use a place by walking about from spot to spot within the area occupied by the persons resorting thereto, as he may by seating himself on a high stool in one particular spot. Nobody would say a man did not use a house because he shifted his operations from room to room as he found it most convenient, or that he did not use a room because, instead of sitting on a chair, or standing in a fixed spot, he walked up and down it. . . . As to the mode of using a place for the illegal purposes mentioned, it is immaterial what particular means are resorted to for those purposes. A man may stand on a stool in one spot, or he may sit at a desk, or he may walk here and there in all parts of the place amongst the assembled multitude, indicating in any way he may think fit or most attractive, his business or avocation, and his readiness to bet with the persons who are assembled at the place. To use all parts of a place in this manner seems to me to be a more effectual use of it than to confine himself to a particular spot. He may use as his attraction or advertisement a tall painted

(k) 17 Cox, C. C. at pp. 442, 443.
hat, or adopt other singularity of dress, or may use a placard or a flag, or exercise his voice to announce and call attention to his readiness to bet in the manner forbidden, which of these methods he adopts is absolutely immaterial."

The persons rendered liable by the statute are (1) the owner or occupier of any house, &c., using or permitting any other person to use the same for either of the illegal purposes, (2) a person using the same for either of such purposes, and (3) any person having the care or management of or in any manner assisting in conducting the business of any house, &c., used for either of such purposes (l).

As has already been seen, ante, p. 458, the occupier of inclosed grounds who uses, or permits them to be used for the purpose of illegal betting upon one occasion only, is liable to conviction under section 3, even though the primary object for which such grounds are kept is a lawful one; and the same remark applies to a similar user of a house or room, with the additional fact that in the latter case no question can arise as to the occupation of any fixed and ascertained spot (m).

In Foote v. Butler (n), an informer had paid two visits to the appellant's house, and had made bets with him on some races, money passing between them; there was further evidence that on the house being searched a number of books and documents relating to betting were found, and that certain remarks had been made by the appellant which tended to show that he had recently used them. It was held this was sufficient evidence to justify a conviction.

In Hornsby v. Raggett (o), it appeared that on five different days a bookmaker and his clerk were in the tap-room of a beerhouse kept by the respondent, and used the same for the purpose of betting with persons resorting thereto. The respondent was present, and knew of and permitted such use. The bookmaker and clerk did not occupy any specific place in the tap-room, and had no interest or property in the premises. It was held that the respondent had knowingly and wilfully permitted a room to be used for the purpose of illegal betting, and ought, therefore, to have been convicted.

In order to convict the occupier of a house of permitting

(l) See 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119, ss. 1, 3, ante, pp. 450, 451.
(m) Roy. v. Preedy, 17 Cox, C. C. 462 & 463.
(n) 41 J. P. 792.
(o) [1892], 1 Q. B. 20; 61 L. J., M. C. 24; 40 W. R. 111.
it to be used for the purpose of the receipt of money by way of betting, it is necessary to prove the actual receipt of such money inside the house in question (p). But it is immaterial whether such receipt is through the post or from persons resorting thereto (q).

A bonâ fide commission agent who keeps or uses an office for the purpose of undertaking commissions to make bets on credit for the public at large, is clearly not within the Act, as he does not bet himself, but executes his clients' commissions at Tattersall's or some other betting club. But a person who, although he holds himself out as a commission agent, receives money on deposit on bets on horse-races, and pays his clients their winnings without naming any principal as advancing the money for such purpose, is liable to conviction for keeping his office for receiving money on an undertaking to pay money on the event of horse-races within the meaning of section 1; and this, notwithstanding that he deducts a percentage from the winnings for commission, for his conduct indicates his intention to be responsible for the payment of the bets, and that he is really the principal (r).

The racing coupon competitions as ordinarily carried out by the proprietors of sporting newspapers, do not amount to betting transactions, even though a separate payment is required in respect of each coupon sent in after the first, which is supplied gratis with a copy of the paper; and the proprietor of such a paper is therefore not liable to conviction for using the publishing office for either of the purposes prohibited by section 1 (s).

It would appear that it is not essential to the user of a house, &c., for the purpose of illegal betting, that it should have an occupier, or that the person who uses it for the illegal purpose should have permission so to do from either owner or occupier. To again adopt the language of Hawkins, J., in his judgment in Reg. v. Preedy (t): "The right or title to be upon the place seems to me to be utterly immaterial, if in fact there is an illegal user of it. . . . Nothing could be easier than to evade the operation of section 3 if

(q) Wright v. Clarke, 34 J. P. 661.
(r) Ibid.
(s) Caminada v. Hutton, 60 L. J., M. C. 116; 64 L. T., N. S. 572;
(t) 39 W. R. 540; 55 J. P. 727; Stoddart v. Sagar, [1895] 2 Q. B. 474:
34 L. J., M. C. 234. These cases have already been more fully noticed when dealing with the subject of Lotteries, ante, pp. 433, 434.
(t) 17 Cox, C. C. at p. 441.
a person could defend himself upon the ground that he was a mere trespasser on the place used. If such were the law a man might locate himself at the corner of a street, or in an unoccupied shed, or on a vacant piece of ground on a railway platform, and there carry on his betting operations with impunity, if only he did so without the knowledge of the owner or occupier. Whereas if he did so with the permission of the owner or occupier, both would be liable to a penalty."

In order to support a conviction for using a house, &c., for the purpose of illegal betting, it is unnecessary to prove that such house, &c., has been used for the illegal purpose previously to the occasion in question. In other words, the illegitimate user forbidden by section 3 is not necessarily that of a house, &c., which is already a common nuisance and a common gaming house under sections 1 and 2. It is also immaterial that the principal user of the house is for a legitimate purpose (u).

Where certain persons, who were ostensibly bookmakers, went to the bar of a public-house on several occasions, and carried on their business by betting with persons resorting thereto, it was held that they were liable to conviction for using a "room" or "place" for the purpose of illegal betting. And it seems that they would have been equally liable if they had done so upon one occasion only (x).

In Reg. v. Worton (y), the defendant was convicted on an indictment charging him with using the bar of a beer-house on three different days, for the purpose of betting with persons resorting thereto. It was proved that on each of the three days the defendant was in the bar, and a number of persons came in, took slips of paper which were hanging on the wall, wrote on the slips the names of the horses they wished to back, wrapped up in the slips the money they staked, and handed the slips with the money inclosed to the defendant. Usually the defendant went outside, and received the slips and money on the doorstep of the house, but on one of the three days he received two slips with money inclosed, in the bar. It was held that there was evidence to go to the jury that the defendant had used the bar for the purpose of betting with persons resorting thereto on each of the three days, and, therefore,

(u) Reg. v. Freedy, 17 Cox, C. C. 433.
(y) [1895] 1 Q. B. 227; 64 L. J. M. 74; 72 L. T., N. S. 29.
that he was rightly convicted, Lord Russell, C. J., saying: "I am quite clear, and I understand that the other members of the Court agree with me, that if a person uses the bar as the defendant did, for the purpose of meeting the persons with whom he intends to bet, he is using it for the purpose of betting with persons resorting thereto, even if the money is always handed over to him outside the door of the house."

It would seem, however, that a person who, not being a professional betting man, makes casual bets with the persons he comes across at any house, &c. is not a person using the same for the purpose of betting with persons resorting thereto, but rather one of the ressorters, and is therefore not guilty of any offence against the Act. In Snow v. Hill (z), the defendant went to a reserved portion of an inclosed field where races were being held, and walked about making bets with various persons there; and it was held that he was not using a place for the purpose of illegal betting. And the same conclusion was arrived at in Whitehurst v. Pincher (a), where the defendant went on three successive days to the bar-room of a public house, and made casual bets with persons he met there. In neither of these cases was there any evidence that the defendant was a professional betting man, and the Court evidently regarded them merely as persons resorting, and therefore not within the purview of the Act.

A member of a bona fide club who habitually bets there with other members is not liable to conviction for using the club premises for the purpose of betting with persons resorting thereto, even though he be a professional bookmaker, and the club be formed for the purpose of the members betting with each other (b).

With regard to the liability of any person having the care or management of the business of any house, &c., used for either of the purposes prohibited by section 1, it has been held that the word "business" means the business of a betting-house keeper, and that the Act was not intended to apply to any person having the care or management of a lawful business who takes no share or part in any

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(z) 14 Q. B. D. 588; 54 L. J., M. C. 95; 52 L. T., N. S. 859; 33 W. R. 475.
(a) 62 L. T., N. S. 433; 54 J. P. 505.
(b) Downes v. Johnson, [1895] 2 O...
illegal betting which may take place on the premises upon which such lawful business is carried on (c).

*Slatter v. Bailey* (d) is an instance of a person assisting in the business of a betting-house keeper, although the conviction was for using a room for the purpose of illegal betting. In that case, a house was kept by T. and his two sons, for the purpose of betting on horse-races. One day T. and one son sat at a table in one room receiving bets, and the appellant and another son of T. sat at a table in another room doing likewise, whilst persons offering bets stood around. It was held that there was evidence that the appellant had some part in the management of the business, and had therefore been rightly convicted.

In *Reg. v. Cook* (dd), the appellant was the manager of a bicycle ground. Upon an occasion when some bicycle races were being held there several bookmakers were present pursuing their avocation amongst a large crowd of spectators. Placards prohibiting betting were posted about the ground by the appellant. Some betting took place about twenty yards from the winning-post, where the appellant stood, acting as judge of the races. He was aware that betting did and would take place, but could not have wholly prevented it under the circumstances, although he might have repressed it to a certain extent with the aid of some constables who were present at his request. It was held that as the business of the ground was not that of illegal betting, he was not liable to conviction.

A conviction which alleges that the defendant unlawfully had the care and management of a place used for the purpose of other persons betting therein is bad, as this would apply to persons betting with one another in the ordinary way, which is not interfered with or dealt with by the Legislature (e).

Upon a charge of keeping a house for the purpose of betting with persons resorting thereto, it is unnecessary to show that such persons have physically resorted to the premises, the purpose for which the house is kept being that which is condemned by section 1, and the offence may be proved by showing that the house was opened and advertised as a betting house, although no person ever physically resorted thereto. But where no other evidence than that of resorting is offered in support of such a charge,

(d) 37 J. P. 262.
(dd) Ubi supra.
(e) *Reg. v. Cook*, 13 Q. B. D. at p. 381, per Hawkins, J.
there must be evidence of physical resorting, and it is not sufficient to show that letters and telegrams were sent to the accused directing him to make bets with the senders; persons sending such letters and telegrams do not resort to the house within the meaning of the section (f).

No stronger evidence can be given of actual resorting to a house than that of persons going there to pay money for the purpose of ready money betting—i.e., paying the money as a stake upon a horse on the assurance that the defendant will pay over if the horse wins (g). Quære, whether upon the construction that the resorting must be physical, a case would fall within the Act where a man did not come to the house himself, but sent messengers or representatives to make bets for him. Dealing with this point, Lord Russell, C. J., in delivering judgment in Reg. v. Brown (h), says: "I should be sorry to suppose for an instant that such a case would not be within the statute as it stands, and would not be consistent with the construction I have put upon the section."

Any owner or occupier, or person acting on his behalf, or managing or assisting in conducting the business of any house, &c., or place opened, kept or used for any of the above-mentioned purposes, who shall receive any money or valuable thing as a deposit on any bet on condition of paying any money or valuable thing, on the happening of any event "relating to a horse-race, or any other race, or any fight, game, sport, or exercise," or as or for the consideration for any agreement, &c., to pay or give any money or valuable thing on any such event, and any person giving any acknowledgment, security, &c., on the receipt of any money or valuable thing so paid or given, purporting or intended to entitle the bearer or any other person to receive any money or valuable thing on the happening of any such event, is on summary conviction before two justices of the peace (i) liable to a penalty not exceeding 50l., and payment of costs, or to imprisonment not exceeding three calendar months (k).

Any money or valuable thing received by any such person as a deposit on any bet, or as or for the consideration for any such agreement, &c., is to be deemed to have been re-


(g) Ibid.

(h) [1895], 1 Q. B. at p. 130.

(i) Or a police magistrate within the Metropolitan Police District, 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, s. 14.

(k) 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119, s. 4, Appendix, see note (f), ante, p. 451.

Money, &c. so received may be recovered from the holder.
BETTING HOUSES.

ceived for the use of the person from whom it was received, and may be recovered with full costs in any Court of competent jurisdiction (l).

Attention should be called to the fact that section 4, supra, does not include "any person using the same." It is therefore a condition precedent to the recovering back of the money, that the person from whom it is sought to be recovered shall be an owner or occupier of the house (m).

The Act is not to extend to the holder of any "stakes or deposit to be paid to the winner of any race or lawful sport, game, or exercise," or to be paid "to the owner of any horse engaged in any race" (n); as where, for instance, the owner of the second horse is entitled to receive back his stake.

Any person exhibiting or publishing, or causing to be exhibited or published, any placard, advertisement, &c. making it to appear that any house, &c. or place is opened, kept, or used for the purpose of making bets in manner above mentioned, or for the purpose of exhibiting lists for betting, or with intent to induce any person to resort to such house, &c., or place, for the purpose of making bets or wagers in manner above mentioned, or any person who on behalf of the owner or occupier, or person using any such house, &c., or place, may invite other persons to resort thereto for the purpose of making any bets or wagers as above mentioned, is on summary conviction before two justices of the peace (o), liable to a penalty not exceeding 30l., and payment of costs, or to imprisonment not exceeding two calendar months (p).

Section 3 of the Betting Act, 1874 (37 Vict. c. 15), further provides that where any letter, circular, telegram, placard, handbill, card, or advertisement is sent, exhibited, or published—(1) whereby it is made to appear that any person either in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, will, on application, give information or advice for the purpose of or with respect to any such bet or wager, or any such event or contingency as is mentioned in the principal Act, or will make on behalf of any other person any such bet or wager as is mentioned in the principal Act; or (2) with

(l) 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119, s. 5, Appendix.
(m) Reg. v. Proeody, 17 Cox, C. C. at p. 440. See also Doggett v. Cat-
ners, ante, p. 452.
(n) 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119, s. 6, Appendix.
(o) Or a police magistrate within the Metropolitan Police District, 2 & 3
Vict. c. 71, s. 14.
(p) 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119, s. 7, Appendix.
intent to induce any person to apply to any house, office, room, or place, or to any person, with the view of obtaining information or advice for the purpose of any such bet or wager with respect to any such event or contingency as is mentioned in the principal Act; or (3) inviting any person to make or take any share in or in connection with any such bet or wager—every person sending, &c., or causing the same to be sent, &c., shall be subject to the penalties provided as above in the 7th section of the principal Act with respect to offences under that section.

This enactment is confined to such bets as are mentioned in 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119, s. 1, that is, to bets made in any house, office, or place kept for betting, and therefore does not apply to advertisements offering information for the purpose of bets not to be made in any such house, &c. (q). An advertisement of a racing coupon competition as ordinarily carried out by the proprietors of sporting newspapers is not an advertisement inviting the persons who read it to make bets on the event or contingency of or relating to a horse-race, as such a transaction does not amount to betting within the meaning of the principal Act (r).

A justice of the peace, upon complaint made on oath, may authorize the search of any suspected house or place by special warrant to a constable, who may obtain necessary assistance, and also use force if required to make an entry, and arrest, search, and bring before a justice of the peace all persons found there, and seize all lists, cards or other documents relating to racing or betting (s). But the warrant and arrest above provided for do not dispense with the necessity of a regular information and summons giving the defendant notice of the charges made against him; and the want of such information and summons will render the proceedings on the hearing invalid (t). The information may be laid before one justice only (u).

An information which charged the defendant with having on the 5th of October, and on divers other days, kept and used a house for the purpose of betting with persons resorting thereto, was held good as not alleging more than one offence, and a conviction for so keeping and using the

(s) 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119, s. 11, Appendix.
(u) Lee v. Gold, 44 J. P. 395.
house in question on the 8th of November was therefore upheld (z).

The warrant may issue in respect of licensed premises as well as others (y). And all persons found upon any premises entered by virtue of such warrant may be arrested whether they are actually engaged in contravening the Act or not (z).

Within the Metropolitan Police District, and the Dublin Metropolitan Police District, a Commissioner of Police may authorize any superintendent of police, accompanied by such constables as may be directed to assist him, to enter any suspected house, &c., or place, and to use force if necessary, and to take into custody all persons found there, and to seize all lists, cards, or other documents relating to racing or betting (a).

Penalties and costs may be levied by distress (b). Half of every pecuniary penalty is to be paid to the informer, and the remaining half to be applied in aid of the poor rate of the parish or extra-parochial place where the offence was committed (c).

In case a person who has laid any complaint or information do not appear at the time at which the defendant may have been summoned to appear, or on the adjournment of the summons, or neglect to prosecute, any justices having authority to adjudicate may authorize some other person to proceed on such summons, or take out a fresh one, as if the previous summons had not been granted (d).

An appeal is given to quarter sessions (e), but the certiorari is taken away (f).

A conviction before justices under this Act is a "criminal cause or matter" within section 47 of the Judicature Act, 1873, and the Court of Appeal has, therefore, no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a judgment of the High Court quashing the conviction on a case stated by justices (g).

This Act (h) did not extend to Scotland, but by section 4 of the Act of 1874 (37 Vict. c. 15), it is so extended with the following modifications and provisions:—(1) The term "distress" shall mean p oiling and sale; the term "mis-

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(z) Ibid.
(a) 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119, ss. 12, 18, Appendix.
(b) Ibid. s. 8.
(c) Ibid. s. 9.
(d) Ibid. s. 10.
(e) Ibid. s. 13.
(f) Ibid. s. 14.
(g) Blake v. Beech, 2 Ex. D. 335;
(h) 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119.
demeanor" shall mean a crime and offence. (2) All offences or penalties under the Acts shall be prosecuted and recovered before the sheriff of the county or his substitute in the Sheriff Court, at the instance of the procurator fiscal, or of any private person, under the provisions of the Summary Procedure Act, 1864, and the jurisdictions, powers, and authorities necessary for the purposes of this section are hereby conferred on the sheriffs and their substitutes. (3) Every pecuniary penalty which is adjudged to be paid under either of the Acts is to be paid to the clerk of the Court and by him accounted for and paid to the Queen's and Lord Treasurer's Remembrancer on behalf of Her Majesty. (4) The 13th and 14th sections of the principal Act are not to apply to Scotland, but any person who is convicted under either of the Acts may appeal against such conviction to the High Court of Justiciary, in the manner prescribed by such of the provisions of the 20 Geo. 2, c. 43, and any Acts amending the same, as relate to appeals in matters criminal, and by and under the rules, limitations, convictions and restrictions contained in the said provisions.

The Betting and Loans (Infants) Act, 1892.

As the portions of this Act which relate to the inciting infants to betting are to some extent analogous to the legislation on betting houses dealt with in the preceding pages of this chapter, their insertion in this place is deemed appropriate.

Section 1 of this Act (55 Vict. c. 4) enacts as follows:—

(1) "If anyone, for the purpose of earning commission, reward, or other profit, sends or causes to be sent to a person whom he knows to be an infant any circular, notice, advertisement, letter, telegram, or other document which invites, or may reasonably be implied to invite, the person receiving it to make any bet or wager, or to enter into or take any share or interest in any betting or wagering transaction, or to apply to any person or at any place with a view to obtaining information or advice for the purpose of any bet or wager, or for information as to any race, fight, game, sport, or other contingency upon which betting or wagering is generally carried on, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be liable, if convicted on indictment, to imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for a term not exceeding three calendar months, or to a fine not exceeding 100",
or to both imprisonment and fine, and if convicted on summary conviction, to imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for a term not exceeding one month, or to a fine not exceeding 20l., or to both imprisonment and fine.

(2) If any such circular, notice, advertisement, letter, telegram or other document as in this section mentioned, names or refers to any one as a person to whom any payment may be made, or from whom information may be obtained, for the purpose of or in relation to betting or wagering, the person so named or referred to shall be deemed to have sent or caused to be sent such document as aforesaid, unless he proves that he had not consented to be so named, and that he was not in any way a party to, and was wholly ignorant of, the sending of such document."

By section 3, if any such circular, notice, advertisement, letter, telegram, or other document as in section 1 mentioned, is sent to any person at any university, college, school, or other place of education, and such person is an infant, the person sending or causing the same to be sent shall be deemed to have known that such person was an infant, unless he proves that he had reasonable ground for believing such person to be of full age.

And by section 6: "In any proceeding against any person for an offence under this Act such person and his wife or husband, as the case may be, may, if such person thinks fit, be called, sworn, examined, and cross-examined as an ordinary witness in the case."

**Gaming Houses.**

All common gaming houses are nuisances in the eye of the law, not only because they are great temptations to idleness, but because they are apt to draw together great numbers of disorderly persons; they promote cheating and other corrupt practices, and incite to idleness and avaricious ways of gaining property (k).

The keeper of a common gaming house is indictable and punishable as for a misdemeanor with fine or imprisonment, or both; and his wife may be joined with him, or they may be indicted severally (k).

The indictment would seem to be good if it merely charges the defendant with keeping a common gaming house \( l \); as where the person is indicted for the offence of keeping a house where people assembled to play rouge et noir \( m \).

And as it is an indictment for a public nuisance, and not for any matter in the nature of a private injury, any person may go on with it even against the consent of the original prosecutor, it he has discontinued it \( n \).

Under 25 Geo. 2, c. 36 \( o \), provision is made for the indictment of “any person who shall act or behave him or herself as master or mistress, or as the person having the care, government, or management of any gaming house, &c.”

To encourage prosecutions for keeping gaming houses, &c., two inhabitants of any parish or place may give notice in writing to the constable of any person there keeping a gaming house, &c., upon which notice the constable is to go with such inhabitants to a justice of the peace, who on making oath that they believe the contents of such notice to be true, are each to enter into a recognizance in the sum of 20l. to give evidence, and the constable into a recognizance in the sum of 30l. to prosecute at the next general or quarter sessions or assizes \( p \).

After the constable has entered into such recognizance to prosecute, the justice is to make out his warrant to bring the accused person before him to be bound over to appear at the general or quarter sessions or assizes, there to answer such bill of indictment \( q \) as may then be found for the offence. And the justice may, in his discretion, take security for such person’s good behaviour in the meantime \( r \).

The overseers of the poor of the parish or place are to pay the constable the reasonable expenses of prosecution, and on conviction 10l. to each of the two inhabitants, on penalty of forfeiting double the sum \( s \).

Any constable who may neglect or refuse upon such notice to go before any justice of the peace, or to enter into such recognizance, or may be wilfully negligent in carrying on such prosecution, is for every offence to forfeit 20l. to each inhabitant giving such notice \( t \).

\( l \) Rex v. Rogier, 1 B. & C. 272; 2 D. & R. 431.
\( m \) Ibid.
\( n \) Rex v. Wood, 3 B. & Ad. 657.
\( o \) 25 Geo. 2, c. 36, ss. 6, 8.
\( p \) Ibid. s. 5.
\( q \) The certiorari in all cases is taken away by s. 10. See Reg. v. Sanders, 9 Q. B. 235.
\( r \) 25 Geo. 2, c. 36, s. 6.
\( s \) Ibid. s. 5.
\( t \) Ibid. s. 7.
Any person setting up the games of the ace of hearts, pharaoh, basset or hazard, is liable on summary conviction before a justice of the peace to a penalty of 200l. And any person playing or staking at any of the games is liable in the same manner to a penalty of 50l. (u).

On an information before two magistrates under this statute (x) "for setting up, maintaining and keeping a certain game, to be determined by the chance of dice, called hazard," the proof was that certain persons were found in the house playing at hazard with cards; that a dice-box and dice were found on the table the subsequent day, and these facts were held sufficient to warrant the justices to conclude that the game of hazard was there played (y).

Under 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, a common gaming house, "contrary to law," may be a place either where people play an unlawful game against a bank, or where a lawful game is so arranged that the chances are in favour of the table. This is set out with particularity in the 2nd section of the statute (z), which after reciting that "whereas doubts have arisen whether certain houses, alleged or reputed to be open for the use of the subscribers only, or not open to all persons desirous of using the same, are to be deemed common gaming houses," enacts, "that in default of other evidence proving any house or place to be a common gaming house, it shall be sufficient in support of the allegation in any indictment or information, that any house or place is a common gaming house, to prove that such house or place is kept or used for playing therein at any unlawful game, i.e., any game of chance, or any mixed game of chance and skill (a), and that a bank is kept there by one or more players exclusively of the others, or that the chances of any game played therein are not alike favourable to the players, including among the players the banker or other person by whom the game is managed, or against whom the other players stake, play, or bet." (b). It is immaterial whether the bank is kept by the owner or occupier or keeper of the house, or by one of the players (c).

(u) 12 Geo. 2, c. 28, ss. 2, 3, Appendix; M'Kinnell v. Robinson, 3 M. & W. 438.

(x) 12 Geo. 2, c. 28, s. 2, Appendix.


(z) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 2, Appendix.

(a) Jenks v. Terpin, 13 Q. B. D. at p. 530, per A. L. Smith, J.

(b) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 2, Appendix. For form of indictment, see Archbold's Criminal Pleading. As to other evidence of a house being a common gaming house, see post, pp. 476, 477.

(c) Jenks v. Turpin, 13 Q. B. D. at p. 530, per A. L. Smith, J.
A house which is ostensibly kept and used as an ordinary social club, but which is in reality kept and used for the purpose of gaming, the social arrangements being merely subsidiary to its use for the purpose of gaming, and the club, therefore, being a mere sham, is a common gaming house (d). And so, it seems, is a house which is kept and used for a double purpose, viz., as an honest social club for those who do not desire to play, as well as for the purpose of gaming for those who do (e). It makes no difference that the use of the house is limited to the members of the club, and that it is not open to all persons who may be desirous of using it. It is not a public, but a common gaming house which is prohibited—i.e., a house in which a large number of persons are invited habitually to congregate for the purpose of gaming (f).

In every case, except within the Metropolitan Police District, in which the justices of peace in every shire, and mayors, sheriffs, bailiffs and other head officers within every city, town and borough, now have by law authority to enter into any house, room or place where unlawful games are suspected to be held (g); any justice of the peace, under complaint made before him on oath that there is reason to suspect any house, room or place to be kept and used as a common gaming house, may by his warrant, at any time in his discretion, authorize any constable, together with necessary assistance, to make an entry in the same manner as might have been done by such justices, mayors, &c. in person. Permission is also given to use force if necessary in making such entry, either by breaking open doors, or otherwise, and authority is given to arrest, search and bring before a justice of the peace both "the keepers and the persons resorting and playing there" (h) to be dealt with according to law (i).

Within the Metropolitan District, if any superintendent belonging to the Metropolitan Police Force report in writing to the Commissioners of Police of the Metropolis that there are good grounds for belief, and that he believes that a house, room or place within the Metropolitan Police District is kept or used as a common gambling house; either of these Commissioners, by their order in writing,

(c) Jenks v. Turpin, 13 Q. B. D. at p. 512, per Hawkins, J.
(f) 13 Q. B. D. at pp. 515, 516, per Hawkins, J.
(g) 33 Hen. 8, c. 9, s. 14, Appendix.
(h) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 3, Appendix. See post, p. 479.
(i) 33 Hen. 8, c. 9, s. 14.
may authorize the superintendent to make an entry, with such constables as the Commissioner may direct to accompany him, and if necessary to use force to effect such entry, either by breaking open the doors or otherwise, and to take into custody all persons there found, and to seize all tables or instruments of gaming, and all monies and securities for money found in such house or premises (k). He may also search all parts of the house or premises where he shall suspect that tables or instruments of gaming are concealed, as well as all persons there found, and seize all tables and instruments of gaming he may happen to find (l).

Under 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, the owner or keeper, and every person having the care or management of such gaming house, and also every banker, croupier and other person in any manner conducting the business of it, on conviction either by his own confession or by the oath of a credible witness before any two justices of the peace, besides being liable, under 33 Hen. 8, c. 9, to pay a fine of forty shillings for each day (m), and to be imprisoned till he shall have found sureties to abstain from such practices for the future (n), is liable to such an additional penalty of not more than 100L. as might be adjudged by the justices before whom he may be convicted; or, in the discretion of such justices, he may be committed for not more than six calendar months to the house of correction, with or without hard labour. On non-payment of any penalty so adjudged, and of the reasonable costs and charges attending the conviction, one of the convicting justices may, by his warrant, authorize the same to be levied by distress and sale of the goods and chattels of the offender (o).

The penalty under 33 Hen. 8, c. 9, for using and haunting and playing in gaming houses, was six shillings and eightpence for each time of so doing (p), and such persons when taken might be imprisoned till they gave security to abstain from such practices for the future (q).

And where any cards, dice, balls, counters, tables, or other instruments of gaming used in playing any unlawful game are so found, it is evidence, until the contrary is made to appear, that such house, room, or place, is used

Penalties on gaming-house keepers under 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109.

Penalty for playing.

Evidence of gaming.

(k) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 6. (p) 33 Hen. 8, c. 9, s. 12. See post, pp. 478, 479, as to the penalties, which may be adjudged under 17 & 18 Vict. c. 38.

(l) Ibid. s. 7. (q) Ibid. s. 14.

(m) 33 Hen. 8, c. 9, s. 11.

(n) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 4.

(o) Ibid. See post, p. 479.
as a common gaming house, and that the persons so found were there playing; although no play was actually going on in the presence of such superintendent or constable or those accompanying him on his entry. And the police magistrate or justices, before whom any person is taken by virtue of the warrant or order, may direct all such tables and instruments of gaming to be forthwith destroyed (r).

But the difficulty of obtaining such evidence of gaming was so great, that this portion of the Act proved to be practically a dead letter; for all gaming houses were found to be provided with the means of secretly making away with the instruments of gaming on any alarm being given; and the penalties inflicted were insufficient to correct the evil.

Accordingly, to remedy these defects in the operation of the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, and the other Acts for the prevention of unlawful gaming, a supplementary Act was passed in the year 1854, intituled "An Act for the Suppression of Gaming Houses" (s), which has been completely successful in accomplishing that object. It recites that "the keepers of common gaming houses contrive, by fortifying the entrances of such houses, or by other means, to keep out the officers authorized to enter the same until the instruments of gaming have been removed or destroyed, so that no sufficient evidence can be obtained to convict the offenders, who are thereby encouraged to persist in the violation of the law; and" that "it is expedient that the law shall be made more efficient for the suppression of gaming houses."

With this object persons may be summarily convicted under this Act before two justices of the peace of thus obstructing the officers, and, in the discretion of the justices, may be fined a sum of money not exceeding 100l., or be imprisoned, with or without hard labour, for any period not exceeding six calendar months (t). And the mere fact of obstructing the officers is to be evidence of the house being a common gaming house (u).

Persons found there, and giving false names or addresses, or refusing to give their names and addresses, may,  

(r) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 8.  
(s) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 38, Appendix.  
(t) Ibid. s. 1, Appendix. So much of this section and of ss. 2, 3, and 4 as prescribes the term of imprisonment for non-payment of penalty and costs is repealed by the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1884.  
(u) Ibid. s. 2.
upon summary conviction, be fined 50l., or imprisoned for one month (x).

The owner or occupier, or any person "having the use of any house, room, or place, who shall open, keep, or use the same for the purpose of unlawful gaming being carried on therein, and any person, who being the owner or occupier of any house or room, shall knowingly and wilfully permit the same to be opened, kept, or used by any other person for the purpose aforesaid, any person having the care or management of or in any manner assisting in conducting the business of any house, room, or place opened, kept, or used for the purpose aforesaid, and any person who shall advance or furnish money for the purpose of gaming with persons frequenting such house, room, or place," may be summarily convicted before two justices of the peace, and be adjudged to pay any sum not exceeding 500l. and costs, or may be imprisoned, with or without hard labour, for twelve calendar months (y).

Gaming may be unlawful by reason of the place in which it is carried on, or by reason of the unlawfulness of the game itself. All gaming in a gaming house, even at lawful games, is unlawful (z). As to lawful and unlawful games, see ante, pp. 425, 426.

According to Hawkins, J., excessive gaming, per se, is no longer unlawful, as it was not an offence at common law, and there now exists no statute against it. But the fact that it is habitually carried on in a house kept for the purpose of gaming is cogent evidence for a jury or other tribunal called upon to determine whether the house in which it is carried on is a gaming house, so as to make the keeper of it liable to be indicted for a nuisance at common law (a). But, according to A. L. Smith, J., every game may be rendered unlawful by playing at it for excessive stakes (b).

In Jenks v. Turpin (c) the proprietor of a club, who was also the occupier of the club-house, which was obviously kept and used for the purpose of gaming at the game of baccarat, was held to have been rightly convicted of keeping and using the club-house for the purpose of unlawful gaming, and four members of the committee were

(x) Ibid. s. 3. (y) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 38, s. 4, at p. 524. Appendix. (z) Jenks v. Turpin, 13 Q. B. D. at p. 524. (b) 13 Q. B. D. 532. (c) Ubi supra.
held to have been rightly convicted as persons "having the care or management of and assisting in conducting the business of the club;" but a conviction against three of the players, who were included in the same information, for assisting by playing in conducting the business of the club, was held bad, although they might possibly be liable to indictment for unlawful gaming in a common gaming house.

Under this Act the justices of the peace, before whom persons found in a room or place of this description shall be brought, may require any of the persons apprehended to be sworn and to give evidence under a penalty for refusal (d); but persons making a full discovery may be freed from all penalties (e).

The penalties and costs inflicted under this Act may be levied by distress (f). And one-half of each penalty shall be applied in aid of the poor rate of the parish in which the offence shall have been committed, and the other half shall be paid to the person laying the information (g). Except in the case of a conviction before a Metropolitan Police magistrate, when the half of the penalty which is not payable to the informer goes to the receiver of the Metropolitan Police (h).

On the neglect of the person laying the information to prosecute the summons, the justices may authorize any other person to proceed thereon, or to lay a fresh information (i).

An appeal is given to quarter sessions (k); and the judgment of the justices thus given is not removable by certiorari (l).

By 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 10, a licence is required for persons apprehended may be made witnesses.

Penalties and costs.

On neglect to prosecute, another person may be authorised to do so. Remaining provisions.

Billiards, bagatelle, &c.

Persons

(d) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 38, s. 5, Appendix.
(e) Ibid. s. 6.
(f) Ibid. s. 7.
(g) Ibid. s. 8.
(h) Wray v. Ellis, 1 E. & E. 276; 28 L. J., M. C. 45.
(i) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 38, s. 9, Appendix. By the 22 & 23 Vict. c. 17, s. 1, no bill of indictment for keeping a gambling house (amongst other offences) shall be presented to or be found by any grand jury, unless the prosecutor or other person presenting such indictment has been bound by recognizance to prosecute or give evidence against the person accused of such offence, or unless the person accused has been committed to or detained in custody, or has been bound by recognizance to appear in answer to an indictment to be preferred against him for such offence, or unless such indictment for such offence, if charged to have been committed in England, be preferred by the direction or with the consent in writing of a Judge of one of the Superior Courts or of Her Majesty's Attorney-General or Solicitor-General.
(k) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 38, s. 10, Appendix.
(l) Ibid. s. 11.
every house, room, or place where a public billiard table, or bagatelle board, or instrument used in any game of the like kind is kept, at which persons are admitted to play, except in houses or premises specified in a victualler’s licence (m).

Justices of the peace are authorized at their general annual licensing meeting to grant billiard licences to such persons as, in their discretion, they deem fit and proper to keep such public billiard tables, on payment of six shillings, and such licences are to continue a year (n). And no appeal lies against a refusal by justices to grant a billiard licence (o). The words “Licensed for Billiards” are to be legibly painted in some conspicuous place on the outside of the house and near the door (p).

Every person neglecting to comply with these regulations may be proceeded against as the keeper of a common gaming house, and in addition to the penalty to which he is liable for that offence, he may be fined any sum the justices may fix upon of not more than 10s. for every day in which such billiard table, &c. has been used; or in the justices’ discretion may be committed to the House of Correction, with or without hard labour, for any term not exceeding one calendar month. A power of distress is given for non-payment of any penalty; but no person summarily convicted can be indicted for the same offence (q).

Persons offending against the tenor of their licences are liable to the same penalties and punishments in the case of a first, second, or third offence as keepers of inns, alehouses, and victualling houses, under 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, and all the provisions of that Act with respect to convictions, penalties, &c. are to apply to convictions for offences against the tenor of the licences under this Act, and to the consequent proceedings (r).

No keeper of any public billiard table, &c., whether he have a victualler’s licence or not, is to allow any person to play between one and eight in the morning of any day, or at any time on Sundays, Christmas Day, Good Friday, or any day appointed to be kept as a public fast or Thanksgiving, and no victualler is to allow any person to play during the time his premises are not by law allowed to be

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(m) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 11, Appendix.
(n) Ibid. s. 10.
(o) Ex parte Chamberlain, 8 E. & B. 644.
(p) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 11.
(q) Ibid. Appendix.
(r) Ibid. s. 12. But sec 35 & 36 Vict. c. 94, s. 75, post, p. 481.
opened for the sale of liquors; and during the hours that play is prohibited, every licensed house and every billiard room in every licensed victualler's must be closed (s).

A licensed victualler who allows his lodgers to play billiards during closing hours is liable to conviction for so doing, notwithstanding the provisions of 37 & 38 Vict. c. 49, s. 10, to the effect that such a person may sell intoxicating liquor at any time to persons lodging in his house (t).

All constables and officers of police may enter any public billiard room, &c. when and so often as they think fit, and the non-compliance with these regulations is to be deemed an offence against the tenor of the keeper's licence (u).

The Licensing Act, 1872 (x), s. 75, contains a proviso that, "in the case of persons intending to apply for billiard licences under 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, or for the transfer of such licences, the same notices shall be given as are by this Act required in the case of licences as defined by this Act, or as near thereto as circumstances admit; and any person convicted of an offence against the tenor of a billiard licence, or of any offence declared by the last-mentioned Act to be an offence against the tenor of a licence as defined by this Act, shall be punished under this Act in the same manner in all respects as a licensed person within the meaning of this Act is punishable under this Act for suffering any gaming or unlawful game to be carried on on his premises; and in construing the last-mentioned Act any reference to the Intoxicating Liquor Licensing Act, 1828, shall be construed to refer to that Act as amended by this Act."

(s) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 13.
(u) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 14, Appendix.
(x) 35 & 36 Vict. c. 94.
APPENDIX OF STATUTES.

33 Henry VIII. Cap. 9.

The Bill for the Maintaining Artillery, and the Debarring of Unlawful Games.

Sect. 11. No manner of person or persons, of what degree, quality or condition soever he or they be, from the Feast of the Nativity of St. John Baptist, now next coming, by himself, factor, deputy, servant or other person shall for his or their gain, lucre or living, keep, have, hold, occupy, exercise or maintain, any common house, alley or place (a) of dubbing, table, or carding, or any other manner of game prohibited by any estatute heretofore made, or any unlawful new game now invented or made, or any other new unlawful game hereafter to be invented, found, had or made, upon pain to forfeit and pay for every day keeping, having or maintaining, or suffering any such game to be had, kept, executed, played or maintained within any such house, garden, alley, or other place, contrary to the form and effect of this estatute, forty shillings.

12. And also every person using and haunting any of the said houses and plays, and there playing, to forfeit for every time so doing, six shillings and eight-pence.

14. It shall be lawful to all and every the justices of peace in every shire, mayors, sheriffs, bailiffs, and other head officers within every city, town and borough within this realm, from time to time, as well within liberties as without, as need and case shall require, to come, enter and resort into, all and every houses, places and alleys where such games shall be suspected to be holden, exercised, used or occupied, contrary to the form of this estatute; and as well the keepers of the same, as also the persons there haunting, resorting and playing, to take, arrest and imprison, and them so taken and arrested to keep in prison unto such time as the keepers and maintainers of the said plays and games have found sureties to the king's use, to be bound by recognizance or otherwise, no longer to use, keep or occupy any such house, play, game, alley or place (b); and also that the persons there so bound be in like case bound

(a) Keeping a cock-pit is within this statute; Dalton, c. 46.
(b) For further provisions, see 2 Geo. 2, c. 28, s. 9, post.
by themselves, or else with suretics, by the discretions of the justices, mayors, sheriffs, bailiffs, or other head officers, no more to play, haunt or exercise from henceforth in, at or to any of the said places, or at any of the said games.

16. No manner of artificer or craftsman of any handicraft or occupation, husbandman, apprentice, labourer, servant at husbandry, journeyman or servant of artificer, mariners, fishermen, watermen or any serving-man, shall from the said Feast of the Nativity of St. John Baptist, play at the tables, dice, cards, or any other unlawful game, out of Christmas, under the pain of twenty shillings, to be forfeit for every time; and that all justices of peace, mayors, bailiffs, sheriffs and all other head officers, and every of them, finding or knowing any manner of person or persons using or exercising any unlawful games, contrary to this present statute, shall have full power and authority to commit every such offender to ward, there to remain without bail or mainprise until such time that they so offending be bounden by obligation to the king's use in such sums of money as by the discretions of the said justices, mayors, bailiffs, or other head officers shall be thought reasonable, that they or any of them shall not from henceforth use such unlawful games.

17. All other statutes made for the restraint of unlawful games, or for the maintenance of artillery, as touching the penalties or forfeitures of the same, shall be from henceforth utterly void; and that all informations, plaints, actions or suits that shall be taken or sued upon any part of this statute, shall be commenced within the year after the offence committed and done, or otherwise no advantage or suit thereof to be taken.

18. And where any such forfeitures shall happen to be found within the precincts of any franchise, leet, or lawday, then the lord of the same franchise, leet or lawday to have the one moiety thereof, and the other moiety thereof to any of the king's subjects that will sue for the same in any of the king's courts, by action, information, bill or otherwise, in which action or suit the defendant shall not be admitted to wage his law, nor any protection nor essoin shall be allowed; and where such forfeitures shall be found out of the precinct of any franchise, leet or lawday, that the moiety of all such forfeitures shall be to the king, our sovereign lord, and the other moiety thereof to any the king's subjects that will sue for the same by bill, plaint, action, information or otherwise, in any of the king's courts, in which suit or action the defendant shall not be admitted to wage his law, nor any protection or essoin shall be allowed.

19. And to the intent that every person may have knowledge of this Act, and avoid the danger and penalties of the same, be

Persons prohibited to play at unlawful games out of Christmas (c).

All other statutes made against unlawful games, and for the maintenance of artillery repealed.

Within what time any suit shall be prosecuted upon this statute and who shall have the forfeitures.

(c) 1 Lutw. 1.

Proclamation of this statute.
it enacted by the authority aforesaid, That all mayors, bailiffs, sheriffs and all other head officers shall four times in the year, that is to say, every quarter once, make open proclamation of this present Act in every market to be holden within their several jurisdictions and authorities.

20. And also that the justices of gaol delivery, assizes and justices of peace, do cause the same to be proclaimed in their several circuits and sessions before them holden, and that this statute shall begin to take his effect concerning the penalties of the same from the said Feast of St. John Baptist now next coming, and to continue and endure for ever.

11 Hen. 7, c. 13.
Further provisions relating hereto.
31 Eliz. c. 12.

In what manner horses shall be sold in fairs or markets.
The former misuse in sale of stolen horses.
A place shall be appointed for a horse fair and also a toll taker.

When, where, and of whom toll for horses shall be taken.

2 & 3 Philip and Mary, Cap. 7.

An Act against the Buying of Stolen Horses.

"Forasmuch as stolen horses, mares and geldings by thieves and their confederates, be for the most parts sold, exchanged given or put away in houses, stables, back-sides and other secret and privy places of markets and fairs, and the toll also privily paid for the same, whereby the true owners thereof being not able to try the falsehood and covin betwixt the buyer and seller of such horse, mare or gelding, is by the common law of this realm without remedy:"

2. Be it therefore enacted by the authority of this present parliament, That the owner, governor, ruler, ferrnor, steward, bailiff or chief keeper of every fair and market overt within this realm, and other the queen's dominions, shall before the feast of Easter next, and so yearly, appoint and limit out a certain and special open place within the town, place, field, or circuit where horses, mares, geldings and colts have been and shall be used to be sold in any fair or market overt; in which said certain and open place as is aforesaid there shall be by the said ruler or keeper of the said fair or market, put in and appointed one sufficient person or more to take toll and keep the same place from ten of the clock before noon until sunset of every day of the foresaid fair and market, upon pain to lose and forfeit for every default forty shillings: And that every toll-gatherer, his deputy or deputies, shall, during the time of every the said fairs and markets, take their due and lawful tolls for every such horse, mare, gelding or colt at the said open place to be appointed as is aforesaid, and betwixt the hours of ten of the clock in the morning and sunset of the same day, if it be tendered, and not at any other time or place; and shall have presenty before him or them, at the taking of the same toll, the parties to the bargain, exchange, gift, contract or putting away of every such horse, mare, gold-
ing or colt; and also the same horse, mare, gelding and colt so sold, exchanged or put away; and shall then write or cause to be written in a book to be kept for that purpose, the names, surnames and dwelling-places of all the said parties, and the colour, with one special mark at the least of every such horse, mare, gelding and colt, on pain to forfeit at and for every default contrary to the tenor thereof, forty shillings.

3. And the said toll-gatherer or keeper of the said book shall within one day next after every such fair or market bring and deliver his said book to the owner, governor, ruler, steward, bailiff, or chief keeper of the said fair or market, who shall then cause a note to be made of the true number of all horses, mares, geldings and colts sold at the said market or fair, and shall there subscribe his name, or set his mark thereunto; upon pain to him that shall make default therein, to lose and forfeit for every default forty shillings, and also answer the party grieved by reason of the same his negligence in every behalf.

4. And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That the sale, gift, exchange or putting away after the last day of February now next coming, in any fair or market overt, of any horse, mare, gelding or colt that is or shall be thievishly stolen or feloniously taken away from any person or persons, shall not alter, take away nor exchange the property of any person or persons to or from any such horse, mare, gelding or colt, unless the same horse, mare, gelding or colt shall be in the time of the said fair or market wherein the same shall be so sold, given, exchanged or put away, openly ridden, led, walked, driven or kept standing by the space of one hour together at the least, betwixt ten of the clock in the morning and the sun-setting, in the open place of the fair or market wherein horses are commonly used to be sold, and not within any house, yard, back-side or other privy or secret place, and unless all the parties to the bargain, contract, gift or exchange, present in the said fair or market, shall also come together and bring the horse, mare, gelding or colt so sold, exchanged, given or put away to the open place appointed for the toll-taker, or for the book-keeper, where no toll is due, and there enter or cause to be entered their names and dwelling-places, in manner as is aforesaid, with the colour or colours, and one special mark at the least of every the same horses, mares, geldings or colts, in the toll-taker’s book, or in the keeper’s book for that purpose where no toll is due, as is aforesaid, and also pay him their toll, if they ought to pay any; and if not, then the buyer to give one penny for the entry of their names, and executing the other circumstances aforesaid rehearsed, to him that shall write the same in the said book.
APPENDIX.

Recovery of horse by owner.

5. And if any horse, mare, gelding or colt that is or shall be thievishly stolen or taken away, shall after the said last day of February next coming be sold, given, exchanged or put away, in any fair or market, and not used in all points according to the tenor and intent of this estatute, that then the owner of every such horse, mare, gelding or colt, shall and may by force of this estatute, seize or take again the said horse, mare, gelding, or colt, or have an action of *detinue* or *replevin* for the same; any sale, gift, exchange or putting away of any such horse, mare, gelding, or colt, other than according to this estatute, in anywise notwithstanding.

6. The one-half of all which forfeitures to be to the king and queen's majesties, her heirs and successors, and the other to him or them that will sue for the same before the justices of peace, or in any of the king's and queen's majesties ordinary courts of record, by bill, plaint, action of *debt* or information, in which suits no protection, essoin or wager of law shall be allowed.

7. And be it enacted by the authority aforesaid, That the justices of peace of every place and county, as well within liberties as without, shall have authority in their sessions, within the limits of their authority and commission, to inquire, hear and determine all offences against this estatute, as they may do any other matter triable before them.

8. Provided alway, that in every such fair or market where any toll is nor shall be due ne leviable by reason of the freedom, liberty or privilege of the said fair or market, the keeper or keepers of the book, touching the execution of this present Act, shall take nor exact but one penny upon and for every contract for his labour in writing the entry concerning the premises, in manner and form as is before declared.


An Act to avoid Horse Stealing.

"Whereas through most counties of this realm horse stealing is grown so common, as neither in pastures or closes, nor hardly in stables, the same are to be in safety from stealing, which ensueth by the ready buying of the same by horse-coursers and others, in some open fairs or markets far distant from the owner, and with such speed as the owner cannot by pursuit possibly help the same; and sundry good ordinances have heretofore been made touching the manner of selling and tolling of horses, marcs, geldings, and colts in fairs and markets, which have not wrought so good effect for the repressing or avoiding of horse stealing as was expected:"

2. Now for a further remedy in that behalf, be it enacted by the authority of this present parliament, That no person after twenty days next after the end of this session of parliament shall in any fair or market sell, give, exchange or put away any horse, mare, gelding, colt, or filly, unless the toll taker there, or (where no toll is paid) the book-keeper, bailiff, or the chief officer of the same fair or market, shall and will take upon him perfect knowledge of the person that so shall sell or offer to sell, give or exchange any horse, mare, gelding, colt, or filly, and of his true christian name, surname and place or dwelling or resianey, and shall enter all the same his knowledge into a book there kept for sale of horses; or else that he so selling or offering to sell, give, exchange or put away any horse, mare, gelding, colt, or filly, shall bring unto the toll taker or other officer aforesaid, of the same fair or market, one sufficient and credible person that can, shall, or will testify and declare unto and before such toll taker, book-keeper or other office, that he knoweth the party that so selleth, giveth, exchangeth or putteth away such horse, mare, gelding, colt, or filly and his true name, surname, mystery and dwelling-place, and there enter or cause to be entered in the book of the said toll taker or officer, as well the true christian name, surname, mystery and place of dwelling or resianey of him that so selleth, giveth, exchangeth or putteth away such horse, mare, gelding, colt or filly, as of him that so shall testify or avouch his knowledge of the same person; and shall also cause to be entered the very true price or value that he shall have for the same horse, mare, gelding, colt or filly, so sold: And that no person shall take upon him to avouch, testify or declare that he knoweth the party that so shall offer to sell, give, exchange or put away any such horse, mare, gelding, colt or filly, unless he do indeed truly know the same party, and shall truly declare to the toll taker or other officer aforesaid, as well the christian name, surname, mystery and place of dwelling and resianey of himself, as of him of and for whom he maketh such testimony and avouchment: And that no toll taker or other person keeping any book of entry of sales of horses in fairs or markets, shall take or receive any toll, or make entry of any sale, gift, exchange or putting away of any horse, mare, gelding, colt or filly, unless he knoweth the party that so selleth, giveth, exchangeth or putteth away any such horse, mare, gelding, colt or filly, and his true christian name, surname, mystery and place of his dwelling or resianey, or the party that shall and will testify and avouch his knowledge of the same person so selling, giving, exchanging or putting away such horse, mare, gelding, colt or filly, and his true christian name, surname, mystery, and place of dwelling or resianey, and shall make a
perfect entry into the said book of such his knowledge of the
person, and of the name, surname, mystery and place of the
dwelling or resianey of the same person, and also the true
prcie or value that shall be bonâ fide taken or had for any
such horse, mare, gelding, eolt or filly so sold, given, ex-
changed or put away, so far as he can understand the same,
and then give to the party so buying or taking by gift, ex-
change or otherwise, such horse, mare, gelding, eolt or filly,
requiring and paying twopence for the same, a true and per-
fect note in writing of all the full contents of the same, sub-
scribed with his hand; on pain that every person that so shall
sell, give, exchange, or put away any horse, mare, gelding,
eolt or filly without being known to the toll taker or other
officer aforesaid, or without bringing such a voucheer or witness,
causing the same to be entered as aforesaid, and every person
making any untrue testimony or avouchment in the behalf
aforesaid, and every toll taker, book-keeper or other officer
of fair or market aforesaid, offending in the premises contrary
to the true meaning aforesaid, shall forfeit for every such
default the sum of five pounds; but also that every sale, gift,
exehange, or other putting away of any horse, mare, gelding,
eolt, filly, in fair or market, not used in all points according
to the true meaning aforesaid, shall be void; the one-half of
all which forfeitures to be to the queen's majesty, her heirs,
and successors, and the other half to him or them that will
sue for the same before the justices of peace, or in any of her
majesty's ordinary eourts of record, by bill, plaint, action of
debt or information, in which no essoin or proteetion shall be
allowed.

3. And be it further enacted, That the justices of peace of
every place or county, as well within liberties as without,
shall have authority in their sessions, within the limits of their
authority and eommission, to inquire, hear and determine all
offences against this statute, as they may do any other matter
triable before them.

4. And be it further enacted, That if any horse, mare,
gelding, eolt, or filly, after twenty days next ensuing the end
of this session of parliament, shall be stolen, and after shall be
sold in open fair or market, and the same shall be used in all
points and eircumstances as aforesaid, that yet nevertheless
the sale of any such horse, mare, gelding, eolt or filly, within
six months next after the felony done, shall not take away the
property of the owner from whom the same was stolen, so as
claim be made within six months by the party from whom the
same was stolen, or by his executors, or administrators, or by any
other by any of their appointment, at or in the town or parish
where the same horse, mare, gelding, eolt or filly shall be found,
before the mayor or other head officer of the same town or
parish, if the same horse, mare, gelding, colt or filly, shall happen to be found in any town corporate or market town, or else before any justice of peace of that county near to the place where such horse, mare, gelding, colt, or filly shall be found, if it be out of a town corporate or market town; and so as proof be made within forty days then next ensuing by two sufficient witnesses to be produced and deposed before such head officer or justice (who by virtue of this Act shall have authority to administer an oath in that behalf), that the property of the same horse, mare, gelding, colt or filly so claimed was in the party by or from whom such claim is made, and was stolen from him within six months next before such claim of any such horse, gelding, mare, colt or filly; but that the party from whom the said horse, mare, gelding, colt or filly was stolen, his executors or administrators shall and may at all times after, notwithstanding any such sale or sales in any fair or open market thereof made, have property and power to have, take again and enjoy the said horse, mare, gelding, colt, or filly upon payment or readiness, or offer to pay, to the party that shall have the possession and interest of the same horse, mare, gelding, colt, or filly, if he will receive and accept it, so much money as the same party shall depose and swear before such head officer or justice of peace (who by virtue of this Act shall have authority to minister and give an oath in that behalf) that he paid for the same bona fide, without fraud or collusion; any law, statute or other thing to the contrary thereof in anywise notwithstanding.

2 Geo. II. Cap. 28.

An Act (among other things) for more effectual debarring of unlawful Games.

9. "And whereas a good and profitable statute was made in the threec-and-twentieth year of the reign of King Henry the Eighth, (among other things) for the debarring of unlawful games; and whereas by the said statute no power is given unto the justices of the peace to demand and take from persons found playing contrary to law any other security than their own recognizances that they or any of them shall not from thenceforth use such unlawful games, unless such persons are found playing contrary to law upon the view of one or more justice or justices of the peace;" for remedy thereof, be it further enacted, that where it shall be proved upon the oath of two or more credible witnesses, before any justice or justices of the peace, as well as where such justice or justices shall find upon his or their own view that any person or per-
sons have or hath used or exercised any unlawful game contrary to the said statute, the said justice or justices shall have full power and authority to commit all and every such offender and offenders to prison, without bail or mainprize, unless and until such offender and offenders shall enter into one or more recognizances, with sureties or without, at the discretion of the said justice or justices of the peace, that he or they respectively shall not thenceforth play at or use such unlawful game.

12 Geo. II. Cap. 28.

An Act for the more effectual preventing of excessive and deceitful Gaming.

"And whereas it is found by experience that the said good and wholesome laws have not effectually answered the good ends, intents and purposes in and by the said Acts (d) designed; but that, contrary to the true intent and meaning of the said recited Acts, several deceitful games and subscriptions are daily carried on under the denomination of sales of houses, lands, plate, jewels, goods and other things; and that several printers have printed, published, or caused to be printed and published, proposals or schemes for the sale of such houses, lands, plates, jewels, goods and other things, to be determined by Rafljes, by mathematical machines or engines, and by other indirect ways and means, tending to evade the said good and wholesome laws before mentioned; and whereas several persons have for many years past carried on and set up certain fraudulent games and lotteries, to be determined by the chance of cards and dice, under the denomination of the games of the ace of hearts, pharaoh, basset and hazard, and thereby defrauded several of his majesty’s subjects ignorant of the great disadvantage adventures in the said games and lotteries so denominated the games of the ace of hearts, pharaoh, basset or hazard (e), arc under, subject and liable to; and whereas several doubts have arisen whether the said games of the ace of hearts, pharaoh, basset and hazard (e) arc within the descriptions of the lotteries prohibited by the said recited Acts of Parliament (d); and whereas great difficulties have arisen upon the methods of conviction of the offenders against the said Acts of Parliament; for remedy whereof, and for explaining and making more effectual the said Acts of Parliament, may it please your most excellent majesty that it may be

(d) 10 & 11 Will. 3, c. 17; 9 Anne, c. 6, s. 56; 8 Geo. 1, c. 2, s. 36, prohibiting Lotteries.
enacted, and be it enacted by the king's most excellent majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, in the present parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, that if any person or persons shall, after the twenty-fourth day of June, one thousand seven hundred and thirty-nine, erect, set up, continue or keep any office or place under the denomination of a sale or sales of houses, land, advowsons, presentations to livings, plate, jewels, ships, goods or other things by way of lottery, or by lots, tickets, numbers or figures, cards or dice; or shall make, print,advertize or publish, or cause to be made, printed, advertized or published, proposals or schemes for advancing small sums of money by several persons, amounting in the whole to large sums, to be divided among them by chances of the prices in some public lottery or lotteries established or allowed by Act of Parliament, or shall deliver out, or cause or procure to be delivered out, tickets to the persons advancing such sums, to entitle them to a share of the money so advanced, according to such proposals or schemes; or shall expose to sale any houses, land, advowsons, presentations to livings, plate, jewels, ships or other goods by any game, method or device whatsoever, depending upon or to be determined by any lot or drawing, whether it be out of a box or wheel, or by cards or dice, or by any machine, engine or device of chance of any kind whatsoever; such person or persons, and every or either of them, shall, upon being convicted thereof before any one justice of the peace for any county, riding or division, or before the mayor or other justice or justices of the peace for any city or town corporate, upon the oath or oaths of one or more credible witness or witnesses (which said oaths the said justices of the peace and mayor are hereby authorized, empowered, and required to administer), or upon the view of such justice or justices, or the mayor, justice or justices for any city or town corporate, or on the confession of the party or parties accused, shall forfeit and lose the sum of two hundred pounds, to be levied by distress and sale of the offender's goods, by warrant under the hands and seals of one or more justice or justices of the peace of such county, riding, division, city or town where the offence shall be committed; which said forfeitures, when recovered, after deducting the reasonable charges of such prosecution, shall go and be applied, one-third thereof to the informer, and the remaining two-thirds to the use of the poor of the parish where such offence shall be committed, excepting the said two-thirds of such forfeitures which shall be incurred by and recovered upon any person or persons within the city of Bath, which said two-thirds shall go and be applied to and for the use and benefit of the poor residing within the hospital or infirmary

200l. penalty on any offence against this Act.

The same, how to be levied and applied.
lately erected for the use and benefit of poor persons resorting to the said city for the benefit of the mineral waters, after deducting the charges of convietion as aforesaid.

2. The said games of the ace of hearts, pharaoh, basset and hazard (f), are and are hereby declared to be games or lotteries by cards or dice within the intent and meaning of the said in part recited Acts; and that all and every person or persons who shall set up, maintain or keep the said games of the ace of hearts, pharaoh, basset and hazard shall be subject and liable to all and every the penalties and forfeitures in and by this Act indicted upon any person or persons who shall erect, set up, continue or keep any of the said games or lotteries in this present Act mentioned; and shall be prosecuted and convicted, and the penalties and forfeitures shall be sued for and recovered, in like manner as the said penalties and forfeitures are by this Act directed to be sued for and recovered.

3. All and every person and persons who shall be adventurers in any of the said games, lottery or lotteries, sale or sales; or shall play, set at, stake or punt at either of the said games of the ace of hearts, pharaoh, basset and hazard (f), and shall be thereof convicted in such manner and form as in and by this Act is prescribed, every such person or persons shall forfeit and lose the sum of Fifty pounds, to be sued for and recovered as aforesaid.

4. All and every such sale or sales of houses, lands, advowsons, presentations to livings, plate, jewels, ships, goods or other things by any game, lottery or lotteries, machine, engine or other device whatsoever, depending upon or to be determined by chance or lot, shall and are hereby declared to be void to all intents and purposes whatsoever; and all such houses, lands, advowsons, presentations to livings, plate, jewels, ships, goods or other things set up and exposed to sale in manner and form aforesaid shall be forfeited to such person or persons who shall sue for the same, by action, bill, plaint or information, in any of his majesty’s courts of record, or at the assizes for any county where the offence shall be committed; in which action, bill, plaint or information no essoin, protection, wager of law, or more than one imparlance shall be allowed.

5. Provided always, that if any person or persons shall think him, her or themselves aggrieved by the judgment or determination of any justice or justices of the peace or mayor as aforesaid, upon any convietion of or for any of the offences in this Act, such person or persons may appeal from the said judgment of the said justice or justices or mayor to the next general quarter sessions of the peace (g).


(g) The rest of this section was repealed by the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1884, as replaced by s. 31
6. Provided always, that no such conviction made, or judgment given as aforesaid, by this Act, shall . . . (k) be removed or removable by certiorari, or any other writ or process whatsoever, into any of his majesty's courts of record at Westminster, until such order or other proceeding shall have been first removed to, and judgment and determination given and made thereupon, by such court of quarter sessions as aforesaid.

7. That no writ of certiorari or other process shall issue or be issuable to remove the record of any such conviction from the said court of quarter sessions, or to remove any order or other proceedings taken or made by the said court of quarter sessions upon, touching or concerning such conviction, into any of his majesty's courts of record at Westminster, until the party or parties against whom such conviction shall be made, before the allowance of such writ of certiorari or other process, shall find two sufficient sureties to become bound to the prosecutor in the sum of One hundred pounds, with condition to prosecute the same with effect within six calendar months, and to pay unto the prosecutor or prosecutors his, her, or their treble costs and charges, in case such order or conviction shall be affirmed.

8. [Offenders not able to pay the penalties to be imprisoned (i).]

9. If any justice of the peace, or any other justice hereinbefore described, or mayor of any corporation, shall neglect or refuse to do what is required of him and them by this Act, such justices and mayors so neglecting or refusing shall respectively forfeit and pay the sum of Ten pounds for each offence, one moiety whereof to be paid to any person or person who shall sue for the same, and the other moiety thereof to the poor of the parish or place where such offence shall be committed (k), and shall be recovered with full costs of suit, by action, bill, plaint or information in any of his majesty's courts of record, or at the assize for any county; in which action, bill, plaint or information no essoign, protection or wager of law, nor more than one impalement shall be allowed; such prosecution being commenced within six months next after such refusal of such justices or mayor.

10. Nothing in this Act or in any former Acts against gaming contained shall extend to prevent or hinder any person or persons from gaming or playing at any of the games in this or in any of the said former Acts mentioned within any of his

of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, as amended by s. 6 of the Act of 1884.

(k) The omitted portion of this section was repealed by the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1884, as having been replaced by s. 39 of the Act of 1879.

(i) Repealed by the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1884.

(k) But see 46 Geo. 3, c. 148, s. 59.
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majesty's royal palaces, where his majesty, his heirs and successors shall then reside.

11. Provided always, that nothing herein contained shall extend, or be any ways construed, deemed or taken to extend, or in any sort to affect or prejudice any estate or interest in, out of, or to any manors, honours, royalties, lands, tenements, advowsons, presentations, rents, services and hereditaments whatsoever, which shall or may at any time or times hereafter be according to the laws now in being legally allotted to, or held by, or by means of any allotment or partition by lots (l); but that all persons who now are, or that shall hereafter become really and truly seised as part owners, joint tenants, and tenants in common of any manors, honours, royalties, lands, tenements, advowsons, presentations, rents, services, and hereditaments shall, and he, she and they and his, her and their heirs and assigns is and are hereby made and continued capable to accept and take such estates and interest, and parts therein, in such and the like manner, and to such and the like uses, as he, she, or they might, would or could have done by or by virtue or in consequence of any lot, scroll, chance or allotment whatsoever had this present Act never been made, anything herein contained to the contrary thereof notwithstanding.

12. If any suit or action shall be commenced or prosecuted against any person or persons for anything done in pursuance of this Act, every such suit or action shall be commenced within three calendar months next after the fact was committed, and not afterwards; and shall be laid or brought in the county, city or place where the cause of action shall arise and not elsewhere; and the defendant and defendants therein shall and may plead the general issue, and give this Act and the special matter in evidence at the trial to be had thereupon, and that the same was done in pursuance of or by the authority of this Act; [and if the plaintiff or plaintiffs shall become nonsuited or discontinue his, her or their action or actions, suit or suits, or if upon demurrer judgment shall be given against the plaintiff or plaintiffs, the defendant or defendants shall and may recover treble costs, and have like remedy for the same as any defendant or defendants hath or have for costs in any other cases by law] (m).

(l) See Ballot in Building Societies, (m) Repealed, 5 & 6 Vict. c. 97, &c., ante, Part III., Chap. IV. s. 2.
13 Geo. II. Cap. 19.

An Act to restrain and prevent the excessive Increase of Horse Races, and for amending an Act made in the last Session of Parliament, intituled "An Act for the more effectual preventing of excessive and deceitful gaming."

9. "And whereas a good and wholesome law was made in the twelfth year of the reign of his present majesty King George the Second, intituled 'An Act for the more effectual preventing of excessive and deceitful Gaming;' but contrary to the true intent and meaning thereof, some fraudulent and deceitful games have been invented, and a certain game called passage is now daily practised and carried on, to the ruin and impoverishment of many of his majesty's subjects;" it is therefore hereby enacted and declared, that the said game of passage, and all and every other game and games invented or to be invented, with one or more die or dice, or with any other instrument, engine or device, in the nature of dice, having one or more figures or numbers thereon (backgammon and the other games now played within the backgammon tables only excepted) and shall be deemed to be games or lotteries by dice, within the intent and meaning of the said in part recited Act; and all and every person and persons who shall set up, maintain or keep any office, table or place (save and except as in the said in part recited Act is provided and declared), for the said game of passage, or for any other such game or games as aforesaid (backgammon and the other games now played with the backgammon tables only excepted), shall severally forfeit, be subject and liable to, all and every the penalties and forfeitures in and by the said in part recited Act inflicted upon any person or persons who shall erect, set up, continue or keep any of the games or lotteries in the said in part recited Act mentioned; and all and every person or persons who shall play, set at stake, or adventure at the said game of passage, or at any such other game as aforesaid (backgammon and the other games now played with the backgammon tables only excepted), save and except as in the said in part recited Act is provided and declared, he and they respectively shall severally forfeit, be subject and liable to all and every the penalties and forfeitures in and by the said in part recited Act inflicted upon any person or persons who shall play, set at stake or adventure at any of the said games in the said in part recited Act mentioned; and all and every such offenders respectively shall be prosecuted and convicted, and the several penalties and forfeitures shall be sued for and recovered and disposed of in like manner, and to such uses, as the several penalties and forfeitures in either of such cases are by the said

12 Geo. 2, c. 28.

Game of passage, and other games with dice, prohibited.

Under penalties of 12 Geo. 2, c. 28.
in part recited Act directed to be sued for and recovered, and disposed of.

10. [Double costs] (n).

18 Geo. II. Cap. 34.

An Act to explain, amend, and make more effectual the Laws in being, to prevent excessive and deceitful Gaming; and to restrain and prevent the excessive Increase of Horse Races.

"Whereas notwithstanding the many good and wholesome laws now in being for preventing excessive and deceitful gaming, many persons of ill fame and reputation, who have no visible means of subsistence, do keep houses, rooms, and other places for playing, and do permit persons therein to play at cards, dice and other devices, for large sums of money, by means whereof divers young and unwary persons and others are drawn in to lose the greatest part, and sometimes all their substance; and it frequently happens they are thereby reduced to the utmost necessities, and betake themselves to the most wicked courses, which end in their utter ruin: And whereas a certain pernicious game called roulet or roly-poly, is daily practised, and the laws now in being have by experience been found ineffectual to put a stop to such pernicious practices:” For remedy whereof may it please your majesty that it may be enacted, and be it enacted by the king’s most excellent majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, in this present parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, That from and after the twenty-fourth day of June, one thousand seven hundred and forty-five, no person or persons, of what condition soever, shall keep any house, room or place for playing, or permit or suffer any person or persons whatsoever, within any such house, room or place to play at the said game of roulet, otherwise roly-poly, or at any other game, with cards or dice, already prohibited by the laws of this realm; and in case any person or persons whatsoever shall keep any such house, room or place for playing, or permit or suffer any person or persons as aforesaid to play at the said game of roulet, otherwise roly-poly, or at any other game, with cards or dice, already prohibited by law, such person or persons so offending shall incur the pains and penalties, and be liable to such prosecution as is directed in and by an Act made in the twelfth year of the reign of his present majesty, intituled “An Act for the more effectual preventing excessive and deceitful Gaming.”

(n) Repealed by 5 & 6 Vict. c. 97, s. 2.
2. If any person or persons whatsoever shall after the said twenty-fourth day of June, one thousand seven hundred and forty-five, play at the said game of rouleto, otherwise roly-poly, or at any game or games with cards or dice, already prohibited by law, every such person or persons so offending shall also incur the pains and penalties, and be liable to such prosecution, as is directed in and by an act made in the twelfth year of the reign of his present majesty, intituled "An Act for the more effectual preventing excessive and deceitful Gaming."

4. And for the more easy conviction of persons offending against this or any other former Act, for preventing excessive and deceitful gaming, be it enacted by the authority aforesaid, That it shall and may be lawful to and for such person or persons who have jurisdiction to hear and determine informations upon the statutes against excessive and deceitful gaming, upon any information exhibited before them, for any offence committed against this Act, or against this statute made in the twelfth year of his present majesty, intituled "An Act for the more effectual preventing of excessive and deceitful Gaming;" or against one other Act made in the thirteenth year of the reign of his present majesty, intituled "An Act to restrain and prevent the excessive Increase of Horse Races, and for amending an Act made in the last Session of Parliament, intituled 'An Act for the more effectual preventing excessive and deceitful Gaming;'") to summon any person or persons other than the party accused, to appear before them at a certain day, time, and place, to be inserted in such summons, and to give evidence for the discovery of the truth of the matter in the said information contained; and in case of neglect or refusal to appear, or if upon appearance such person or persons shall refuse to give evidence, or shall give any false evidence, every such person or persons so offending shall forfeit and lose the sum of Fifty pounds, to be levied by distress and sale of the offender's goods and chattels, by warrant under the hands and seals of such persons issuing such summons as aforesaid; and in case such person or persons not appearing, or neglecting, or refusing to give such evidence, or giving any false evidence, shall not have sufficient goods and chattels whereon to levy the said sum of Fifty pounds, every such person or persons shall be by such person or persons having jurisdiction as aforesaid committed to the common gaol for the county, city or place where such offence shall be committed, there to remain for the space of six months without bail or mainprize.

5. No person or persons other than the parties plaintiff and defendant in the cause shall be incapacitated from being a witness, touching any offence committed against the laws for preventing excessive and deceitful gaming, by reason of having
played, betted or staked at any game prohibited by this or any of the said statutes.

6. Provided also, that nothing in this Act contained shall extend to prevent or hinder any person or persons from playing at any game whatsoever within any of his majesty's royal palaces wherein his majesty, his heirs and successors, shall then actually reside.

7. No privilege of parliament shall be allowed to any person or persons whatsoever against whom any prosecution or proceedings shall be commenced or had for keeping of any public or common gaming-house, or any house, room or place for playing at any game or games prohibited by this or any other Act now in being against excessive or deceitful gaming, any law, usage or custom to the contrary in anywise notwithstanding.

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5 & 6 Will. IV. Cap. 41.

An Act to amend the Law relating to Securities given for Considerations arising out of gaming, usurious and certain other illegal Transactions.

Whereas by an Act passed in the sixteenth year of the reign of his late majesty King Charles the Second, and by an Act passed in the parliament of Ireland in the tenth year of the reign of his late majesty King William the Third, each of such Acts being intituled "An Act against deceitful, disorderly and excessive Gaming," it was enacted, that all and singular judgments, statutes, recognizances, mortgages, conveyances, assurances, bonds, bills, specialties, promises, covenants, agreements, and other acts, deeds and securities whatsoever, which should be obtained, made, given, acknowledged, or entered into for security or satisfaction of or for any money or other thing lost at play or otherwise as in the said Acts respectively is mentioned, or for any part thereof, should be utterly void and of no effect: and whereas by an Act passed in the ninth year of the reign of her late majesty Queen Anne, and also by an Act passed in the parliament of Ireland in the eleventh year of the reign of her said late majesty, each of such Acts being intituled "An Act for the better preventing of excessive and deceitful Gaming," it was enacted, that from and after the several days therein respectively mentioned all notes, bills, bonds, judgments, mortgages or other securities or conveyances whatsoever, given, granted, drawn, or entered into or executed by any person or persons whatsoever, where the whole or any part of the consideration of such conveyances or securities should be for any money or other valuable thing whatsoever won by gaming or
playing at cards, dice, tables, tennis, bowls, or other game or games whatsoever, or by betting on the sides or hands of such as did game at any of the games aforesaid, or for the reimbursing or repaying any money knowingly lent or advanced for such gaming or betting as aforesaid, or lent or advanced at the time and place of such play to any person or persons so gaming or betting as aforesaid, or that should, during such play, so play or bet, should be utterly void, frustrate, and of none effect, to all intents and purposes whatsoever; and that where such mortgages, securities, or other conveyances, should be of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or should be such as should encumber or affect the same, such mortgages, securities, or other conveyances should enure and be to and for the sole use and benefit of and should devolve upon such person or persons as should or might have or be entitled to such lands or hereditaments in case the said grantor or grantors thereof, or the person or persons so encumbering the same, had been naturally dead, and as if such mortgages, securities, or other conveyances had been made to such person or persons so to be entitled after the decease of the person or persons so encumbering the same; and that all grants or conveyances to be made for the preventing of such lands, tenements, or hereditaments from coming to or devolving upon such person or persons thereby intended to enjoy the same as aforesaid should be deemed fraudulent and void and of none effect, to all intents and purposes whatsoever: and whereas by an Act [Recital of effect of 12 Ann. Stat. 2, c. 16, and 58 Geo. 3, c. 93, relating to usurious transactions, and of 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, relating to transactions with bankrupts, and of 45 Geo. 3, c. 72, relating to transactions for ransoms of ships]: and whereas securities and instruments made void by virtue of the several hereinbefore recited Acts of the sixteenth year of the reign of his said late majesty King Charles the Second, the tenth year of the reign of his said late majesty King William the Third, the ninth and eleventh years of the reign of her said late majesty Queen Anne, the eleventh and twelfth years of the reign of his said late majesty King George the Third, the forty-fifth year of the reign of his said late majesty King George the Third, and the sixth year of the reign of his said late majesty King George the Fourth, and securities and instruments made void by virtue of the said Act of the twelfth year of the reign of her said late majesty Queen Anne and the fifth year of the reign of his said late majesty King George the Second, other than bills of exchange or promissory notes made valid by the said act of the fifty-eighth year of the reign of his said late majesty King George the Third, are sometimes indorsed, transferred, assigned or conveyed to purchasers or other persons for a valuable consideration, without notice of the original consideration for which such
Securities given for considerations arising out of illegal transactions not to be void, but to be deemed to have been given for an illegal consideration.

Money paid to the holder of such securities shall be deemed to be paid on account of the person to whom the same was originally given.

securities or instruments were given; and the avoidance of such securities or instruments in the hands of such purchasers or other persons is often attended with great hardship and injustice: For remedy thereof be it enacted by the king's most excellent majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, in this present parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, That so much of the hereinbefore recited Acts of the sixteenth year of the reign of his said late majesty King Charles the Second, the tenth year of the reign of his said late majesty King William the Third, the ninth, eleventh and twelfth years of the reign of her said late majesty Queen Anne, the fifth year of the reign of his said late majesty King George the Second, the eleventh and twelfth and the forty-fifth years of the reign of his said late majesty King George the Third, and the sixth year of the reign of his said late majesty King George the Fourth, as enacts that any note, bill or mortgage shall be absolutely void, shall be and the same is hereby repealed; but nevertheless every note, bill or mortgage, which if this act had not been passed would, by virtue of the said several lastly hereinbefore mentioned acts or any of them, have been absolutely void, shall be deemed and taken to have been made, drawn, accepted, given or executed for an illegal consideration, and the said several acts shall have the same force and effect which they would respectively have had if instead of enacting that any such note, bill or mortgage should be absolutely void, such acts had respectively provided that every such note, bill or mortgage should be deemed and taken to have been made, drawn, accepted, given or executed for an illegal consideration; Provided always, that nothing herein contained shall prejudice or affect any note, bill or mortgage which would have been good or valid if this act had not been passed.

2. In case any person shall, after the passing of this act, make, draw, give or execute any note, bill or mortgage for any consideration on account of which the same is by the hereinbefore recited Acts of the sixteenth year of the reign of his said late majesty King Charles the Second, the tenth year of the reign of his said late majesty King William the Third, and the ninth and eleventh years of the reign of her said late majesty Queen Anne, or by any one or more of such acts, declared to be void, and such person shall actually pay to any indorsee, holder or assignee of such note, bill or mortgage the amount of the money thereby secured, or any part thereof, such money so paid shall be deemed and taken to have been paid for and on account of the person to whom such note, bill or mortgage was originally given upon such illegal consideration as aforesaid, and shall be deemed and taken to be a debt due and owing from such last-named person to the person who shall have so
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paid such money, and shall accordingly be recoverable by action at law in any of his majesty's courts of record.

3. So much of the said Acts of the ninth and eleventh years of the reign of her said late majesty Queen Anne as enacts that where such mortgages, securities or other conveyances as therein mentioned should be of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or should be such as should incumber or affect the same, such mortgages, securities or other conveyances should enure and be to and for the sole use and benefit of and should devolve upon such person or persons as should or might have or be entitled to such lands or hereditaments in case the grantor or grantors thereof, or the person or persons incumbering the same, had been naturally dead, and as if such mortgages, securities, or other conveyances had been made to such person or persons so to be entitled after the decease of the person or persons so incumbering the same, and that all grants or conveyances to be made for the preventing of such lands, tenements or hereditaments from coming to or devolving upon such person or persons thereby intended to enjoy the same as aforesaid, should be deemed fraudulent and void and of none effect, to all intents and purposes whatsoever, shall be and the same is hereby repealed; saving to all persons all rights acquired by virtue thereof previously to the passing of this Act.


An Act to amend the Law concerning Games and Wagers.

Whereas the laws heretofore made in restraint of unlawful gaming have been found of no avail to prevent the mischiefs which may happen therefrom, and also apply to sundry games of skill from which the like mischiefs cannot arise; be it enacted by the queen's most excellent majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, in this present parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, That so much of an Act passed in the thirty-third year of the reign of King Henry the Eighth, intituled "The Bill for maintaining Artillery, and the debarring of unlawful Games," whereby any game of mere skill, such as bowling, cotying, dloysheayls, half bowl, tennis, or the like, is declared an unlawful game, or which enacts any penalty for playing at any such game of skill as aforesaid, or which enacts any penalty for lacking bows or arrows, or for not making and continuing butts, or which regulates the making, selling or using of bows and arrows, and also so much of the said Act as requires the mayors, sheriffs, bailiffs, constables, and other head officers within every city, borough and town within this realm, to make search weekly, or at the farthest once a month,
in all places where houses, alleys, plays, or places of dicing, carding or gaming shall be suspected to be had, kept and maintained, shall be repealed, and also so much of the said act as makes it lawful for every master to license his or their servants, and for every nobleman and other having manors, lands, tenements, or other yearly profits for term of life, in his own right or in his wife's right, to the yearly value of a hundred pounds, or above, to command, appoint or license, by his or their discretion, his or their servants or family of his or their house or houses to play at cards, dice or tables, or any unlawful game, as therein more fully set forth, shall be repealed: and that no such commandment, appointment or licence shall avail any person to exempt him from the danger or penalty of playing at any unlawful game or in any common gaming house.

2. And whereas doubts have arisen whether certain houses, alleged or reputed to be opened for the use of the subscribers only, or not open to all persons desirous of using the same, are to be deemed common gaming houses; be it declared and enacted, That, in default of other evidence proving any house or place to be a common gaming house, it shall be sufficient, in support of the allegation in any indictment or information that any house or place is a common gaming house, to prove that such house or place is kept or used for playing therein at any unlawful game, and that a bank is kept there by one or more of the players exclusively of the others, or that the chances of any game played therein are not alike favourable to all the players, including among the players the banker or other person by whom the game is managed, or against whom the other players stake, play or bet; and every such house or place shall be deemed a common gaming house, such as is contrary to law and forbidden to be kept by the said Act of King Henry the Eighth, and by all other Acts containing any provision against unlawful games or gaming houses.

3. In every case (except within the metropolitan police district) in which the justices of peace in every shire, and mayors, sheriffs, bailiffs and other head officers within every city, town and borough within this realm, now have by law authority to enter into any house, room or place, where unlawful games shall be suspected to be holden, it shall be lawful for any justice of the peace, upon complaint made before him on oath that there is reason to suspect any house, room or place to be kept or used as a common gaming house, to give authority, by a special warrant under his hand, when in his discretion he shall think fit, to any constable, to enter, with such assistance as may be found necessary, into such house, room or place, in like manner as might have been done by such justices, mayors, sheriffs, bailiffs or other head officers, and, if necessary, to use
force for making such entry, whether by breaking open doors or otherwise, and to arrest, search and bring before a justice of peace all such persons found therein as might have been arrested therein by such justice of peace had he been personally present; and all such persons shall be dealt with according to law, as if they had been arrested in such house, room or place by the justice before whom they shall be so brought; and any such warrant may be in the form given in the first schedule annexed to this Act.

4. The owner or keeper of any common gaming house and every person having the care or management thereof, and also every banker, croupier and other person who shall act in any manner in conducting the business of any common gaming house, shall, on conviction thereof, by his own confession, or by the oath of one or more credible witnesses, before any two justices of the peace, beside any penalty or punishment to which he may be liable under the provisions of the said Act of King Henry the Eighth, be liable to forfeit and pay such penalty, not more than one hundred pounds, as shall be adjudged by the justices before whom he shall be convicted, or, in the discretion of the justices before whom he shall be convicted, may be committed to the house of correction, with or without hard labour, for any time not more than six calendar months; and on nonpayment of any penalty so adjudged, and of the reasonable costs and charges attending the conviction, the same shall be levied by distress and sale of the goods and chattels of the offender, by warrant under the hand and seal of one of the convicting justices: Provided always, that nothing herein contained shall prevent any proceeding by indictment against the owner or keeper or other person having the care or management of a common gaming house; but no person who shall have been summarily convicted of any such offence shall be liable to be proceeded against by indictment for the same offence.

5. It shall not be necessary in support of any information for gaming in, or suffering any games or gaming in, or for keeping or using, or being concerned in the management or conduct of a common gaming house, to prove that any person found playing at any game was playing for any money, wager or stake.

6. If any superintendent belonging to the metropolitan police force shall report in writing to the commissioners of police of the metropolis that there are good grounds for believing, and that he does believe, that any house, room or place within the metropolitan police district (o), is kept or used as a common gaming house, it shall be lawful for either of the said commis-

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(o) See 2 & 3 Vict. c. 4, s. 48.
instruments of gaming and take into custody all persons found therein.

Police superintendent may search for instruments of gaming.

What shall be deemed evidence of gaming.

Indemnity of witnesses.

sioners, by order in writing, to authorize the superintendent to enter any such house, room or place, with such constables as shall be directed by the commissioner to accompany him, and, if necessary, to use force for the purpose of effecting such entry, whether by breaking open doors or otherwise, and to take into custody all persons who shall be found therein, and to seize all tables and instruments of gaming found in such house or premises, and also to seize all monies and securities for money found therein.

7. It shall be lawful for the police superintendent making such entry as aforesaid in obedience to any such order of one of the commissioners of police of the metropolis, with the assistance of any constable or constables accompanying him, to search all parts of the house, room or place which he shall have so entered, where he shall suspect that tables or instruments of gaming are concealed, and all persons whom he shall find therein, and to seize all tables and instruments of gaming which he shall so find.

8. Where any cards, dice, balls, counters, tables or other instruments of gaming used in playing any unlawful game shall be found in any house, room or place, suspected to be used as a common gaming house, and entered under a warrant or order issued under the provisions of this Act, or about the person of any of those who shall be found therein, it shall be evidence, until the contrary be made to appear, that such house, room or place, is used as a common gaming house, and that the persons found in the room or place where such tables or instruments of gaming shall have been found were playing therein, although no play was actually going on in the presence of the superintendent or constable entering the same, under a warrant or order issued under the provisions of this Act, or in the presence of those persons by whom he shall be accompanied as aforesaid; and it shall be lawful for the police magistrate or justices before whom any person shall be taken by virtue of the warrant or order to direct all such tables and instruments of gaming to be forthwith destroyed.

9. And for the more effectual prosecution of the keepers of common gaming houses, be it enacted, that every person who shall have been concerned in any unlawful gaming, and who shall be examined as a witness by or before any police magistrate or justice of the peace, or on the trial of any indictment or information against the owner or keeper or other person having the care or management of any common gaming house, touching such unlawful gaming, and who upon such examination shall make true and faithful discovery to the best of his or her knowledge of all things as to which he or she shall be so examined, and shall thereupon receive from the magistrate or justice of the peace or judge of the court by or before
whom he or she shall be so examined a certificate in writing to
that effect, shall be freed from all criminal prosecutions, and
from all forfeitures, punishments and disabilities, to which he
or she may have become liable for any thing done before that
time in respect of such unlawful gaming.

10. The justices in every division, district and place in
England, for which a special session of the justices of the peace
(called the general annual licensing meeting) is holden annually
for granting licences to persons keeping or being about to keep
inns, alehouses and victualling houses, to sell exciseable liquors
by retail, to be drunk or consumed on the premises therein
specified, shall have authority at such general annual licensing
meeting, or at any adjournment thereof, to grant billiard
licences to such persons as the said justices shall in their dis-
cretion deem fit and proper to keep public billiard tables and
bagatelle boards, or instruments used in any game of the like
kind, and at the special sessions holden for transferring licences
to keep inns shall have authority to transfer such billiard
licences to such other persons as they in their discretion shall
dem fit and proper to continue to hold the same, and who in
each case shall be required to give the like notice of their inten-
tion to apply for such billiard licence, (p) and entitled to receive
the like notice of the licensing days, as is required in the case
of persons intending to apply for a licence or the transfer of a
licence to sell exciseable liquors by retail to be drunk or con-
sumed on the premises, or as near thereto as the case will allow;
and every such billiard licence shall be in the form given in the
third schedule annexed to this act, and shall continue in force
in the counties of Middlesex and Surrey from the fifth day of
April, and elsewhere from the tenth day of October, after the
granting thereof, for one whole year thence respectively next
ensuing, and no longer; and the clerk of the justices shall be
entitled to demand and receive from every person licensed
under this act, for the petty constable or other peace officer
for serving notices and other services required of him, the sum
of One shilling, and for the clerk of the justices, for the
licence, the sum of Five shillings; and every clerk who shall
demand or receive from any person for such fees more than
the said sums, being together Six shillings, shall for every
such offence, on conviction before one justice, forfeit and pay
the sum of Five pounds.

11. After the fifth day of April, 1846, in the counties of
Middlesex and Surrey, and elsewhere after the tenth day of
October next after the passing of this Act, every house, room
or place kept for public billiard playing, or where a public
billiard table or bagatelle board, or instrument used in any

(p) The words in italics were repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act,
1875.
game of the like kind is kept, at which persons are admitted to play, except in houses or premises specified in any licence granted under an Act passed in the ninth year of the reign of King George the Fourth, intituled "An Act to regulate the granting of Licences to Keepers of Inns, Ale-houses, and Victualling Houses in England," hereinafter called a Victualler's Licence, shall be licensed under this Act; and after the said fifth day of April in Middlesex and Surrey, and elsewhere after the said tenth day of October, every person keeping any such public billiard table or bagatelle board, or instrument used in any game of the like kind for public use, without being duly licensed so to do, and not holding a victualler's licence for the house or premises where such billiard table, bagatelle board, or other instrument as aforesaid is kept or used, and also every person licensed under this Act who shall not during the continuance of such billiard licence put and keep up the words "Licensed for Billiards," legibly painted in some conspicuous place near the door and on the outside of the house specified in the licence, shall be liable to be proceeded against as the keeper of a common gaming house, and, beside any penalty or punishment to which he may be liable if convicted of keeping a common gaming house, shall, on conviction of keeping such unlicensed billiard table, bagatelle board, or other instrument as aforesaid, by his own confession, or by the oath of one or more credible witnesses before any police magistrate or any two justices of the peace, be liable to pay such penalty, not more than Ten pounds for every day on which such billiard table, bagatelle board, or instrument as aforesaid shall be used, as shall be adjudged by the magistrate or justices before whom he shall be convicted, or, in the discretion of the magistrate or justices, may be committed to the house of correction, with or without hard labour, for any time not more than one calendar month; . . . . (q) but no person who shall have been summarily convicted of any such offence shall be liable to be further proceeded against by indictment for the same offence.

12. Every person licensed under this Act, who shall be convicted before a police magistrate or two justices acting in and for the division or place in which shall be situated the house kept or theretofore kept by such person of any offence against the tenor of the licence to him granted, shall be liable to the same penalties and punishments in the case of a first, second or third offence respectively to which persons licensed under an Act passed in the ninth year of the reign of King George the Fourth, intituled "An Act to regulate the granting of Licences to Keepers of Inns, Alehouses, and Victualling Houses in England," are respectively liable on conviction of a first,

(q) The omitted portion of this section was repealed by the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1884.
second or third offence, against the tenor of the licence granted to them under the last-recited Act, or as near thereunto as the nature of the case will allow; and all the provisions of the last-recited Act with respect to convictions and penalties for offences against the last-recited Act, and the proceedings for enforcing the same, and to the expenses of prosecution and penalties on witnesses for not attending and the recovery and application of penalties, and the proceedings on appeals against convictions, and the award of costs on appeals, and in actions against justices, constables or other persons, for anything done in the execution of the last-recited Act, shall be deemed to apply, so far as they are applicable, to convictions for offences against the tenor of the licences granted under this Act, and to the proceedings consequent thereupon or connected therewith, as if they were herein re-enacted.

13. Every person keeping any public billiard table or bagatelle board, or instrument used in any game of the like kind, whether he be the holder of a victualler's licence or licensed under this Act, who shall allow any person to play at such table, board or instrument, after one and before eight of the clock in the morning of any day, or at any time on Sundays, Christmas Day, or Good Friday, or any day appointed to be kept as a public fast or thanksgiving; and every person holding a victualler's licence who shall allow any person to play at such table, board or instrument, kept on the premises specified in such victualler's licence at any time when such premises are not by law allowed to be open for the sale of wine, spirits or beer, or other fermented or distilled liquors, shall be liable to the penalties herein provided in the case of persons keeping such public billiard table, bagatelle board or instrument, as aforesaid for public use without licence; and during those times when play at such table, board or instrument, is not allowed by this Act, every house licensed under this Act, and every billiard room in every house specified in any victualler's licence, shall be closed, and the keeping of the same open, or allowing any person to play therein or thereat, at any of the times or on any of the days during which such play is not allowed by this Act, shall be deemed in each case an offence against the tenor of the licence of the person so offending.

14. It shall be lawful for all constables and officers of police to enter into any house, room or place where any public table or board is kept for playing at billiards, bagatelle or any game of the like kind, when and so often as such constables and officers shall think proper; and every person licensed under the said Act of the ninth year of the reign of King George the Fourth, or under this Act, who shall refuse to admit or who shall not admit any such constable or officer of police into such house, room or place shall, on conviction thereof before a
police magistrate or any two justices of the peace, be deemed guilty of an offence against the tenor of his licence, whether the same be a billiard licence or a victualler's licence, and in the case of a first, second, third or subsequent offence shall be punished accordingly (r).

15. [Repeal of the provisions of 16 Car. 2, c. 7; 9 Anne, c. 14; and 18 Geo. 2, c. 34, against excessive gaming (s).]

17. Every person who shall, by any fraud or unlawful device or ill practice, in playing at or with cards, dice, tables or other game, or in bearing a part in the stakes, wagers, or adventures, or in betting on the sides or hands of them that do play, or in wagering on the event of any game, sport, pastime or exercise, win from any other person to himself, or any other or others, any sum of money or valuable thing, shall be deemed guilty of obtaining such money or valuable thing from such other person by a false pretence, with intent to cheat or defraud such person of the same, and, being convicted thereof, shall be punished accordingly.

18. All contracts or agreements, whether by parol or in writing, by way of gaming or wagering, shall be null and void; and no suit shall be brought or maintained in any court of law or equity for recovering any sum of money or valuable thing alleged to be won upon any wager, or which shall have been deposited in the hands of any person to abide the event on which any wager shall have been made: provided always, that this enactment shall not be deemed to apply to any subscription or contribution, or agreement to subscribe or contribute, for or towards any plate, prizc, or sum of money to be awarded to the winner or winners of any lawful game, sport, pastime or exercise.

19. [Proceedings under feigned issues abolished (t)].

20. Any person who shall be summarily convicted under this Act may appeal to the next general or quarter sessions of the peace . . . . (u); and it shall be lawful for the magistrate or justices by whom such conviction shall have been made to bind over the witnesses who shall have been examined in sufficient recognizances to attend and be examined at the hearing of such appeal; and that every such witness, on producing a certificate of being so bound, under the hand of the said magistrate or justices, shall be allowed compensation for his or her time, trouble and expenses in attending the appeal, which compensation shall be paid in the first instance by the treasurer of the county or place, in like manner as in

(r) The words in italics were repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act, 1875.

(s) This section was repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act, 1875.

(t) Repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act, 1892.

(u) The omitted portion of this section was repealed by the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1884.
cases of misdemeanor, under the provisions of an act passed in the seventh year of the reign of King George the Fourth, intituled "An Act for improving the Administration of Criminal Justice in England," and in case the appeal shall be dismissed, and the order or conviction affirmed, the reasonable expenses of all such witnesses attending as aforesaid, to be ascertained by the court, shall be repaid to the said treasurer by the appellant.

21. When any distress shall be made for any money to be levied by virtue of the warrant of any justice under this Act, the distress shall not be deemed unlawful, nor shall any party making the same be deemed a trespasser, on account of any defect or want of form in the information, summons, warrant of apprehension, conviction, warrant of distress, or other proceeding relating thereto, nor shall such party be deemed a trespasser from the beginning on account of any irregularity which shall be afterwards committed by him; but all persons aggrieved by such defect or irregularity may recover full satisfaction for the special damage by an action on the case in any of her majesty's courts of record.

22. [Plaintiff not to recover after tender of amends (x).]

23. [Limitation of actions.]

24. And be it enacted, That in Ireland the term "metropolitan police force," and the terms "commissioners of the police of the metropolis," and the terms "metropolitan police district," shall mean and include respectively the Dublin metropolitan police force, the commissioners of police of Dublin metropolis, and the police district of Dublin metropolis.

25. And be it enacted, That no information, conviction or other proceeding before or by any justice or justices under this Act shall be quashed or set aside, or adjudged void or insufficient, for want of form, or be removed by certiorari into her majesty's Court of Queen's Bench.

The First Schedule to which the foregoing Act refers.

Form of Warrant.

County of | To the constable
---|---

Whereas it appears to me, J. P., one of the justices of our lady the queen, assigned to keep the peace in the said county, by the information on oath of A. R. of —, in the county of ——, yeoman, that the house ["room" or "place"] known as [here insert a description of the house, room or place by which it may be readily known and found], is kept and used as a common gaming house within the meaning of an Act passed in the —— year of the reign of her majesty Queen Victoria, intituled [here insert the title of this Act]:

(x) This section and s. 23 were repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act, 1894. See now the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893.
APPENDIX.

This is, therefore, in the name of our lady the queen, to require you with such assistants as you may find necessary, to enter into the said house ["room" or "place"], and, if necessary, to use force for making such entry, whether by breaking open doors or otherwise, and there diligently to search for all instruments of unlawful gaming which may be therein, and to arrest, search and bring before me, or some other of the justices of our lady the queen assigned to keep the peace within the county of ——, as well the keepers of the same as also the persons there haunting, resorting and playing, to be dealt with according to law; and for so doing this shall be your warrant.

Given under my hand and seal at ——, in the county of ——, this —— day of ——, in the —— year of the reign of ——.

J. P. (l.s.)

The Second Schedule to which the foregoing Act refers.

In the Court of Queen's Bench ["Common Pleas," or "Exchequer," or in any inferior court, as the case may be].

Middlesex to wit, [or such other county as may be directed.]

Whereas A. B. affirms and C. D. denies [here state fully the fact or facts in issue], and the lord chancellor [or such other court, &c.] is desirous of ascertaining the truth by the verdict of a jury, and both parties pray that the same may be inquired of by the country: Now let the jury, &c.

The Third Schedule to which the foregoing Act refers.

Form of Licence.

At the general licensing annual meeting [or "an adjournment of the general annual licensing meeting," or "at a special petty session"] of her majesty's justices of the peace acting for the division [or "liberty," &c., as the case may be], of —— in the county of ——, holden at —— on the —— day of ——, in the year ——, for the purpose of granting billiard licences, we being —— of her majesty's justices of the peace acting for the said county [or "liberty," &c., as the case may be], and being the majority of those assembled at the said sessions, do hereby authorize and empower A. L., now dwelling at ——, in the parish of ——, to keep a house for public billiard playing at [here specify the house], provided that he [or "she"] put and keep up the words "licensed for billiards" legibly painted in some conspicuous place near the door and on the outside of the said house, and do not wilfully or knowingly permit drunkenness or other disorderly conduct in the said house, and do not knowingly allow the consumption of excisable liquors therein by the persons resorting thereto, and do not knowingly suffer any unlawful games therein, and do not knowingly suffer persons of notoriously bad character to assemble and meet together therein, and do not open the said house for play or allow any play therein after one and before eight of the clock in the morning, or keep it open or allow any play therein on Sundays, Christmas Day, or Good Friday, or on any day appointed for a public fast or thanksgiving, but do maintain good order and rule therein; and this licence shall continue in force from the —— day of —— next until the —— day of —— then next following, and no longer.

Given under our hands and seals on the day and at the place first written.
Whereas certain voluntary associations have been and may hereafter be formed in various parts of the United Kingdom, under the name of Art Unions, for the purchase of paintings, drawings, or other works of art, to be afterwards allotted and distributed, by chance or otherwise, among the several members, subscribers or contributors forming part of such associations, or for raising sums of money by subscription or contribution, to be allotted and distributed, by chance or otherwise, as prizes, amongst the members, subscribers, or contributors forming part of such associations, on the condition, nevertheless, that such sums of money so allotted and distributed be expended solely and entirely in the purchase of paintings, drawings or other works of art, and whereas such allotment and distribution of paintings, drawings, or other works of art, or of sums of money for their purchase, and the proceedings taken to carry the same into effect, may be deemed and taken to come within the provisions of the several Acts of Parliament passed for the prevention of lotteries, littlegoes, and unlawful games, whereby the members, subscribers, or contributors of such associations as aforesaid, or persons acting under their authority or on their behalf, may be liable or subjected to certain pains and penalties imposed by law on persons concerned in lotteries, littlegoes, and unlawful games: and whereas it is expedient that all members of and subscribers and contributors to such voluntary associations as aforesaid, and all persons acting under their authority or on their behalf, so long only as their proceedings are carried on in good faith for the encouragement of the fine arts, shall be discharged and protected from any pains and penalties to which they may have rendered themselves liable, or may hereafter render themselves liable, by reason of any such their proceedings as aforesaid: be it enacted by the queen’s most excellent majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, in this present parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, That all such voluntary associations as aforesaid, now constituted, or which may hereafter be constituted according to the provisions hereinafter contained, shall be deemed to be lawful associations; and the members of and subscribers and contributors to all such lawful associations, and all persons acting under their authority or on their behalf for the purposes aforesaid, shall be freed and discharged from all pains and penalties, suits, prosecutions and liabilities, to which by law they would be liable but for the passing of this Act, as being concerned in illegal lotteries, littlegoes, or unlawful

Voluntary associations constituted for the distribution of works of art by lot deemed legal, pro-

vided a royal charter shall have been first obtained, &c.
games, by reason of anything done or which may be done by them or any of them in furtherance of the allotment or distribution, by scheme or otherwise, of paintings, drawings, or other works of art, or of the allotment or distribution of sums of money as prizes to be expended for their purchase: provided always, that a royal charter or charters shall have been first obtained for the incorporation of any such association, or provided that the deed of partnership, or other instrument or instruments constituting such association, and the rules and regulations relating to the proceedings of such association for such purposes as aforesaid, shall have first been submitted to the consideration and be approved of by a committee of her majesty’s most honourable privy council, and a copy thereof deposited with such committee; and that it shall be expressed in every such charter, deed or instrument, that it shall be lawful for any committee of her majesty’s privy council to whom the consideration of art unions shall be referred by her majesty, whenever it shall appear to them that any such association is perverted from the purposes of this Act, to certify the fact to her majesty, and thereupon it shall be lawful for her majesty to revoke or annul the charter, deed or instrument under which the association so offending shall have been constituted; and nothing in this Act contained shall be deemed to apply to any association whose charter, deed of partnership, or other instrument constituting the same, shall have been so revoked or annulled.


An Act for the Suppression of Betting Houses.

Whereas a kind of gaming has of late sprung up, tending to the injury and demoralization of improvident persons, by the opening of places called betting houses or offices, and the receiving of money in advance by the owners or occupiers of such houses or offices, or by other persons acting on their behalf, on their promises to pay money on events of horse races and the like contingencies: for the suppression thereof, be it enacted (y):

1. No house, office, room, or other place shall be opened, kept, or used for the purpose of the owner, occupier, or keeper thereof, or any person using the same, or any person procured or employed by or acting for or on behalf of such owner, occupier, or keeper, or person using the same, or of any person having the care or management or in any manner con-

(y) This preamble was repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act, 1892, but such repeal is not to affect the construction of the Act, and the preamble may, therefore, still be looked to for that purpose.
ducting the business thereof, betting with persons resorting thereto; or for the purpose of any money or valuable thing being received by or on behalf of such owner, occupier, keeper, or person as aforesaid as or for the consideration for any assurance, undertaking, promise, or agreement, express or implied, to pay or give thereafter any money or valuable thing, on any event or contingency of or relating to any horse race, or other race, fight, game, sport or exercise, or as or for the consideration for securing the paying or giving by some other person of any money or valuable thing, on any such event or contingency as aforesaid; and every house, office, room, or other place opened, kept, or used for the purposes aforesaid or any of them, is hereby declared to be a common nuisance and contrary to law.

2. Every house, room, office or place opened, kept or used for the purposes aforesaid, or any of them, shall be taken and deemed to be a common gaming house within the meaning of an Act of the session holden in the eighth and ninth years for her majesty, chapter one hundred and nine, to amend the "law concerning games and wagers."

3. Any person, who, being the owner or occupier of any house, office, room, or other place, or a person using the same, shall open, keep, or use the same for the purposes hereinbefore mentioned, or either of them; and any person who, being the owner or occupier of any house, room, office, or other place, shall knowingly and wilfully permit the same to be opened, kept or used by any other person for the purposes aforesaid or either of them; and any person having the care or management of or in any manner assisting in conducting the business of any house, office, room or place opened, kept or used for the purposes aforesaid, or either of them, shall, on summary conviction thereof before any two justices of the peace, be liable to forfeit and pay such penalty, not exceeding One hundred pounds, as shall be adjudged by such justices, and may be further adjudged by such justices to pay such costs attending such conviction as to the said justices shall seem reasonable; and on the nonpayment of such penalty and costs, or in the first instance, if to the said justices it shall seem fit, may be committed to the common gaol or house of correction, with or without hard labour, for any time not exceeding Six calendar months (z).

4. Any person, being the owner or occupier of any house, office, room or place opened, kept or used for the purposes aforesaid, or either of them, or any person acting for or on

(z) So much of this section and of s. 4, as prescribes the term of imprisonment for non-payment of penalty and costs is repealed by the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1884. See s. 5 of the Act of 1879; and see also s. 17 of the same Act as to the right to claim a trial by jury.
behalf of any such owner or occupier, or any person having the care or management or in any manner assisting in conducting the business thereof, who shall receive, directly or indirectly, any money or valuable thing as a deposit on any bet, on condition of paying any sum of money or other valuable thing on the happening of any event or contingency of or relating to a horse race or any other race, or any fight, game, sport or exercise, or as or for the consideration for any assurance, undertaking, promise or agreement, express or implied, to pay or give thereafter any money or valuable thing on any such event or contingency, and any person giving any acknowledgment, note, security or draft on the receipt of any money or valuable thing so paid or given as aforesaid, purporting or intended to entitle the bearer or any other person to receive any money or valuable thing on the happening of any such event or contingency as aforesaid, shall, upon summary conviction thereof before two justices of the peace, forfeit and pay such penalty, not exceeding fifty pounds, as shall be adjudged by such justices, and may be further adjudged by such justices to pay such costs attending such conviction as to the said justices shall seem reasonable; and on the non-payment of such penalty and costs, or in the first instance, if to such justices it shall seem fit, may be committed to the common gaol or house of correction, with or without hard labour, for any time not exceeding three calendar months. (a)

5. Any money or valuable thing received by any such person aforesaid, as a deposit on any bet, or as or for the consideration for any such assurance, undertaking, promise or agreement as aforesaid, shall be deemed to have been received to or for the use of the person from whom the same was received, and such money or valuable thing, or the value thereof, may be recovered accordingly, with full costs of suit, in any court of competent jurisdiction.

6. Provided always, that nothing in this Act contained shall extend to any person receiving or holding any money or valuable thing, by way of stakes or deposit to be paid to the winner of any race or lawful sport, game or exercise, or to the owner of any horse engaged in any race.

7. Any person exhibiting or publishing or causing to be exhibited or published any placard, handbill, card, writing, sign or advertisement, whereby it shall be made to appear that any house, office, room or place is opened, kept or used for the purpose of making bets or wagers in manner aforesaid, or for the purpose of exhibiting lists for betting, or with intent to induce any person to resort to such house, office, room or place for the purpose of making bets or wagers in

(a) See note to s. 3 supra.
manner aforesaid, or any person who, on behalf of the owner or occupier of any such house, office, room or place, or person using the same, shall invite other persons to resort thereto for the purpose of making bets or wagers, in manner aforesaid, shall upon summary conviction thereof before two justices of the peace, forfeit and pay a sum not exceeding Thirty pounds, and may be further adjudged by such justices to pay such costs attending such conviction as to the said justices shall seem reasonable; and on the nonpayment of such penalty and costs, or in the first instance if to such justices it shall seem fit, may be committed to the common gaol or house of correction, with or without hard labour, for any time not exceeding Two calendar months.

8. If any person convicted under this Act on information before justices shall be adjudged to pay any penalty, or any costs and charges attending the conviction, and shall fail to pay such penalty or costs, the same may be levied by distress and sale of the goods and chattels of the offender by warrant under the hand and seal of one of the convicing justices: Provided always, that if any person shall be committed to prison for default of payment of any penalty and costs, then the costs alone may be levied by distress as aforesaid.

9. One half of every pecuniary penalty which shall be adjudged to be paid under this Act shall be paid to the informer, and the remaining half shall be applied in aid of the poor rate of the parish in which the offence shall have been committed, and shall be paid for that purpose to the overseer or other person authorized to receive poor rates in such parish, or if the place wherein the offence shall have been committed shall be extra-parochial, then the justices by whom such penalty shall be adjudged to be paid shall direct such remaining half thereof to be applied in aid of the poor rate of such extra-parochial place, or if there shall not be any poor rate therein, in aid of the poor rate of any adjoining parish or district.

10. In case any person who shall have laid any complaint or information in respect of any offence against this Act shall not appear at the time at which the defendant may have been summoned to appear, or at any time to which the hearing of the summons may have been adjourned, or, in the opinion of any justices having authority to adjudicate with respect to the offence charged in such information or complaint as aforesaid, shall otherwise have neglected to proceed upon or prosecute such information or complaint with due diligence, it shall be lawful for such justices to authorize any other person to proceed on such summons instead of the person to whom the same may have been granted, or if such justices think fit, to dismiss the summons already granted, and authorize any person to take out a fresh summons in respect of the offence charged in such
information or complaint, in like manner as if the previous summons had not been granted.

11. It shall be lawful for any justice of the peace, upon complaint made before him on oath that there is reason to suspect any house, office, room, or place to be kept or used as a betting house or office, contrary to this Act, to give authority by special warrant under his hand, when in his discretion he shall think fit, to any constable or police officer, to enter, with such assistance as may be found necessary, into such house, office, room, or place, and, if necessary, to use force for making such entry, whether by breaking open doors, or otherwise, and to arrest, search, and bring before a justice of the peace all such persons found therein, and to seize all lists, cards, or other documents relating to racing or betting found in such house or premises; and any such warrant may be according to the form given in the first schedule annexed to the beforementioned Act “to amend the law concerning games and wagers.”

12. If any superintendent belonging to the metropolitan police force shall report in writing to the commissioners of police of the metropolis that there are good grounds for believing and that he does believe that any house, office, room, or place within the metropolitan police district is kept or used as a betting house or office, contrary to this Act, it shall be lawful for either of the said commissioners by order in writing to authorize the superintendent to enter any such house, office, room, or place, with such constables as shall be directed by the commissioners to accompany him, and, if necessary to use force for the purpose of effecting such entry, whether by breaking open doors or otherwise, and to take into custody all persons who shall be found therein, and to seize all lists, cards, or other documents relating to racing or betting found in such house or premises.

13. Any person who shall be summarily convicted under this Act may appeal to the next general or quarter session of the peace (b) . . . . ; and it shall be lawful for the magistrate or justices by whom such conviction shall have been made, to bind over any party who shall have made information against the party convicted, and any witnesses who shall have been examined, in sufficient recognizances to attend and be examined at the hearing of such appeal; and every such witness, on producing a certificate of being so bound under the hand of the said magistrate or justices, shall be allowed compensation for his or her time, trouble, and expenses in attending the appeal, which compensation shall be paid in the first instance by the treasurer of the county or place in like manner as in cases of misdemeanor

(b) The omitted portion of this section is repealed by the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1884, as having been replaced by s. 31 of the Act of 1879, as amended by the Act of 1884.
under the provisions of an Act passed in the seventh year of the reign of King George the Fourth, intitled "An Act for improving the Administration of Criminal Justice in England;" and in case any such appeal shall be dismissed and the order or conviction affirmed, the reasonable expenses of all such witnesses attending as aforesaid, to be ascertained by the court, shall be repaid to the said treasurer by the appellant.

14. No information, conviction, or judgment of the justices in general or quarter sessions shall be removed by certiorari into the Court of Queen's Bench (c).

15. [Distress not unlawful for want of form (d)].

16. [Tender of amends, &c. (e)].

17. [Limitation of actions (f)].

18. In Ireland the term "metropolitan police force," and the terms "commissioners of the police of the metropolis," and the terms "metropolitan police district," shall mean and include respectively the Dublin metropolitan police force, the commissioners of police of Dublin metropolis, and the police district of Dublin metropolis.

19. This Act shall commence and come into operation on the first day of December, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-three.

37 Vict. Cap. 15.

An Act to amend the Act of sixteenth and seventeenth Victoria, chapter one hundred and nineteen, intitled "An Act for the Suppression of Betting Houses."

Whereas it is expedient to amend the Act of the session of the sixteenth and seventeenth years of the reign of her present majesty, chapter one hundred and nineteen, intitled "An Act for the Suppression of Betting Houses," and to extend the provisions of such Act to Scotland:

Be it enacted by the Queen's most excellent majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, in this present parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:

1. This Act shall be construed as one with the Act of the session of the sixteenth and seventeenth years of the reign of her present majesty, chapter one hundred and nineteen, inti-

(c) The previous portion of this section, which provided against any objection in matter of form, was repealed by the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1884.

(d) This section was repealed by the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1884.

7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 28.

Certiorari taken away.

Interpretation of terms.

Commencement of Act.

Act to be construed with 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119.
tuled "An Act for the Suppression of Betting Houses" (in this Act referred to as the principal Act), and the principal Act and this Act may be cited together as the Betting Acts, 1853 and 1874, and each of them may be cited separately as the Betting Act of the year in which it was passed.

2. This Act shall not come into operation until the thirty-first day of July, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-four.

3. Where any letter, circular, telegram, placard, handbill, card, or advertisement is sent, exhibited, or published,—

(1) Whereby it is made to appear that any person, either in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, will on application give information or advice for the purpose of or with respect to any such bet or wager, or any such event or contingency as is mentioned in the principal Act, or will make on behalf of any other person any such bet or wager as is mentioned in the principal Act; or,

(2) With intent to induce any person to apply to any house, office, room, or place, or to any person, with the view of obtaining information or advice for the purpose of any such bet or wager or with respect to any such event or contingency as is mentioned in the principal Act; or,

(3) Inviting any person to make or take any share in or in connection with any such bet or wager; every person sending, exhibiting, or publishing, or causing the same to be sent, exhibited, or published, shall be subject to the penalties provided in the seventh section of the principal Act with respect to offences under that section.

4. The twentieth section of the principal Act is hereby repealed, and the principal Act as amended by this Act, shall extend to Scotland, with the following modifications and provisions:

(1) The term "distress" shall mean poinding and sale:
   The term "misdemeanour" shall mean a crime and offence:

(2) All offences or penalties under this Act and the principal Act shall be prosecuted and recovered before the sheriff of the county or his substitute in the sheriff court, at the instance of the procurator fiscal, or of any private person, under the provisions of the Summary Procedure Act, 1864, and all the jurisdictions, powers, and authorities necessary for the purposes of this section are hereby conferred on the sheriffs and their substitutes:

(3) Every pecuniary penalty which is adjudged to be paid under this or the principal Act, shall be paid to the clerk of the court, and shall be by him accounted for
and paid to the Queen's and lord treasurer's remembrancer on behalf of her majesty:

(4) The thirteenth and fourteenth sections of the principal Act shall not apply to Scotland, but it shall be competent to any person who is convicted under this Act or the principal Act to appeal against such conviction to the high court of justiciary, in the manner prescribed by such of the provisions of the Act of the twentieth year of the reign of King George the Second, chapter forty-three, and any Acts amending the same, as relate to appeals in matters criminal, and by and under the rules, limitations, convictions, and restrictions contained in the said provisions.

17 & 18 Vict. Cap. 38.

An Act for the Suppression of Gaming Houses.

Whereas divers statutes have been made from time to time for the prevention of unlawful gaming; and particularly by the Act of the session holden in the eighth and ninth years of her majesty, chapter one hundred and nine, powers are given to justices of the peace in places beyond the metropolitan police district to authorize constables, and to either of the commissioners of police within such district to authorize superintendents belonging to the metropolitan police force, to enter houses suspected to be kept as common gaming houses, and to arrest all persons found therein; and it is thereby enacted, that where any cards, dice, balls, counters, tables or other instruments of gaming used in playing any unlawful game shall be found in any house, room or place suspected to be used as a common gaming house, and entered under a warrant or order issued under the provisions of that Act, or about the person of any of those who shall be found therein, it shall be evidence, until the contrary be made to appear, that such house, room or place is used as a common gaming house, and that the persons found in the room or place where such tables or instruments of gaming shall have been found were playing therein: and whereas the keepers of common gaming houses contrive, by fortifying the entrances to such houses, or by other means, to keep out the officers authorized to enter the same until the instruments of gaming have been removed or destroyed, so that no sufficient evidence can be obtained to convict the offenders, who are thereby encouraged to persist in the violation of the law; and whereas it is expedient that the law shall be made more efficient for
the suppression of gaming houses; be it therefore enacted by the Queen's most excellent majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, in this present parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same as follows:

1. Any person who shall wilfully prevent any constable or officer authorized under the provisions of the said Act of the eighth and ninth years of her majesty to enter any house, room or place, from entering the same or any part thereof, or who shall obstruct or delay any such constable or officer in so entering, and any person who, by any bolt, bar, chain or other contrivance shall secure any external or internal door of or means of access to any house, room or place so authorized to be entered, or shall use any means or contrivance whatsoever for the purpose of preventing, obstructing or delaying the entry of any constable or officer authorized as aforesaid into any such house, room or place, or any part thereof, may for every such offence, on a summary conviction of the same before two justices of the peace, be adjudged by such justices to forfeit and pay any penalty not exceeding one hundred pounds, together with such costs attending the said conviction as to the said justices shall appear reasonable; and on the non-payment of such penalty and costs, or in the first instance, if to the said justices it shall seem fit, may be committed to the common gaol or house of correction, with or without hard labour, for any period not exceeding six calendar months (g).

2. Where any constable or officer authorized as aforesaid to enter any house, room or place is wilfully prevented from or obstructed or delayed in entering the same or any part thereof, or where any external or internal door of or means of access to any such house, room or place so authorized to be entered shall be found to be fitted or provided with any bolt, bar, chain, or any means or contrivance for the purpose of preventing, delaying or obstructing the entry into the same or any part thereof of any constable or officer authorized as aforesaid, or for giving an alarm in case of such entry, or if any such house, room or place is found fitted or provided with any means or contrivance for unlawful gaming, or with any means or contrivance for concealing, removing, or destroying any instruments of gaming, it shall be evidence, until the contrary be made to appear, that such house, room or place is used as a common gaming house within the meaning of this Act and of the former Acts relating to gaming, and that the persons found therein were unlawfully playing therein.

(g) So much of this section and of ss. 3 and 4 as prescribes the term of imprisonment for non-payment of penalty and costs, is repealed by the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1884.
3. If any person found in any house, room or place entered by any constable or officer authorized as aforesaid to enter the same, upon being arrested by any such constable or officer, or upon being brought before any justices, on being required by such constable or officer or by such justices to give his name and address, shall refuse or neglect to give the same, or shall give any false name or address, he may, upon summary conviction thereof, before the same or any other justices, be adjudged to pay any penalty not exceeding fifty pounds, together with such costs as to such justices shall appear reasonable, and on the nonpayment of such penalty and costs, or in the first instance, if to such justices it shall seem fit, may be imprisoned in the common gaol or house of correction for any period not exceeding one month (h).

4. Any person being the owner or occupier, or having the use of any house, room or place, who shall open, keep or use the same for the purpose of unlawful gaming being carried on therein, and any person who, being the owner or occupier of any house or room, shall knowingly and wilfully permit the same to be opened, kept or used by any other person for the purpose aforesaid, and any person having the care or management of or in any manner assisting in conducting the business of any house, room or place opened, kept or used for the purpose aforesaid, and any person who shall advance or furnish money for the purpose of gaming with persons frequenting such house, room or place, may, on summary conviction thereof before any two justices of the peace, be adjudged by such justices to forfeit and pay such penalty not exceeding five hundred pounds as to such justices shall seem fit, and may be further adjudged by such justices to pay such costs attending such conviction as to them shall seem reasonable; and on the nonpayment of such penalty and costs, or in the first instance, if to the said justices it shall seem fit, may be committed to the common gaol or house of correction, with or without hard labour, for any time not exceeding twelve calendar months (i).

5. It shall be lawful for the justices before whom any persons shall be brought who have been found in any house, room or place entered in pursuance of any authority granted under the provisions of the said Act of the eighth and ninth years of her majesty, to require of any such persons to be examined on oath and give evidence touching any unlawful gaming in such house, room or place, or touching any act done for the purpose of preventing, obstructing or delaying the entry into such house, room or place or any part thereof of any constable or officer authorized as aforesaid; and no person so required to be

(h) See note (g), supra.

(i) See note (g), supra.
examined as a witness shall be excused from being so examined when brought before such justices as aforesaid, or from being so examined at any subsequent time, by or before the same or any other justices, or by or before any court, on any proceeding, or the trial of any indictment, information, action or suit in anywise relating to such unlawful gaming or any such acts as aforesaid, or from answering any question put to him touching the matters aforesaid, on the ground that his evidence will tend to criminate himself; and any such person so required to be examined as a witness who refuses to make oath accordingly, or to answer any such question as aforesaid, shall be subject to be dealt with in all respects as any person appearing as a witness before any justices or court in obedience to a summons or subpoena, and refusing without lawful cause or excuse, to be sworn or to give evidence, may by law be dealt with.

6. Every person so required to be examined as a witness as aforesaid, who upon such examination shall make true and faithful discovery to the best of his knowledge of all things as to which he is so examined, shall receive from the justices or judge of the court by whom he is examined a certificate in writing to that effect, and shall be freed from all criminal prosecutions and penal actions, and from all penalties, forfeitures and punishments to which he may have become liable for anything done before that time in respect of the matters touching which he has been so examined; but such witness shall not be indemnified under this Act unless he receive from such justices or judge a certificate in writing under their hands, stating that such witness has on his examination made a true disclosure touching all things as to which he has been examined; and if any action, information or indictment be at any time pending in any court against any person so examined in respect of any act of gaming touching which he was so examined, and if any action, information or indictment be at any time pending in any court against any person so examined as a witness in manner before mentioned, for any such matter or thing, such court shall, on the production and proof of such certificate, stay the proceedings in any such action, information or indictment, and may, in its discretion, award to such person such costs as he may have been put to by such action, information or indictment.

7. If any person convicted under this Act on information before justices shall be adjudged to pay any penalty or any costs and charges attending the conviction, and shall fail to pay such penalty or costs, the same may be levied by distress and sale of the goods and chattels of the offender, by warrant under the hand and seal of one of the convicting justices: provided always, that if any person shall be committed to prison
for default of payment of any penalty and costs, then the costs alone may be levied by distress as aforesaid.

8. One half of any pecuniary penalty which shall be adjudged to be paid under this Act shall be paid to the person laying the information upon which the conviction takes place, and the remaining half shall be applied in aid of the poor rate of the parish in which the offence shall have been committed, and shall be paid for that purpose to the overseer or other person authorized to receive poor rates in such parish, or if the place wherein the offence shall have been committed shall be extra-parochial, then the justices by whom such penalty shall be adjudged to be paid shall direct such remaining half thereof to be applied in aid of the poor rate of such extra-parochial place, or if there shall not be any poor rate therein, in aid of the poor rate of any adjoining poor rate or district.

9. In case any person who shall have laid any information in respect of any offence against this Act shall not appear at the time at which the defendant shall have been summoned to appear, or at any time to which the hearing of the summons may have been adjourned, or if such person, in the opinion of any justices having authority to adjudicate with respect to the offence charged in such information as aforesaid, shall otherwise have neglected to proceed upon or prosecute such information with due diligence, it shall be lawful for such justices to authorize any other person to proceed on such information and summons instead of the person to whom the same may have been granted, or such justices may dismiss the first information and summons, and authorize any person to lay a fresh information in respect to the offence charged in such first information, in like manner as if the previous summons had not been granted.

10. Any person who shall be summarily convicted under this Act may appeal to the next general or quarter session of the peace . . . . . (k); and it shall be lawful for the magistrate or justices by whom such conviction shall have been made to bind over any party who shall have made information against the party convicted, and any witnesses who shall have been examined, in sufficient recognizances, to attend and be examined at the hearing of such appeal; and every such witness, on producing a certificate of being so bound, under the hand of the said magistrate or justices, shall be allowed compensation for his or her time, trouble and expenses in attending the appeal, which compensation shall be paid in the first instance by the treasurer of the county or place, in like manner as in cases of misdemeanor, under the provisions of an Act passed in the seventh

(k) The omitted portion of this section is repealed by the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1884, as having been replaced by s. 32 of the Act of 1879, as amended by the Act of 1884.
APPENDIX.

7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 28.

year of the reign of King George the Fourth, intituled "An Act for improving the administration of Criminal Justice in England," and in case any such appeal shall be dismissed, and the order or conviction affirmed, the reasonable expenses of all such witnesses attending as aforesaid, to be ascertained by the court, shall be repaid to the said treasurer by the appellant.

11. No information, conviction or judgment of the justices in general or quarter sessions shall be removed by certiorari into the Court of Queen's Bench (l).
12. [Distress not unlawful for want of form (m).]
13. [Tender of amends (n).]
14. [Limitation of actions (o).]
15. This Act shall commence and come into operation on the first day of August, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-four.

42 & 43 Vict. Cap. 18.

An Act for the Licensing of Metropolitan Suburban Racecourses.

Whereas the frequency of horse-races in the immediate vicinity of the metropolis is productive of much mischief and inconvenience, and the holding of such races in thickly populated places near the metropolis is calculated to cause, and does in fact cause, annoyance and injury to persons resident near to the places where such races are held:

Be it therefore enacted by the Queen's most excellent majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, in this present parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows; (that is to say,)

1. A horse-race within the meaning of this Act shall mean any race in which any horse, mare or gelding shall run or be made to run in competition with any other horse, mare or gelding, or against time, for any prize of what nature or kind soever, or for any bet or wager made or to be made in respect of any such horse, mare or gelding, or the riders thereof, and at which more than twenty persons shall be present.

2. From and after the twenty-fifth day of March, one thousand eight hundred and eighty, it shall not be lawful that any horse-race be held or take place on any pretext whatsoever.

(l) The previous portion of this section is repealed by the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1884.
(m) Repealed by the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1884.
(n) This section and s. 11 are repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act, 1894. See Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893.
(o) See note (n), supra.
ever within a radius of ten miles from Charing Cross, in the City of Westminster, unless in a place for which a licence for horse-racing has been obtained pursuant to the provisions hereinafter contained.

3. Any person desirous of obtaining a licence for horse-racing for any open or enclosed land or place, being the owner, lessee or occupier of such land or place, may apply to the justices assembled at any Michaelmas quarter sessions of the peace to be holden for the county, city, riding, liberty or division in which such land or place is situate, which justices are hereby empowered to grant or withhold a licence at their discretion, such licence to be of force and valid for twelve months dating from the twenty-fifth day of March next following the date of such application.

4. Every such application shall be made to the justices in the same manner as applications for licences for places to be kept for public dancing, music, or other entertainment under the provisions of an Act passed in the twenty-fifth year of his late Majesty King George the Second.

5. Any person who after the said twenty-fifth day of March, one thousand eight hundred and eighty, shall take part in any horse-race in any open or enclosed land or place for which a licence is required under this Act, and for which a licence has not been obtained, shall upon summary conviction be liable to a penalty of ten pounds, or an imprisonment not exceeding two months.

6. Any person who shall be the owner or lessee or in possession of any open or enclosed land or place for which a licence for horse-racing is required under this Act, and upon which any horse-race shall be held after the said twenty-fifth day of March, one thousand eight hundred and eighty, without such licence having been obtained, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be punishable for every such offence with fine or imprisonment at the discretion of the court, such fine not to be less than five pounds nor more than twenty-five pounds, and such imprisonment not to be less than one month nor more than three months.

7. Every horse-race held or taking place in contravention of the provisions of this Act shall be deemed to be a nuisance, and any person injured or inconvenienced thereby shall have all such rights and remedies against all persons taking part in the same, and against owners, lessees, and occupiers of the land or place, as he would have in case of a nuisance at common law.

8. This Act may be cited as the Racecourses Licensing Act, 1879.
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